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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the emergence of cashless welfare payments (CWP) and their effect on 
everyday life. It argues that CWP create a space in everyday life in which social relations and 
social behaviours are restructured. This restructuring is considered as a process and 
consolidation of neoliberalisation. The precise form of CWP are contingent on the social and 
policy contexts in which they are embedded, the contradictory nature of neoliberalism, and 
crucially, the effects on the everyday lives being targeted and responses to this. In South Africa 
it has taken an inclusive form that has facilitated state-society social relations and enabled 
financial accumulation. In Australia it takes a disciplinary form that has sought to control 
consumption and encourage capitalist social relations. 
The thesis draws on two main theoretical influences: ‘neoliberalisation’ as an understanding of 
the restructuring of contemporary welfare, and Henri Lefebvre’s theorisation of Everyday Life. 
The framework developed from these influences is used to analyse two case studies. Firstly, 
the South African ‘SASSA card’ that was introduced in 2012, and distributed cards and bank 
accounts to people who received a social grant. Secondly, the Australian ‘Cashless Debit Card’ 
(CDC), which was introduced in specific sites across Australia from 2016. Data was gathered 
through a combination of semi-structured interviews, ethnographic observations and 
documentary and policy analysis.  
This thesis contributes to academic knowledge in three central areas. Firstly, it offers a new 
example and interpretation to contribute to the field of everyday IPE. Drawing on Lefebvre’s 
approach, it demonstrates the value of the study of the everyday by offering a sociological, 
experiential dimension to contemporary welfare restructuring. It also deepens studies of 
neoliberalisation by addressing contingency at an everyday level and the variegated outcomes 
this produces. The second area is in the study of welfare. Empirically, the thesis draws attention 
to the importance of the mode of payment in shaping people’s lives, providing new empirical 
material on welfare systems in South Africa and Australia. Finally, it contributes to the study 
of everyday financialisation by drawing on social meanings of money, and offers new examples 
of the way linkages are developed between finance capital and welfare recipients.   
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Introduction 
The future is cashless, we must embrace it 
(Korski 2017) 
In 2016, the UK government announced a trial to make welfare payments using blockchain 
(Cellan-Jones 2016). Partnering with a small technology company, Govcoin, the “20 or 30” 
people who participated in the trial were paid their welfare money digitally onto a card with an 
accompanying app (Hansard 2017). The app allowed the users to make use of the ‘jam-jar’ 
saving method, which is considered an effective way to manage budgets and stay in control of 
money. It enabled users to apportion different amounts of money to different expenditures and 
spend digitally within the app, or withdraw cash while updating the ‘jam-jars’ manually. While 
the app was not coercive (users could withdraw money in cash and spend as they wished) it 
effectively sought to shape the ways that people receiving welfare thought about and 
‘earmarked’ their money, to ensure that they had sufficient funds for important costs such as 
housing or bills (Hansard 2017). This trial occurred at the same time as the Universal Credit 
policy was being introduced, which changed the nature of welfare payments to mean that 
recipients would receive one monthly amount, rather than the state distributing payments 
directly for housing or utilities.  
The government considered the trial to have been a success,1 enabling financial inclusion, 
reducing costs associated with using cash, and arguing that “some of them had found it very 
useful” (Hansard 2017). However, some have considered the use of new technologies to be a 
worrying imposition with further implications (Herian 2017). The use of blockchain allows the 
capacity to track spending and control money. Although it was claimed that “the department 
and the Government will have no access to that information; that is, what has come out of the 
jam jars and gone into housing or whatever”, the capacity still remains (Hansard 2017). In an 
earlier report, blockchain technology was said to mean that “expenditure could be both 
specified and tracked” making it possible to “set rules at both the recipient and merchant ends 
of welfare transactions” (GOS 2016: 59, 67). Although the government has no plans to extend 
or develop another trial using this technology, Govcoin brought cashless welfare payments to 
a British audience, as well as the accompanying contentious political issues of surveillance, 
control and financial inclusion. 
                                               
1 Although notably no official evaluation has yet been released.  
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The Govcoin experiment is the extreme end of a movement in welfare payments to a cashless 
form. Around the world, states and aid organisations have begun to use cashless technologies 
to make payments to people. In refugee camps the World Food Programme (WFP) has begun 
paying people with Mastercard cards, rather than distributing rations or paper vouchers. In a 
number of states in the Global South, the rapid growth of conditional or unconditional cash 
transfers has been accompanied by a diversity of new forms of cashless payment. For example, 
in India, the Aadhaar unique identification number is increasingly being coupled with cashless 
cards to make payments electronically (Sahu 2016). More established forms of cashless 
payment are also present, such as food stamps in the USA where money is restricted to a card 
that can only be used at certain retailers and on certain products.  
More widely than just welfare, cashless is becoming increasingly prominent as a form of 
payment. There were 433.1 billion non-cash transactions in 2014-2015, with the expectation 
that there will be nearly 726 billion by 2020 (Capgemini 2017: 5,11).2 This growth is supported 
and promoted by a number of large state projects around the word that seek to discourage cash 
and encourage cashless transactions. One example is India’s 2016 demonetisation, where all 
500 and 1000 Rupee notes were removed from circulation over the period of one month (Wolf 
2017; Chandrasekhar and Ghosh 2018). Alternatively, the Nigerian government’s “Cash-less 
Nigeria” introduced bank charges for cash withdrawal by consumers with the aim of “reducing 
the amount of physical cash circulating in the economy, and encouraging more electronic-
based transactions” (CBN 2018; Rice 2013). Large payment companies such as Mastercard 
and Visa are also involved in many of these projects. What is clear is that cashless payments 
are here and becoming increasingly widespread.  
The move towards cashless welfare is especially important considering the influence that both 
the form and meaning of money have on people’s lives. Being able to receive and spend money 
reliably and smoothly, at the places people wish to shop, with confidence in the exchange and 
safety of the transaction is crucial, especially for people with very low incomes. A fundamental 
facet of cashless welfare payments (CWP) is that those who are subject to them are vulnerable 
to any changes. People receiving welfare are not easily able to refuse or opt-out of payments, 
especially if it is their only source of income. As a result, a critical perspective on the 
emergence of cashless in the field of welfare payments is vital to expose any regressive, 
                                               
2 Although it should be noted that cash remains the predominant form of monetary exchange worldwide (Bech et 
al. 2018). 
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exploitative or dispossessing elements in these policies, as well as connecting them to wider 
structural patterns or processes in the global economy.  
Therefore, CWP can also offer an area of interest to the discipline of International Political 
Economy (IPE). The technological advances that have enabled cashless forms of payment 
allow the capacity for powerful actors, such as the state or financial capital, to pursue different 
interests. This connects and contributes to a number of core ideas in IPE. CWP are relevant to 
the relationship between states and markets, to features such as the privatisation of the form of 
payment, the mediation and regulation of labour markets, as well more broadly the state’s role 
in reproducing capitalist social relations and accumulation through welfare. As a contemporary 
policy, CWP also allow the investigation of new forms and issues in welfare restructuring, the 
international diversity of types of restructuring, and the continued (or declining) relevance of 
neoliberalism as a dominant concept. Finally, cashless policies require a financial partner and 
make use of financial payment infrastructure. As a result, they offer an interesting example of 
the financialisation and the ‘co-imbrication’ of state and finance in the delivery of social policy 
(Dowling 2017: 295).  
Academic scholarship so far has had only limited engagement with this phenomenon, and 
where it has, it is rarely from a critical perspective. In the study of hypothetical cashless 
economies and societies, literature has discussed the impact that cashless and electronic money 
may have on monetary policy, finding that it poses a challenge to conventional monetary 
management and will require changes in central banking policy making (Cohen 2001; Storti 
and De Grauwe 2001; Duemmler and Kienle 2012; Kernbauer 2016). Other scholars have 
looked at the obstacles to achieving cashless societies, such as the ways that cashless payments 
can be encouraged by reducing fees for bank accounts (Mukhopadhyay 2015) or analysing the 
costs and benefits for different actors (Garcia-Swartz et al. 2006). The Nigerian cashless 
project is especially prominent, with studies on the effect on financial inclusion, the associated 
benefits, assessments of the government’s progress, and the obstacles it faces (Odior and 
Banuso 2012; Ovat 2012; Bayero 2015; Oginni et al. 2013). A significant amount of literature 
has looked at mobile money as a form of cashless, especially the M-PESA currency in Kenya 
(Maitrot and Foster 2014; Allen 2013). However, the present literature on ‘cashless’ leans 
much more towards what Robert Cox called ‘problem solving’ types of analysis (Cox 1981: 
128-129). Problem solving analysis works within prevailing social and power relationships and 
institutions, in this instance to make cashless payments function more effectively. While this 
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is valuable, a more critical theoretical approach will also be important, not least because of the 
centrality of welfare payments to recipients’ lives, and therefore their vulnerability to change. 
Two contributions within the field of IPE do stand out for taking a critical approach to cashless, 
both of which focus on international development and the accumulation and surveillance 
possibilities. Mader (2016) looks at the shift to digital money in development policy. He argues 
that cashless payments are encouraged as a route to financial inclusion, reflective of a new 
approach to poverty alleviation based on financial intermediation, not income generation. 
Digital and cashless money enables transaction revenues, data gathering and controls on money 
(Mader 2016: 73-76). Similarly, Maurer (2015) discusses the transition from mobile banking 
to mobile payment. He argues that the shift to mobile payments as a focus of development was 
based on the idea of benefits stemming from the form of payment, distinct from the actual 
monetary value. However, he argues that new forms of payment are ‘private’ forms of 
exchange, generating fee revenue and data (Maurer 2015: 138). This thesis then proposes to 
complement these studies and contribute a critical perspective on the specific area of ‘cashless 
welfare payments’. 
Defining Cashless Welfare Payments 
To build the argument, a definition of ‘cashless welfare payments’ is first required, and a line 
drawn between which cases are relevant to the analysis and which are not. To do this the 
concept will be broken down into two parts, ‘cashless’ and ‘welfare payments’, and will then 
be combined to generate an overall definition of this phenomenon. 
‘Cashless’ can be defined broadly as “not using cash as a medium, especially as a means of 
payment; designating, relating to, or characterized by financial transactions which do not 
involve the use of cash, especially the exchange of funds by cheque, debit card, or any of 
various electronic methods” (OED 2018). Cashless can be taken as any form of payment or 
transfer of value that occurs by a form other than physical cash. Papadopoulos (2007: 4-5) 
draws the distinction between ‘money proper’ and money’s token form. Cash, cheques, 
cashless are all token forms of money. This opens up a whole variety of forms of money that 
are not represented in the physical form of cash such as mobile money, vouchers, coupons or 
software e-money.  
Although new forms of money have recently emerged, such as cryptocurrencies like bitcoin or 
mobile money such as M-PESA, this thesis focuses on state issued money. It is interested in 
the cashless form that represents “accounts held at banks or other authorised financial 
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institutions” (Schlossberger 2016). Financial accounts require some form of financial 
intermediation, with money stored with a third-party separate from the owner of the money 
and any agent transferring money. In the case of CWP, a third-party sits between the state and 
a person receiving government support, which is not chosen by the user. These accounts can 
be represented and accessed in a number of ways, with plastic cards the most prominent form, 
and the focus of the research. State money, placed in a state created account at a financial 
institutional and represented and accessed by card is the subject of this thesis.3  
The second definitional point is ‘welfare payments’. Welfare is variously defined but can, by 
drawing on Polanyi (2001: 138-139), be understood as a form of ‘social protection’ from the 
dangers and dislocating effect of the market on society, an approach that will be elaborated in 
the next chapter. This broad definition can encompass a number of institutions or practices 
undertaken by a variety of actors. However, welfare is most commonly associated with the 
actions of the state, in the institutional form of the welfare state. As such, the thesis concentrates 
on payments being made to individuals by the state, rather than alternative organisations. 
Payments are transfers of money to citizens to supplement, replace or provide incomes, which 
are most commonly seen in pensions, unemployment, disability or child care payments. The 
emphasis on payments is important as it opens questions about its form, its route to the recipient 
and how this experience has everyday consequence. Thus the focus of the thesis is on welfare 
payments made by the state that are routine and regular, and are a stable feature of an 
established welfare system. This routine aspect of welfare is critical to understand its everyday 
significance, as discussed in Chapter Two.  
This definition excludes some cases that are therefore not included or considered in the 
analysis. Firstly, welfare payments that are single lump sum payments (such as pension lump 
sums or compensation payments) are not considered, as the routine and regular aspect of 
payments are central to the everyday. Secondly, the focus is on welfare systems undertaken by 
national states and therefore non-state payments are excluded. This is not to understate the 
important role of certain non-state actors in welfare payments. One of the clearest is in the 
presence of development institutions, especially in humanitarian interventions. Most 
noticeably, humanitarian camps run by the UN and the WFP have increasingly begun to use 
direct, card-based cash transfers to those staying in camps. These cards can be used at shops 
                                               
3 However, this does not mean that CWP necessarily have to always remain in a cashless form, in some cases 
users can immediately withdraw cash. In the thesis it shown how forms of CWP can mean a regular transformation 
of cashless money into cash in Chapter Five, and a restriction on the ability to do this in Chapter Seven. 
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within the camps and are regularly updated with money (Akkus 2018). However, the politics 
of a refugee camp are qualitatively different to those set up as part of a welfare or social 
protection system, with shorter time frames and a fundamentally different relationship between 
those giving money and those receiving it (Hilhorst and Jansen 2010: 1123-1135). The 
definition also excludes certain types of payment. Any welfare payment that is paid directly 
into a person’s own bank account is not a CWP, and similarly any payment that is made in 
cash, where a person must visit a location to get money is not considered a CWP either. Finally, 
new forms of welfare such as those paid with mobile money4 are also not considered as a CWP 
for this study. Thus, the overall definition of a CWP is one where money is placed onto a state 
created card as part of a routine stable welfare system.  
Given this, the thesis analyses two contemporary examples of cashless welfare, the South 
African Social Security Agency (SASSA) card in South Africa and the Cashless Debit Card 
(CDC) in Australia. The SASSA card was introduced in South Africa in 2012, replacing the 
previous devolved system where each region controlled the payment of social grants. In the 
new payment system, a private organisation, CashPaymaster Services (CPS) took on the 
delivery of the project, overseeing the distribution of over 10 million new cards. These new 
cards functioned like a debit card, enabling cash withdrawal, merchant transactions and the 
purchase of financial services. In Australia, the CDC was introduced as a trial in two rural 
locations in 2016 before being expanded to two more regions in 2018. Anyone, except 
pensioners, receiving a government payment had to use the card. The trial placed 20% of the 
payment into a person’s own account, and 80% onto a new card. This card could not be used 
to withdraw cash and was blocked from working at gambling outlets and alcohol retailers.  
To take the required critical perspective, the thesis will draw on, and contribute to, two fields 
of IPE scholarship that are well placed to understand these cases and the emergent phenomenon 
of CWP: political economy studies of the restructuring of welfare and everyday 
financialisation. Studies of welfare restructuring, chiefly of neoliberalisation, connect discrete 
policy changes to broader structures of welfare and capitalist accumulation. Taking this 
approach not only enables the identification of patterns and similarities internationally and 
across different contexts, but also a critical perspective on restructuring. The financialisation 
angle connects CWP to other studies of the relationship between finance and welfare. Given 
their cashless nature, these forms of payment require the involvement of financial organisations 
                                               
4 These are becoming an increasingly prominent form of development intervention (Interview 12, 2017; Maitrot 
and Foster 2014), 
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to deliver. As a result, CWP form another way for the practices, logics and technologies of 
finance to expand into people’s lives.  
The study of CWP enables a number of contributions to extend these two bodies of scholarship. 
Given the relative paucity of analysis on cashless and CWP, this thesis makes an empirical 
contribution that will offer valuable and interesting cases to both literatures, verifying their 
concepts, perspectives and utility. It undertakes the first comprehensive empirical study of 
CWP drawing on original primary fieldwork that hears the perspectives and experiences of 
those affected by restructuring. The thesis also proposes to make an analytical contribution by 
concentrating the analysis on the everyday. This is seen in two areas. Firstly, the research 
proposes to understand CWP as a ‘contingent’ policy, its emergence and form being dependent 
on a number of factors. Whilst studies of neoliberalisation have specifically focused on the 
contingent, uneven and variegated aspects of restructuring, this can be valuably extended to an 
appreciation of the everyday. In doing so, the forms of resistance, compromise and adaptation 
that occur in policy implementation will be exposed.  
Secondly, it proposes to develop the concepts and processes of both welfare restructuring and 
financialisation. While studies of welfare restructuring have a number of valuable insights, this 
thesis will, by taking an everyday approach, complicate and deepen core ideas in both fields; 
what do these ideas mean, how do they appear and actualise in people’s lives and with what 
consequence? For example, Mader (2015: 27) has argued that one “blind spot” in the field of 
financialisation is an understanding of social meanings of money and its social power. As this 
research will show, an everyday approach will allow a grounding of studies of finance in the 
use and meanings of money. By delving into the everyday, a more sociological understanding 
can be gained that appreciates the lived experiences and consequences of welfare restructuring, 
strengthening the critique of the literature.  
Research questions and argument 
To make this contribution the thesis concentrates on a specific part of the shift towards cashless 
transactions and takes an analytical focus on the everyday. It asks one central question that is 
addressed in three parts.  
• How can the emergence of cashless welfare be explained and how has this affected 
everyday life? 
(1) How, and where, have cashless welfare payments emerged as a new form of welfare 
delivery? 
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(2) Why were the policies introduced in Australia and South Africa? 
(3) How has the cashless form of delivery affected everyday life, and how has everyday life 
affected cashless?  
For some the answer to this is straightforward. The move to cashless is considered by some 
media commentators to be a private sector project led by transnational corporations like Visa 
and Mastercard, chiefly to boost financial profits (Scott 2018; Quijones 2018; Hinscliff 2016). 
Whilst financial accumulation is important, conventional thinking on the rise of cashless 
payments has so far underappreciated the crucial role of the state, specifically through changes 
in welfare, which these questions point to.  
To answer the research questions and provide an original contribution, the thesis presents a 
critical empirical study of cashless welfare payments, featuring two detailed case studies that 
draw on extensive primary fieldwork in South Africa and Australia. It argues that CWP create 
a space in everyday life in which social relations and economic behaviours can be 
restructured. This restructuring is considered as a process and consolidation of 
neoliberalisation to promote market subjects and create new market spaces. The precise form 
of CWP are contingent on the social and policy contexts from which they emerge, the 
contradictory nature of neoliberalism, and crucially, the effects on everyday life and its 
responses to this. In South Africa it has taken an inclusive form that has facilitated state-society 
social relations and enabled financial accumulation. In Australia it takes a disciplinary form 
that has sought to control consumption and encourage capitalist social relations.  
To make this argument the thesis predominantly draws on two theoretical influences. Firstly, 
it uses neoliberalisation as a way to understand contemporary welfare restructuring (Peck and 
Tickell 2002; Brenner and Theodore 2002). This is useful because it offers a variegated and 
contingent understanding of specific forms of neoliberal restructuring and how this relates to 
the evolution of capitalist accumulation. It contains a number of crucial concepts and features 
of contemporary welfare that are developed in Chapter One and then applied in the analysis in 
Chapters Three to Seven. The second theoretical influence is Henri Lefebvre’s 
conceptualisation of Everyday Life under capitalism (Lefebvre 1991; 2002; 2008). Lefebvre’s 
work is useful because it offers a concrete theorisation of what the everyday is (a feature 
missing from some contemporary studies in everyday IPE), as well as an understanding of how 
Everyday Life is ‘programmed’ by capitalism. Crucially, Lefebvre’s approach does not 
consider the everyday as a passive, pliant space, but instead one with the capacity for resistance, 
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forcing adaptation and change from policymakers. Lefebvre’s work is developed and extended 
in Chapter Two.  
There are, however, a number of different theoretical ways to understand these cases. One clear 
example is through Foucault’s work and subsequent derivations in studies of governmentality 
(Larner 2000a; Burchell et al. 1991; Miller and Rose 1990). Scholars in this field focus on the 
way that power is dispersed and exercised through society to promote specific subject forms 
and forms of behaviour, which are underpinned by discursive political rationalities. 
Governmentality scholars Miller and Rose (1990) for instance, use the concept of ‘technologies 
of government’ to understand contemporary governance. They suggest this is the process by 
which political rationalities are translated into reality to “to shape, normalize and 
instrumentalize the conduct, thought, decisions and aspirations of others in order to achieve the 
objectives they find desirable” (Miller and Rose 1990: 8). Focus should then be on the 
mechanisms that make governance possible and then extended to attempt governance at a 
distance and shape the decisions of policy-making targets. Other scholars in the Foucauldian 
or governmentality tradition also draw attention to extension of surveillance technologies into 
society to monitor or police ‘deviant’ subjects.5 
Thus, these approaches to the study of CWP offer useful and interesting perspective for this 
thesis. For instance, in Australia there is a clear example of technologies of government seeking 
to translate political rationalities of correct conduct into the lives of ‘deviant’ welfare subject 
and then seeking to shape their decisions and preferences. In some cases, it goes further to 
extend methods for individuals to exert governance over the self (Dean 1995: 572-577). 
However, the key limitation of this approach is the absence of a wider structural impetus and 
driving force. As Miller and Rose (1990: 8) argue, technologies provide authorities can “pursue 
the objectives they consider desirable”, yet this leaves unanswered the question of the origin 
of these objectives and political rationalities. The Marxist approach offers some answers to 
these questions.  
Marxist approaches would consider the structures of capitalism to be underpinning these forces 
(Gough 1978). As such, the focus of this body of literature would be on the structural power 
of capital and class interest driving the policies (Ankarloo 2012: 383). This is most clearly 
evident in the power of financial capital in the South African case and the profit and 
exploitation that was able to take place (Fine and Rustomjee 1996). However, the structural 
                                               
5 This a point that is elaborated further in the next chapter.  
Introduction 
 10 
Marxist approach also has limitations. These approaches tend not to delve into the mundane, 
but important, details that make these systems function, focusing instead on the macro or 
functional role of welfare. As a result, it  overlooks the variations, contingencies and resistances 
that challenge and undermine the theoretical understanding of a capitalist system.  
This thesis then takes an eclectic approach to theory, drawing on the key insights of these 
significant bodies of work, while also mitigating against the limitations of a strictly disciplinary 
approach. The thesis draws on those theorists that are cognisant of variations, resistances and 
contingencies, but also underpin their approach by the driving force of capital accumulation 
and social relations, rather than an overall system of ‘Capitalism’. Both Polanyi and Lefebvre 
offer this ability, connecting capitalist accumulation and social relations to welfare and 
everyday life respectively, in a nuanced way. The coherence and connections between Polanyi 
and Lefebvre are unpacked more in Chapter Two.  
Mid-range theories are also used to complement and extend the more abstract ideas of both 
thinkers. These mid-range theories are selected for their specific relevance and productive 
outcome from bringing them into conversation with the empirical cases. Both the Social 
Meaning of Money and Financialisation provide crucial insights into the details of the 
empirical cases and draw attention to the mundane and specific features of the empirical cases.   
 
 
Methodology 
To support the theoretical arguments, fieldwork and primary data gathering was undertaken. 
This methodological section will explain what was done and the challenges that were faced. It 
begins with brief description of the overall research and is followed by a deeper description 
and elaboration on the research activities, the theoretical issues and justification for my chosen 
method.6 The fieldwork was undertaken between February 2017 and July 2017 in Australia 
and South Africa. The three main forms of data gathering were interviews, observations, and 
document collection. 40 people were formally interviewed, as well as a large number of 
informal conversations. The interview participants were people receiving welfare payments, 
community members, advocacy organisation representatives, state officials and politicians. 
                                               
6 To recognise the personal experience of doing primary research, this section will be written in the first person. 
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The observations occurred predominantly in Australia, but also some in South Africa and 
recorded through field notes. The documents that have been used come from a number of 
sources. These include a selection of state documents such as policy and research reports, 
parliamentary proceedings, media statements and speeches; secondary data from NGOs, 
development organisations, and private firms; and finally, media and newspaper reports. The 
interviews were transcribed, field notes typed up and relevant documents uploaded to a data 
analysis programme (NVIVO) where they were analysed.  
The research in Australia occurred between February 2017 and April 2017 and consisted of 
visiting two sites. The main location was a rural community where the CDC was being trialled, 
and Canberra, the location of the Australian Parliament. In the trial location, interviews and 
observations occurred. As the town was small and secluded, it allowed me to undertake a 
‘focused-ethnography’, spending time with people and learning about the community 
(Knoblauch 2005). This was complemented by more formal interviews with community 
members, local state employees and politicians. In Canberra, the focus was more on interviews, 
where I spoke to federal state officials and politicians. The second research location was in 
Cape Town, South Africa, in June and July 2017. As will be discussed later on, the location 
and context made observations more difficult, and so the focus was more on interviews with 
people using a SASSA card. 17 recorded interviews were undertaken, as well as informal 
interviews and a small number of targeted observations.  
The research was given ethical clearance by the Warwick PAIS department on the 24th January 
2017.7 All interviews were anonymised, except for those who wished to speak publicly. The 
location of the community in Australia is kept anonymous to reduce the possibility of 
identifying any participant. Participants either signed a consent form, or verbal consent was 
recorded to take part in the interviews. At the beginning of each interview I explained what my 
research was about and allowed participants to ask any questions to ensure I gained informed 
consent. I made it clear that the interview or their consent could be stopped or withdrawn, any 
questions could be refused an answer, and that the data would be kept confidentially and stored 
electronically and securely for 10 years. In order to ensure my safety, I kept my supervisors 
informed of my location and activities each week.  
                                               
7 Warwick ethics reference code: PHD/BANTOCK-RICHARDSON. 
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Research design  
The study takes a qualitative approach to understanding the cases and answering the research 
questions. It draws on a selection of data gathering strategies concentrating mainly on 
interviews, observations and document analysis. The use of a variety of methods provides a 
number of benefits. Firstly, it allows triangulation, which allows “greater confidence in 
findings” and is especially helpful when using observations, as interviews can check the 
interpretation of events (Bryman 2016: 386). By combining observations, interviews and 
documentary analysis I could corroborate the findings of each method against each other. 
Secondly, the choice of multiple methods responds to the research questions. As the questions 
are seeking to understand both everyday life and policy development, one method alone would 
be insufficient. Concentrating purely on observations for example would make answering 
policy development questions difficult, while document analysis would provide a limited 
insight into everyday lives.  
The choice of methods was also pragmatic. My capacity in terms of time, resources and access 
meant that one method alone would have been impossible. For instance, the requirements to 
do purely observation would require more time and resources than the project permitted, as 
gaining access and building relationships with policymakers and people receiving welfare in 
two different countries would have been unfeasible. The choice of a variety of data gathering 
strategies was also partially a result of access issues. This will be unpacked in the following 
sections but, in short, due to access issues in South Africa, gaining interviews and observations 
was challenging, requiring a greater use of documentary evidence compared to the Australian 
case.  
Sampling  
The first aspect of the research method is sampling, which is related to both sampling of cases 
and sampling within cases (Bryman 2016: 408). In the case of the former, an explanation is 
required for the choice of the South African SASSA card and Australian CDC. Firstly, it has 
been important from the outset of the project to have two cases, even if this does not necessarily 
entail a strict comparative design. Comparative research allows a greater understanding of the 
phenomena being understood by extending beyond a single case study, and allows the research 
to make more substantial and confident conclusions about cashless welfare (Mahoney 2007). 
As a new and emerging mode of payment, having two cases allows the theoretical arguments 
to carry more weight. In the thesis the research design is more small-n case studies than 
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formally comparative. While there are some important similarities between the two chosen 
cases (a colonial past, marginalised ethnic groups, use of cashless payment) a comparative 
method was considered inappropriate. The structured comparative approach looks for either 
two very similar cases with a different outcome (‘method of difference’), or two very different 
cases with the same outcome (‘method of agreement’) (Mill 1874: ch.8; Lijphart 1975: 163-
165; Przeworki and Teune 1970: 32-37). However, the scale of variation between the two 
countries made a ‘most similar system design’ unfeasible, and the differing types of cashless 
outcomes make a ‘most different system design’ inappropriate.  
Instead the route taken was to use case studies that together contribute towards theory building 
to understand cashless welfare. Case studies are valuable as they allow an in-depth, 
contextualised understanding of a specific case (Pierce 2008: 66-67). This is especially 
important given the research questions direct analysis toward a holistic understanding of a 
specific policy, from the international level to the everyday. Odell (2001: 162-167) lists seven 
types of case study relevant in IPE, and this thesis uses a combination of the “disciplined 
interpretive case study” and “hypothesis-generating case study”. The former refers to the study 
of a new phenomenon by an existing theory, and the latter refers to the study of a phenomena 
in order to generate new theories and hypothesis. Further, drawing on the literature on 
neoliberalisation that is elaborated in Chapter One, cases should be “selected according to their 
theoretically generative properties” to understand the variegated process of restructuring (Peck 
and Theodore 2007: 763). Thus while the study of South African and Australian cashless 
welfare is done through the existing lens of critical IPE, the thesis also seeks to generate new 
insights on, and from, cashless more generally. The choice of multiple case studies was done 
to assist in an understanding that stretches beyond the single case study. By having other cases 
the conclusions and claims are strengthened.  
In addition, the cases are not necessarily national studies, for example in Australia not all 
welfare payments are made with the CDC, just the ones in the trial area. The focus throughout 
is intended to be on specific policies within states that reflect the specific context in which they 
are embedded. A multi-layered focus is used to overcome methodological nationalism, which 
has been a criticism of comparative welfare and development literature (Obinger et al. 2013: 
111-112; Williams 1995). To avoid this issue, the thesis moves through multiple levels, from 
the transnational level of payments firms and development organisations, through the variation 
between national schemes of CWP, to the everyday life of communities subject to cashless 
policies and drawing out the connections between them. While clearly the national state is an 
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important actor in introducing these policies, the selection of specific welfare policies rather 
than welfare as a whole, nuances the analysis. It recognises the importance of different state 
welfare departments and the relations between them, as well as the prominence of non-state 
actors in the design and delivery of payments.  
Case selection was influenced by an understanding of the international context of CWP. As 
will be seen in Chapter Three, international examples of CWP are grouped around two ‘ideal 
types’ and South Africa and Australia are presented as being archetypes of these two groups: 
South Africa is an ‘Inclusive’ form and Australia as the ‘Disciplinary’ form. Selecting them 
connects the international analysis of cashless payments through to the everyday level. The 
two cases helped not only to develop the typology of international forms of CWP, but also by 
having an example of both types allowed greater generalisability of the key findings.  
Importantly, both of the two cases offer a contemporary example of a CWP, the South African 
case began in 2012 and Australia in 2015. This allows the ability to understand how the shift 
to cashless has affected everyday lives by speaking directly to people who have recently 
experienced the change. Also, it was possible to speak to policymakers who were directly 
involved in the introduction to understand their reasoning. An alternative example, the USA 
Electronic Benefit Card system, was introduced in the 1990s, and it is therefore likely to have 
been normalised in people’s everyday life as well as being more difficult to speak to 
policymakers involved in the change. Case selection was also partly pragmatic. South Africa 
and Australia are both predominantly English speaking, accessible and familiar to me having 
visited both previously. These aspects made the sort of research needed in the time frame I had 
possible.  
It was also important to select cases that would seek to destabilise the binary between states in 
the ‘Global North’ and ‘Global South’ that are usually analysed separately (Doty 1996: 2).8 
Commonly welfare studies have concentrated on sites in Western Europe and North America. 
This is most clearly seen in Esping-Anderson’s (1990) familiar typology of liberal, 
conservative and social democratic regimes that are drawn from a select pool of wealthier 
national economies. States outside these regions are rarely analysed as providers of ‘welfare’ 
and not compared with those within them. One way this can be seen is in the terminology for 
                                               
8 South Africa and Australia are in fact rarely analysed together. Some examples exist that are predominantly 
histories of colonialism, and draw on more than two cases (Hartz 1964; Coombes 2006; Eddy and Schreuder 
1988), but rarely are specific contemporary policy examples considered together. Malcolm (2001) is a notable 
exception. 
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the two cases. In South Africa the payments are referred to as ‘social protection’ whilst in 
Australia it is ‘welfare’, despite being essentially the same. Although both states are 
geographically south of the equator, South Africa is seen as the ‘South’ or ‘developing’ and 
Australia the ‘North’, or ‘developed’ (see Figure 1, Brandt 1980). By bringing these two cases 
together as examples of a shared phenomenon the hope is to challenge this distinction and 
demonstrate the value of this sort of analysis and case selection. The two cases also have 
interesting parallels and similar histories. As two examples of ‘settler colonialism’ (Veracini 
2010), both have a history of discrimination and exploitation against indigenous groups. As a 
result, both welfare systems are raced, both in the racial inequality of the population the state 
now governs and the institutional echoes of previous colonial forms of rule. 
Figure 1 - The Global North and Global South (Brandt 1980) 
 
The second aspect of sampling is the selection of units within the cases. This covers how I 
chose the locations within my cases, and how I found the participants. In South Africa, a 
number of research sites were considered prior to Cape Town. Pretoria was considered as it 
had the Head Office of SASSA, and Johannesburg was considered as it is the financial centre 
of the country. However, prior to the research I was unable to gain sufficient access to either 
of these two locations. As a result, Cape Town was chosen as it had the National Parliament, 
the Head Office of the most prominent NGO organisation (Black Sash) and I was able to gain 
institutional links with the University of Cape Town. Cape Town also has a large network of 
NGOs who I contacted to help me gain access to people receiving social grants. The choice of 
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location in Australia was limited to sites where the CDC was being trialled, and one was 
selected as being more accessible practically and in terms of contacts. 
In terms of choosing who to interview and observe, I followed a snowball strategy to identify 
participants (Bryman 2016: 424). In South Africa I contacted a large number of NGOs and 
asked to speak to people they worked with. This gave me access to a selection of townships 
and communities in Cape Town covering differing ages and races. In these sites I relied on 
gatekeepers to find appropriate people willing to speak with me. This provoked some issues 
however. In partnering with the agencies, I would be associated with them and the services 
they provided, potentially influencing the answers I received. Additionally, this sampling 
method increased the risk that I would be associated with the state and therefore people would 
provide answers amenable to state officials. For example, one lady in a Township initially told 
me how good the SASSA card was and that she had no problems with it. As the interview 
progressed however, she revealed some significant issues with the system. A decision was 
made before travelling to South Africa to concentrate on interviews with people receiving 
grants. I struggled to gain access with either state officials or politicians, receiving no reply 
from my attempts to contact them. Further, at the time I was preparing to visit, a large number 
of the relevant officials and politicians were involved in a court case about the contract and 
payment of social grants.  
In Australia, I followed a more conventional snowball method. I had made a number of contacts 
prior to visiting who introduced me to others or suggested people to speak to once I arrived in 
the community. As I was also living there I met new people and built relationships organically, 
and these contacts then introduced me to others. Two examples stand out. One man introduced 
himself to me the second day I was in town, and over the next week or so we spoke and 
interacted. As he learned about my research he would introduce me to other people in the 
community and vouched for my trustworthiness. Secondly, I met an elderly Aboriginal lady 
with a significant network within the local community. She would often speak to me and 
encouraged others to do so. That relationship also assisted in subsequently speaking to other 
Aboriginal people. In Canberra I targeted politicians involved in the policy (either in support 
or opposition) as well as state officials from the department responsible for the policy.  
One of the central sampling limitations in Australia was a selection bias in the participants I 
interviewed. One group of people I wanted to speak to was anyone who used the CDC. 
However, as became clear during the research I was only able to access those who were 
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opposed to the card, because they wanted their perspective to be heard and represented. Those 
who may have adapted and were coping with the new system were difficult to access as they 
were hard to identify, and would have little to gain from speaking to me. Likewise, local 
community policymakers or social services were either reluctant to talk to me, or delivered a 
cautious, professionally acceptable interpretation of events. As a result, the thesis presents a 
partial picture from the data I was able to gather.9  
Research Methods: Interviews 
Interviews were chosen because they give insight into how participants understand and give 
meaning to the world, which was important for the research for both policy and the everyday. 
At a policy level the interview method allows the exploration of complicated processes and 
decisions (Rubin and Rubin 2012: 2–4). They provided useful data to understand why the 
cashless mode of payment had been used, how it connected to past policy decisions and 
structures, and how the decisions were justified. By interviewing people who were intrinsically 
involved with the introduction of these policies, such as politicians or civil servants, individual 
perspectives offered an in-depth understanding of the policy’s emergence. At the everyday 
level, the interview method gives an insight into how people have been affected by CWP. One 
of the themes of the research is the meaning people give to welfare money, as a result 
interviews were a vital method to uncover this. Further, the anonymised confidential interview 
also allowed the space for an investigation into sensitive topics that are important to the 
research, such as poverty or stigma (Ritchie et al. 2014: 56). 
Semi-structured interviews were used, as this method allows the flexibility to pursue and 
uncover new areas of interest as they emerge through the interview (Bryman 2016: 468). This 
method was especially important as the research interests changed during the fieldwork as 
certain aspects became more relevant and prominent and others were found to be less so. 
Questions were developed in advance of visiting the fieldwork sites with support from the 
supervisory team, which was helpful in avoiding questions that might be leading, biased, or 
risk causing harm. The questions were a combination of open and closed questions and were 
ordered to allow a gradual progression from easier, shorter ones to more probing, challenging 
or controversial questions later on. They were also themed around specific areas of interest to 
allow a participant to maintain a thread of thought throughout. Participants were encouraged 
to talk about whatever they considered relevant, especially when time allowed, in the hope that 
                                               
9 Partiality is a given in qualitative research. Silverman (2014: 47) suggests it researchers should “celebrate the 
partiality of your data and delight in the particular phenomenon that it allows you to inspect”. 
Introduction 
 18 
we would come across something interesting or relevant. Prior to each interview I rewrote all 
the questions and select the most appropriate ones for the participant and reflecting my 
evolving thoughts on the research. 
Rapport is considered central to conducting effective interviewing, and I tried hard to build 
rapport with the participants (DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree 2006: 316). I had a number of 
strategies to do this, following advice from the literature on interviewing. Firstly, I dressed 
appropriately for the situation. When interviewing politicians or state representatives I dressed 
smartly and wore a suit, whereas for interviews with people receiving welfare payments I 
would dress much more casually and reflect how they might dress, especially so in Australia. 
During the interview I sought to develop a conversational style and approach, concentrating on 
building my own ‘key vocabulary’ (shared phrases and language with the interview participant) 
to build a relationship with them (Pierce 2008: 129). For example, in Australia I quickly began 
using phrases like ‘grog’ or ‘bottle shop’ rather than ‘alcohol’ or ‘off-licence’ as I normally 
would. Within the interview I would ask for clarification and offer personal anecdotes and 
information where relevant to make the interview more like an exchange than an extraction of 
information.  
Some interviews needed to be undertaken over the phone or internet. This posed a number of 
challenges. While some authors suggest the differences between phone and face-to-face 
interviews are over-stated or minimal (Bryman 2016: 484–485; Burnham et al: 2008: 234) or 
offers other valuable benefits (Novick 2008) my experience was that they were much more 
difficult. Not having body language to respond to made building rapport challenging. One 
aspect of this was that it made it more difficult to identify the difference between when a person 
has finished a point and were ready for the next question, or if they were simply still thinking, 
meaning there was often interruption and talking over each other. Interviews with video calling 
ameliorated this somewhat but these issues still remained. Practical issues were also much more 
prominent. Phone lines would cut out or internet connections would be unreliable; at one point 
I ran out of credit on my phone and in another a participant’s laptop battery ran out. However, 
despite these issues, phone interviews did give me access to interviewees that I would not have 
otherwise been able to speak to.  
There were a number of challenges that I faced when interviewing, notably in three areas. One 
of these is a familiar challenge of all forms of research, that the interview participants are liable 
to mislead, seek to impress or provide answers they believe I wanted to hear by saying the 
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‘right thing’.10 As some of my questions asked about how people used their money and how it 
was distributed, there is the possibility that people wanted to present an image of a sensible, 
responsible citizen.11 It is unlikely people would completely reveal their lives to a person they 
had just met. Moreover, in both cases the payment systems were political. In South Africa 
people appeared unwilling to criticise the policy, potentially worried that I was a state 
representative. In Australia some people were very willing to criticise the policy to state their 
opposition, while others were highly reluctant for fear of reprisals.  
Finally, difficulties were encountered in comprehending the perspectives and experiences of 
people whose lives are so far removed from my own, such that my questions and areas of 
enquiry may have been inappropriate or irrelevant. One example was the research interest in 
social meanings of money, and experiences of poverty and welfare. Whilst an academically 
interesting topic, this was a challenging subject in both settings. The sorts of questions I was 
asking, and the sorts of answers they evoke, require not only deep reflection on abstract topics 
by participants, but also a close, long and trusting relationship. My positionality made these 
questions difficult at times, especially across cultural and language barriers. As a result, once 
this became clear I changed my questions and hoped for these themes to appear organically, 
rather than being asked directly, but this also proved difficult. Upon reflection it may have been 
better to have used focus groups as “abstract, intangible or conceptual topics can be better 
suited to group discussion, where the group can work together to tackle the subject” (Ritchie 
et al. 2014: 56). 
Observations 
As well as interviews, observations were taken. This method was chosen as it provides insight 
into “behaviour that is not obvious or of which participants may not be aware, things that are 
so everyday or ‘normal’ that people find it hard to convey them in words, social norms or 
pressures to conform with expected behaviours” (Ritchie et al. 2014: 245). Observations were 
especially helpful in understanding everyday life in the locations where the CDC was 
introduced. Given that was a focus for the research, the rich data and understanding that 
observations provide was critical. Ethnographic methods are also said to offer a valuable tool 
for the study of politics and power - “close, person-to-person contact that is attuned to the 
worldviews of the people we study is invaluable for a science of politics” (Schatz 2009: 4). 
Specifically, the immersion that ethnographic methods feature offers a number of benefits, but 
                                               
10 This is known as ‘social desirability bias’ (Nederhorf 1985: 264). 
11 A point made to me by one gatekeeper after an interview in South Africa.  
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importantly for this thesis is the space for human agency it enables, and the normative 
grounding that “has the central virtue of keeping the researcher in touch with the people 
affected by power relations” (Schatz 2009: 12).  
The observations occurred in two sites, one in a small rural town in Australia and in Cape 
Town, South Africa. In Australia the trial site was contained enough to be able to explore the 
entire community. I was able to immerse myself in the place where I was interviewing people 
by living there for a month and becoming familiar to people and the community. In Cape Town 
however, observations were more challenging. On the one hand, the city is too large to do 
observations of the entire location, and secondly the ability to move around the city and spend 
time in the relevant specific places (poorer neighbourhoods or townships) was hampered by a 
lack of knowledge, access and safety.12 The targeted observations I did were in places where 
transactions take place such as supermarkets or shops. In South Africa I was able to observe a 
payday on the 1st of July when SASSA recipients queue up to collect their payment in cash.  
In Gold’s (1958: 211) typology my role was as a ‘participant as observer’, a role used in one-
visit interviews. This role has the value of avoiding losing perspective, but also is more 
superficial, leading the risk of misunderstanding and being misunderstood. I was overt in my 
research. I informed everyone with whom I came into contact with I was a student from the 
UK doing research, but as Cassidy (quoted in Bryman 2016: 172) says “it is possible that some 
of the people I observed in shops were unaware of the reason of my presence”. In Australia 
this was much less likely as the community was small and I would have been conspicuous due 
to my unfamiliarity and accent. In South Africa it is likely that I was observing people who 
would not necessarily have been aware who I was. However, this was only ever in public places 
where participants would expect to be observed and seen. Although the observation locations 
may have been ‘public’ in Hammersley and Atkinson’s (1995) classification, it did not mean 
access was easy, as discussed above.  
Documentary Analysis 
The final method of data collection was documentary analysis. This method acted as a 
supplement to the primary data collected during the fieldwork to deepen and corroborate the 
research findings. The sources were predominantly a selection of ‘grey’ literature from the 
state, private organisations and the third sector. State literatures were documents such as 
                                               
12 I was frequently told by people that I would be in danger if I walked around alone at night, used public transport 
or entered the townships or poor areas.  
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department and policy reports, speeches and resources for the use of the different cards. Private 
firm data were predominantly annual reports, websites and press releases while third sector 
documents were mainly research or policy reports. Newspaper and media were also used to 
provide further empirical evidence and corroboration for the findings. This was especially 
useful in Chapter Three on contemporary policies that academic and grey literature had yet to 
cover.  
State documents were especially useful in providing insight to answer the research questions 
on policy development. Using politician’s statements and parliamentary proceedings from 
when the policy was developed and introduced allows an understanding of the process it went 
through and the justifications used. Similarly, private firms (and especially those involved in 
the delivery of a payment) documents were useful in seeing the specific terms and conditions 
of the card, how the company speaks of itself in terms of strategy, and how CWP can generate 
revenue in annual reports. Clearly there are challenges with using documents in terms of their 
quality (Scott 1990: ch.2). Although the use of these was not necessarily to gain an ‘accurate’ 
understanding of an actor’s perspective, but more to understand how they present and 
legitimise their policies. 
Reflexivity and limitations 
In doing qualitative research it is important to be reflexive. This is the on-going critical 
evaluation of the researcher’s views, actions and interpretations, as well the ways that others 
will interact with them (Tickner 2006: 27-28; Harding 1991). A key aspect of this is 
positionality, which is a researcher’s status in relation to the field and research subjects, and 
their beliefs, values and biases. As a result, it is crucial to recognise that the data gathered is 
inherently partial and subjective. Interviews are shaped by a variety of social and power 
relations between myself and the participants, and the answers and my observations are filtered 
through my own prior beliefs and assumptions. As a white, male, middle-class (but relatively 
wealthy) British student, a number of these features will have signified my difference from 
research participants. My own positionality shaped the entire research, from the choice of 
research areas, conceptualisation of the issue to be investigated, to the way I use language, 
interact with research participants, to the filtering and analysing of the findings (Berger 2015: 
220). Crucially however, it should be acknowledged that I am in a position of power over the 
research, especially in data collection and final interpretations (Gilbert 1994: 94).  
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Of the many aspects of the research, one that is important to draw out is my ‘outsider’ position. 
As someone who has no experience of living the life that the research participants live, I was 
studying the ‘unfamiliar’ (Berger 2015). The benefits of being an outsider is that the questions 
and viewpoints I bring may offer a new direction to understanding the problem, compared to 
an ‘insider’ (Berger 2015: 227). Further, I was not from either community or the country of my 
research sites, and I would have been identifiably different due to my accent, behaviour and 
sometimes skin colour. In some senses this was actually helpful to the research. In both 
locations people sometimes appeared grateful that I was taking an interest in their lives and the 
struggles they were facing, especially considering I had come from the ‘other side of the world’ 
to speak to people who felt ignored or marginalised. Gaining access to policymakers certainly 
felt easier in Australia as a result of my outsider, researcher status. Yet in other ways the 
outsider status shaped the research in fundamental ways.  
One unavoidable feature of this research is its post-colonial context. Any encounters or 
research on these areas inevitably carry the history and representations of colonialism (Spivak 
1988). According to Said (1979: 11): 
No production of knowledge in the human sciences can ever ignore or 
disclaim its author’s involvement as a human subject in his own 
circumstances, then it must also be true that for a European or American 
studying the Orient there can be no disclaiming the main circumstances 
of his actuality: that he comes up against the Orient as a European or 
American first, as an individual second. And to be a European or an 
American in such a situation is by no means an inert fact. It meant and 
means being aware, however dimly, that one belongs to a power with 
definite interests in the Orient, and more important, that one belongs to 
a part of the earth with a definite history of involvement in the Orient. 
This same argument can be made regarding the sites of South Africa and Australia. Both cases 
were locations where there had been previous British colonisation, the effects of which 
continue to this day. In Australia for instance I encountered members of the ‘Stolen 
Generation’, children taken away from their Aboriginal families and placed in state or 
religious care. I encounter these post-colonial sites as British first, and as an individual second, 
and my interactions with these people and my research cannot escape these histories. This 
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relation meant that it was difficult to ask certain questions, especially about poverty and its 
experience, while also requiring me to be reflexive about my own assumptions and beliefs. 
The extractive nature of colonialism also highlighted the somewhat extractive nature of 
international fieldwork, especially in post-colonial sites (Schlosser 2014). As a relatively 
affluent person doing funded research that will benefit my future, ethical concerns arose. In 
comparison to me, the target population who were receiving welfare were much poorer and 
disadvantaged, sometimes living in severe deprivation and so at times the research felt 
exploitative. Research participants gained little from speaking to me. For example, one 
participant told me to end an interview when he discovered I was just a student with no real 
power or influence. In comparison I benefit significantly more. By hearing and analysing 
people’s experiences of hardship, I gain life enhancing qualifications and experiences. While 
it is hoped that my research will contribute to a greater understanding of welfare policies, and 
people did seem genuinely grateful for my interest, it raised questions about the ethics of 
fieldwork in postcolonial and deprived settings.  
An important comment on reflexivity comes from Rose (1997: 306-311), who questions the 
ability or possibility of researchers to be reflexive. Instead she suggests acknowledging the 
situatedness and partiality of any research, opening space for new perspectives and avoiding 
overgeneralisation. For example, one way my research is partial is how my positionality and 
past research interests elevated one direction of enquiry over others. My own interest in studies 
of welfare and social policy pushed the research to focusing on this, and the questions (both 
research and interview) focused on an issue I was personally interested in: how money is given 
meaning and how profit can be made from these forms of payment. As a result, alternative 
ways of conceptualising the research were not taken. One clear example of this is the 
prominence of race and a post-colonial angle. Whilst race was considered to be a relevant 
dimension within the everyday, a different approach could have considered the project through 
a post-colonial lens and dealt with race relations more comprehensively.  
The research was also partial because of events during the fieldwork that further pushed me 
away from a strictly raced or post-colonial perspective. I was unable to access certain places 
that that would have been valuable to visit for the research. In Australia outside of the town I 
stayed were a number of Aboriginal communities. However, visiting them was not allowed 
without an invitation, which I was unable to gain. As a result, I was unable to observe or speak 
to these people, limiting my understanding. Similarly, in Cape Town, I was unable to visit 
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certain sites where people who were using the SASSA card would live and who would have 
been among those most vulnerable to exploitation. Visiting townships was considered too 
dangerous to visit alone and so I was dependent on gatekeepers to escort me. When I did get 
to speak to people from these communities, in both Australia and South Africa, my whiteness 
is likely to have prohibited or limited answers that feature a race dimension. As a result, the 
appreciation of race within the thesis is limited by the access I could gain, but it may well also 
mean that my own positionality may have made pursuing a raced centred study highly difficult. 
These ideas will be returned to in the Conclusion. 
 
Structure of the thesis 
Chapter One begins by discussing welfare and its relationship with capitalism, arguing that 
welfare settlements are an intrinsic feature of stable capitalist societies that reproduce capitalist 
social relations and accumulation. It first draws on Karl Polanyi’s work to understand the state 
and welfare’s role in capitalist societies, distilling the features down to two contingent 
dynamics of governance and accumulation. These dynamics are applied to two liberal welfare 
settlements, the post-war embedded liberal welfare settlement, and the contemporary phase of 
neoliberalisation. In the embedded liberal settlement, governance was achieved through 
ensuring social stability and governance of a gender order to provide social reproduction. 
Accumulation on the other hand was enabled through the reproduction of a reliable workforce 
and maintenance of aggregate demand. An argument is then made for the value of 
neoliberalisation as a conception of contemporary restructuring. Here governance is argued to 
be achieved through discipline, inclusion and surveillance, whilst accumulation is provided by 
privatisation, labour commodification and financialisation. However, the contemporary 
neoliberal settlement requires significant attention to the everyday, because of the types of 
policies and the contingent forms of policies. 
Chapter Two develops a theoretical understanding of the everyday using Henri Lefebvre’s 
critique of Everyday Life. Lefebvre’s work is shown to offer a valuable contribution to the 
study of the everyday in IPE, as it offers a specific theorisation of what the everyday is, its 
connection to the state and capitalist economies, and how it is shaped and ‘programmed’. His 
approach is used to develop a way to complicate and deepen key processes and concepts of 
neoliberalisation, and is extended to two areas of programming relevant to CWP: social 
meanings of money and everyday financialisation.  
Introduction 
 25 
Chapter Three sets the emergence of CWP in an international context. It argues that CWP are 
an emerging but prominent form of welfare payment that are accompanied by distinctive 
transnational tropes and representations that reflect neoliberal ideas of governance and 
accumulation. Two groups of actors propagating these ideas are identified, ‘Providers’, who 
are predominantly financial payments companies, and ‘Advocates’ a collection of large 
international aid and development agencies and think tanks. These groups present CWP as 
allowing cheap, safe, financially inclusive and controllable welfare payments. The second 
section of the chapter then goes on to look at the variety of CWP around the world, classifying 
them into two ‘ideal types’: Inclusive CWP and Disciplinary CWP. Three examples of each 
are then described and analysed.  
Chapter Four begins the substantive empirical analysis. This chapter contextualises the 
introduction of the SASSA card. It draws out the important historical, institutional and 
discursive aspects of the card’s introduction as well as describing the specific policy details. 
The first section presents the historical and institutional context of the policy, discussing South 
African political economy and the history of the transition to neoliberalisation in the post-
apartheid era. It also describes the details of the policy and the state of contemporary social 
protection. The second section critiques the prominent discourses accompanying the card’s 
introduction. Whilst the card is supposed to provide dignity for people, chiefly through 
alleviating poverty and financial inclusion, it is instead argued that these constitute a 
consolidation of capitalist relations into the lives of the poor (predominantly black) target 
population.  
Chapter Five applies the framework developed in the earlier chapters to analyse the SASSA 
card. It that uses fieldwork and primary data to argue that the SASSA card consolidates 
neoliberalisation by introducing an Inclusive CWP system that enables a raft of governance 
and accumulation strategies targeting and programming everyday life. Governance strategies 
are characterised by inclusion, developing formal relations between people and the state whilst 
building the surveillance and control capacities. Accumulation on the other hand provides new 
opportunities for specifically financial accumulation, at a national and everyday level. Finally, 
it demonstrates how the internal contradictions of neoliberalisation can create conflict between 
state and capital in the case of the selling of financial services.  
Chapter Six contextualises the Australian CDC, once again drawing out the important 
historical, institutional and discursive aspects of the policy, as well as describing its specific 
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details. The first section describes the relevant features of the political economy of Australian 
welfare, the colonial history and relationship with the Aboriginal population. It also 
acknowledges previous versions of disciplinary welfare in the form of the ‘Basics Card’, before 
finally describing the policy. Section two critiques the surrounding discourses of the policy, 
finding each of them unconvincing. 
Chapter Seven, uses fieldwork and primary data to analyse the Australian CDC. The chapter 
argues that the CDC has consolidated neoliberalisation by introducing a Disciplinary CWP that 
aims to restructure everyday life and social relations. It first discusses the governance aspects 
that are characterised by disciplinary control, making the act of exchange a stigmatising one, 
while controlling and individualising the everyday lives of recipients. Second it focuses on 
accumulation that is enabled by deepening and extending capitalist accumulation into 
underdeveloped spaces through privatisation and familiarising people with cashless money. 
However, the implementation of this policy is not straightforward and linear. It contains 
unexpected consequences, contestation and resistance that required adaptation and 
compromise on behalf of policymakers.  
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Chapter One: State Welfare in Capitalist 
Society 
 
This thesis seeks to explain why welfare has moved to a cashless form and what the impact has 
been on the everyday. However, changes in the mode of payment are not isolated from wider 
restructuring in welfare, and so first an understanding of this is necessary. To do this, the thesis 
draws on the valuable insights of the political economy of welfare literature, while also 
acknowledging some of its limitations. The chapter asks four questions. One, what is the 
relationship between state, welfare and capitalist society? Two, what are the key dimensions 
of the two liberal welfare settlements? Three, what are the absences of these perspectives? Four 
how can this thesis contribute to the existing literature? 
In answering these questions, the chapter argues that welfare settlements are an intrinsic feature 
of stable capitalist societies, contributing to the reproduction of capitalist accumulation and 
social relations through the contingent dynamics of governance and accumulation. However, 
the contemporary neoliberal settlement requires significant attention to be paid to the everyday, 
because of the types of policies and the contingent forms of policies. Not only do contemporary 
neoliberal policies target everyday life more directly, but also an appreciation of contingency 
requires a consideration of the everyday. By arguing this, the chapter serves three important 
functions for the overall thesis. Firstly, it establishes the underlying understanding of welfare 
and its relationship to capitalist accumulation and social relations. Secondly, it advances a 
conceptualisation of neoliberalisation as a form of political-economic restructuring, and 
develops key analytical themes to be used in the empirical chapters. Finally, it demonstrates an 
empirical and analytical gap in the body of welfare literature that the thesis aims to address and 
therefore extends the existing scholarship.  
The chapter is structured as follows. It first develops a Polanyian conception of welfare’s role 
in capitalist societies. The state, with welfare as a key aspect, maintains social relations and 
creates markets for accumulation but also manages the issues arising from the associated 
dislocating effects. Capitalist societies are thus established to be intrinsically related to welfare, 
and as a result neither can be understood independently; stable moments of this relationship 
are considered as ‘welfare settlements’. Through this, two central concepts are developed, the 
capacity of welfare to govern and accumulate. The first section concludes with an argument 
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for contingency. Welfare should be understood within the context it is embedded, with 
influencing factors being both institutional and social. Having developed the foundations of an 
understanding of welfare, the chapter applies the concepts of governance and accumulation to 
two archetypes of liberal welfare settlements, the embedded liberal welfare settlement and the 
contemporary neoliberal settlement. In the embedded liberal settlement, governance was 
ensured through a class compromise that ensured living standards, social stability and the 
maintenance of a gendered division of labour. Meanwhile, accumulation was promoted by the 
reproduction of the labour force and the maintenance of domestic demand. The chapter then 
moves on to the neoliberal settlement, specifically drawing on economic geographers’ work on 
‘neoliberalisation’. Governance is seen in processes of discipline, surveillance and inclusion, 
whilst neoliberal accumulation is present in processes of privatisation, commodification and 
financialisation. The final section makes an argument regarding the absences in the welfare 
literature, suggesting two relevant areas. Both the mode of payment and the everyday have 
been under-acknowledged, and both are areas that could contribute significantly to the 
academic field, laying the foundation for the thesis’ original contribution.  
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1. Welfare in capitalist societies  
Whilst some welfare literature concentrates on welfare policies alone, this thesis takes the 
position that understanding welfare and welfare policies requires an understanding of the 
interaction with capitalist social relations and accumulation. The chapter uses Polanyi’s (2001) 
work to argue that state welfare and capitalist society are fundamentally intertwined, and that 
welfare settlements function to reproduce capitalist accumulation and social relations. The key 
Polanyian insights are that states must seek to produce the appropriate relations, institutions 
and markets for capitalist accumulation, whilst also resolving the social dislocations to which 
these give rise.   
 
1.1 Karl Polanyi: The state, welfare and capitalist society  
In The Great Transformation, Karl Polanyi (2001) sought to argue that nation states and market 
economies are intrinsically related in the reproduction of capitalist accumulation and social 
relations, and that the emergence of ‘market society’ was a contingent, not an inevitable, 
occurrence. Contrary to the dominant narratives of the time, he suggested that the emergence 
of market economies in the 18th and 19th century was not the emergence of a natural state of 
social relations. Polanyi contrasted market relations and capitalist economic organisation with 
pre-market forms that were built upon principles of reciprocity, redistribution or 
householding.13 ‘The great transformation’ was the change from a society built on these 
principles, to one built on the motive of gain and exchange relationships (Hodgson 2017: 7). 
The emergence of ‘market societies’ was one where relations and distribution were organised 
through the market, conditioned by prices and supply and demand functions. In this way 
Polanyi (2001: ch.5) argues that economies became, for the first time, disembedded from the 
social relations they were previously subject to. Instead, social relations became embedded in 
the economy.  
The embedding of the economy in social relations means that economically orientated action 
is organised to serve, or is subservient to, existing power or social relations. The reverse, social 
                                               
13 Reciprocity refers to the sexual organisation of society, with regard to family and kinship. Redistribution refers 
to the distribution of goods by within a hierarchy by a common leader. Householding refers to production for 
one’s own use and distribution within a small (family) unit.  All of these principles are underpinned and reinforced 
by different institutional patterns (Polanyi 2001: 49-52). 
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relations embedded in the market system, means that society is organised by exchange relations 
and conditioned by prices. Polanyi’s analysis has come in for critique. As many authors have 
argued, the concept of embeddedness is unclear at best and “meaningless” at worst (Krippner 
et al. 2004: 113). Clearly, and as seen in this thesis, non-market social relations are still 
important, and Block’s (2003: 276) conceptualisation of economies as always embedded in 
social relations appears more accurate (see also, Lie 1991). Block (2001: 8) uses the simile of 
an elastic band to nuance the understanding of the disembedding economy. As the market gains 
greater autonomy, the elastic band’s tension increases. Either the band snaps, representing 
social disintegration, or market self-regulation is restricted.  
However, the ‘transformation’ or restructuring of social relations does offer an important 
insight for this thesis. A society of commodified, exchange relations is a ‘market society’ 
containing a form of social relations that is required for capitalist society; “a market economy 
can function only in a market society” (Polanyi 2001: 57).14 Chiefly, Polanyi shows that 
capitalist societies require specific forms of social relations to suit forms of accumulation and 
economic practices, which needed to be created or enforced. In this thesis then, the focus will 
predominantly be on capitalist forms of social relations. This is defined as the different 
positions within the accumulation process, and as such are also considered as alienating from 
relationships with other humans (this latter aspect will be discussed more in Chapter Two). 
Polanyi provides an understanding of how capitalist social relations are created or enforced, 
and thereby an understanding of the relationship between state, economy and welfare.  
The emergence of ‘market society’ was not a spontaneous phenomenon. This is encapsulated 
in Polanyi’s (2001: 147) famous phrase “laissez faire was planned”. In other words, the creation 
of the ‘market society’15 required active intervention by the nation state to create the required 
institutions, practices and relationships. This is critical to the understanding of the relationship 
between state and economy. They are not in fundamental opposition but are intertwined in the 
emergence and maintenance of capitalist accumulation and social relations. States have used 
                                               
14 See also Lie (1991: 223) on the rise of market society forms of relations.  
15 There is some confusion about Polanyi’s concept of ‘market society’. One helpful way of understanding it is 
that it is a utopian project to achieve full commodification of land, labour and money, and the absolute dominance 
of exchange relationships (see Polanyi 2001: ch.19). However, this is not achievable in reality because of the 
resistance of society. To avoid confusion, ‘market society’ will be used when specifically referring to Polanyi, 
whilst the more generic ‘society’ will be used in the rest of the chapter and thesis.  
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their power to create markets where they do not exist, whilst regulating and maintaining them 
where they do.16  
One of the central features of this active creation was the development of ‘fictitious 
commodities’. Polanyi’s (2001: 75) definition of a commodity is “something that has been 
produced for sale on a market” that is then subject to supply and demand price fluctuations. 
For a fully functioning self-regulating market, all aspects of industry must be commodified. 
However, three fundamental aspects of production are not true commodities – land, labour and 
money – as they have not been produced for sale on a market.17 However, to maintain a 
functioning market economy, these three must be treated as such and made to operate as closely 
as possible to market commodities. For instance, commodified labour’s wages should respond 
to the price fluctuations of supply and demand, such that labour can be expanded or contracted 
as necessary. This must be enforced and maintained by the state, while any impediments to this 
must be removed. For Polanyi (2001: ch.7), an influential example of such a policy is the 1834 
Poor Law in the UK, which removed state guarantees of income, allowing changes in wages 
and coerced people into labour markets. While Polanyi (2001: 86) considers it the starting point 
of modern capitalism, he also suggests that “never perhaps in all modern history has a more 
ruthless act of social reform been perpetrated.” 
Treating labour as a commodity has severe consequences for society, as subjecting workers to 
price fluctuations can cause significant dislocations.18 Polanyi claims that as labour inherently 
constitutes a human and their life, treating them as a commodity means the disposal of their 
“physical, psychological, and moral entity” (Polanyi 2001: 76).19 Therefore, whilst the state 
has an active role in creating and maintaining markets, this also has dislocating effects on 
society. Those subject to labour market fluctuations can lose their employment or see their 
incomes decrease. These costs mean society needs protecting. Prior to the Poor Law, the 
                                               
16 Lie (1991: 226) does make the important comment that Polanyi overstates the role of the state and underplays 
“social actors or social forces behind the expansion of the market”. However, as the focus of the chapter is on 
state welfare, the focus will remain on the role of the state.  
17 The concept of these fictitious commodities has been subject to close scrutiny. For example, Bhambra and 
Holmwood (2018: 577-580) suggest that the ability to sell labour power, and therefore commodify labour power, 
is a privilege only extended to certain groups. Those subject to slavery, for example, are treated as actual 
commodities.  
18 Given the constraints of the chapter and its focus on welfare, labour as a fictitious commodity will be focused 
on. 
19 This has echoes in feminist writing that argues the social reproduction required for productive labour is 
neglected, further demonstrating the fictitious commodity nature of labour (Holmwood 2000: 32). 
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Speenhamland Law of 1795 protected workers by guaranteeing all workers an agreed minimum 
income, shielding them from the vagaries of the labour market (Polanyi 2001: ch7).  
While Polanyi argued the construction of markets was planned, he also argued the construction 
of social protection measures was a spontaneous response to social costs of commodification 
(Polanyi 2001: ch12). In Polanyi’s terms the forces of ‘habitation’ – the response of society to 
the disembedding of the economy – demands ‘re-embededding’ of economic activity, and 
protection from the forces of ‘improvement’ or economic restructuring. As a result, the state 
has a dual function, it must actively contribute to the creation of markets through the process 
of commodification, whilst also implementing a variety of ‘social protection’ measures to 
maintain the stable functioning of society. However, this means that the state has an internal 
paradox or contradiction between its two functions, which can cause conflict or crisis.  
Building on this Polanyian foundation, state welfare in capitalist society can thus be said to 
undertake three central functions. It ameliorates the negative and dislocating effects of labour 
markets, it reproduces capitalist relations within society, and it maintains or creates new 
opportunities for capitalist accumulation. The state is able to create, for a temporary period of 
time a welfare ‘settlement’. This is a (relatively) stable set of structures, institutions and shared 
paradigms on the identification of social problems and the appropriate way to address them 
(Taylor-Gooby 2008: 2). The market and welfare policies work coherently to support capitalist 
reproduction and accumulation. Welfare policies are then influenced by, and created according 
to, the settlement in which they are embedded, influencing their form and politics. There have 
been two notable phases of liberal welfare settlement over the last 70 years in the Global North, 
the embedded liberal welfare settlement, and the neoliberal phase. 20 However, as discussed, 
the state in capitalist societies has internal contradictions in its role, meaning any welfare 
settlement is temporary. For Polanyi, it was a contradiction between the protection of fictitious 
commodities, and the needs of the self-regulating market for them to be fully commodified.21 
When this tension reaches crisis, new forms of regulation and settlement are needed.  
                                               
20 Some of the literature argues that there was a third, ‘social investment’ settlement. However, the features of the 
social investment settlement – social benefits to progressively support employment mobility, a deregulated 
economy and significant investment – have not manifested as policy discourse suggested (Taylor-Gooby 2008: 
20) and are better encapsulated as aspects of the neoliberal settlement.  
21 Polanyi (2001: ch.7) sites this contradiction in his discussion of the Speenhamland Law. The law, which was 
intended to be an emergency, temporary measure, guaranteed an income regardless of earnings, protecting 
workers from the vagaries of the market. However, this had significant effects on the functioning of the market, 
affected productivity and sustainability of the scheme, leading to the introduction of the Poor Laws.  
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Considering the above discussion, state welfare can be conceptualised in two intertwined, but 
sometimes contradictory dynamics: governance and accumulation.22 Governance 
predominantly refers to the amelioration of negative aspects of markets and the (re)production 
of capitalist social relations. Accumulation predominantly refers to the maintenance and 
creation of profitable circuits for capital. This dual conceptualisation will be fundamental for 
the analysis throughout the thesis and will also be used to frame the upcoming analysis of 
liberal welfare settlements.  
However, it is important to acknowledge some welfare literature that has a different 
understanding of the nature of welfare in capitalist societies. One alternative conceptualisation 
sees welfare (and the welfare state) in tension and conflict with the forces of the market. This 
perspective can, for example, be seen in the prominent debate on globalisation, which tends to 
conceptualise the state and market as antithetical. The central debate here is whether economic 
globalisation compels states to reduce or retrench their welfare provision (Swank 2005). While 
the state may not want to retrench, economic logics mean they have no choice. This suffers 
from two key problems. Firstly, the focus is often on quantification, meaning that analysis is 
built on the size of welfare states and their changes (Navarro et al. 2004). Critically this misses 
qualitative changes in welfare provision and is ill suited to understanding power relations 
(Orloff 1993: 305; Therborn 1987: 238). Secondly, the conception of state and market in a 
zero-sum game has issues when states actively and intentionally reduce welfare state provision 
(for a variety of contingent reasons) to encourage globalisation and capitalist accumulation, 
rather than being forced to (Watson and Hay 2003: 291-294). Krippner (2007) demonstrates 
the limitations of these approaches. As she puts it, the dichotomous view of state and market 
is flawed because the relationship between state and market is an abstract separation, whereas 
in reality they are intrinsically intertwined, and “state officials can accomplish policy 
objectives through markets” (Krippner 2007: 478-483). The binary conceptualisation neglects 
the ways the relations are built and maintained by state and economic actors re-regulating rather 
than deregulating, or in welfare terms, restructuring, rather than retrenching.  
In other literature the conception of welfare is distinct from discussions of the economy, or 
independent from capitalist accumulation altogether. This can be seen in the ‘retrenchment or 
                                               
22 It should be noted this dual conceptualisation has a number of echoes in other literature. The French Regulation 
school for instance frames analysis of political economy around a mode of regulation and regime of accumulation 
(Aglietta 1979; Jessop 2002). Whereas those from a Marxist perspective have used a framework of ‘accumulation’ 
and ‘legitimacy’ as the two governing imperatives of states (O’Connor 1973; Rogers 2013: 6; Copley 2017: 696). 
Combining these, Gough (1979) suggests three functions, accumulation, reproduction and social legitimation.  
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resilience’ debate (Starke 2006). First asked by Pierson (1994), this body of scholarship seeks 
to understand whether the welfare state has been retrenched, or if it has remained resilient in 
the face of attack from politicians. Pierson finds that in fact welfare states have remained 
resilient, and have maintained a similar, consistent size. He suggests two reasons for this. First, 
the popularity of the welfare state creates democratic resistance to reduction. Second, 
institutional ‘stickiness’ makes it hard to radically reform policy. As a result, changes must 
occur gradually and incrementally leading to ‘permanent austerity’ as state incomes decrease 
(due to socio-economic changes) but demand for services remains strong (Pierson 1998: 554). 
Although both factors are important, this debate lacks any sustained engagement with the 
relationship between welfare and capitalist society that has such a significant influence on the 
changes in welfare provision. Thus, a Polanyian foundation provides an understanding of the 
nature of welfare as a part of capitalist economies that some other approaches to welfare do 
not. However, Polanyi’s fundamental ideas are abstract and theoretical, while the features of a 
welfare settlement are not necessarily present in all forms, at all times or in consistent ways. 
Their application and relevance to concrete situations will be contingent on the context being 
analysed. It is this contingency to which the chapter now turns. 
 
1.2 Contingent welfare  
The argument of this thesis is that CWP are a ‘contingent’ welfare policy. The forms of CWP 
that can be observed in ‘actually existing’ welfare policies are the product of a variety of social 
and political factors (Brenner and Theodore 2002). As comparative welfare literature has 
demonstrated, there is significant variation in the pathways and forms of welfare around the 
world (Clift 2014: 258).23 As such, the comparative design of this thesis will be useful to draw 
out the specific contingencies with each case. Welfare policies do not emerge out of a vacuum. 
In order to adequately analyse welfare settlements, it is vital to acknowledge the specific policy 
and social contexts they operate within. These influence their conception, design and 
implementation.  
Failing to recognise welfare contingencies means that the politics, diversity and unevenness of 
specific forms of welfare are subsumed underneath broad welfare conceptualisations and 
                                               
23 Comparative welfare literature has able demonstrated the diversity and contingencies of different welfare 
regimes, states and polices. For example, see (Eichhorst and Konle-Seidl 2008; Etherington and Ingold 2012; 
Ebbinghaus and Manow 2004). 
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‘essentialist’ readings of capitalism (Gibson-Graham 2006). Acknowledging contingencies and 
variations allows a complicating of the broad settlements (and concepts) they are embedded in 
and understood by. The actual form of welfare policies is a product of “space and institutional 
configurations” (Brenner and Theodore 2002: 357), because as Polanyi himself recognised, 
“the human economy…is embedded and enmeshed in institutions, economic and non-
economic” (Polanyi 1957: 250). 
One important aspect of contingency is to understand the specific contexts of different policies. 
Crouch et al. (2009) make the argument that moving beyond the national level is required to 
understand “local and sectoral diversity”. In their analyses companies “act rationally in 
response to sector-specific challenges, being partly bound by the existing institutional 
framework that they encounter, but partly acting to alter it” (Crouch et al. 2009: 654). This also 
applies to welfare policies. For example, in some contexts the attempts to reform 
unemployment insurance have been more successful (Pierson 1996: 151), whilst in others, 
pensions have been easier to reform (Anderson 2001). Similarly, welfare policies respond to 
the emergence of ‘new social risks’ (Bonoli 2007) that require the introduction of new forms 
of welfare. Whilst these will be undoubtedly be influenced by overarching welfare settlements, 
in terms of the construction and understanding of the problem and the appropriate response, 
the specific policy that emerges can only be understood contingently. Bonoli (2007: 498-501) 
for instance considers these new risks to be socio-economic transformations of post-industrial 
societies, namely precarious employment and the increase of female labour. He argues that the 
national responses to these are contingent on a selection of factors including the power 
resources of the affected groups, institutional settings, and the timing of the changes, generating 
a wide diversity of responses. New social risks as a contingent factor in the emergence of 
welfare policies can, however, be expanded beyond broad socio-economic transformations to 
specific policy targets. In the case of this thesis, the emergent ‘risks’ of social harm in Australia 
and fraud in South Africa are crucial in understanding the cashless policy responses.  
A second contingent feature is that policies are also influenced by the institutional setting that 
they must navigate. As already mentioned, ‘sticky’ institutions can compromise familiar ways 
of doing policy developed from previous experiences,24 imposing path-dependent costs upon 
changing course or previous institutional principles (Pierson 1998: 552). They can be 
encapsulated by the phrase ‘institutional landscapes’, which must be navigated by any attempts 
                                               
24 For a clear example of this see the development of the Australian CDC and the learnings from the previous 
‘Basics’ card in Chapter Six. 
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to restructure welfare systems (Brenner et al 2010a: 184). These landscapes appear in many 
different scales however, from the global, through nation states and to regional or local bodies. 
Close analysis of specific policies is required to explain outcomes in terms of the collision 
between existing institutional landscapes and efforts at restructuring that create “mutations” of 
welfare settlements (Brenner et al. 2010a: 197). There is no ‘pure’ form of a welfare settlement, 
only contingent versions.  
As well as the ‘institutional landscape’, social relations can influence and shape the form of 
policies that are implemented. Welfare literature has recognised the influence that class has on 
the outcomes and forms of welfare policies. Esping-Anderson’s (1990: 16-18) influential 
work25 describes three welfare regimes that he argues stem from the power distribution 
amongst different economic classes. Clearly social class will be influential in understanding 
welfare reforms.26 However, one of the critiques of Esping-Anderson’s work has been the 
absence of other, non-economic social classes (Lewis 1997). Both gender and race are 
influential in the shaping of welfare policies. Some authors have attempted to include another 
dimension, defamilisation, to Esping-Anderson’s own categories of commodification and 
comprehensiveness to gender the framework. Defamilisation refers to the extent to which 
welfare regimes support women’s independence and reduce dependency on the family 
(Bambra 2004: 203-207). An important insight of feminist scholarship is that welfare plays a 
crucial role in delineating the responsibilities for social reproduction. The conceptualisation of 
what constitutes domestic care and family responsibilities, for example, will shape the ways 
that welfare policies provide social reproduction or leave it to the household (Sainsbury 1996: 
37). Alternatively, social relations of gender shape how, and if, women engage with the labour 
market, and how they are made dependent on men or the state (O’Connor 1993: 507-509).  
Race is also a fundamental organising and structuring factor in understanding welfare. Take, 
for example ‘citizenship’, one of the key concepts of welfare, providing access to services and 
social protection. This cannot be understood without an appreciation of the inclusions and 
exclusions that notions of citizenship depend upon, which have frequently been shaped by race 
(Paul 1997: ch.1).27 Race politics affects how welfare problems are conceptualised, for 
example some literature has critiqued the racial characterisation in the USA of ‘welfare queens’ 
or ‘welfare mothers’ who are ‘lazy’ and dependent on the state that generate public opposition 
                                               
25 A significant body of comparative literature has built on his typology. See, for example Morissens and 
Sainsbury (2005); Offer et al. (2010); Sainsbury (2006). 
26 See Korpi and Palme (2003), Baldwin (1990), Korpi (2006). 
27 See also Bleich (2005: 183) 
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to welfare (Gilens 1996; Cassiman 2008: 1692). Wacquant’s work on prisons is indicative of 
the ways that race politics can shape how welfare issues should be resolved. For Wacquant 
(2010) the penal system in America functions as a supplement to the welfare system (creating 
‘prisonfare’) to manage racialised groups. In formally unequal societies race can affect the 
eligibility for, and value of, welfare (for example Seekings 2002: 12-18). Alternatively, welfare 
policies can also seek to ameliorate racial inequalities in more or less progressive ways or 
reshape racial hierarchies and how they are understood.28  
In sum, the specific configurations and intersections of gender, class and race, within a 
specific context, are critical to understanding welfare policies, and failing to do so leaves 
analysis short.29 As discussed above, the thesis is focused on capitalist social relations, and 
therefore class is a fundamental aspect of this. However, capitalist social relations are not 
considered only class based and have other intrinsic dimensions, amongst which gender and 
race are crucial. Further, rather than talking about capitalist social relations in the abstract, 
contingent analysis requires an investigation of how these manifest in, influence the design 
of, and shape the experience of welfare policies. An effective example of this is Larner 
(2000b), who draws attention to the interrelationship between gendered and raced relations in 
the constitution of post-welfare state governance. By analysing state documents, she argues 
that neoliberal welfare in New Zealand is an assemblage of neoliberal, gendered and raced 
forms of rules.   
However, it is also important not to go too far in the other direction and become overly 
specified, finding each case to be a unique and isolated occurrence. This approach neglects the 
‘context of contexts’ – the macro institutions and frameworks that restructuring occurs within 
and the common patterns and trends that can be observed (Brenner et al. 2010a: 202). Thus, an 
understanding of welfare requires attentiveness to both broad shifts in welfare settlements and 
locally specific forms. The emergence of welfare policies are the product of these settlements 
and specific political and social institutions. It is an analysis of liberal welfare settlements the 
chapter now moves on to. 
                                               
28 Quadagno (1994) argues that attempts to address poverty in the USA have been undermined by racism. Johnson 
(2010) finds the structuring of welfare reform restricted the ability of black women in the USA to access higher 
education, restricting their ability to become self-reliant as the policy intended. 
29 Notable examples of this are Orloff (2002) and Reingolf and Smith (2012).  
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2. The embedded liberal welfare settlement  
Having developed the underlying relationship between welfare, the state and capitalist society, 
the chapter will now explain the embedded liberal welfare settlement through the dynamics of 
governance and accumulation. Governance is characterised by an aim to maintain social 
stability and legitimacy, whilst maintaining a gender hierarchy. It facilitated accumulation by 
developing a class compromise, socialising capitalist relations and maintaining demand led 
growth.  
Drawing on Polanyi’s insights, Ruggie (1982: 385) considered the period following WWII  as 
a period of ‘embedded liberalism’ which can loosely be defined to have continued until the 
mid-1970s.30 This ‘consensus’ sought to ensure domestic stability following the disruption and 
dislocation of the previous 30 years, while also ensuring the reproduction of capitalist 
accumulation and social relations. Through state planning and cooperation, fiscal demand 
management could ensure a reduction in fluctuations in the economy and provide full 
employment (Jessop 1997: 572; Fraser 2003: 163). It featured an accommodating international 
economic system that encouraged trade along with the ability to pursue protective measures 
against those costs in the form of the welfare state.31 Accompanying the economic settlement 
was a welfare settlement that enabled the functioning of the economy and capitalist 
reproduction.32  
The presence of embedded liberalism was not ubiquitous and monolithic however. Peck and 
Tickell (2007: 29) suggest that the embedded liberal consensus was a broad and variegated 
one, with an international system that enabled a variety of ‘national Keynesianisms’, stemming 
from specific contingencies. So, whilst Western Europe developed national welfare states and 
prominent relationships between labour and capital, some states in the Global South introduced 
alternative variations.33 Importantly, those states emerging out of colonialism developed their 
own national systems. As will be discussed further in Chapter Four and Six, South Africa and 
Australia developed their own (raced) national welfare systems. Although contingent, broad 
                                               
30 There is some debate about the periodisation and construction of the period as an ‘epoch’ (Wincott 2012) 
31 For Western Europe however, another aspect of the international system enabled the welfare state: colonialism. 
The resources that colonialism afforded the Western European states made their welfare systems possible 
(Bhambra and Holmwood 2018: 8). 
32 There is a substantial literature on the various routes and pressures that created the welfare states in different 
states, but the focus here is on what welfare does. For the development of welfare states, see Maier (1981) for a 
Canadian example see Bakker and Scott (1997: 290-301). 
33 Although as Ruggie (1982: 414) notes, “the compromise of embedded liberalism has never been fully extended 
to developing countries”. 
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generalisations and patterns can be discerned in the dynamics of governance and accumulation 
within the post-war embedded liberal welfare settlement. 
 
2.1 Embedded liberal governance  
The first central function of the embedded liberal welfare settlement was to ensure social 
stability and contain social unrest, legitimising capitalist social relations by redistributing 
surplus product to citizens. One way this was done was through extending rights and 
entitlements, ensuring them a share of rising prosperity. A key theorist of the period was Alfred 
Marshall, who argued that in Britain the post-war settlement constituted an expansion of social 
rights, beyond the civil and political rights previously won. Social rights were inherently 
related to citizenship, ensuring welfare and income that was not “proportionate to the market 
value of the claimant” (Marshall 1950: 47). For Marshall, the welfare state was a 
democratically demanded modification of the economic system to direct it towards socially 
beneficial purposes. This explains the idea of the welfare state as a ‘safety net’ (Macleavy 
2010). It gives people the assurance that should something occur in their lives, they will be 
protected from destitution by the welfare state.34  
This is identifiable in both payments and services. In services, the extension of a variety of 
universal services, such as health and education were intended to ensure the well-being and 
‘welfare’ of citizens.35 In terms of payments, the guarantee of an adequate income in the 
absence of wages through state benefits worked toward the same end. There were two 
predominant types of benefit. For those involved with the labour market, insurance 
contributions could be accrued that would entitle workers to payment if they were made 
unemployed. Alternatively, social assistance was paid to those who had accrued no 
entitlements and had low incomes, but this was considered to just be a supplement to other 
sources of income. As these were considered ‘entitlements’, few compulsory obligations or 
conditions were added to the payment (Torfing 1999: 8). This ultimately manifested in 
significant increases in OECD state expenditures on social services during the period (Gough 
1978: 27-28). The funding of such an arrangement required taxation and redistribution, 
                                               
34 In the Canadian case for example, Bakker and Scott (1997: 287) suggest that whilst the welfare state was not 
“warmly embraced”, it was tolerated as it “insured continuity of incomes over the ups and downs of the economy”, 
muting distributional conflict.  
35 For instance, Swartz (1993: 235) argue that introduction of healthcare reform in Canada was partly a function 
of a working class struggle, but also politicians seeking to reproduce the rule of capital.  
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dependent upon a (relatively coherent) national identity and solidarity.36 These forms of 
welfare governance respond to one of Polanyi’s roles of the state, protecting society from the 
dislocating effects of the market.  
This interpretation offers a more positive perspective, suggestive of a benevolent state 
distributing resources. Those from a more critical approach however, interpret embedded 
liberal welfare differently. An alternative reading suggests that welfare governed by controlling 
the poor and preventing revolutionary sentiment. Piven and Cloward (1972: xv) argue that 
welfare is cyclically related to the state of the economy, with the expansion “designed to mute 
civil disorder”. As a result of the crisis prone tendencies of capitalist accumulation, outbreaks 
of unemployment and social dislocation are inevitable. In the embedded liberal settlement, in 
response to the dislocation of the previous 30 years, welfare was significantly expanded in 
order to prevent civil disorder and disruption.37 As will be seen under the neoliberal settlement, 
once the risk of disorder has dissipated, welfare contracts and work norms are reasserted, as 
predicted by Piven and Cloward (1972: 3).38 Other Marxist interpretations suggest that the class 
compromise effectively reconciled the working class to far reaching and dislocating effects of 
the restructuring of capitalist accumulation and social relations, in return for a guarantee of 
constant increases in standards of living, including via welfare payments and services (Offe 
1983: 247).39  
The second governance dimension of the embedded liberal welfare settlement was the 
maintenance of a gender order. The welfare state maintained and enforced gender norms and 
social relations in order to reproduce capitalist production (Abramovitz 2018). This was done 
through a gendered division of labour that meant men were responsible for productive labour 
or paid work,40 whilst women were responsible for socially reproductive unpaid work. In doing 
so the state promoted the household as a unified economic unit and the family as a social unit. 
                                               
36 Esping-Anderson’s (1990) argument also depends on the idea of solidarity. Only with unified, solidarisitic 
classes can welfare decommodification be demanded.  
37 Gordon (1988: 615) makes an important claim however, that he majority of people receiving welfare payments 
were not wage workers, and so their willingness to protest would be unaffected by welfare. Instead, it would be 
more affected by the access to welfare services and the guarantee of wages.  
38 Further demonstrating welfare contingency and the variety of influencing factors, expansion and retraction in 
US welfare has also been found to be related to urban riots and racial insurgency at a national level, suggesting 
that in order to manage disruption, welfare programmes expand (Isaac and Kelly 1981). 
39 Offe (1983: 228) argues that the compatibility of capitalism and democracy, which previous scholars had 
believed incompatible, was only possible because of political mass parties, and the welfare state.  
40 Marxists would not however consider productive and paid work as synonymous. Although both are waged, paid 
work is not concerned with the reproduction of capital.  
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This was achieved through the control on eligibility for welfare payments, the 
comprehensiveness of welfare services, and the discursive enforcement of gendered roles.  
The reproduction of capitalist accumulation requires some people to do productive labour, and 
others to do reproductive labour. Given the relatively rigid gendered division of labour in the 
post-war period, the embedded liberal settlement was built upon a ‘male breadwinner’ model, 
with full employment actually referring to full male employment (Herd 2005; Hemerjick 2013: 
38).41 Women on the other hand were seen as mothers and wives who were dependent on male 
wages, responsible for child care and domestic reproduction (Acker 1988: 491). The class 
compact led to male wages that were supposedly sufficient to maintain an entire family, so 
women would undertake domestic work unpaid and wages were therefore considered a ‘family 
wage’ (Fraser 1994: 591-592). Welfare states were thus built on and (re)produced this 
assumption, although the social reality was very different to the traditional nuclear family 
(Porter 2003: 33). In doing so, the welfare state governed the boundaries of social reproduction, 
directing women to undertake unpaid reproductive labour and men to undertake paid 
productive labour (Taylor-Gooby 1991: 101).  
A variety of institutional features reinforced these relations. Jobs and benefits were made 
difficult for women to access,42 and limited or non-existent state provision in certain areas of 
care enforced women’s dependency in the home and their responsibility for social reproduction 
(Porter 2003: 33).43 A key aspect of post-war welfare was that access was often dependent on 
those with an adequate qualifying record. Not only does this create a commodifying imperative 
(workers must work in order to gain entitlements) but also excluded those who have not gained 
a qualifying record.44 As caring responsibilities were not considered as labour, women were 
often unable to develop the qualifying record for entitlements, making them dependent on a 
male partner or the state (Hobson 1990: 236). For instance, in the USA women’s retirement 
benefits were denied if they were divorced (Acker 1988: 493).  
                                               
41 Although Sainsbury (1996: 70-72) demonstrates the contingency of welfare settlements by challenging the 
pervasiveness of a ‘breadwinner model’ by considering the social policies of Sweden.  
42 In Australia women could only receive unemployment support if was shown that it was not “’reasonably 
possible’ for their husbands to maintain them” (Harris 2001: 14). Alternatively, Shaver (1989) shows how taxation 
and transfer system reinforced gendered divisions of labour.  
43 Although Logue (1979: 71) suggests that Scandinavian welfare did provide a number of different family and 
child care provisions.  
44 Alternatively, migrant workers from the Commonwealth coming to work in Britain were not given access to 
the rights of citizenship (Hughes and Lewis 1998: 5). 
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Finally, dynamics in the embedded liberal welfare settlement governed and disciplined those 
who did not act in line with the accepted gender norms through discursive representations, 
some of which continue to persist. The ‘breadwinner’ model is built on the idea of an 
independent self-governing individual who is considered superior, whilst being ‘dependent’ is 
more pejorative (Fraser and Gordon 1994; Gordon 1988: 611).45 The institutional features and 
associated discourses reinforced the gendered hierarchy of women as dependent on men and 
male incomes. Further, when women had to access the welfare state, it was as ‘wives or 
mothers’ entailing means testing and greater supervision and intrusion, whereas when men who 
had worked access welfare they did so as ‘workers’ entailing a different, less dependent 
relationship (Orloff 1993: 54).46 Conversely men were governed by creating social norms about 
their responsibility for providing income for their family, encouraging or coercing them to join 
the labour market (Abromovitz 2018: 98).47  
 
2.2 Embedded liberal accumulation  
The embedded liberal welfare settlement also enabled continued reproduction of capitalist 
accumulation. In some interpretations the post-war welfare state operated as a social 
democratic ‘truce’ between capital and labour. By wresting control of the state, the working 
class were able to protect themselves from the effects of capitalist accumulation, placing 
controls and constraints on the extent of accumulation (Esping-Anderson 1990). However, 
Marxist theorists pose a central challenge to this position, and it is their argument that will be 
developed here. Rather than preventing accumulation in the post-war era, the welfare state was 
seen as fundamental to the reproduction of capital.  
The first aspect to this approach is that that the welfare state ensured stable social conditions 
for continued reproduction. The post-war settlement required a ‘class compromise’, an 
agreement between labour and capital about the extent of capitalist activity and the power 
distribution between the two sides.48 By internalising the class relations and institutions such 
                                               
45 Despite, as Gordon (1988, 614) points out, they are no more or less dependent on welfare payments than men 
are dependent on labour income.   
46 There is a critical racial argument in that non-white men would struggle to access welfare payments leading to 
“highly conditional forms of welfare” (Powell 2000: 47). 
47 As well as being commodifying, the absence of work for men is said to challenge their identity and sense of 
self, leading to psychological harm (Waddington et al. 1998: 231-234). 
48 Although, Gibson-Graham (2006: 156) notes the challenge of the idea of a ‘class compromise’. Not only does 
it privilege one social formation over all others, but also gives an impression of a unified social formation.  
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as trade unions and left wing political parties in the state, labour was given an influence over 
the operation of the economy, but within a context of capitalist reproduction (Harvey 2005: 10-
12). For example, the class compromise enabled wage restraint and kept inflation low, at least 
temporarily, in return for a low level of unemployment (Broadberry 1994: 253; Nijhuis 2017: 
592). A central feature of this compromise was the welfare state. As argued previously the 
welfare state ensured that the dislocations of the market were ameliorated by welfare 
institutions, providing health care when people were ill and income when they were made 
unemployed or were no longer able to work. For this reason: 
The welfare state can be said to partially dispel motives and reasons for 
social conflict and to make the existence of wage labor more acceptable 
by eliminating parts of the risk that result from the imposition of the 
commodity form upon labor (Offe 1983: 237).  
Here the functions of governance and accumulation are working in support of each other. In 
ensuring social stability by providing income protection and welfare services, systemic 
resistance and unrest was prevented, but also this same feature enabled the class compromise 
and ongoing uninterrupted capitalist accumulation.  
Secondly, this interrelationship can also be seen in the realm of social reproduction where the 
welfare state socialised the costs of capitalist production and its economic reproduction. As 
argued above while the welfare state governed gender norms to induce the household to 
undertake social reproductive work, this not did not entail all reproduction required in society. 
One example is an educational role that provided a skilled labour force, advantaging domestic 
firms and production (Clarke 1988: 172). This can be seen in the extension of universal 
education system, as well as an expansion of higher education or the extension of health care 
to care for ill workers. In its unemployment support role,49 the welfare state enabled capital to 
increase or decrease the labour force as profit demands require, whilst the social costs are 
absorbed through the state. In undertaking the roles, the state socialises the costs of production, 
ensuring profitability (Gough 1975: 67). 
Thirdly the embedded liberal welfare settlement had a socialisation role. For instance, the: 
Education process, at home and in the school, is of crucial importance 
in raising children who are both trained in particular ways to fit them 
                                               
49 Although unemployment was notably low in the post-war era (Broadberry 1994). 
Chapter One: State Welfare in Capitalist Society 
 45 
for the various kinds of work necessary and available under capitalism, 
and trained to a belief in the naturalness and inevitability of this process 
(Wilson 2002: 15).  
Welfare normalised and legitimised capitalist social relations, producing a society of healthy, 
educated and motivated citizens to take part in production or reproduction (Gough 1980: 9). In 
Foucauldian terms, these welfare institutions have been seen as ‘disciplinary’ institutions that 
formed a mode of control, embodying a distinctive political rationality (Fraser 2003: 162).  
The fourth and final accumulation dimension of the embedded liberal welfare settlement was 
as a means to redistribute profits. The post-war settlement was built on a number of key 
economic principles: the pursuit of full employment, state management of the economy 
through fiscal and monetary strategies and demand driven growth through mass consumption 
– a combination of Fordist praxis and Keynesian economics (Clarke 1990, 6-7, 14). 50 
According to Offe (1982: 8): 
The welfare state came to be seen not so much as a burden imposed 
upon the economy, but as a built-in economic and political stabiliser 
which could help to regenerate the forces of economic growth and 
prevent the economy from spiralling downward into deep recessions. 
Welfare maintained growth and demand by re-distributing surplus capital (Clarke 1988: 60). 
Welfare payments ensured those with lower incomes (and a higher propensity to consume) had 
adequate incomes, spreading mass consumption norms and resources outside of those not in 
the labour market. Demand is therefore stimulated, consistent growth is achieved and full 
employment possible (Jessop 1996: 168). 
By doing this the embedded liberal welfare settlement also functioned as a tool to manage 
fluctuations and crises. Through taxation and state spending on services and payments, the state 
could use the welfare state as a tool to manage overaccumulation and falling profitability 
(Clarke 1988). On this view, the crisis prone tendencies of capitalist accumulation require 
‘fixes’, and as unemployment rises, the welfare state (temporarily) maintains demand and 
profitability. This is the fundamental tenet of Keynesian economic management: to regulate 
the fluctuations of capitalist accumulation.  
                                               
50 Or as Clarke pithily puts it “the relationship between Fordism and Keynesianism was about as close and stable 
as we can imagine the relationship between Ford and Keynes would have been!” (Clarke 1990: 15).  
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There is a significant body of literature on the intervening period between the post-war 
settlement and the emergence of neoliberalisation, and the attempts to manage the crisis the 
embedded liberal welfare state encountered.51 However, the focus of the thesis is on stable 
welfare settlements, and so will not be addressed. One useful insight however, is how the 
governance and accumulation strategies began to conflict and how these different imperatives 
can be in contradiction (Offe 1982). As unemployment began to rise during the 1970s, states 
continued to pay benefits to maintain social stability and aggregate demand (Tickell and Peck 
1992: 195). The consequence of this was increased inflation, reduced profitability and a ‘fiscal 
crisis of the state’ due to the increased costs and reduced tax income (O’Connor 1973; Miller 
1989: 88). The governing and accumulation dynamics of welfare settlements can both 
complement at certain times and be incompatible or contradictory at others.
                                               
51 See, for example Therborn and Roebuck (1986); Myles (1988); Rhodes (2000); Peck and Tickell (1994); 
Dukelow (2011). 
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3. Neoliberal welfare settlement 
Having analysed the post-war embedded liberal welfare settlement in terms of governance and 
accumulation, this next section will apply the same conceptual framework to the contemporary 
phase of neoliberalism. This is especially important as the dimensions of governance and 
accumulation developed here will then be specifically used to apply to the empirical cases in 
Chapters Five and Seven. The contemporary neoliberal settlement52 has entailed a fundamental 
reworking of many of the central embedded liberal principles, although some continuities still 
remain. Welfare governance in the neoliberal settlement is characterised by a disciplinary 
approach to enforcing behaviours, inclusion for those outside capitalist relations and an 
extension of surveillance over the deviant or non-compliant. Accumulation enabled by 
neoliberal welfare is seen in processes of privatisation, labour commodification and 
financialisation.  
Beyond very broad principles, the understanding of neoliberalism, a ‘rascal concept’, has been 
exceptionally diverse (Brenner et al. 2010a: 184). Some Marxist scholars have considered 
neoliberalism as a political project to reassert the power of class elites. Within this ‘utopian 
project’ to ‘fix’ capitalism, the neoliberal welfare settlement functions as a legitimating device 
for economic restructuring (Harvey 2004; Saad-Filho and Johnston 2005: 3). Alternatively, 
those from a Foucauldian perspective have suggested that ‘governmentality’ is most valuable 
for understanding contemporary restructuring. Here neoliberalism is characterised by less 
central state government, but more governance of both individuals (including self-governance) 
and institutions to conform to market norms (Larner 2000a: 12-14). For them, neoliberalism 
can be understood as a political rationality that is exercised through capillaries of power and a 
wide array of institutions and discourses.  
This thesis however, draws on ‘neoliberalisation’ as an approach to understand contemporary 
restructuring (Brenner et al. 2010b; Brenner and Theodore 2002; Peck and Tickell 2002). The 
general aim of neoliberalisation processes are to promote market activity, which Brenner et al 
(2010b: 330) describe as: 
market-disciplinary regulatory restructuring…it involves the 
recalibration of institutionalized, collectively binding modes of 
                                               
52 For a historical and theoretical background to the emergence of neoliberalism see (Harvey 2005; Hall et al. 
1996: 13-19) 
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governance and, more generally, state-economy relations, to impose, 
extend or consolidate marketized, commodified forms of social life. 
Neoliberalisation prioritises market-based or market-orientated solutions to regulatory 
problems. This can predominantly refer to processes of commodification of new spaces for 
capitalist accumulation (potentially using new techniques of finance), marketisation of the 
public sector, or the disciplinary restructuring of social relations to market-based ones 
(Brenner et al. 2010b: 330). As with Polanyi, state organisations must play a central (and 
sometimes authoritarian) role in these processes, especially through welfare policies. 
Drawing on insights from political economy and economic geography, neoliberalisation is an 
alternative to other conceptualisations of ‘neoliberalism’, especially those where neoliberalism 
has been used to suggest a uniform progression to a coherent end state.  Neoliberalisation shifts 
the understanding of restructuring to a process and not a final end goal. Consequently, analysis 
focuses on how neoliberalisation is consolidated, reproduced or mutated through different 
policies or regulatory projects. It is a conceptualisation that also resists tendencies to view 
neoliberalism as an irresistible force. Neoliberalisation can be countered or undermined by new 
forms of redistributive or market restraining regulation (Brenner et al 2010b: 340).  
This procedural understanding also allows for contingent and indeterminate outcomes. As 
capitalism itself is variegated, organised and structured by a variation of different historically 
formed institutions and social relations that lead to uneven development across different scales 
so, therefore, is neoliberalisation (Peck and Theodore 2007: 763). As argued above, 
restructuring occurs in a context, where policies are embedded in social relations and 
institutions. Attempts at restructuring then are a collision between changing forms of 
neoliberalisation projects and specific local contexts. Therefore, the forms and specific types 
of neoliberal welfare are ‘hybrid’, uneven across different places and scales and can have 
contradictory outcomes on the societies they reorganise (Brenner et al 2010b: 331-332). This 
has led scholars to call for analysis of “actually existing neoliberalism” to recognise the variety 
of ‘neoliberalisms’ that can be observed (Brenner and Theodore 2002).  
A crucial feature of this contingent and hybridised neoliberalisation is how forms of 
neoliberalism and always already gendered and raced. Rather than focusing on the “moments 
of eruption” (Roberts and Mahtani 2010: 248), of gendered or racial discriminate on that stem 
from processes of neoliberalisation, it is important to recognise that neoliberalism is 
unavoidably imbued with structures of gender and race. Processes of neoliberalisation rely 
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on, alter, and produce race and gender. One of the notable features on contemporary 
neoliberalism is the elimination of overtly gendered and raced roles and discourse, the 
structural features of these social relations remain fundamental (see for example, Kapoor 
2013: 1028). The gendered and raced features of neoliberal governance will be drawn out 
below.  
However, it is important not to become overly specified and consider each act of restructuring 
as unique and unconnected to other international forms. The study of neoliberalisation demands 
attention to uneven, locally specific elements, but also crucially the interconnected, patterned 
phenomena in alternative diverse locations. The concept of neoliberalisation recognises the 
commonalities of international examples of restructuring, while the ‘neo’ reflects the continuity 
with previous forms of liberalism (Brenner et al. 2010b: 331) 
Broadly then from this perspective, the neoliberal settlement can be understood to have gone 
through two phases. Phase one was characterised by the ‘rolling back’ of the embedded liberal 
settlement, deregulating markets (notably financial and labour markets) to encourage 
‘flexibility, weakening trade unions, reducing or privatising state services and industries, and 
using monetarist forms of economic governance (Jessop 2002: 459). Phase two however, 
responds to the dislocation that occurred because of the internal contradictions of phase one: 
the “perverse economic consequences and social externalities” (Peck and Tickell 2002: 399). 
As Polanyi predicted, a ‘free’ market had significant social costs. Phase two has been 
characterised by increasingly authoritarian and interventionist state activity. It seeks to 
paternalistically reregulate and discipline those left dispossessed, enforcing new market social 
relations and subjects. Market failures in a number of areas required an increasing state 
involvement to make markets work. While neoliberalisation is variegated, it is possible to 
identify some common trends of market-based restructuring in welfare policy, themed around 
governance and accumulation.  
 
3.1 Governance: Discipline and stigma  
One of the prominent governance dimensions of the neoliberal welfare settlement is discipline, 
which can operate at different levels. For instance it is apparent in the ways that international 
financial markets are said to ‘discipline’ national economies to organise accumulation in 
specific ways to maximise profitability (Gill 1995). Alternatively, market discipline is exerted 
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on the state such that public sector organisations act more like a private-firms. These forms of 
‘New Public Management ‘ mean that welfare policies must be efficient and deliver value for 
the ‘taxpayer’, having a direct influence on the making of welfare policy (Clarke and Newman 
1997).53 In some areas this has led to the restructuring and retrenchment of welfare services, 
by reducing eligibilities and payment amounts in the pursuit of fiscal discipline. 
In welfare, discipline can function as a regulatory mechanism to organise social life, controlling 
and shaping individual behaviours in-line with market principles to create market subjects. The 
individualising and responsibilising aspects of this are critical. For neoclassical economics 
approaches individuals are considered to be innately individual, rational and utility 
maximising. As such, a key aspect of neoliberalisation is recognition of the flaws of this, and 
therefore focus on the active, and potentially disciplinary, production and maintenance of 
market subjects. For Friedrich Hayek, although people may not naturally be responsible, 
independent individuals, policies can use incentives, disincentives and disciplinary coercion to 
encourage these characteristics (Glaze and Richardson 2017: 140). Stemming from this 
perspective, in neoliberal welfare policy the outcome of people’s lives is considered the 
consequence of their decisions and actions, and negative costs as an appropriate outcome. The 
implication for welfare policy therefore, is that poverty is a moral, personal failing, rather than 
a consequence of structural impediments, what Wacquant (2010: 198) has called “moral 
behaviouralism”.54 When individuals do not act accordingly, they are disciplined or trained to 
overcome their supposed ‘dysfunction and deviance’ that leads to a ‘lifestyle choice’ of welfare 
dependence (Stanford and Taylor 2013: 479).  
This ‘new paternalism’ is evident in in a number of neoliberal welfare policies, as well as penal 
policy, and is indicative of the “aggressive reregulation, disciplining, and containment of those 
marginalized or dispossessed by the neoliberalization of the 1980s” (Schram et al. 2010: 743-
747; see also, Peck and Tickell 2002: 389; Wacquant 2010).55 For example, Schram et al. 
(2008) find that there are systematic racial inequalities in the way that disciplinary sanctions 
are applied. The implication of this being that the implementation of a disciplinary welfare 
program occurs through existing racial structures. 
                                               
53 For example, Green-Pedersen (2002) analyse the reforms in Sweden and Denmark and the way that principles 
of NPM interacted with social democratic principles, and the differing responses the two states took. Alternatively, 
Lorenz (2012) presents new reforms in higher education are characterised by NPM. 
54 For more on the moral connection to neoliberal welfare see Amable (2011: 21-26), and for an example of this 
see Ajzenstadt (2009: 72), who analyses the moral representation of single mothers in Israel.  
55 Some scholars have connected the methods of behavioural economics to welfare state restructuring, especially 
in paternalistic policies (Klein 2016: 508; McMahon 2015) 
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An important mechanism to shape behaviour is to make the experience of receiving welfare: 
So degrading and punitive as to instil in the labouring masses a fear of 
the fate that awaits them should they relax into beggary and pauperism. 
To demean and punish those who do not work is to exalt by contrast 
even the meanest labor at the meanest wages (Piven and Cloward 1972: 
3).  
The mobilisation of shame and stigma associated with the receipt of welfare payments is an 
important feature of this. Scholars have pointed out the disciplinary and stigmatising effect 
welfare can have, and its role in reproducing neoliberalism.56 Stigma can manifest in discourses 
and assumptions about welfare recipients, constructing ‘dependence’ on payment as a moral 
failure on the part of the citizen, often in racialised terms (Fraser and Gordon 1994; Stanford 
and Taylor 2013).57  
Stigma can be powerful in two forms. On one hand it impacts negatively on recipients, and on 
the other it is mobilised for political legitimisation (McCormack 2004).58 As seen in the above 
section, ‘welfare queens’ offers a context specific intersection of both race and gender. In an 
example drawn predominantly from the USA, the ‘welfare queen’ (and also the ‘deadbeat dad’) 
is a discursive trope that, although appearing race neutral, is in fact a raced trope that legitimises 
disciplinary policy and reinforces racial stereotypes (Cammett 2016: 367). These discourses 
and stigmas are also crucially enforced and experienced on a micro level, suggesting the value 
of an everyday study. 
 
 
                                               
56 Although, stigma is not confined solely to the neoliberal settlement. Polanyi (2001: 86) noted how workhouses 
became “an abode of shame” and enforced labour market participation. Esping-Anderson (1990) drew attention 
to stigma which emerges as a consequence of means testing, compelling recipients back into the labour market. 
57 There is significant sociological and anthropological literature on the experiences and navigation of stigma 
(Little 1999; Goode and Maskovsky 2001).  
58 Stigma’s disciplinary function has also been harnessed for microfinance, where the stigma and shame of 
failing to repay one’s debts, especially when borrowing within a group coerces people to repay their loans 
(Armendáriz et al. 2000; Bateman 2010).  
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3.2 Governance: Inclusion  
An alternative, but complementary, dimension to disciplinary neoliberalism is inclusion, which 
in policy terms is sometimes referred to as ‘social inclusion’ (Lister 1998).59 Porter and Craig 
(2004: 390-391; 2005) argue that this constitutes what they describe as ‘inclusive liberalism’ 
and conceptualise its emergence as a Polanyian double movement, re-embedding neoliberalism 
and solving the social disruptions caused by the ‘disembedding’ moment of neoliberalism.60 
However, an alternative interpretation is that neoliberalisation is consolidated by further 
extending market principles and relations further into society. ‘Inclusive liberalism’ can thus 
be reinterpreted as a form of the ‘roll-out’ phase of neoliberalisation. According to this view 
inclusive forms of welfare seek to include ’excluded’ groups into society, and into participation 
in the market. Crucially, it also means inclusion into capitalist social relations and 
commodification. This may be into the labour market, into relations with the state by accessing 
state services or into participation into financial markets (see Jayasuriya 2006).61 Once 
included, it allows the potential for subsequent extensions of discipline or surveillance should 
the state deem it necessary (Cammack 2004: 165).  
Inclusion is however an area saturated with race and gender. As discussed, a facet of 
neoliberalisation is the discursive elimination of these structures. Davis (2007) argues that 
processes of neoliberalisation replace racial discrimination with exclusion from the market, 
and that these inequalities can be eliminated by entering into the workforce. For gender, 
neoliberal policy encourages the inclusion of women into the workforce as a way to alleviate 
and overcome gendered discrimination. However, both of these approaches neglect (or ‘mute’) 
the other structural features that disadvantage certain groups.  
Moving beyond just responsibilising welfare recipients, the inclusion dimension promotes a 
much more active role for the state in identifying barriers for people’s inclusion in the labour 
market and ‘mainstream’ social behaviours (Peck 2001a: 445). Various groups are targeted for 
inclusion into labour market participation. People with disabilities are one such group where 
barriers to their entry to the labour market are identified (the cause of their exclusion) and 
                                               
59 See Lister (1998) on the emergence of social inclusion rather than equality as a policy target for the Labour 
Party in the UK.  
60 Others consider this stage optimistically as ‘post’ or ‘after’ neoliberalism (Jenson 2012; Larner and Craig 2005).  
61 Jayasuriya’s (2006) research is especially valuable as it draws examples from across the world, to make an 
argument about the politics of inclusion. By analysing the UK, Korea, Thailand and Brazil, (states not normally 
discussed together) he is able to draw out the contingent versions of these policies, whilst also connecting them 
together.  
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interventions are made to include them, which can be disciplinary or ‘enabling’ (Harris et al. 
2012: 825). Yet in many cases, funding limitations, especially in the public sector, mean that 
there is limited ability for this to come about in practice. Reflecting the contradictory dynamics 
of neoliberalisation, inclusion occurs alongside funding cuts for disability services and 
exploitative conditions in the workplace (Wilton and Schuer 2006: 192; Soldatic and Chapman 
2010).62 In a study relevant to this thesis, Soldatic and Meekosha (2012) argue that disabled 
women have a specific experience of neoliberal welfare that is “bureaucratised, sanitised and 
moralised”. Disabled women receiving welfare are characterised by ‘disgust’, an emotive 
labelling that shapes and justifies the conditions set on the welfare they receive. 
Applying neoliberalism to the Global South, and in locations with less developed welfare 
systems or state institutions more generally, neoliberalisation is said to involve a process of 
active state building, extending the reach and knowledge of the state infrastructures (Peck and 
Tickell 2002: 384). This involves the extension of neoliberalised state forms and modes of 
governance into areas where other informal, non-market based relations or practices may exist. 
This is encapsulated in the phrase ‘making markets work’, and further ‘making markets work 
for women’. The aim then is to reduce barriers to entry into the labour market for women and 
make the resource allocation from markets efficient. Thus, issues of gender or race inequality 
are reduced to technical issues in the functioning of markets.  
Social protection systems, whilst seemingly counterintuitive to neoliberalism’s focus on more 
markets and less state, are a key part of this state building and contain important inclusionary 
aspects.63 People in the  South are often said to suffer from a number of ‘exclusions’, such as 
access to formal education, health, the internet or finance.64 Improving access and including 
people into these spheres also includes people into neoliberalised, market-based social 
relations, developing a ‘market citizenship’ and consolidating these state forms (Lavinas 2013: 
7; Jayasuriya 2006: 161-162). Including citizens into markets may involve state intervention 
to remove certain obstacles or extend certain infrastructures to enable inclusion. This is 
especially important across spaces and into ‘underdeveloped’ areas, reflecting the previously 
uneven development of capitalist social relations (Brenner et al 2010a: 184). This could be the 
                                               
62 Etherington and Ingold (2012: 41) expose this tension through a comparative study of the UK and Denmark. 
As a result, chiefly, of income security and subsidies, Denmark has been more effective in including people with 
disabilities into the labour market.  
63 For instance, ‘inclusion’ forms a key part of World Bank (2013a) development strategies.   
64 Although this does not necessarily mean exclusion from these areas altogether, with informal forms of health, 
education, or welfare existing (Woolcock and Pritchett 2002: 12). 
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creation of property rights, the enforcing of the rule of law, or the extension of transportation 
infrastructure to allow market participation (Sheppard and Leinter 2010: 191). While enabling 
people to gain education, stay healthy and gain income from labour or financial markets, they 
are also developing and formalising social relations with both the state and the market. 
For women, entry into the workforce may occur alongside additional care or family 
responsibilities. In terms of race, although formal access into the workforce is encouraged, the 
underlying structures that limit attainment or opportunity. As Griffin (2010) points out, 
empowerment has become a key governing code for global governance. Empowerment 
however has depended on measuring the economic role of women and considering it 
‘productive’ when it contributes to the formal economy. As a result non-formal market 
behaviours or relations, such as non-competitive or non-entrepreneurial, are discursively 
eradicated and unvalued.  
 
 
3.3 Governance: Surveillance  
The final governance dynamic of the neoliberal settlement is a much greater extension of 
surveillance and monitoring.65 One could argue that there is nothing intrinsically wrong with 
the surveillance of vulnerable people. Biggs and Powell’s (2001: 14) example of increased 
surveillance to prevent abuse of elderly people seems reasonable. It is the terms and nature of 
surveillance techniques that require critical attention. The extension of surveillance and 
intervention runs counter to some neoliberal discourses of freedom and responsibility, 
principles that would suggest an absence of overarching observation and monitoring. However, 
phase two of neoliberalisation involves a significant extension and intensification of the 
surveillance of people receiving welfare.66 This is closely related to the disciplinary and 
stigmatising aspects of neoliberal welfare. Those stigmatised and represented as deviant or a 
‘risk’ are subject to more intense surveillance (Henmen and Martson 2008), and this can also 
be used as a disciplinary tool to manage and control lives, to enforce market behaviours. 
Surveillance aspects of welfare connect closely with the developments in penal policy under 
                                               
65 Surveillance in the neoliberal settlement is not confined to welfare, Wood (2013) describes the “global 
surveillance assemblage” that maintain neoliberal forms of governance.  
66 MacLeavy and Peoples (2009) suggest that neoliberalised forms of welfare (including surveillance) have been 
influenced by techniques developed in the military.  
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neoliberalisation, such as the increased presence of CCTV cameras or electronic probation 
technologies.67  
One critical feature of surveillance is how it is unevenly distributed and targeted across 
different social groups. Whilst those on welfare are disproportionately monitored, different 
racial and gender groups are often subject to closer scrutiny, and the categorisation can in fact 
intensify these social cleavages (Graham and Wood 2003). Single mothers are often the target 
of surveillance, enabling the state to identify ‘fraudulent’ claims and reduce welfare costs (Hier 
2003: 497). Further, it is often single mothers of colour who are targeted. They are therefore 
more vulnerable to the exercise of state power to construct those who are not ‘good market 
citizens’ as ‘deviants’ and therefore requiring of more surveillance (Maki 2011: 57-58; Gilliom 
2001).  
Surveillance comes in many forms. One is the data collected by social services that are used to 
enforce societal norms. Welfare agencies collect data on the everyday lives of people that is 
collated into large administrative databases, which can be used for the justification for exercises 
of state power (Wacquant 2009: 58-59). Neoliberal governance is also characterised by a use 
of technological surveillance, such as the use of Electronic Benefit Cards (EBT) for welfare 
payments in the USA.68 These allow a much closer and constant scrutiny of financial and 
personal decisions. The technological features allow the state to ‘control at a distance’ and 
shape the behaviours of people using the card towards market activities (Monahan 2009: 292-
294). These techniques of surveillance can also involve a combination of private and public 
actors, creating new market spaces for private actors. The enmeshing of private firms and 
databases with state surveillance not only provokes questions of use and misuse of knowledge 
(Maki 2011: 51), but is also indicative of the ways that governance and accumulation 
dimension combine and reinforce each other. However, surveillance can also be interpersonal, 
with communities functioning as a surveillance system, monitoring for welfare fraud or 
inappropriate behaviour. This ‘street-level’ surveillance embeds state surveillance into local 
social relations allowing the involvements of personal disputes and grievances (Kohler-
Hausmann 2007: 341-342). These surveillance systems, and especially technological ones, can 
enable the state to extend control over the lives of people receiving welfare payments. In short 
                                               
67 See Monahan (2006) and Wacquant (2009) for more on penal surveillance.  
68 As Maki (2011: 54) notes, the embedded liberal settlement also contained surveillance through home visits and 
meetings. The neoliberal version is intensified and developed with technology, as well as the closer involvement 
of private agencies.  
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surveillance consolidates neoliberalisation by monitoring and enabling extensions of discipline 
over ‘deviant’ actors.  
 
3.4 Accumulation: Privatisation  
Dynamics of accumulation in the embedded liberal settlement are distinct from the neoliberal 
settlement in one important way: neoliberalisation involves a much a greater direct 
involvement in accumulation processes. Rather than simply maintaining reproduction, 
neoliberalisation seeks to deepen the involvement of capital in processes of welfare and the 
delivery of services. The most notable example of this is the extensive use of privatisation and 
the increased involvement of private firms in the financing, design and delivery of welfare 
(Raco 2013).69 Privatisation is underpinned by the fundamental neoliberal notion of the 
primacy of the market. One feature of this is the creation of new markets for state services and 
the delivery of public goods. By offering contracts that different organisations (including state 
agencies) can apply for, states can create competitive markets and ensure the best price and 
service. This can be seen in a number of areas of social policy, such as pension provision and 
savings (Hyde et al. 2003), public housing (Forrest and Murie 1991), or health care (Pollock 
2004).70 However, a central Polanyian insight is that as well as the creation of markets, the 
state must also take an active and prominent role in the maintenance of those markets. The state 
does not remove itself from these spheres, but instead takes a regulatory role, evidenced by the 
significant rise in independent and semi-independent regulatory institutions for example, 
pensions regulators or healthcare ‘watchdogs’ (Schamis 2002; Birch and Siemiatycki 2016: 
193). 
There are many ways to interpret processes of privatisation. Harvey (2004: 75) understands 
privatisation as part of a wider process of ‘accumulation by dispossession’. The state enables 
new forms of accumulation for capital by dispossessing public assets and services, moving 
them into the sphere of private property in a form of legalised theft, so as to provide a temporal 
                                               
69 Beyond this, privatisation is also relevant in a number of other, non-welfare areas, such as water (Narsiah 2012; 
Bayliss 2014).   
70 There is also a body of literature that looks at the discourses around state and private services that serve as a 
legitimating device for privatisation by representing state services as inefficient and costly. The state is positioned 
as being an inefficient provider who wastes money and fails to provide sufficient levels of quality or choice. Thus, 
the solution is to commodify services and place them in the hands of the private sector which are able to 
(McGregor 2001; McClusky 2003). 
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fix to overaccumulation.71 Other literatures see this more benignly as a means to reduce 
spending and improve the fiscal position of the state (Feigenbaum et al. 1998). However, a 
more apt understanding of neoliberal privatisation is one of a contingent, variegated 
phenomena that aims to open new spaces for market accumulation. Privatisation rarely operates 
in a linear, uniform fashion, and it is instead composed of a selection of public-private 
partnerships, forms of outsourcing and marketisation. These are the products of policy 
attempts, learning and failures, a constant process of adaptation and reregulation (Peck and 
Theodore 2012: 179).  
An example of the ‘mutations’ of neoliberalisation is in the variety of ways private organisation 
are enmeshed into providing welfare services, without being solely responsible for them. For 
example, through outsourcing private firms have been contracted to undertake a number of 
frontline services, while final responsibility and funding rest with the state (Newman 2011). 
For example, when private providers fail, the state must re-enter to provide the service. 
Alternatively, private firms can become closely involved with the design of policies, “giving 
them a seat at the planning table” allowing them to reinforce market centred ideas inside policy 
decisions (Aldred 2008: 31). Finally, a recent development has been private firms financing 
services, but not delivering the service. Social Impact Bonds allow capital to profit from the 
delivery of welfare services, by gaining a return on investment through the savings in state 
spending the project is anticipated to make (Dowling 2017; Dowling and Harvie 2014). 
Notably, as with cashless systems, these schemes are gaining prominence internationally 
(McHugh et al. 2013).  
However, the markets states create are not necessarily ‘free’ in the sense of being subject to 
inter-firm competition. While the state can create such markets through a variety of techniques, 
it also has the power to create loosely regulated monopolies or oligopolies when privatising or 
outsourcing. This is especially common in areas with natural monopolies, where competition 
is difficult or impossible such as power or water networks. In these sorts of markets, one 
organisation is given significant power, which can manifest in rent seeking (Chung and Ngai 
2007: 72) or the sale of income streams on financial markets at the cost of public service quality 
(Leyshon and Thrift 2007: 103). This relates to Crouch’s (2011) idea about ‘corporate 
neoliberalism’. As it favours efficiency, and large firms are considered the most efficient, 
                                               
71 Whiteside’s (2009: 81-86) uses this concept in her analysis of healthcare in Canada. She sees the restructuring 
as part of a ‘fix’ to solve overaccumulation and temporarily solve capitalist crisis. Here the scholarship will tend 
to understand commodification as a method to increase the profitability and market for private firms, often at the 
cost of quality of service (see also, Pollock 2004). 
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neoliberalism actually often creates unfree monopoly markets, allowing significant profits and 
a concentration of power in the hands of a small number of firms (Crouch 2016: 156). 
 
3.5 Accumulation: Commodification of labour 
The neoliberal welfare settlement encompassed a different type of labour market, and therefore 
different welfare principles than the embedded liberal settlement. There welfare was said to be 
decommodifying, allowing people to exist outside the market. The new ‘flexible’ labour market 
required social relations to be restructured, weakening the power of labour, whilst the state 
encouraged people into the labour market and new commodified forms of social relations 
(Brenner et al 2010b: 330). These ‘workfare’ policies have a number of strategies to encourage 
or discipline the unemployed into work (Dingeldey 2007; Peck 2001b).72 One simple method 
is to reduce the value of welfare payments, making existence outside waged labour difficult or 
impossible (Allan and Scruggs 2004: 498-501). This is part of a wider restructuring, and 
changes in the quantitative level of payments have been accompanied by transformative 
qualitative changes in the terms of payments. Welfare payments have been transformed from 
being an entitlement, requiring minimal reciprocal action from the recipient, to conditional. 
These conditionalities are increasingly common and relate to the disciplinary forms of 
governance discussed previously. Conditionalities can be, amongst other things, the need to 
undertake work (‘work-first programmes’), certain forms of job or skills training, job search 
requirements or routinely interacting with state agencies (Peck 2001b; Peck and Theodore 
2001).73 These conditions are accompanied by punitive consequences, such as sanctioning, if 
conditions are not met (MacDonald and Marston 2005: 389).74  
Returning to Polanyi, although labour is a fictitious commodity, workfare seeks to make it 
operate as closely as possible to a ‘real’ commodity in a market. By reducing the ability to opt 
                                               
72 Some also refer to these as ‘activation’ policies (Etherington and Ingold 2012; Borghi and Van Berkel 2007). 
However, the implication underlying the phrase ‘activation’ is that people receiving welfare were previously 
inactive or passive, a political statement that justifies more intrusive forms of state policy.  
73 Peck’s (2001b) work is worth noting here, as he provides a multi-layered investigation of the emergence of 
workfare schemes since the 1970s. Of the many valuable insights in Peck’s work, one is of particular interest. 
Peck connects global processes through national contexts and into local enactments. He takes the “structural and 
generic features of workfarism combined with a sensitivity to the variability of local outcomes”, seeing how they 
manifest in different institutional contexts (Peck 2001b: 11). In comparing US, Canada and UK policies he shows 
the continuities and discontinuities of policy transfer. Implementation is seen to be uneven and iterative, leading 
to diverse and varied outcomes. 
74 Further Schram et al. (2009: 414-416) note that the use of sanctions is especially racialised. Latina and black 
people were found to be much more likely to be sanctioned than white clients.  
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out, welfare policy aims to maintains a labour ‘market’ that should respond to price signals 
(wages) and be responsive to demands for flexibility. Flexibility is considered a critical 
component in the neoliberal settlement, and so the labour force is required to be responsive to 
this, leading to a rise in ‘precarious’ forms of employment (Jessop 1999: 355; Standing 2011). 
The ‘zero hour contract’ is the epitome of this wherein the labour market can expand or contract 
with ease when needed. Given the unfavourable terms of these labour markets for workers, 
welfare states play a role in maintaining or enforcing it, for example by having mandatory 
waiting times before being allowed to claim benefits or using sanctions to coerce people back 
into the labour force. 75  
The justifications for these policies are to shift the ‘incentives’ for people, deterring them from 
wanting welfare support and keeping them ‘job ready’ (Besley and Coate 1992: 249). Some 
scholars consider workfare policies as ‘enabling’, as they allow individuals the opportunity to 
retrain, improve their skills and gain work experience. Torfing (1999) for instance sees 
activation in Denmark as empowering recipients to improve their life quality. Brodkin (2008: 
3) thus identifies two perspectives on workfare: 
One view is that workfare is part of a neo-liberal project of 
commodification that makes paid work a responsibility of citizenship 
and gives primacy to the market in determining the value of their 
contribution. Another view is that workfare is part of a project of 
inclusion that can be used to bring marginalized populations into the 
mainstream by supporting their advancement in the labor market. 
These perspectives – both of which have some validity – are also relevant to distinct types of 
governance. Some (the ‘deserving’) are included into an ‘enabling’ environment, incorporated 
into capitalist social relations and benefiting from training or accommodation in workplace. 
Yet the purpose of enabling welfare policy is still to compel people to enter or return to the 
labour market; existing outside it is not considered an option. Others (the ‘undeserving’) are 
subject to discipline, stigma and coercion of the sort discussed previously. Both these two 
aspects are coherent within the neoliberal welfare settlement and the commodification of 
labour. Workfare individualises poverty and unemployment, neglecting the structural changes 
                                               
75 See for example, Smith et al. (2008: 290) on the ways that the welfare state has enabled flexibility promoting 
labour market reforms in Eastern Europe. However, they do also note that elections in Poland and Slovakia had 
led to reduction in retrenchment and flexibilization, demonstrating the continual change and contestation of 
neoliberalisation.  
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in the economy whilst ‘complementing’ deregulated labour markets and promoting precarious 
forms of employment (Peck and Theodore 2000: 120; Greer 2016).  
 
3.6 Accumulation: Financialisation  
The final accumulation dimension of the neoliberal welfare settlement is financialisation. 
Whilst Peck and Tickell (2002: 391) consider both changes in finance and changes in social 
policy to be critical aspects of neoliberalisation, they are theorised as separate processes. 
Arguably though, financialisation and welfare policy have worked together. Financialisation is 
a crucial process as it combines a significant number of the dynamics of neoliberalisation and 
welfare. This is expressed in Soederberg’s (2014) concept of the ‘debtfare state’. Whilst 
expansions of finance are considered forms of ‘inclusion’, debt relations in fact enable 
accumulation and were introduced to solve a crisis of ‘over-accumulation’. Financial 
accumulation through neoliberal welfare can chiefly occur in two ways – either indirectly, by 
restructuring welfare to make survival dependent on engaging with financial markets, or by 
directly encouraging participation in the financial market to offset future risks and increase 
incomes.76 Crucially, the forms of financialisation that can be observed in the neoliberal 
settlement are contingent on social and policy context, generating a diversity of financialised 
welfare forms.  
Firstly, financial accumulation is indirectly enabled by simply reducing the incomes of those 
on welfare, so that households take on more debt. Montgomerie (2013: 872) argues that rather 
than a welfare safety net, consumer credit has created a ‘debt safety net’. Changes in credit 
markets are linked to actions by households to cope with welfare changes, funding healthcare, 
education or periods of unemployment, which is seen as a (re)privatisation of social 
reproduction (Roberts 2013: 25-26). Indeed, indicating the epochal shift outlined in this 
chapter, Crouch (2009) considers this a regime of ‘privatised Keynesianism’. Rather than the 
state borrowing to maintain aggregate demand, individuals borrowed to maintain their incomes 
and in doing so also maintained economic growth.77 Streeck (2011: 28) sees this as critical 
                                               
76 Dowling (2017: 295) makes a clear statement on the interaction of financialisation with welfare, “the defining 
characteristic of the financialisation of the welfare state is in effect a co-imbrication between the state and finance: 
on the one hand, the state accesses finance to achieve social policy goals; on the other hand, finance uses the state 
to accumulate financial profits.” 
77 See also Gonzalez (2015) on the Chilean version of a privatised Keynesian regime, whereby debt is generated 
via department stores and attributed to consumption habits, private welfare services and decreased incomes.  
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issue for the future of capitalism, suggesting that “democratic states [are] being turned into 
debt collecting agencies on behalf of a global oligarchy of investors.” In this form, the state 
enables accumulation by forcing debtor-lender relationships on those with low incomes.  
Secondly, accumulation has been encouraged through promoting direct participation in 
financial markets and activities. One area has been through ‘asset-based welfare’, 
concentrating predominantly on mortgages and the housing market, whereby “rather than 
relying on state-managed social transfers to counter the risks of poverty, individuals accept 
greater responsibility for their own welfare needs by investing in financial products” (Doling 
and Ronald 2010: 165). The rationale of encouraging individuals to invest in a house is that 
they would then be able to nurture their asset and access income through further borrowing and 
eventual sale (Montgomerie and Budenbender 2015: 390). Underpinning asset-based welfare 
is said to be an attempt to remake the subjectivities, aspirations and behaviours of citizens, 
whilst also shifting liability from state to individual for securing welfare (Finlayson 2009: 
407).78 Another area has been the management of pensions. It is claimed by some states that 
individuals should no longer expect to receive a reliable state-based pension upon retirement 
and should instead invest in financial products to ensure that they have a sufficient income 
(Langley 2004).79 
In the Global South financial accumulation has manifested most clearly in the form of financial 
inclusion, which has become a central policy tool for resolving development issues (Taylor 
2012; Schwitty 2011). Rather than attempting to tackle structural causes of poverty, welfare 
programmes seek to include individuals into financial markets, encouraging them to save, or 
borrow to generate their own incomes and protect themselves against unexpected costs. 
Microfinance is a key example of this.80 Combining neoliberal ideas of responsibilisation and 
individualisation, microfinance is said to encourage poor people to generate their own incomes, 
whilst also generating profits for financial organisations.81 Microfinance enables accumulation 
by “channelling return-seeking capital into Asian slums, African villages and Latin American 
                                               
78 However, asset-based welfare in Wales demonstrates how contingency is relevant within states, and how a 
spatial scale (devolved government) affects policy. Prabhakar (2013: 660) suggests that the Welsh version was a 
progressive means to promote financial inclusion amongst low income families. 
79 Langley’s work on the everyday of financial subjects will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Two.  
80 Although commonly considered a policy in the Global South, microfinance has also been seen in ‘developed 
welfare states’, with similar outcomes. Barinaga (2014: 28) argues that microfinance in Sweden has resulted in 
new neoliberal methods for governing excluded groups. Alternatively, financial inclusion programmes in Britain 
are said to reflect neoliberal discourses emphasising autonomy, individualism and market participation (Marron 
2013). 
81 This echoes a large body of critical scholarship on microfinance, (see for instance Bateman 2010). 
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favelas, bringing them closer to the core of contemporary capitalist activity” (Mader 2015: 1). 
This idea of ‘incorporating’ the unbanked is vital to financial processes, and welfare can be 
seen at the forefront of this. However, this process is never smooth or uncontested, and these 
efforts are at the ‘frontier’ of an intense but contested space (Aitkin 2015: 10).
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4. Problematising welfare settlements 
 
The previous two sections have developed an argument about the nature of welfare in capitalist 
societies and the way that the two prominent liberal welfare settlements have developed forms 
of governance and accumulation to maintain and manage capitalist social relations and 
accumulation. It has done this by drawing on the established literature in the field of the 
political economy of welfare and process of neoliberalisation. However, this literature 
overlooks two notable aspects of welfare provision, one empirical and one analytical. Firstly, 
the mode of welfare payment has been neglected as an empirical feature of welfare policy. 
Secondly, the analysis of welfare settlements has focused on areas (such as regimes, states or 
policies) up to, but not including the everyday. Addressing both these limitations, the move 
towards an everyday perspective will thus make a valuable contribution to the study of 
neoliberal welfare.  
 
4.1 Modes of payment  
A significant amount of the literature on welfare concentrates on payments. In both the 
embedded liberal and neoliberal welfare settlements payments have been fundamental, where 
there is a variety of different types of payment, such as for child care, pensions, disability 
support or unemployment. Other studies look at the reach, eligibility and value of payments. 
The retrenchment debate for example analyses the extent to which welfare payments on 
aggregate have increased or decreased. In the contemporary era literature on workfare has 
looked at how welfare payments have been coupled with conditions and obligations for those 
receiving the payment. However, the majority of previous literature on welfare payments has 
been focused on the value of payments, the eligibility of payments or the conditions of 
payments. What is notable is the absence of attention to the mode of payments.  
Occasionally, some literature does acknowledge the importance of the mode of payment. This 
is most common in research in the Global South, where the diversity of payment forms, and 
the relatively recent emergence of social protection systems have seen a greater interest in 
payments. Two prominent debates are identifiable. One strand has looked at the effectiveness 
of delivering payments either through cash or in-kind payments as in the case of food aid, with 
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effectiveness often considered in terms of the increase in food consumption and improvements 
in food security of these welfare recipients (Schubert and Slater 2006: 573; Hidrobo et al. 
2014). Alternatively, another strand looks at the connection between electronic payments (card 
or mobile) and financial inclusion. Here electronic modes of payment are assessed as being 
more cost-effective, improving state identity systems (Gelb and Decker 2012) and opening 
access to financial markets for people (Santos and Kvangraven 2017).82 While these 
acknowledge the important of modality, they neglect a critical perspective on the terms of 
assessment and fail to connect them to the larger questions of welfare restructuring. Notably, 
while Lavinas (2013: 7) mentions modalities of payments in relation to the reshaping of welfare 
to draw people into “the embrace of financial markets”, she leaves unanswered the deeper 
questions of how they do this, and with what consequence. 
This is an important absence as “modalities matter” (Bauchet 2015).83 Modes of welfare 
payments can vary widely. There are simple, cash-based distribution systems where people go 
to specific places to receive money in cash form, or paper-based voucher systems that allow 
only specific purchases. Alternatively, and most commonly across established welfare systems, 
money is transferred electronically into people’s personal bank accounts. More recent 
developments, especially in the Global South, have seen the rise of mobile phone-based 
payments. For all of the different types of payment, from pensions to unemployment benefit, 
there are interesting variegated forms of politics that demand scrutiny. Moreover, the mode of 
a payment fundamentally affects the everyday lives of the people receiving welfare, such as 
how, where or when they receive or can spend their money. Crucially then, understanding 
modes of payment requires attention to the everyday. 
 
4.2 Welfare and the everyday  
As has been seen, a substantial portion of the welfare literature concentrates on an analytical 
level above the everyday, be it analyses of broad regulatory settlements, regimes, states or 
policies. All of these have generated substantial amount of useful research, and valuable 
analytical concepts that will be used in the thesis. However, the political economy of welfare 
                                               
82 Santos and Kvangran (2017: 211-212) do warn however about the risks of uncompetitive financial systems that 
be exploitative if not properly regulated. 
83 Although Bauchet’s (2015) argument is that modalities matter in the case of microinsurance and its uptake, 
rather than mattering as a site of politics and critical attention.  
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can be extended and deepened by also drawing attention to the everyday. This is the case for 
three reasons: one empirical and two analytical. 
Firstly, the empirical need for the everyday. Contemporary neoliberalisation is characterised 
by a much greater attention and intervention into the micro aspects of people’s lives. It involves 
greater involvement in the ‘social’ to remake and restructure the lives of people receiving 
welfare (Peck and Tickell 2002: 389). This consolidates neoliberalisation in everyday life 
through market based governance and accumulation dynamics. The ideas of ‘new paternalism’, 
for instance, seek to identify and modify the behaviours of the poor, as they are considered to 
be unable to make the changes themselves (Schram et al. 2010). Arguably, one critical feature 
that distinguishes the neoliberal settlement from the embedded liberal version is the scale and 
intensity of interventions into everyday life that technology has facilitated. Technological 
advancement has enabled closer surveillance as well as new techniques to control and manage 
people receiving welfare, including by changing the mode of welfare payment. Likewise, the 
state has been prominent in enabling accumulation through processes of everyday 
financialisation (to be discussed in more detail in the next chapter). These have targeted the 
everyday as a space for accumulation, whilst ‘bottom of the pyramid’ ideas have repackaged 
the poor and their lives as a profitable and underserved market. 84 
Two further points demonstrate the analytical justification for the focus on the everyday, and 
the limitations of the literature that neglect it. This thesis proposes to take contingency 
seriously. By this it means it recognises the variety of context specific factors that shape the 
outcomes of policies, as well as their changing and evolving nature. As such, one important 
factor in the contingent processes of welfare restructuring is how people react and respond 
when their everyday lives are targeted. This is not wholly novel. Scott (1998) has demonstrated 
how state projects frequently fail to achieve their aims, and efforts to understand, organise and 
manipulate the social world by the state have often ended in disaster.85  
                                               
84 The bottom of the pyramid is an idea coined by Prahalad (2009) to suggest that businesses are missing out by 
not marketing and selling to the poorest people. In doing so, not only will the poor consumer better products, but 
businesses will make more profits. Whilst the concept has been critiqued and suggested that costs are too high 
and market penetration very difficult, the bottom of the pyramid has been extended to refer to any business ideas 
that profits from selling to the very poor. See for example, Schwittay (2014: 512) on repackaging the poor as 
financial consumers.  
85 Scott’s analysis is however, mainly centred on authoritarian states pursuing ideas of ‘high modernity’, so not 
directly relevant, but his earlier work “Weapons of the Weak” demonstrates how everyday forms of resistance are 
possible, and subvert and shaping policy making (Scott 1985). 
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Policies are not smoothly and simply implemented onto the social world, and the ‘actually 
existing’ policy forms are the product of compromise, contestation and constant maintenance. 
Similarly, the social world that policies are working with does not receive attempts at 
restructuring passively. People can resist, adapt or modify policy, invoking a corresponding act 
and modification from policymakers.86 As Polanyi argued, the social world does not tolerate 
all efforts to disembed it and make it subject to the market. This resonates with Seabrooke and 
Hobson’s (2007) argument that existing IPE is largely characterised by ‘Regulation’ IPE, 
which has a core question of “who governs and how is international order regulated?”, and 
analyses nations and hegemons in a top-down rationalist method (Seabrooke and Hobson 2007: 
5). For them the everyday opens analysis to the sites, the nature and strength of resistance, or 
alternatively, the absence of resistance and legitimations that drive and shape change 
(Seabrooke and Hobson 2007: 13).87 Whilst studies of neoliberalisation have covered 
“national, regional and local instances of neoliberal regulatory reform” (Brenner et al 2010b: 
335), delving into the messy world of the everyday, to fully understand policies’ form and 
effect would also be valuable.  
Finally, the everyday offers an important extension to the broad settlement ideas that are 
prominent in the political economy of welfare. It is undeniably valuable to discuss the wider 
connections and ideas that underlie welfare restructuring, connecting and theorising events. 
However, it is also useful to draw on insights and research methods from a more sociological 
or anthropological background to deepen the understanding of welfare reform. This brings the 
chapter back to where it began. Polanyi’s (1957) sociological understanding of the economy 
draws attention to how economies are embedded in social relations, and structured by 
institutions, both economic and non-economic. As above, the gendered and raced discursive 
codes that are central to neoliberalisation can be seen to have an everyday impact, shaping and 
affecting people’s lives and behaviours. 
Extending to the everyday gives an insight into this, complicating and deepening some of the 
broader and abstract ideas. It allows questions about how restructuring occurs, how it is given 
meaning or how it is experienced by those subject to it. As Enloe’s (2013: 47, emphasis added) 
                                               
86 Similar thoughts are developed by Miller and Rose (1990: 14) “‘the real’ always insists in the form of resistance 
to programming; and the programmer's world is one of constant experiment, invention, failure, critique and 
adjustment.” 
87 The concept of ‘legitimacy’ is especially important to Seabrooke and Hobson’s (2007) understanding of the 
everyday. Regardless of unequal power relations, the weak have a capacity to change their “political, economy 
and social environment” through small rejections of legitimacy (Seabrooke and Hobson 2007: 13-14).  
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work on factory organising shows, the concepts and issues IPE is interested in were “out of 
sync with the everyday realities of women factory workers”. An everyday approach facilitates 
a deepening of core concepts and dynamics that have been discussed in this chapter. For 
example, in the case of stigma as a method of discipline, becomes much more visible when the 
analysis moves beyond the level of regulation and settlements, and into the everyday. As 
something relational and experiential, it can be most effectively identified and understood by 
speaking to those subject to stigmatising discourses. Trying to understand stigma at a policy or 
national level is insufficient, as it misses how it is experienced and navigated. How is stigma 
experienced and how does it shape and affect people’s lives? By understanding the actual lived 
experiences and effects on social relations, this approach provides an additional critical edge 
to welfare literature.  
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5. Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a foundation for the analysis of the emergence of cashless welfare 
payments, as well as demonstrating an opportunity to make an original contribution to the 
academic literature. It has first argued that welfare settlements are an intrinsic part of capitalist 
societies and that the two are fundamentally linked and intertwined. The two broad concepts 
of governance and accumulation were developed to understand this relationship. They were 
applied to two prominent liberal welfare settlements, finding different manifestations of 
governance and accumulation in the embedded liberal and neoliberal settlement. Under the 
embedded liberal settlement, governance was achieved by enabling social stability and 
enforcing a gendered division of labour. Accumulation was enabled through the class 
compromise whereby welfare reproduced an effective labour force whilst maintaining 
aggregate demand.  
The governance and accumulation dynamics of neoliberalisation are especially crucial to this 
thesis and will be used to frame the upcoming empirical analysis. Neoliberal governance was 
argued to be characterised by discipline, inclusion and surveillance, while accumulation was 
enabled through the processes of privatisation, labour commodification and financialisation. 
However, the manifestation of welfare policy was not simply read off the broad settlements, 
but was seen as contingent on national, political and social context. This supports the use of a 
neoliberalisation perspective that views welfare as variegated and uneven, requiring 
investigation of ‘actually existing’ forms of policy.  
This leads to the concluding point of the chapter, that there are two gaps in the literatures on 
welfare settlements. The first is empirical, namely that the mode of transfer is an important site 
of welfare politics that requires further investigation and insufficient attention has thus far been 
paid to cashless welfare payments. Secondly, it argues that the everyday is a crucial level of 
analysis to develop the study of welfare. It is important because of the changing policy of 
contemporary welfare, the contingent outcomes it generates, and the deepening and 
complicating it offers to the dynamics of governance and accumulation. How should the 
everyday be conceptualised and analysed? What are its distinctive features, and how does it 
relate to capitalist accumulation? These are questions the next chapter will aim to answer. 
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Chapter Two: The Everyday Turn and 
Welfare Payments 
 
The previous chapter closed by suggesting that while the literature on welfare had valuable 
insights, in order to adequately understand the contemporary and contingent nature of 
neoliberal welfare an appreciation of the ‘everyday’ was necessary. This chapter picks this up 
and will develop an understanding of the everyday that will be then used to guide the empirical 
analysis. The aim of this chapter is to develop a framework to fill the absences seen in Chapter 
One, while also bringing the literature on neoliberalisation and everyday life into fruitful 
conversation. The absences of the previous literature were, firstly, an understanding of the 
‘everyday’ and how welfare, in the form of CWP, targets and shapes it. Secondly, an 
understanding of the contingent nature and policies and how they are resisted or opposed. And 
finally, developing a grounded, sociological approach to understanding key processes of 
neoliberalisation. The chapter uses Lefebvre’s concept of ‘Everyday Life’,88 and the processes 
of ’programming’ within it, to explain the interaction with neoliberalisation. It argues that 
Lefebvre offers a sophisticated understanding of the everyday that complicates and deepens 
processes of neoliberalisation. Everyday life and its programming provide a way to understand 
how restructuring can occur, as well as the ways that this is contingent, challenged and 
experienced.  
The chapter begins with a discussion of the contemporary turn to the everyday in IPE, arguing 
that Lefebvre’s approach offers a sophisticated theorisation compared to that seen in other 
literature. It then describes Lefebvre’s argument, beginning with how the everyday relates to 
capitalism. Central here is Lefebvre’s call for a sociological Marxism, as well as the alienating 
effects of the transformation of social relations that has occurred in capitalist societies. It then 
draws out the relationship between the state, space and the everyday, with clear parallels to 
Polanyi and neoliberalisation from Chapter One, and through this explains the process of 
programming and Everyday Life. The chapter then applies Lefebvre’s ideas to the study of 
CWP and sees possibilities for programming in two area: the construction of social meanings 
of money and everyday financialisation. Social meanings of money shape who gets how much, 
what it can be spent on, where it can be spent on and how it can be spent, all of which can be 
                                               
88 A note on phrasing and capitalisation. When referring to Lefebvre’s specific conceptualisation of the ‘Everyday 
Life’, it will be capitalised, in other places in this chapter and the rest of the thesis, everyday life will be used. 
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programmed to affect everyday life (Zelizer 1994). Everyday financialisation addresses how a 
cashless financial mode of payment opens a space for new forms of accumulation (Maurer 
2012) and inclusion (Aitken 2015) that shape the routines of everyday life.  
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1. The Everyday Turn in IPE 
In the previous chapter, the focus on the everyday was justified for three reasons, namely, 
because of an increased targeting of the everyday in the neoliberalisation of welfare, because 
of the value of a sociological perspective, and because policies are contingent on their everyday 
implementation. However, there are a number of different ways to understand the everyday in 
IPE. What does Lefebvre's conceptualisation offer? This section will first assess the 
contemporary everyday IPE literature89 and, following Davies (2006; 2016), argue that 
contemporary studies of everyday IPE often fail to adequately theorise what the everyday 
actually is. As will be seen, the everyday in IPE commonly appears as anything that people or 
societies do, without always referring to actual practices or behaviours, lacking a concrete 
perspective of the ‘everydayness’ of the everyday (Lefebvre and Levich 1987). However, the 
section will suggest that Lefebvre offers a useful and developed theory of Everyday Life, and 
therefore a framework with which to understand it. 
One notable and influential body of literature that does contain a theorised understanding of 
the everyday is feminist and gender studies. Feminist scholars have been notably influential in 
this recent emergence of everyday IPE, drawing attention to the ways that economic 
transformations “are constituted by deeply gendered economic practices at the everyday level” 
(Elias and Roberts 2016: 787). Enloe’s (2014) work is especially important expanding the 
feminist dictum that the “personal is political” by claiming the “international is political” too. 
Enloe’s conceptualisation of the everyday is a gendered one. She argues that to understand 
international politics “requires us to follow diverse women to places that are usually dismissed 
by conventional foreign affairs experts as merely ‘private’, ‘domestic’, ‘local’ or ‘trivial’”, and 
that ‘the mundane matters’ (Enloe 2014: 27; Enloe 2013: ch.3). The everyday can be located 
in any number of sites, but should be analysed where gender is important, but neglected. While 
valuable, the everyday focus of feminist IPE has tended to be on the household and structures 
of patriarchy. As such this thesis instead follows Lefebvre’s approach, as it provides a way to 
understand the everyday in terms routine practices and capitalist social relations, themes that 
were more pertinent to the thesis.  
                                               
89 Whilst an interest in the everyday has renewed recently, Watson (2013) suggests a longer lineage. He draws 
connections between eighteenth-century classical political economy of Adam Smith and contemporary political 
economy.  
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Recent literature on everyday IPE suggests it can be separated into two separate, but 
interconnected forms of analysis (Elias et al. 2016: ch.12, Davies 2016). One influential strand, 
termed ‘everyday politics’ by Elias et al. (2016: 244-246) looks at how actors experience, resist 
or acquiesce to economic change. While not effacing power asymmetries, this approach 
suggests that there is always “space, however small, for the expression of agency” (Elias et al. 
2016: 244). Everyday politics connects closely to the case for contingency made in the previous 
chapter. The agency of everyday actors mediate, or cause changes to economic restructuring, 
creating an interaction that produces unexpected outcomes. Seabrooke and Hobson (2007) 
offer one of the most prominent versions of this argument. Counterpoised to Regulatory IPE is 
their own approach, Everyday IPE (EIPE), which asks “who acts and how do their actions 
constitute and transform the world economy in its multiple spatial dimensions” (Seabrooke and 
Hobson 2007: 12). The insights gained from their approach are highly valuable, demonstrating 
the sociological foundations of IPE categories, the sites of resistance that can be identified and 
the forms of change this causes. However, at the heart the authors conceptualise the everyday 
as anyone who isn’t an elite, and any act that negotiates, constitutes, transforms, resists or does 
not resist the political and economic environment (Seabrooke and Hobson 2007: 15-16). It is a 
broad and undiscerning conception of the everyday and one that is potentially better 
characterised as resistance rather than particularly everyday. “Once agents take up overt 
resistance, in what ways can they be said to be engaged in everyday activities?” (Davies 2016: 
25).   
The second form of everyday analysis is termed ‘everyday life’, where this thesis and 
Lefebvre’s work more comfortably sits. From this perspective everyday life is structured, or 
‘disciplined’, shaping lives to follow certain practices that are subsequently normalised, 
helping to maintain wider structures of power. For example, Konings (2009: 77) suggests that 
US financial power is built on a buttress of everyday financial participation, which was driven 
by the ability of financial elites to “control the dynamics” of everyday life. The everyday here 
is understood loosely, simply as people in the economy, neglecting any of the routine or 
repetitive things that give the everyday its ‘everydayness’ (Lefebvre and Levich 1987). Further, 
society is disciplined through the exercise of elite power at an institutional level, but little 
attention is paid to the subjects of discipline and their experiences.   
A more sophisticated example of everyday life is offered by  Langley (2008: 11-16). He 
analyses the disciplinary creation of ‘investment subjects’ (as seen in the practices of saving 
and borrowing), drawing on Lefebvre’s understanding of the everyday as residual, routine and 
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repetitive. He also incorporates the ways that everyday investors and pension savers do not 
cooperate or obey the structures placed upon them. “Individuals cannot identify with the 
subject position of the investor to which they are summoned in an unambiguous manner, and 
therefore negotiate and contest disciplinary power relations in important ways” (Langley 2007: 
80). People have resisted and adapted to attempts to promote investment in pensions by not 
accepting the risk of investing while investing in housing instead. However, Langley’s (2008: 
15) approach is underpinned by a post-structuralism that seeks to understand the 
transformations and constitution of market networks. Lefebvre’s approach is distinct from this 
in retaining the centrality of capital accumulation as the driving force for restructuring 
Everyday Life, as with earlier discussions of welfare in Chapter One.  
Both literature on everyday politics and everyday life, whilst insightful and valuable, have 
sometimes struggled to fully conceptualise and theorise the ‘everyday’. As the chapter will 
now show, Lefebvre provides such as framework. It is the aim of this thesis to combine both 
the ‘everyday politics’ and ‘everyday life’ conceptualisation through Lefebvre’s conception of 
Everyday Life. While Lefebvre is clear on the ways that everyday life is programmed and 
conditioned by capitalism (the ‘everyday life’), his conceptualisation is also sensitive to the 
resistant possibilities (the ‘everyday politics’), and mediating effect everyday life has on 
economic restructuring and programming efforts (Davies 2016). As Elias et al (2016: 243) 
argue, the lines between the approaches of everyday politics and everyday life are blurred and 
interact in “many and variegated ways”.90  
  
                                               
90 See for example Morton (2007) in his study of peasant resistance under forms of neoliberal restructuring.  
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2. Henri Lefebvre and Everyday Life 
2.1 The Everyday, capitalism and alienation  
This section will develop Lefebvre’s perspective and the important insights his work has for 
this thesis, moving the focus from a broad understanding of capitalism to a specific discussion 
of the everyday. It first begins with the foundations of Lefebvre’s approach which is of 
capitalist alienation in everyday life and the sociological perspective required to study this. It 
then moves to focus on Lefebvre’s approach to the state and its role in reproducing capitalist 
accumulation and social relations, while also explaining Lefebvre’s insights on space and 
difference. Drawing this section together is the process of ‘programming’, which attempts to 
shape and control everyday life. The section ends by fully developing Lefebvre’s specific 
conceptualisation of Everyday Life.   
Lefebvre’s understanding of Everyday Life has to be situated within his wider work on 
capitalism and the state, as the interaction of daily life and capitalism is critical to understand 
the ways that Everyday Life emerges in modern society. Lefebvre argued that capitalism, from 
the mid-20th century, became more focused on the everyday and sought to shape and 
programme it (Lefebvre 1971). Conversely to understand the nature of modern capitalism also 
requires an appreciation and analysis of the changes to daily life. “The proposition here is to 
decode the modern world – that bloody riddle – according to the everyday” (Lefebvre and 
Levich 1987: 9).  
Lefebvre drew on Marxist thought when analysing the interrelationship between capitalism and 
the everyday, which is underpinned by a fundamental critique of alienation in capitalist 
societies. He argued that Marx focused on alienation in the productive and economic aspects 
of English capitalism. However, this did not constitute the full extent of the impact of these 
processes; as well as transforming the productive experience, capitalism also transforms the 
non-labour time (Lefebvre 2002: 51-51).91 An example he uses is the work/leisure divide. 
Modern society creates a ‘need for leisure’ and ‘concrete needs’ expressed in forms of leisure. 
The alienating aspects and experiences of productive labour develop a need for a ‘break’, and 
                                               
91 For instance, Lefebvre’s book title The Critique of Everyday Life can be seen a response to Marx’s The Critique 
of Political Economy.  
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forms of relaxation. Within leisure however, commercial and commodified activities are 
developed and sold, facilitating accumulation and further alienating the subject.  
Lefebvre (1991: 180) developed his understanding from diverse sources,92 but broadly 
understood alienation as:  
Man torn from his self, from nature, from his own nature, from his 
consciousness, dragged down and dehumanized by his own social 
products…. It has imposed itself in everyday life, in social relations 
more complex than the immediate relations of kinship and primitive 
economy.  
As noted above, Lefebvre aimed to expand the understanding of alienation beyond the sphere 
of the workplace, arguing that alienation could occur in different ways in multiple sites and 
especially in aspects of everyday life such as family life or leisure activities (Conlon 2010: 72). 
Lefebvre (2008: 500-510) saw not one alienation, but instead many alienations as a result of 
the way capitalism has spread beyond the economic sphere. An important process is through 
urbanisation and the elimination of difference, where people are segregated and individualised, 
with an important vector of this being technological development (Lefebvre 1991: 31; Elden 
2006: 85). However, alienation is in a dialectic process with disalienation. One technique may 
disalienate human activity from nature or individuals from one another, but in doing so subject 
it to an alternative, potentially deeper, form of alienation (Lefebvre 2002: 208). Critically, these 
can only be understood and identified in concrete situations and social frames, rather than 
abstractly conceptualised, supporting the sort of fieldwork this thesis has undertaken. As will 
be seen in the upcoming empirical analysis, CWP consolidate alienation by attempting to 
individualise subjects from communal or non-market relationships, especially through 
technology and subjecting people to repetitive and routine practices. 
Lefebvre (1991: 52) sought to reinvigorate the study of sociological Marxism from a 
“simplified base-superstructure model” and critiqued political thought for abstracting from the 
concrete ground upon which social relations develop (Brenner and Elden 2009: 360). In doing 
                                               
92 Alongside Marxism, a foundational influence on Lefebvre’s conception of the everyday was Heidegger's (1962) 
distinction between an ‘inauthentic’ life and an ‘authentic’ existence, which also stressed the repetitive nature of 
the everyday (Elden 2006). An authentic life is when one lives in recognition and knowledge of their own 
individual uniqueness. However, most of the time, people live an inauthentic life, which Heidegger warns of 
‘doing what one does’ and unreflectively following set rules and practices, as it leads to an unowned everyday 
existence (Varga and Guignon 2016; Sherman 2009). However, Lefebvre considered Heidegger’s work to be too 
abstract and removed from concrete praxis as analysis should focus on both theory and action together. 
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so, he hoped to bring in sociological analysis and research of social relations.93 For him, 
capitalism remakes social relations such that these are transformed from relations between 
people, to relations between things and commodities (Lefebvre 2002: 206). Lefebvre (2004: 
52) considers this alienation from an authentic self and others the fundamental ethical problem 
and “evil power” of capitalism: 
Human beings separated themselves from each other: on the one hand 
the masters, men worthy of this name – and on the other, the sub-
humans, treated like animals, and with the same methods: dominated, 
exploited, humiliated…It delocalises humans. 
How should opposition to the everyday alienation be challenged or ended? Lefebvre draws on 
the concept of ‘autogestion’, which is translated to self-management by workers. “The desire 
to achieve autogestion enables the taking control of the things that effect their life, the conquest 
of power by the working classes, and therefore fundamental change in how power operates. 
Social relations will become stronger and more complex” (Elden 2006: 229). Autogestion and 
forms of organised opposition will be seen in both empirical cases.  
 
2.2 The state, space and the concept of programming 
For Lefebvre, understanding contemporary capitalism and the creation of Everyday Life also 
required an understanding of the changing state form. The period from the mid-20th century 
onward, in both the Soviet Union and the social democratic Europe, was according to Lefebvre 
marked by the  “state mode of production”, wherein the state took charge of ensuring growth, 
especially in the form of planning (Brenner and Elden 2009: 359).94 In this mode of production 
the state appropriates, in different ways, the social surplus95 of economic activity – be it 
capitalist or socialist – and intervenes in society ‘all the way down’ into everyday life (Lefebvre 
2001: 773). Lefebvre’s analysis is a product of the post-war order in Europe where, as seen in 
                                               
93 Contextually, Lefebvre (1991: 53) was questioning the rise of “authoritarian dogmatism” he saw in Stalin’s 
Soviet Russia, where it was claimed that “alienation could, and must no longer be an issue”. 
94 Lefebvre’s work on the state is predominantly in his book De l’Etat that is however, untranslated into English. 
The understanding of Lefebvre’s work on this topic therefore comes predominantly from secondary sources, 
notably Brenner and Elden’s (2009), and Brenner’s (2001) interpretations.  
95 Though Lefebvre argued this is insufficient to address social inequality and exploitation. He argues that simply 
appropriating the social surplus without addressing the underlying ownership of private property will not lead to 
equitable outcomes (Brenner 2008: 237). A similar conclusion to that which the Marxist scholars in Chapter One 
arrived.  
Chapter Two: The Everyday Turn and Welfare Payments 
 
 79 
Chapter One, state institutions became much more involved in accumulation processes and in 
managing the economy. Here there is also a close connection to Polanyi and his ideas on the 
state’s role in the maintenance of capitalist reproduction, as for Lefebvre too, the state is the 
“major institutional framework” through which capitalism operates (Brenner 2001: 794).  
Despite Lefebvre’s work being contextually focused on the embedded liberal state, it is still 
possible to develop his ideas to the contemporary neoliberal era and the ideas of 
neoliberalisation seen in the previous chapter. Firstly, Lefebvre considers the two roles of the 
state to be maintaining economic growth and extending political control. State institutions use 
a variety of techniques aimed at the intensification of market relations and consolidation of 
accumulation especially in everyday life (Brenner and Elden 2009: 359), a conceptualisation 
that reflects the previous chapter’s concern with accumulation and governance. Secondly, as 
with the economic geographers who have interrogated processes of neoliberalisation, Lefebvre 
was concerned with spatiality and how space is governed (Lefebvre 1992). According to 
Brenner (2001: 792), in Lefebvre’s framework “states play an essential role in the production, 
regulation and reproduction of a vast range of capitalist spaces” as well as producing the 
‘spatiality’ of the state (Brenner and Elden 2009: 372). One method to produce these spaces is 
by creating a calculable, legible ‘abstract space’ where unevenness is flattened and 
commodification is possible (Lefebvre 1992: 287).96 Attempts at creating abstract space can be 
seen in the creation of uniform categories in time (clocks, calendars, working weeks), space 
(maps, structured urban planning), which are quantified and stripped of symbolic or non-
market meaning (Lefebvre 1992: 285-291).97 In Lefebvre’s terms these practices aim at “spatial 
homogenization”, removing any historical or emergent differences, especially non-market 
relations and forms of organising, so as to facilitate production, exchange and control (Brenner 
and Elden 2009: 358; Lefebvre 2009: 108).  
As with the critical scholarship on neoliberalisation, Lefebvre acknowledges the uneven and 
variegated nature of state interventions and capitalist societies, as well as revealing strategies 
to produce capitalist accumulation. This is especially the case in ‘underdeveloped’ places 
marked out by their differences to the urban metropole, considered by him as attempts to 
‘pulverise’ everyday space into a productive form (Brenner and Elden 2009: 367). The 
production of capitalist spaces includes sites of production such as factories as well as road and 
                                               
96 This also links to Scott’s (1998) work in Seeing Like a State where states pursue legibility and simplification of 
the societies they govern.  
97 For a concrete application of Lefebvre’s work on abstract space see McCann (1999) on race and space in the 
USA.  
Chapter Two: The Everyday Turn and Welfare Payments 
 
 80 
rail networks, utility systems and, crucially, the development of “techno-institutional 
infrastructures” such as telephone or internet networks, or electronic payment systems (Brenner 
2001: 792). Infrastructures work as a ‘relay station’ between state institutions and everyday 
life, both as a productive force and a way to monitor and organise the social relations of space, 
capitalism and with the state (Ronneberger 2008: 141). This is especially relevant in the two 
empirical cases where CWP are used as a strategy to extend cashless practices, and 
infrastructure is used to attempt to ‘flatten’ differences in rural spaces and impose order for 
accumulation opportunities. Yet, as with attempts to disembed the economy in Polanyi’s 
account, Lefebvre argues that the attempts to homogenise space are also futile, as these 
attempts create conflicts and crisis that continually disrupt state attempts at control; an analysis 
which arguably underpins his normative argument for a politics of difference rather than one 
of homogeneity (Lefebvre 2009: 120). 
While the maintenance of market and the production of space are important state roles, there 
is a third that is especially crucial to this thesis. Lefebvre’s concept of ‘programming’ describes 
how daily life is changed and shaped to become Everyday Life, infusing it with capitalist 
accumulation. This task is undertaken by both state and capital, intertwined as they are in the 
aim of reproducing capitalism: “What we have is a state controlling daily life because it helps 
to create it. And it even moulds it. It fashions it” (Lefebvre 2008: 126-127). He argues that 
following WWII:  
Exchange value prevails over use value. The commodity, market and 
money, with their implacable logic, seize everyday life. The extension 
of capitalism goes all to the slightest details of ordinary life…needs and 
the everyday are programmed; techniques enter into everyday life…. It 
is at this moment that technical revolution substitutes itself for social 
and political revolution, while capitalism seizes the ground that had 
escaped it in large part until then: everyday life (Lefebvre 1988: 79, 
emphasis added). 
Although polemic and rhetorical in this instance, Lefebvre’s analysis helps better understand 
market-based interventions into the everyday. These occur in a diversity of ways. For example, 
as a theorist of space, one of the areas Lefebvre was interested in was the planning of public 
and private space was a tool of programming. The rational organising of new towns and urban 
areas created the mundane routines of everyday life (Elden 2006: ch.4). Another strategy that 
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Lefebvre wrote on extensively was the critical role of advertising, marketing and the media in 
promoting everyday practices suited to accumulation (Lefebvre 2002). The advertising 
industry create material needs that are fulfilled through purchases and consumption. People are 
persuaded and programmed by “having it explained to them how they should live in order to 
'live well' and make the best of things; what they would choose and why; how they would use 
their time and space” (Lefebvre 2008: 26). Finally, he also attributes the introduction of new 
social reproduction technologies – washing detergents, kitchenware – that although make tasks 
easier and more convenient, also enable capitalism to insert accumulation and consumption 
into everyday routines (Lefebvre 2002: 3). This technology enabled convenience98 is an idea 
that will be returned to throughout the thesis. The general impetus of Lefebvre’s everyday 
programming is to create needs that can only be fulfilled by market consumption, and which 
generate consumer subjectivities.  
These processes sought to bring about the bureaucratic society of controlled consumption99 – 
a ‘rational’ organisation and programming of Everyday Life that is orientated towards 
consumption instead of production (Lefebvre 1971: 60). The state has a prominent role in the 
programming of everyday life, such that he feared:  
One day it may well be that, sparing the unforeseen or some initiative, 
an army of bureaucrats, under the orders of a technico-political high 
command, will treat daily life not as an object or product, no longer as 
a semi-colony, but quite simply as a conquered country (Lefebvre 2008: 
128). 
Lefebvre’s focus was predominantly on consumption. He was interested in how the everyday 
was shaped and programmed to encourage the purchase of various goods or activities, for the 
household, leisure time or formally non-productive activities. All of which were driven by a 
rational process of organising, especially through the habitats and spaces people lived in. 
However, the concept of programming does not have to be restricted to Lefebvre’s use. It is a 
                                               
98 Lefebvre (1991: 229-230) uses an indicative example “Several years ago a world-wide firm which was trying 
to extend the market and put a rival firm out of business decided to distribute paraffin lamps to Chinese peasants 
free of charge. And now in several million poverty-stricken Chinese households artificial light (an immense 
progress) shines down on muddy floors and rotten matting - because even peasants who cannot afford to buy a 
lamp can afford to buy paraffin ... The 'progress' capitalism brings, like its 'generosity', is just a means to an end: 
profit”. 
99 Lefebvre (1971: 60) defines this as “society's rational character is defined as well as the limits set to its 
rationality (bureaucratic), the object of its organization (consumption instead of production) and the level at which 
it operates and upon which it is based: everyday life”. By this Lefebvre sees it as a rationally organisation of 
society that programmes everyday lives to consume, rather than produce.  
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broad concept that can be applied to different situations and contexts to reflect the contingent 
strategies and outcomes capital and the state aspire to.  
The final aspect of programming is its indeterminacy. Lefebvre considered Everyday Life as 
the route to changing or overcoming capitalism, given that its functioning depends on the 
programming of it. As part of this, Everyday Life resists efforts to change it. Attempts at 
programming and controlling it are not always successful and the operation of the everyday 
always exhibits possibilities and resistance. According to Brenner and Elden’s (2009: 367) 
reading of Lefebvre, “diverse social forces simultaneously attempt to create, defend or extend 
spaces of social reproduction, everyday life and grassroots control”. Despite the attempts of 
state planners and private organisations to shape the everyday life of groups like welfare 
recipients, everyday practices will always involve an opportunity for change. Policies are not 
implemented without resistance and “the politico-bureaucratic-state edifice always contains 
cracks, chinks, spaces” (Lefebvre 2008: 127). The connects with the discussion seen in Chapter 
One on neoliberalisation. There it was argued that neoliberalisation could be countered by new 
forms of redistributive or market restraining regulation. This can be extended to include 
opposition and resistance to market impositions in everyday life that may counter 
neoliberalisation. Although there is a constant and ongoing interaction between efforts to 
intervene in the everyday and efforts to resist, each creating a response from the other. 
Everyday critique and resistance thus play out in the ways in which people and societies adapt 
and mediate the impact of programming attempts on everyday activities, generating contingent 
and unpredictable outcomes. It is to Lefebvre’s specific theorisation of Everyday Life the 
chapter now turns.  
 
2.3 Everyday Life 
Given the critique of contemporary IPE made above, it is important to elaborate on Lefebvre’s 
specific understanding of the Everyday before applying it two areas relevant to the thesis, 
which provides an insight into how it is programmed. Lefebvre’s approach is especially useful 
because it provides a means to address the absences identified in Chapter One. He makes a 
consistent case for a sociology of the everyday, seeking to the understand social relations100 
                                               
100 As also argued in Chapter One, Lefebvre generally refers to social relations in the Marxist sense, of social 
relations of production and class (for example 2002: 236), but is sometimes conscious of their “various 
expressions” (Lefebvre 2008: 1). 
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and how the everyday works through them, demanding a methodology that appreciates context 
and setting (Lefebvre 2008: 2).101 As part of this an attention to “lived experience is critical” 
(Lefebvre 1991: 49). Only through sociological analysis can the nature of the everyday be 
understood. For the thesis, understanding lived experience grounds the study and concepts of 
neoliberal welfare, such that the “experiential and the conceptual is foregrounded” (Lefebvre 
2008: 10-11).  
Similar to the critiques made by Seabrooke and Hobson (2007), Lefebvre critiqued the 
structuralism of his time for ignoring the everyday and reifying structures, arguing that it was 
critical to delve deeper than this level alone (Lefebvre 2002: 156). Lefebvre considers there to 
be three relevant levels of analysis. In The Urban Revolution, Lefebvre (2003: 78-83) theorises 
the different levels of analysis to understand the everyday, and how they relate to each other. 
There is a global level, an urban level and private level. The global is the level of the planners, 
states, politicians and corporations, and these actions follow certain logics, which Lefebvre 
considers to be “class logics” (Lefebvre 2003: 78). In the context of this theses this is the level 
where the Australia and South African states, along with financial organisations such as 
Mastercard, Visa negotiate, plan and implement policies that target the everyday. 
The middle level is the ‘urban’, where the global and the everyday interact and are mediated. 
This can be understood as the level of enactment, when policies meet the world they seek to 
govern, and compromises and negotiations take place. Some existing everyday IPE literature 
can be located at this point. These scholars focus on the ways that the global level seek to affect 
and change the people’s lives (Konings 2009), and how the everyday creates reciprocal change 
at the ‘global’ level (Seabrooke and Hobson 2007). In this thesis the urban level can be 
constituted by the communities and sites of policy enactment, and all the unpredictable and 
complex outcomes that occur. This forms an important analytical point, which recognises the 
mediating impact that existing social relations and institutions have on the implementation of 
policies. However, for Lefebvre, there is a level below this that is the “the commonplace, 
everyday, ordinary, prosaic practice of living in the world”, which is central to his theory 
(Davies 2006: 232). These three levels interact and adapt to each other, with attempts to change 
the everyday by the global level mediated by the urban level producing adaptive and feedback 
effects to both sides.  
                                               
101 To understand the everyday, analysts “must bore down within it for samples, penetrating its details and linking 
it with the overall system” (Lefebvre 1991: 76). 
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To understand Everyday Life, Lefebvre first distinguishes between ‘daily life’ and the 
‘everyday’. Daily life has always existed and is what people do and have done (Davies 2013). 
In the pre-capitalist era, daily life was ‘exceptionally diverse’ and based on influences such as 
region, class, religion season, profession, age or sex (Lefebvre and Levich 1987: 7). However, 
whilst lives and cultures were diverse, they were understood as a whole or a totality, and linked 
to wider meaning and value systems. At this stage capitalism was not concerned with the 
everyday, and use value rather than exchange value was predominant.102 Everyday Life is the 
outcome of attempts to transform and shape daily life towards capitalist and modernist ideals.  
As well as its spatial dimension, Everyday Life governed temporarily through rhythmic 
routines. Lefebvre suggests there are ‘rival rhythms’.103 One is the natural, ‘cyclical’ rhythms 
of “nights and days, seasons and harvests, activity and rest, hunger and satisfaction” (Lefebvre 
and Levich 1987: 10). These natural cycles are part of daily life in all societies, capitalist or 
not. The other rhythms are the repetitive features of capitalist society, ‘linear’ rhythms of work 
and consumption. These are linear in the sense of being measured through socially constructed 
devices such as clocks and calendars, particularly driven by routines of production, offering an 
example of the construction of ‘abstract space’ (Aronowitz 2015: 83).104 In Everyday Life the 
repetitive dominates, going to work, weekends, household reproduction and consumption: ‘the 
daily grind’, and technological rhythms are an especially important programming technique 
(Lefebvre 2004: 30). Capitalism aims to shape the routines of daily life to the routines of 
accumulation imposing its monotony (Lefebvre 1987: 10). As such, Everyday Life is 
constituted by repetitive, rhythmic routines that are orientated to capitalist accumulation.  
In undertaking these activities routinely and relatively, and due to its ‘residual’ nature, 
Everyday Life appears banal and mundane, becoming normalised and subconscious. Lefebvre 
partly attributes this to philosophy that abstracted from Everyday Life, considering it trivial 
and unworthy of reflection, instead focusing on the self and ‘higher activities’ (Lefebvre 1991: 
86). This abstraction is accentuated by the division of mental and manual labour, and the 
positive representation of the former over the latter. The oppressive and alienating features of 
Everyday Life only become noticeable when the routines are disrupted or clearly altered, but 
                                               
102 Though this is doubtful as Elden (2004: 115) points out. Capitalist landlords had been building pubs and 
housing for workers, shaping leisure time, well before WWII, when Lefebvre considers capitalism becomes 
relevant to Everyday Life 
103 Indeed, Lefebvre sought to create an entire field of analysis of rhythms as part of his intention to rethink the 
understanding of time and space (Lefebvre 2004). 
104 This formed a difference between Lefebvre’s Marxism and that of other dialectical materialism, which 
Lefebvre is said to have considered to be a “linear, teleological picture of historical change” (Elden 2001: 812).  
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in its normal functioning people are unaware of their routines. However, Lefebvre is at pains 
to stress that studying the banal elements of the everyday are not unimportant, arguing that 
“why should the study of banal itself be banal?...Why wouldn’t the concept of everydayness 
reveal the extraordinary in the ordinary?” (Lefebvre and Levich 1987: 9). As Lefebvre 
considers all aspects of the everyday to be connected to the wider ‘totality’ it has both an 
analytical and political significance.  
Lefebvre (1971: 35) also suggests that the everyday is especially gendered, which relates 
closely to social reproduction, as Lefebvre’s notions of residual and repetitive action that are 
fundamental to societal functioning could also accurately describe social reproduction. For 
Lefebvre, women are subject to the targeting of Everyday Life through marketing and 
advertising more than men, and as a result of the gendered distribution of household labour. 
Women simultaneously purchase commodities designed to shape and affect Everyday Life, 
such as electrical appliances or fashion and lifestyle magazines, but they are also the symbols 
of these commodities in advertising. Thus, the demands of the everyday appear to focus on the 
household – which has more recently been recognised as a neglected area of everyday IPE 
(LeBaron 2010; Lai 2018). Lefebvre’s work offers the potential to add a new area of analysis 
by focusing on alternative forms of alienation in the household or leisure pursuits beyond the 
domain of labour (Elden 2004: 110). However, an undercurrent in Lefebvre’s work seems to 
suggest an increased susceptibility of women to the demands of capitalism, whilst his writing105 
seem to naturalise men as workers and women as confined to the household (Highmore 2002: 
126). The research therefore should be attuned to the gendered aspects of the cases to be 
analysed, and to see how the demands of the everyday have uneven consequences. The shaping 
the everyday contains strategies that are implemented through gendered social relations, which 
means the outcome for the everyday will necessarily be gendered. This seems likely, given the 
evidence within feminist literature on the multiple and varied effects of welfare policies on 
women (see Chapter One).  
Finally, Everyday Life is considered a ‘residual deposit’. In this sense Lefebvre describes it in 
negative terms; it is what is left when the “highly specialised occupations from man” are 
removed, and all distinct, superior, specialised, structured activities have been singled out by 
analysis leaving only “human raw material” (Lefebvre 2008: 86-97). However, despite being 
residual, Everyday Life is also a ‘product’; it is connected and fundamental to all aspects of 
                                               
105 For example, see the quotes used above on pages 79 and 80.  
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life more widely. Without the “fertile or barren soil” of Everyday Life, all other aspects of life 
are not possible (Lefebvre 1991: 11). Given this, Lefebvre aims to understand it as a “totality”, 
connected to the means of production. Indeed, without Everyday Life capitalism is not possible: 
…daily life cannot be defined as a 'sub-system' within a larger system. 
On the contrary: it is the 'base' from which the mode of production 
endeavours to constitute itself as a system, by programming this base. 
Thus, we are not dealing with the self-regulation of a closed totality. 
The programming of daily life has powerful means at its disposal: it 
contains an element of luck, but it also holds the initiative, has the 
impetus at the 'base' that makes the edifice totter. Whatever happens, 
alterations in daily life will remain the criterion of change (Lefebvre 
2008: 41).  
As Everyday Life is fundamental to the reproduction of capitalism, this is where its power 
stems from. By changing the nature of the Everyday, Lefebvre claims that it is possible to 
change the whole system. Challenges to capitalism therefore must begin within Everyday Life, 
as there is a “power of Everyday Life” that cannot be extinguished (Lefebvre 1984, quoted in 
Davies 2006: 224). Revolution needs to change not only “political personnel or institutions, it 
must also change the everyday” and its relationship with capitalism (Elden 2006: 118). 106 
Lefebvre’s conceptualisation of the everyday has been shown to be a complex theorisation of 
what it means to understand or analyse the everyday. It is the residual, unacknowledged aspects 
of life that are routine, rhythmical and gendered, while being fundamentally connected to 
capitalism. However, Lefebvre’s own examples and areas of Everyday Life and the attempts 
to programme it do not exhaust all possibilities. The concept can be fruitfully developed and 
applied to new areas and methods. Lefebvre’s extensive writing means that his everyday 
approach is broad, and has perhaps become an “elastic” concept (Olson 2014:14). Whilst Olson 
(2014) appears to view this as a weakness, it can instead be considered a strength, in so far as 
analyses can build on Lefebvre’s foundational ideas and combine complementary theoretical 
                                               
106 This supports a bottom-up approach to change and potential in IPE that is seen in Seabrooke and Hobson’s 
(2007) work, through changing the everyday practices, global politics is transformed. This is also similar to 
Holloway’s (2002: 211) notion of revolutionary activity whereby changing the everyday can change the world – 
“the aim of revolution is the transformation of ordinary, everyday life and it is surely from ordinary, everyday life 
that revolution must arise”. 
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positions. As such, the chapter moves on to look at two specific areas relevant to the thesis 
argument where programming could be developed. 
Chapter Two: The Everyday Turn and Welfare Payments 
 
 88 
3. Programming (welfare) payments 
Neoliberalisation and Lefebvre’s work connect and speak to each other in a number of 
important and coherent ways. For example, both have a concern with the active production and 
maintenance of markets and market relationships. Where the neoliberalisation literature has 
predominantly concentrated on the changes in regulation, Lefebvre’s work has focused on the 
everyday. They also both have a central concern with space and unevenness. For Lefebvre, 
states seek to homogenise space for accumulation and governance purposes, whilst 
neoliberalisation sees uneven outcomes emerging from attempts at restructuring. Finally, 
neither approach sees these processes as inevitable or linear, with opportunities for counter 
regulation or everyday resistance always present.  
By combining these two perspectives, both can be productively enhanced. In the previous 
chapter, neoliberalisation and the two dynamics of governance and accumulation were taken 
to be important features of understanding contemporary welfare, but it was also argued that the 
addition of an everyday approach was necessary. By drawing on Lefebvre, a theorisation of the 
everyday has been provided to shape the analysis of CWP in the empirical chapters. His 
everyday  approach, and the interest in understanding the sociological, social relations and 
lived experiences of everyday life, will deepen the understanding of how neoliberalisation and 
the associated processes such as discipline, commodification or privatisation are implemented, 
resisted or experienced.  
How, then, does Lefebvre’s framework connect to CWP and how will it be used in the empirical 
chapters? To use Lefebvre’s work requires the identification of rhythmic, but banal and 
neglected activities that have been reshaped for capitalist governance and accumulation by the 
state. CWP can be identified as one of these everyday activities. They are residual and 
neglected aspects of the functioning of welfare payments, because perspectives on welfare have 
neglected the mode of transfer, whilst also being foundational to the functioning of welfare. 
Further, the nature of a cashless payment system is an inherently repetitive process. On a daily 
basis individuals are required to access and use their money, whether this is at cashpoint, in a 
shop or even online. This also has a rhythmic element of receiving payments, going to shops 
and consuming, or making payments at similar times of the day or week. Control of payment 
allows the control of the everyday: when and how frequently payments are made, how much 
the payments are worth, the extent of data that is collected, where and how the payment can be 
spent or the physical form. Therefore, the mode of payment is a critical feature of the everyday 
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life of people receiving welfare, and cashless payments are a specific form of welfare payment. 
This mode of payment constitutes critical rhythms and routines that might appear mundane but 
can be programmed for either governance activities or accumulation opportunities.  
However, Lefebvre’s approach can also be fruitfully developed by being brought into 
conversation with neoliberalisation.  The concept of ‘programming’ is broad, so the chapter 
will refine it by discussing two areas specifically relevant to the thesis: social meanings of 
money and everyday financialisation. Both of these areas express important processes of 
neoliberalisation that also can shape everyday life. By controlling the mode of payment 
opportunities for governance and accumulation are developed, and both meanings of money 
and financialisation are critical to the analysis in the subsequent chapters. In doing this, the 
chapter also extends Lefebvre’s Everyday Life by providing contemporary examples of how 
programming can occur.  
 
3.1 Programming: Social meanings of money 
The first example is social meanings of money that can shape everyday practices and 
behaviour.  Social meanings of money can attempt to programme the everyday, in this instance 
chiefly to control and govern people and maintain ‘political order’. This section first discusses 
the individual and relational aspects of social meanings of money, before moving on to explain 
three sources of meaning: the media of money, individual earmarking and intersubjective 
meanings. While money can be controlled through meaning alone, it is then shown how 
money’s form can control or affect people’s lives. The section concludes by connecting these 
ideas to neoliberalisation and Lefebvre’s Everyday Life, with a specific focus on the 
paternalism and stigma stemming from social meanings of money.  
Social meanings of money have so far tended to have been neglected in political economy and 
specifically in studies of financial restructuring. Mader (2015: 27) argues “among the blindest 
spots in the ongoing study of financialization…remains the social meaning of money”. Notable 
exceptions include de Goede (2005) who traces the changing ethical controversies of financial 
activity, or Graeber (2011) who charts changing understandings and practices of debt relations. 
Yet these are studies on the meanings of debt money. This study proposes to complement these 
works with an understanding of welfare money and its material form.  
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To do so, this section will draw on Zelizer’s approach to understanding money, which is 
summed up by “what persons and organizations actually do with it…we should approach 
money not via macro-economic aggregates but in microstudies that reveal monetary behaviour 
and its social embedding” (Blanc quoted in Zelizer 2005: 588). Zelizer (1994; 1996) aimed to 
question previous interpretations of ‘modern money’ in the form of national currencies as being 
universalising and quantifying,107 demonstrating that, in fact, it is imbued with meaning and 
remains culturally embedded. Critically, these meanings affect who gets how much, what it 
can be spent on, where it can be spent and how it can be spent. Social meanings of money, 
then, have significant influence.  
As well as shaping the individual’s behaviour and use of money, social meanings also have an 
important connection to social relationships. Monetary payments, and their corresponding 
meaning, can reflect or shape these relationships. Different social relationships require different 
(or no) payment, and failing to do so appropriately can lead to “anger, shock or ridicule” at the 
inappropriate use of money (Zelizer 1994: 19). For example, introducing exchange payments 
would usually be considered inappropriate in domestic intimate relationships. Or basing 
employer relationships on gift exchanges would undermine the labour relationship (Zelizer 
1996: 483). Specific payment types and social relationships entail certain meaning systems 
with everyday consequences. The ability to change social relationships by programming forms 
of money then is an important tool, with the capacity to alienate, promoting capitalist exchange 
relations over all others.  
Social meanings can be generated from three sources. Firstly, the actual form of money can 
affect meaning. While states have largely aimed to remove differentiation between monies so 
the “homogeneity of modern currency is indisputable”, modern money can actually constitute 
a variety of physical forms (Zelizer 1994: 21). The media of payment symbolises and marks 
certain transactions and relationships, forbidding or encouraging other sorts of behaviour, and 
is generative of different forms of identity (Swartz 2014). Payment medium is especially 
important in understanding the meaning of transaction, as “paying with a jar of pennies or a 
debit card that benefits the Sierra Club, or a large wad of cash, or a black American Express 
                                               
107 Simmel worried that the universalising and quantifying impact of money would overrule and overwrite social 
relations, bringing about a “cold and calculating attitude” in monetised society (Dodd 2016: 30). Similarly, 
Polanyi (1957), argued that there was a distinction between ‘special purpose’ money, as seen in tribal or pre-
capitalist societies, and ‘general purpose’ money which is seen in modern capitalist societies, where the former 
can only work in specific spheres of exchange and the latter can be used much more widely. This distinction 
holds that special purpose money was culturally infused and socially embedded, whilst modern money is 
separate and neutral. 
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Centurion each produces distinction and meaning” (Swartz 2014: 138). Cards can be imbued 
with meaning through the designs and symbols placed on them, all of which carry effects on 
behaviour. As seen in the later analysis, the state is actually seeking to create distinctive 
alternative money forms to differentiate users and mark welfare money. The material form and 
media of money, in welfare at least, remains a critical aspect of meaning. Additionally, 
psychology research indicates that the form of payment influences the amount of money 
individuals spend. Spending with a physical currency is said to increase the ‘psychological 
pain’ of transactions, whereas cashless distances the individual from the transaction, increasing 
the amount they spend (Raghubir and Srivastava 2008). Relationships to purchased goods are 
also said to be affected partly by the medium of payment, when more ‘painful forms’ of 
payment are used, this increases loyalty and commitment to the product (Shah et al. 2016). In 
Lefebvre’s terms increased consumption and accumulation can be enabled by something as 
small and mundane as changing - or programming - the medium of a purchase.  
The second way meaning can be generated is individually, through ‘earmarking’. For Zelizer, 
earmarking is the main process by which people distinguish and give meaning to their money, 
which can shape the ways they spend (or do not spend) their incomes. She argues that “there 
is no single, uniform, generalized money but multiple monies: people earmark different 
currencies for many, or perhaps all types of social interaction” (Zelizer 1994: 18). On the one 
hand, this can be an individual act. People can allocate and categorise their own money for 
certain purchases, controlling their own economic spending behaviours.108 In the cash transfer 
literature, unconditional cash transfer programmes frequently see an increase in spending on 
health and education, even when money has no controls on its use. Spending is influenced by 
programme labelling, as the money is associated with ‘responsible’ spending, rather than on 
‘temptation goods’109 (Evans and Popova 2014; Fiszbein and Schady 2009: 66).110  
The third source of social meaning is intersubjective, rather than a purely individually as in 
earmarking. As argued in Chapter One, economies are embedded in social relations and 
institutions which shape economic activity. One form of this is contingent and intersubjective 
social meanings of money, which are created and maintained by communities, culture and 
social structures. This is important as meaning is not passive, it can be an element of control 
                                               
108 Lave (2008) demonstrates this in household budgeting. 
109 Temptation goods are usually considered alcohol and cigarettes (Evans and Popova 2014: 2). 
110 In an alternative example, a study in Denmark found that prostitutes would spend welfare or legal income 
carefully and frugally, and money gained from prostitution was quickly spent on “going out…Dirty money it 
seems ‘burns a hole in your pocket’” (Høigård and Finstad, 1992 quoted in Zelizer 1994: 3). 
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and an exercise of power. For example, a central thread of Zelizer’s work is the ways that 
gender structures and meanings are embedded in and (re)produce gendered social relations, 
controlling women’s use of money. Understandings of women’s ‘allowances’, the appropriate 
spending of money for the household, or self-earned ‘pin money’ all shaped and affected how 
much and what women could or could not do with money (Zelizer 1994: ch.2). Building on 
this, Zelizer (1994) also analyses the ways that welfare money was imbued with certain 
meanings and enforced on welfare recipients. The aim was to ensure that welfare money was 
being spent ‘correctly’ and cultivated a sense of independence in the subjects. This discourse, 
about the ‘appropriate’ spending of state money, and inappropriateness of luxury has been 
pervasive, and is present in both empirical cases.111  
There is an opportunity to combine ideas of social meaning of money within Lefebvre’s 
conceptualisation of Everyday Life. Lefebvre himself suggests that meaning and symbols are 
critical for the programming of everyday behaviours: “In 'industrial society', urban life 
becomes peopled by innumerable signallings. Each one programmes a routine, exactly like a 
calculator, regulating patterns of conduct and behaviour” (Lefebvre 2002: 300). Thus, social 
meanings of money can act as one of these ‘signallings’ that programme a routine, with welfare 
payments an effective opportunity to do so. States have the power to shape social meanings of 
money through the labelling and presentation of the payments. The terms or labels of welfare 
payments, as well as the wider discourse of state officials or politicians, can all contribute to 
generating shared social meanings. In doing so, the state can programme everyday life towards 
its governance or accumulation priorities, encouraging certain forms of behaviour and 
disciplining others.  
The extreme end of this programming is when money becomes explicitly controlling, typically 
manifest in ‘couponing’. To Douglas (1967: 120), money is fundamentally “an instrument of 
freedom”, and any attempts to restrict how that money can be used becomes an exercise of 
control. Couponing extends beyond simply attempting to shape the meaning to placing 
restrictions on where, how or on what money can be used. Couponing welfare money is also 
commodifying, those who want to have money as an “instrument of freedom” need to gain 
alternative forms of income or paid-employment. The state is able to coupon welfare money as 
it can control the mode of welfare payment, transforming payments from fungible cash to 
coupon vouchers or cashless cards. Zelizer (1996: 493) even pointed to this possibility: 
                                               
111 See for instance Schubert and Slater (2006: 572). 
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In the future, for instance, e-money may be issued privately by 
institutions other than banks. Because electronic money is software… 
it could be programmed for restricted purposes, to be spent only on 
designated purchases: ‘A business could have an electronic version of 
petty cash to be used for supplies at an Office Depot-- but not a beer at 
the local tavern. Or parents could wire to a college student E-money 
that is designated for rent or books.’ My own work suggests that this is 
a highly probable outcome.  
Therefore, the ability to impose controls on everyday money is one that the interventionist state 
is likely to take advantage of. As seen in Chapter Seven this is exactly what the Australian state 
has done.  
Drawing this together, how can these discussions be connected to the analysis of 
neoliberalisation? As seen in the previous chapter, neoliberalisation is characterised by an 
increased intervention into the social world that is distinctively disciplinary and paternalistic. 
The programming of social meaning of money provides a deeper, sociological perspective on 
how these characteristics are actualised. For example, welfare payments in the neoliberal 
settlement are restructured from entitlements to conditionalities and have involved an 
intensification of discipline and stigma associated with welfare receipt. One of the ways that 
welfare is disciplined is through the construction of a pejorative social meaning of money that 
makes the user feel stigma when receiving the payment or using the money. The receipt and 
spending of welfare payments is an inherently rhythmical, routine act – payments are usually 
received fortnightly or monthly and spending can occur daily - and the associated meanings 
can be shaped with everyday consequence. Some scholars have looked at the ways that 
different forms and modes of payment can cultivate a relationship between consumer and 
corporate brand through everyday life. Kremers and Brassett (2017: 650-654) argue that mobile 
payments aim to craft a ‘user experience’ that ties consumption and online brands to everyday 
life in an affective relationship. Welfare payments can operate on the other end of this 
spectrum, seeking to cultivate a disciplinary relationship between the state, the form of payment 
and recipient, where the stigma and shame associated with welfare is experienced in every 
transaction. Research has demonstrated how welfare recipients report feelings of stigma when 
using or receiving welfare money, especially when the media is visually identifiable (Kelly 
1996; Stuber and Kronebusch 2004). People feel embarrassment when they can be identified 
using welfare money, as social meanings have stigmatised it.  
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This stigma may be deliberately created. Welfare payments in the neoliberal era often have a 
specific meaning where state money must be spent ‘correctly’, and principles of New Public 
Management demand ‘value for money’,  although the assessments of what constitutes ‘value’ 
are themselves contestable and shaped by social meanings (Heald 2003; Jacobs 1998). These 
meanings filter down to the meanings and discourses of welfare payments, which are imbued 
with notions of ‘taxpayers’ money’. This is encapsulated by Standing’s (2007: 517) rhetorical 
question posed from this perspective: “Why should taxpayers be expected to pay for 
beneficiaries of state transfers if the latter give nothing back to society?” This manifests in the 
need to make sure that welfare money (as ‘taxpayers’ money’) should be spent ‘appropriately’, 
and not on luxury or indulgent purchases. Consequently, it is only people receiving welfare 
whose lifestyles and spending habits are considered an issue of the state. People who need 
welfare should live an austere life, whilst those who do not use state money can spend as they 
wish.  
Some forms of neoliberalisation are typified by paternalistic governance that seek to prevent 
non-market-based behaviours, using different techniques to encourage or coerce them and this 
can be seen as a type of programming. As poverty is understood as individual flaws or 
dysfunctions, attempts are made to ‘guide’ or impose budgeting strategies and spending 
behaviour onto welfare recipients, in line with the state’s understanding of ‘appropriate 
spending. The expectation being that ‘well-managed’ money will reduce a person’s poverty.112 
Given the centrality of money management to everyone’s lives, imposing external budgeting 
has the potential to come into conflict with people’s existing practices. For example, Edin and 
Schafer (2015) have shown how strategic and flexible the very poor need to be with meagre 
resources. Alternatively, Aboriginal Australian money practices are built on principles of 
sharing and mutual obligation that are potentially antithetical to individualised market-based 
behaviours (Demosthenous et al. 2006: 7-8). As such, the imposition of new forms of money 
management are liable to be contested.  
One aspect of the social meaning of money framework is the extent to which people subject to 
externally imposed meanings act in accordance with them. Social meanings alone are not as 
comprehensive method of control as couponing is, although ways around couponing also exist, 
as will be discussed in Chapter Seven. As was argued previously, Lefebvre sees the everyday 
as two faced, both as subject to programmatic demands of capitalism and the state, but also as 
                                               
112 This is despite research demonstrating that actually ‘inappropriate’, ‘temptation’ goods are rarely purchased 
by people receiving welfare (Evans and Popova 2014).  
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the location of resistance and critique. Zelizer (1994: 175) covers extensively the ways that 
official earmarking processes came into conflict with local beliefs, social relationships or 
“community customs”. It is possible for people to simply ignore, challenge social meanings 
and impose their own interpretation, or repackage them as a form of resistance and reassertion 
of their own autonomy, complicating the assertion of discipline or paternalistic governance.  
A clear example of this is sociological work that looks at the ways that welfare recipients are 
subject to certain pejorative discourses. Here oppressive discourses and subject positions are 
created for welfare recipients, but these can be co-opted and resisted. Certainly, these 
discourses can also be pervasive, seeping into everyday interactions with recipients and 
internalising the associated meanings and stigma (McCormack, 2004; Seccombe et al. 1998). 
However, authors also see small acts of resistance and contestation to everyday discourses 
leading to recipients constructing their own adapted discourses and subject positions within the 
dominant systems (Pollack and Caragata, 2010). As will be seen in the empirical chapters, the 
programming of neoliberal social meanings of money is a complicated, contingent process. 
 
3.2 Programming: Everyday financialisation  
The second programming aspect that is relevant to the introduction of CWP is the possibilities 
a financial cashless mode of payment offers. As seen in the previous chapter, financialisation 
is an important dimension of contemporary neoliberal welfare. The everyday approach to 
financialisation makes a valuable contribution to deepen and complicate this perspective. This 
section first discusses the strategies CWP enable to intervene in everyday spaces, mainly 
through technological and physical infrastructures, especially with regard to identification 
systems. Programming the everyday occurs through the routine forms of financial 
familiarisation, and governance and accumulation strategies to consolidate neoliberalisation.  
Financialisation, despite being widely used and (mis)understood (Christophers 2015) can be 
encompassed by the broad notion of “the increasing role of financial motives, financial 
markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and 
international economies” (Epstein 2005: 3).113 The everyday form of financialisation refers to 
                                               
113 Financialisation as an academic field has addressed a number of areas. One prominent area is the increasing 
importance of ‘shareholder value’ in the management of firms and reorientation to the pursuit of influential 
financial metrics (Froud et al. 2000: 102-109), or the changing structure of accumulation in the economy, shifting 
towards finance led accumulation and away from production (for example, see Boyer 2000). For a good overview 
see van der Zwan (2014). 
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the ways finance spreads into the lives of people previously unconnected to global finance, 
transforming logics and practices (Martin 2002). Whilst much financial analysis focuses on the 
centres of high finance, everyday finance is the mundane, un-reflected on area of finance that 
is left over, but where “it is nevertheless performed, experienced, lived, and given meaning” 
(Langley 2008: 12). This has been seen in the areas of mortgages (Schwartz and Seabrooke 
2008; Aalbers 2008), pensions (Langley 2006; 2007), investment (Aitken 2007; Harmes 2001), 
or unsecured debt (Soederberg 2014). The first three are predominantly focused on middle class 
or relatively wealthy people, those with sufficient assets to take out a mortgage, or invest in the 
stock market. It is the other, poorer group, which studies of unsecured debt have been more 
focused on and that this thesis also addresses.  
This form of everyday finance looks at the relationship between micro and macro circuits of 
finance and the multiplicity of actors involved, beyond those at the level of ‘high’ finance 
(Mawdsley 2018: 270). Important here is the variety of ways of including and drawing in those 
outside the sphere of finance; the ‘frontier’ and ‘fringes’ of finance (Roy 2010; Aitken 2015).114 
These concepts encapsulate the way that financial capital expands out in the search for new 
markets and profitable activities, reflecting the processes of neoliberalisation seen in Chapter 
One. A prominent portion of those people on the fringes of finance are liable to be those 
receiving state support, therefore subject to a specific aspect of neoliberalisation of increasing 
coercive state intervention and commodified forms of social life (Brenner et al 2010b: 330). 
Lefebvre’s everyday programming enables an understanding of these processes, demonstrating 
how in specific contexts, the mundane, routine aspects of everyday life become imbued with 
financial companies, and financial practices and accumulation. The state is crucial in this 
process, but as Lai (2018: 627) argues, the role of states is sometimes overlooked, despite their 
important role in driving financialisation.  
In focusing on the everyday, an insight is gained on how these processes are experienced and 
occur in practice (Lai 2018: 632), offering an in-depth context specific understanding, which 
complicate the more abstract ideas of surveillance, financialisation or inclusion. CWP offer an 
example of how everyday lives can be programmed (with mixed success) by a financial mode 
of payment. In doing so, the everyday approach demonstrates how this is not always a straight-
                                               
114 Roy (2010: 30-31) analyses microfinance, which she conceptualises as ‘poverty capital’. Large investments of 
capital seek to access the ‘final frontier’ the ‘last billion’ who could benefit from financial inclusion. Aitken (2015: 
4-14) sees the ‘fringe’ of finance as people on the edges of a ‘diagram’, which the global financial system seeks, 
through processes of incorporation, conversion and formalisation to include. The phrase ‘fringe’ further, evokes 
the contested, frayed edges that Aitken seeks to portray.  
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forward insertion, and efforts to programme are met with not only local resistance, but also 
practical obstacles.  
Financial programming first requires appropriate infrastructure. As argued above, states 
contribute to the creation of ‘techno-institutional infrastructures’ to enable subsequent 
accumulation and control. In the field of cashless payments this involves both technological 
and physical infrastructures. Technological infrastructure is the systems that are required to 
take and make payments electronically, and without cash. This includes the bank accounts and 
software, interchange systems of card providers as well as identity and accounts for individuals 
(Maurer 2012). Physical infrastructures are features such as bank cards, cash machines and 
pay-points, point of sale (POS) devices to take payments in stores, and wider connectivity 
through electricity and internet to connect payments to the central financial databases (Amire 
Comfort and Imiare 2015: 421-422). The creation of these infrastructure is critical to making a 
cashless system work, and both the state and private firms must be involved. They are 
intertwined in building and maintaining a payment infrastructure, and this is clear in the case 
of CWP. For example, although the state creates identities and distributes cards, it also depends 
on the private sector having functioning financial systems, such as interchange networks and 
interbank relations, and payment access points for merchants. Where the firms do not provide 
the appropriate infrastructure, the state may need to intervene directly, inserting payment 
technology where necessary, or outsourcing the services of financial firms to undertake its 
payment needs. As such the creation, maintenance and regulation of payment system is a 
combined state and market project. The introduction of such infrastructures is not 
straightforward however and requires ‘work’ to build and maintain them, leading to socially 
and spatially variegated outcomes (Mawdsley 2018: 267).  
A crucial aspect of the introduction of a cashless financial mode of payment is the requirement 
or creation of specific identities, which potentially did not previously exist. This offers a clear 
example of an inclusionary form of governance through everyday practices. In order to 
establish a financial account, each individual requires some form of unique identification, both 
with the state and with the financial sector. Identity forms can be Unique Identity Numbers as 
seen in India (Jacobsen 2012), the taking of biometric data (Donovan 2015a), bank account 
and personal identification numbers (PIN), or even personal data like email addresses or phone 
numbers.115 All of this data is then transmitted through payment infrastructures each time a 
                                               
115 Whilst the groups targeted for these forms of welfare are not usually in the position to develop credit scores, 
these forms of identification are foundational to subsequently build up a credit record.  
Chapter Two: The Everyday Turn and Welfare Payments 
 
 98 
card is used. In developing electronic forms of payment with the welfare system, the state 
attempts to deepen and formalise the relationship between citizen, state and market. However, 
shifting everyday practices of people to use a PIN, create email addresses, or have phone 
numbers is not as straightforward as policy makers might hope, and requires constant 
adaptation and maintenance. This is what Donovan (2015b: 733) conceptualises as 
‘infrastructuring’, which “captures the ongoing maintenance, preservation, extension, and 
decay of sociotechnical systems”.116 As will be seen, the formalisation of these relations can 
face opposition, or can be exploited by financial firms involved in the delivery.  
With an adequate financial infrastructure in place, the use of a cashless financial mode of 
payment can familiarise and promote financial habits and practices, supporting financialisation. 
By paying welfare money in a card-based, cashless form, the state can attempt to programme 
the routines of everyday life. This aims to create a familiarity with a number of key financial 
practices that some people receiving welfare and financially excluded are perhaps not used to. 
This includes storing money in a card form, making card payments or using and remembering 
a PIN. This might also mean managing money digitally and individually, rather than physically 
and communally with cash. For many, these are unnerving money practices. For example, a 
study in Korea found that older people would resist the removal of coins from circulation as 
electronic forms of payment were unfamiliar (Moon 2017: 108). Alternatively, in both 
empirical cases in this thesis, in some instances kin and wider social relations interfere with the 
idea of managing money digitally and individually.  
However, CWP can programme people’s lives to have to undertake these financial practices 
and habits on a routine basis, especially if this is their sole income. Even if the CWP form 
enables access to withdraw cash, a person must do this through the mainstream financial 
infrastructure and practices. This applies to both those receiving welfare payments in cashless 
form, and the merchants who must take payments, both require training and persuasion to shift 
to new forms of payment (Nyoni and Bonga 2017: 7).117 The programming of new cashless 
habits requires constant effort from state and market to create the convenience of using card 
payments over cash: 
                                               
116 Donovan (2015b) documents a variety of hurdles that are encountered when building a payment infrastructure 
in rural Kenya.  
117 Mehta (1999: 95) for example argues that using Point of Sale (POS) devices for card payment will require a 
re-training of shop staff to be comfortable using the technology.  
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As consumers become familiar with the use of diverse electronic or 
mobile payment instruments such as credit cards, public transportation 
cards and digital wallets, they will find the use of cash to be more and 
more inconvenient (Moon 2017: 108-109). 
Over time, the expectation is that these behaviours and practices will become more familiar, 
normalised and unreflexive: they become a feature of the everyday.  
Critically, introducing relatively innocuous changes into money practices enables the state and 
capital a variety of governance and accumulation opportunities. Prior to cashless money, 
controlling or monitoring money was either inefficient or time consuming, requiring vouchers 
or the active collection of store receipts to monitor spending (Zelizer 1994: 157). Cash is 
anonymous, fungible and prevents the state from directly shaping its use. However, by making 
money electronic, it allows the state to place disciplinary or surveillance strategies on people’s 
money. Cashless enables strategies to control spending behaviour by restricting the sites where 
money can be used, allowing a new form of paternalistic couponing. Cashless transactions also 
allow the tracking and monitoring of people’s spending habits, such that state agencies can 
potentially identify ‘inappropriate’ spending. Academically, this is often considered to be 
problematic. Cobbett (2015: 323) on the SASSA card argues that cashless invokes a significant 
amount of surveillance over those taking the grant. However, the question remains how this 
manifests in everyday life. Do people worry about surveillance? Or do not consider it as 
something of consequence (if they consider it at all?). The value of sociological fieldwork is to 
scrutinise these general claims made about and on behalf of welfare recipients.  
As well as governance opportunities, CWP programme everyday life to facilitate accumulation. 
One mechanism is via the service of micropayments. By switching the mode of transfer to 
cashless delivery, electronic payment methods are further encouraged. As Maurer (2012: 593) 
notes, these payment ‘rails’ are critical, but neglected financial infrastructures. For example, 
Lapavitsas (2013: 95-96) analyses electronic money, but argues that it poses “no theoretical 
challenges” as it simply involves a movement from paper to an electronic form. When 
analysing micro payments, he sees the persistence of cash dominating the “tail end of the 
circulation of personal income in financialised capitalism”. However, Lapavitsas misses the 
ways that payment infrastructures create valuable fee revenue for financial institutions and 
payment organisations (Mader 2016: 77). In a cashless transaction, interchange is ‘non-par’, 
the amount the consumer is pays is different to the amount the merchant receives due to the 
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costs of exchanging value. Both the bank that issues the card, and the card network (Visa or 
Mastercard, for instance) receive a small fee when a transaction occurs (Maurer 2012: 25). 
Contrary to existing literature on financialisation that sees credit as central to incomes, “in a 
world of debit, not credit, the motivation for offering payment is fee generation” (Maurer 2015: 
29). This also provides a further example of a shift to fee-based banking rather than interest 
based-banking, where fee generating activities such as financial services or micropayments are 
emphasised (Erturk and Solari 2007: 378). CWP can provide reliable, state sponsored revenue 
streams that can be a ‘bedrock’ for further speculation and hedge against any accompanying 
losses (Leyshon and Thrift 2007). This shows how the state can enable private accumulation 
by outsourcing the payment system to a financial company. Forms of payment can be public 
whereby there is no private ownership of the means of value transfer, for example cash money. 
However, forms of payment can also be private, where the ability to move money incurs a fee 
or a rent from each repetitive and routine act of consumption. For example, Visa (2016: 6,13), 
one of the major global firms providing cashless payments, processed 83.2 billion transactions 
globally in 2016, worth $5.8 trillion. In doing, they earned $6.7 billion from transaction 
revenues alone.118 Visa’s business model depends expanding the use of the Visa network to 
new customers, into new markets and making the Visa ‘brand’ widely recognisable as a symbol 
of reliability and convenience (Visa 2016: 5), a further example of money’s social meaning.  
Responding to Lai’s (2018: 627) call to focus “analytical attention towards the transformation 
of everyday life” under processes of financialisation, micropayments also programme the lives 
of the poor, as well accumulating from the everyday. One way this can be seen is in the ways 
that the payment of transaction fees can shape consumption practices. A result of sorts of places 
that will or will not accept cashless payments. For instance, research has demonstrated the 
creativity and effort that poor people must go to in order to spend small amounts of money 
efficiently, which is facilitated by cash (Edin and Shaefer 2015). Alternatively, locally situated, 
informal forms of exchange may not have access to electronic card readers. Yet the move to 
electronic cashless money directs spending towards certain places – those that accept electronic 
payment or absorb card fees, which are more likely to be larger merchants, and away from 
places that only accept cash – smaller or informal forms of exchange. For those with very low 
incomes, these small costs are likely to be highly influential. The accumulative potential of 
                                               
118 Visa also make money from data processing ($6.3 billion in 2016) and international transactions ($4.6 billion 
in 2016) (Visa 2016: 13).  
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micropayments can condition the everyday consumption of welfare recipients by making 
cashless money more convenient and cheaper while facilitating financial accumulation.  
Finally, bringing all these aspects together, everyday life can be programmed to encourage 
financial inclusion. The key aspect to this is the use of an ‘open loop’ card payment. Open loop 
means that the card is connected to the financial infrastructure and can be used in the same way 
as any other card. A ‘closed loop’ card can only be used at specific places for specific actions. 
In making a card open loop, the wider financial system can target these new accounts to sell 
financial services and products. This is further enabled by the development of an identification 
system that demonstrates who someone is, where they are, and how much money they have 
going in and out of their account each month. By routinely and rhythmically paying welfare 
money into a newly created account, this immediately enables the targeting of this for the 
selling of financial services. As the state is guaranteed to top the account up each month or 
fortnight, the incomes have increased reliability and are therefore more attractive to lenders. 
This offers a further example of what Mawdsley (2018: 270) the interplay of micro and macro 
financial flows, as welfare recipients are brought into a relation with global finance. This can 
be problematic, especially for people who have low incomes and can be in vulnerable, 
desperate situations. 
As with the social meaning of money though, attempts to programme everyday life through 
financialisation are not a straight-forward, linear process. Everyday life does not passively 
receive the financial restructuring of their routines. In some instances, people may comfortably 
accept the changes, preferring the convenience and positive benefits of a bank account and 
access to financial services, considering there are problems with cash as well as cashless. 
However, in other instances, attempts are likely to be challenged and resisted. Aitken (2015: 
ch.5) argues that any attempts to adjust the fringes of finance always encounter contestation, 
and so the outcome of such policy efforts are liable to be compromised and adapted. In that 
sense programming should be understood as a process, a constant conflict between the efforts 
to programme the everyday one way, and the inevitable response and possible resistance.   
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4. Conclusion  
This chapter has argued that Henri Lefebvre’s conceptualisation of Everyday Life, and the 
ways it is programmed, offers a useful and coherent way of understanding CWP as a form 
neoliberalisation. In focusing on the everyday, it enables an understanding of neoliberalisation 
that is more sophisticated and grounded in actual processes, and which also recognises acts of 
resistance and adaptation. The concept of programming was developed and applied to CWP to 
see how the residual routines and rhythms of everyday life are subject to attempts to change it 
to consolidate neoliberalisation.  
The chapter began by aiming to fill three gaps seen in the literature, which were what is the 
‘everyday’, how does it relate to contingency and how does it complicate and relate to 
neoliberalisation. Firstly, the theorisation of Everyday Life allows an effective understanding 
of what the everyday is, and how capitalism and welfare targets and changes it through the 
application of the concept of programming in terms of governance and accumulation. 
Secondly, Lefebvre’s view of the everyday as a dynamic space that resists and adapts efforts 
to programme it enables an understanding of the contingent nature of neoliberalisation. There 
is an interplay between attempts at programming and the everyday that lead to unpredictable 
outcomes. Finally, Lefebvre’s sociological critique, focusing on social relations and meaning, 
enables a deepening and nuancing of the welfare settlements seen in the previous chapter. The 
chapter then combined Lefebvre’s theory with insights on neoliberalisation, social meanings 
of money and everyday financialisation. As Lefebvre and scholars of neoliberalisation have 
noted, examination of ‘actually existing’ forms of welfare restructuring in their own context is 
what is required. The theoretical work undertaken in these first two chapters has provided a 
valuable conceptual framework with which to apply to the cases of CWP in South Africa and 
Australia.
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Chapter Three: Cashless Welfare Payments 
in International Context 
 
This chapter signals the beginning of the thesis’ empirical analysis. Before analysing the 
specifics of the two central cases, it is important to first situate them in an international context. 
South Africa and Australia are not the only places with CWP and a diverse range of policies 
have developed in different places and at different scales. The argument of the chapter then is 
that CWP are an emergent mode of welfare payment that are supported by a prominent 
transnational discourse, both of which reflect principles of neoliberal welfare. By analysing 
both the discourses and policy forms of CWP, the chapter is able to make an original 
contribution by, first, identifying common themes, tropes and claims about cashless made by 
influential international actors. Second, it analyses international instances of CWP and is thus 
able to categorise them into two principle forms: Inclusive CWP and Disciplinary CWP.  
To make this argument the chapter first describes the relevant actors and critiques the 
discourses that are used. This analysis is broken up into two sections, organised around the 
types of actor. The first group of actors are conceptualised as ‘Providers’, meaning those who 
are involved in the implementation or administration of CWP. Providers’ discourse focuses 
mainly the lower costs, greater surveillance and increased control that cashless offers. The 
second group are ‘Advocates’, who promote the use of cashless as a benefit to those receiving 
welfare payments. Advocates discourses focus on the opportunities of financial inclusion and 
the greater safety cashless payments offer. The second half of the chapter then moves onto look 
at the variety of CWP around the world. Using an ideal type method, the chapter suggests there 
are two distinctive forms of CWP: an Inclusive form and a Disciplinary form. The former 
focuses on financial inclusion and allows users to opt out of the state created system. It is 
evidenced by cases in Brazil, Mexico and Canada. The Disciplinary form is compulsory and 
seeks to shape and control the spending behaviour of people receiving welfare. It is seen in 
examples in the USA, Thailand and the UK.  
In doing this, the chapter contributes to the thesis by identifying a wider trend in CWP that 
both the South African and Australian cases are part of. This helps to answer the research 
question regarding the international emergence of CWP and avoids the depiction of the South 
African and Australian examples as singular one-off examples. Instead, they can be understood 
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as part of a substantial international roll-out of CWP and an instance of neoliberalisation. So 
far literature on, and critique of, CWP have been discreet and isolated. In some cases, policies 
have been as yet unaddressed by academic literature, and therefore the majority of coverage 
and analysis comes from news media. In the examples in section two this is the case for policies 
in Thailand, the UK and Canada. In other cases, literature on CWP have tended not to be 
discussed as part of an international process of restructuring, which is the case for Brazil and 
Mexico.119 These projects occur across scales and may be large, national policies as in Brazil, 
Mexico or Thailand, national policies but with federal responsibility (USA) or local 
experiments and trials, potentially for specific population groups (as in Canada and the UK). 
As such, understanding CWP as a consolidation of neoliberalisation draws these variegated 
sources and examples into an unevenly developed pattern of regulatory restructuring. Further, 
it shows how CWP discourses operate transnationally, as the distinctive ideas and justifications 
for cashless pervade all the forms of CWP, but are repackaged and selected for the individual 
context.  
However, it is insufficient to consider only what Lefebvre called the ‘global’ level and the 
evidence does not suggest a homogenisation of payment systems. Accompanying case studies 
are required to fully understand the contingent policy forms, uneven implementation and the 
everyday consequences and experiences of ‘actually existing’ forms of CWP. As such, this 
chapter lays the groundwork for the subsequent chapters that analyse CWP in contextual detail.  
 
                                               
119 Although there are some examples where this is not the case, for example Molyneux (2008) or Lavinas (2013). 
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1. Proponents and the discourse of CWP  
The first stage of the analysis will be to demonstrate how transnational actors have propagated 
an influential discourse on CWP that resonates through the majority of the upcoming examples. 
The CWP discourse is situated within a wider discourse which seeks to challenge or remove 
cash from entire economies, primarily justified by the prevention of criminal activity such as 
money laundering or tax evasion (see, for instance Rogoff (2017) or Sands (2017)). A practical 
example is India’s demonetisation programme, which withdrew high denomination notes from 
circulation (for a critique see, Ghosh et al 2017). Academically, Mader (2016: 71) studied 
cashless payments, but only briefly mentioned the importance of government payments, his 
focus is much more on financial inclusion and digital money. However, the actors he refers to 
are also relevant to CWP. He describes them as ‘cash crusaders’, who view cash an impediment 
to financial inclusion. They are:  
large international public and private financial inclusion funding 
bodies…the main foremost payment systems and credit card 
companies, large commercial banks, government agencies, select 
international organisations, telecommunication firms, some poverty 
finance providers (such as MFIs) willing to “go digital”, and the 
bewildering gamut of FinTech [financial technology] companies 
(Mader 2016: 70). 
This chapter will complement his analysis by focusing on the move towards cashless through 
state welfare payments in particular. Here there is a specifically welfare payments discourse 
that is propagated by the same group of actors, and these ideas reflect neoliberal principles of 
welfare restructuring. These discourses will be seen to reappear consistently through the thesis. 
CWP are said to provide benefits to both states and ‘users’120, and those propagating the 
discourses can be broken up into two groups, ‘Providers’ and ‘Advocates’. While both tend to 
offer similar ideas, the two groups emphasise different aspects. Providers focus on the 
purported benefits to the state, whereas Advocates concentrate on those for the users. This 
distinction will be reflected in the analysis.  
                                               
120 The term used by proponents of CWP.  
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1.1 Providers  
Providers are those organisations that will directly partner with states seeking to develop and 
implement a CWP system. They are chiefly financial services or payment firms able to take on 
large-scale state contracts. Most prominent here are the two largest payment firms in the world, 
Visa and Mastercard. They are directly involved in a number of the systems seen later in the 
chapter, but they also actively market and promote their services to states. Providers seek to 
encourage cashless forms of welfare disbursement and suggest that their services will benefit 
both users and states, although there is a general emphasis on states. This should not be 
particularly surprising given that they are seeking to sell their services to them. Providers draw 
attention to the cost and efficiency savings a cashless system offers, as well as enabling 
surveillance over welfare money. These claims are indicative of processes of neoliberal 
restructuring, where on the one hand effort is made to reduce public expenditure, seek ‘efficient 
governance’ and commodify services, but on the other hand this is accompanied by an 
extension and use of state power to enforce certain forms of economic behaviour and market-
based social relations. 
Both Visa and Mastercard explicitly claim that a shift to cashless payments will “create 
significant cost saving and efficiencies” (Mastercard 2018a). Visa maintains that “if a country 
can shift from a paper-based payments system to an electronic one, it can save up to one per 
cent of its GDP” (Visa 2012: 5). Cash systems are routinely portrayed as being costly, because 
of “production costs, transportation costs, insurance costs, cash handling, security and …losses 
of interest” (Mastercard 2013a) and the “persistence of cash is surprising given its 
inconveniences and the risks of carrying it around.” (Thomas 2013: 1).121 This demonstrates 
an attempt at discursively creating the ‘convenience’ of cashless, and portraying cash as 
inconvenient. As seen in the previous chapter, convenience is an important feature of 
programming, thus this representation of forms of money helps to infuse everyday practices 
with cashless payments.  
The physical presence and movement of cash, as well as its separation from the financial 
system, accrues costs to governments, merchants and users that a CWP system is said to 
prevent. As the transfer of value in a CWP is electronic, the movement costs are significantly 
lower. As a result, the state gains cost savings, while payments are routed via finance firms’ 
                                               
121 The World Bank (2012a) makes similar claims on the possibilities of the savings that states can achieve by 
digitising payments.  
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‘rails’, providing them with micropayment revenues. The other aspect of cost reduction is 
efficiency savings, as less of the processing of payments is done manually and physically. By 
doing this, the state is able to improve the “service delivery” of welfare payments (AllPay 
2018b).  
Providers mobilise established terminologies of New Public Management, and neoliberal fiscal 
discipline to promote CWP. For example, in a marketing brochure for their government 
payment services, Visa (2012: 5) sympathetically acknowledged: “We understand that you 
have to do more with fewer resources.”122 In this way CWP are positioned as enabling states 
to pursue “core neoliberal priorities such as ‘lean’ bureaucracies [and] fiscal austerity” 
(Brenner and Theodore 2002: 361). As states (and especially states with developed welfare 
systems) pursue ‘permanent’ austerity (Pierson 2002), cashless payments offer lower 
expenditure, increased efficiencies, a better service to users and the involvement of private 
partners. The extent to which this is true is debatable. Especially in the disciplinary forms of 
CWP below, policies can often require large, expensive contracts and accrue additional costs 
by developing appropriate infrastructure. Moreover, the claim that the ‘quality’ of service has 
improved is also questionable, particularly in instances where everyday lives are disciplined 
and controlled.  
A further claim Providers make is that CWP offer states greater control over the money that is 
dispersed, either in how it is spent or by improving the monitoring of card use. In relation to 
the efficiency discourse above, CWP are claimed to provide states with the means to tackle 
corruption and prevent ‘leakage’ (Mastercard 2018b). Cards are said to be more effective in 
monitoring and tracking the movement of payments, which will also prevent money being 
siphoned off by third-parties in the system. For instance AllPay, a UK payments company, 
focus their marketing on the ability of local councils to track the spending of care and personal 
budgets more efficiently, claiming that a card “provides excellent management information 
regarding spend and usage” (AllPay 2018; 2018b) 
Other providers conflate the monitoring and spending control functions as part of the appeal to 
manage ‘inappropriate use’. This aspect is especially the case when providers are speaking to 
states with developed welfare systems. One report states:  
                                               
122 Although an Advocate rather than a Provider a report by Demos, a UK think tank, also acknowledges the 
austerity agenda in its case for cashless payments: “In the face of unprecedented budget cuts, local authorities 
should explore the possibility of using prepaid cards for the distribution of personal budgets, as a tool to reduce 
administrative costs and reduce the budgetary cuts passed to front-line services” (Wood and Salter 2013: 12). 
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Whether funding is made to a bank account or in cash it is traditionally 
difficult and time consuming to check that the funds are being spent 
appropriately by manual methods. This usually involves asking for 
receipts and statements and carrying out a manual reconciliation… As 
well as restricting the use of Prepaid cards to certain categories of spend 
all transactions are automatically logged electronically and made 
available for analysis. Reports can be automatically triggered when, for 
example, funds are regularly underspent or the pattern of spend 
changes. Councils can therefore ensure that funds are being sent 
appropriately and more easily manage the risk of inappropriate or 
fraudulent use (National Prepaid Card Steering Group 2012: 12). 
Similarly, Visa (2012: 14) suggest that “to ensure adherence to a specific benefit programme’s 
requirements, you can restrict cards’ use to certain kinds of merchants.” These providers offer 
states the capacity to extend control over the everyday lives of people receiving welfare money. 
This should not be necessarily thought of a design of the Providers, and is likely to be reflection 
of the desires of the states; Providers have little interest in restricting where the card is used, 
especially in cases where this would reduce their fee revenue. Indeed, the control of payments 
undermines some of the organisations’ own marketing material, for instance Mastercard’s 
famous slogan: “There’s some things money can’t buy, for everything else, there’s 
Mastercard”. 
 
1.2 Advocates 
The other type of actor in the international CWP space are the Advocates. This group of actors 
are drawn predominantly from the international development sector and focus mainly on the 
Global South and the users of CWP. These discourses are in-line with Maurer’s (2015: 129) 
depiction of ‘poverty payment’, whereby the “design of digital platforms for the transfer of 
value, agnostic as to what value is being transited or what it is being used for, has positive spill-
over effects that ultimately benefit poor people”. In other words, the value of the transfer can 
be separated from the wider economic value the form of payment provides. For example, lower 
transaction costs for users or the development of market solutions to social problems using 
transaction data. The most prominent actors here are large international organisations, like the 
World Bank, national development agencies such as USAID, and advocacy organisations such 
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as the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), the Gates Foundation and the Better than 
Cash Alliance (BTCA).123 They are highly influential actors who are able to set agendas, 
prescribe and influence policies and set terms of relationships between themselves and 
recipient states (Boas and McNeill 2004). For example USAID (2014) issued a statement 
saying that “electronic payment systems must be the default method of payment under all 
awards”, immediately shaping the form of USAID backed projects. They also provide toolkits 
to states about how and why they should digitise their payments, disseminate research on the 
value and progress of a transition towards cashless, and offer funding and incentives to digitise 
payments.  
The leading rationale for Advocates for CWP is financial inclusion. Most of the benefits 
considered to accrue to the users of CWP are related to a closer relationship with the financial 
sector.124 The premise for this is that the poor are financially ‘under-served’, and financial 
inclusion fulfils their ‘needs’ and ‘demands’. The poor are said to be excluded because of a 
lack of money, collateral, appropriate identification and proximity to financial service 
providers (World Bank 2018a). As a result, they are either left without any financial services, 
or left to rely on exploitative and expensive ‘informal’ financial services.125 The familiar 
market logic runs thus: Including the ‘under-served’ into formal finance creates a market for 
financial companies to better serve their needs. Competition amongst providers will ensure 
prices are as low as possible, services are appropriately designed to the needs of the poor and 
technological innovation will expand the reach into previously inaccessible areas. Once 
financially included, people can gain a variety of benefits such as easier management of money, 
ability to save for unplanned or large expenditures, and obtain credit for business expansion or 
consumption smoothing (CGAP 2014).  
One important strategy therefore for including the ‘unbanked’ into formal finance is through 
digitisation of welfare payments into a cashless form. The World Bank’s (2012a: 3) General 
Guidelines for Government Payments has financial inclusion as a key feature:  
The large volume of payments issued by governments, as well as the 
nature of some specific programs like social spending programs, 
                                               
123 The Better Than Cash Alliance (2018a) is an organisation based at the at UN comprised of “ a partnership of 
governments, companies, and international organizations that accelerates the transition from cash to digital 
payments in order to reduce poverty and drive inclusive growth.”  
124 Providers also use this claim, but less frequently and with less prominence.  
125 Taylor (2012: 608–609) has argued that the informal/formal distinction used with studies of financial inclusion 
is a false binary, as formal finance has informal practices embedded within it.  
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represents an opportunity to promote or facilitate financial inclusion on 
a large scale.  
Both USAID and the Gates Foundation are explicit about financial inclusion being the central 
benefit of cashless payments. USAID (2016: 2) argue that whilst savings and convenience are 
beneficial to recipients, “the greater benefits” are in the building of a new payment system that 
promotes access to a wider range of financial services. They provide a ‘toolkit’ to assist states’ 
transition to digital payments. The final stage of the toolkit is to ‘Scale Up and Out’ where 
financial inclusion is effectively seen as the pinnacle of digital payments (USAID 2016: 31-
33). Similarly, the Gates Foundation (2014: 12) argue that: 
Government to person (G2P) payments have the greatest potential to 
accelerate financial inclusion in the short to medium term, as it is easier 
for the government to dictate how it pays recipients than to influence 
how businesses or individuals transact.  
States are considered crucial to the transition to cashless and are encouraged to target their 
efforts on those who they have the most influence and power over. Finally the Gates 
Foundation (2013) also make the case that CWP will contribute to financialisation as “digital 
payment systems can also supply financial institutions with additional sources of revenue. For 
example, the data from digital transactions can help providers better understand customer needs 
and patterns, thereby helping create new products and offering more attractive credit terms”. 
CWP are a projected as a ‘bottom of the pyramid’ product that enables a virtuous cycle of 
benefits for state, businesses and people receiving welfare payments.  
As the benefits of financial inclusion are said to occur independently of the transfer of money, 
CWP create a dual gain for people receiving them. Not only will the efficient transfer of 
monetary value supposedly help alleviate poverty, this is supplemented by gains from being 
financially included. However, the gains from financial inclusion, and the assumption of an 
unproblematic engagement with finance can be challenged. Firstly, many of the upcoming 
examples of CWP suggest that in fact the poor are reluctant to engage with the financial sphere, 
preferring to manage their money in cash and avoid purchasing financial services. Secondly, 
as seen in Chapter One, a body of academic research has argued that there are risks involved 
in financial inclusion and claims that it is beneficial should be considered critically. The 
underlying assumption is that ‘the financial’ in financial inclusion is represented as “a neutral 
legal contract into which the working poor enter, voluntarily and on equal terms and from 
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which they are said to benefit” (Soederberg 2014: 163). Financial inclusion does not occur on 
a level playing field, those being included are potentially more vulnerable and therefore willing 
to take unfavourable or exploitative terms, either out of desperation or lack of awareness (see 
Chapter Five for a notable example).  
One final claim about of CWP made by Advocates is the greater security a card-based 
distribution provides, connecting with other claims about the dangers of cash. Receiving 
payments in cash is said to be risky as people are vulnerable to theft, especially when cash 
dispersal is at a publicly known, set time (World Bank 2012b; Gates Foundation 2015: 3). In 
addition, by removing the need to travel long distances to collect the cash, vulnerability whilst 
travelling is said to be reduced. Cards are meant to mitigate this by relocating money onto a 
PIN- or fingerprint- protected card, which can easily be blocked if it is lost. The World Bank 
cite the USA Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) card as an example of how risks of crime 
reduces with a CWP (Klapper and Singer 2014: 10). However, the risk of robbery is not 
necessarily reduced, as a card can as easily be stolen as cash. Moreover, though a card may 
reduce the risk of crime in the form of physical theft, the restructuring of payment arguably 
also leads to a restructuring of crime, whereby there is a vulnerability to new forms of financial 
crime and risk, as will be seen in Chapter Five.  
Four central ideas have been distilled from the discourses of transnational actors involved in 
promoting and implementing CWP. This mode of payment is seen to be cheap, safe, 
informational, controlling and financially inclusive. They are articulated as a virtuous cycle, 
where all parties gain, with no losses. States make savings, users are included and partnering 
financial firms make profits - a triple win. These claims are prevalent in policy writing and 
research on CWP, clearly by Providers and Advocates, but also by the states implementing 
such systems. The key benefits of cashless welfare are coherent across the groups of actors as 
they all mention the key pillars of CWP discourse. As will be seen in the two main thesis cases, 
both the South African and Australian cases use forms of these ideas in their justifications and 
legitimations for the introduction of their CWP. Returning to neoliberalisation, one of its key 
features is considered to be the transnational policy transfer, where neoliberal regulatory 
strategies are circulated for redeployment in new places (Brenner et al. 2010: 335). CWP form 
another example of this process, as there is clear evidence of a transfer of ideas around cashless, 
and the policy solutions and benefits it provides. Further research could valuably study the 
mechanisms and networks through which these ideas travel. As well as discursively, the policy 
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transfer can be observed in the variegated international forms of CWP. The chapter will now 
move on to analyse them and their commonalities and differences. 
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2. The ideal types of CWP 
The Australian and South African cases that are analysed in the subsequent chapters do not 
exist in isolation and are part of an emerging and evolving system of welfare payments. In this 
section, the different varieties of CWP will be described and analysed. While there is diversity 
in each national case, reflecting the contingent nature of welfare policies, it is possible to 
identify two dominant types of CWP into which most versions fit. The ‘ideal type’ 
methodology is used to abstract from the individual differences and analyse the similarities 
between the different forms. It is especially useful in this instance as this method is considered 
valuable “in the analysis of a topic that is little known or explored” as it allows an initial way 
to process large amounts of data (Swedberg 2017:4). The two types that have been identified 
are ‘Inclusive CWP’ and ‘Disciplinary CWP’. The examples to support each case follow the 
initial presentation of the respective ideal type.  
The ideal type method is prominent in studies of welfare. Most obvious is Esping-Anderson’s 
(1990) Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, as well as the substantial subsequent body of work 
following him, identifying new types such as the Mediterranean (Arts et al .2002), Productivist 
(Holliday 2000), or Central and Eastern Europe (Fenger 2007). A more comprehensive 
overview of different ideal types in welfare literature can be found in Arts et al. (2002). 
Alternative ideal type methods in welfare and political economy can also be found in Jessop’s 
(2002) Keynesian Welfare National State and Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regime, 
or Hall and Soskice’s (2001) two varieties of developed capitalism, Liberal Market Economies 
and Coordinated Economies. 
This method of analysis, originating with Max Weber, was first used for developing concepts 
by abstracting from observed characteristics of a phenomena to create a representation of 
observed cases (Risjord 2014: 43). Crucially though, these are idealisations, and do not 
necessarily exist in their abstracted form (Weber 1949: 90). The ideal type method can be useful 
for “heuristic, descriptive and explanatory purposes” (Jessop 2002: 460). In this chapter, the 
ideal type will serve a heuristic role, clustering together identifiably similar types of cashless 
payment systems and identifying common features.126 Doing so provides a basis for the 
subsequent chapter, offering a further justification for case selection (an Inclusive type and a 
                                               
126 The heuristic use is what Weber considered the ideal type’s most valuable contribution (Swedberg 2017: 4)  
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Disciplinary type), as well as demonstrating that both the two cases are also part of a wider 
international phenomenon.  
There are two main issues with ideal types that must be acknowledged and addressed. Firstly, 
many of the previous ideal type theorisations have focused predominantly on comparison 
between the ‘developed’ national economies of the OECD (Rudra 2007: 379). In doing so this 
maintains an outdated and neo-colonial divide between states in the Global North and Global 
South and neglects the important similarities and differences within state welfare policies. 
Given this, the case selection within this chapter has sought to draw on a diversity of cases 
from across the world. Secondly, ideal types can become reified and static, portraying a 
snapshot image of social reality, and as a result struggle to understand or incorporate change. 
Weber (1949: 110-111) was aware of this, suggesting that ideal types should be constantly 
assessed against evidence and adjusted according to findings. As a result, the ideal types 
contained within this thesis need to be subject to ongoing and rigorous investigation, and be 
responsive to findings that dispute the types. Further, these ideal types should act as the 
beginning of the analysis, rather than the end point, enabling an understanding of the specific 
forms and contingencies that create the individual types and how they are experienced in 
everyday life.  
 
2.1 Inclusive Cashless Welfare Payments 
The first type of CWP system is the Inclusive CWP. They are dubbed ‘inclusive’ as the mode 
of payment is designed to include those receiving the payment. This can simply refer to the 
extending of payments to groups who previously did not receive payment, or received it 
unreliably or intermittently. Cashless payments can be effective at doing this, allowing an 
extension of payment across large distances and into rural areas. Significantly, it also refers to 
the prominence of financial inclusion, an aspect that reliably features in these forms of CWP. 
The shift to cashless enables financial inclusion because each person must have an account in 
order to take payment; those without are given a state created financial and associated card. 
The discourse depicted above is present: the state is said to get a cheaper, more efficient 
payment that can prevent leakage or loss, while recipients gain a convenient and safe payment 
that can also financially include them. The positive benefits that are seen to accrue to people 
receiving payment is reflected in their labelling. Inclusive CWP frequently refer to people as 
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‘beneficiaries’ – suggestive of someone who is ‘benefiting’ or gaining an advantage from being 
part of the programme.  
The Inclusive CWP is also connected to the theoretical framework developed in the previous 
chapters, in that they seek to consolidate neoliberalisation and contain both governance and 
accumulation dimensions. Chiefly, they enable governance by developing and deepening 
capitalist social relations, especially between state, society and financial capital. Accumulation 
is furthered by the privatisation and financialisation within these forms of payment.   
There are five key features of the Inclusive CWP. Firstly, the Inclusive CWP allows those 
receiving payment to receive it in their own personal bank account, rather than the state created 
one. Users are also not required to keep the money in the account and can immediately 
transform the cashless money into cash, which many do. The non-compulsory use of the card 
is important because underlying the project is an aim to make the payment more inclusive and  
efficient; as long as the payment is made into an electronic, financial account, which account 
is less important. Nevertheless, some form of engagement with the financial sector is required, 
as opting out of the financial system entirely whole still receiving a payment is no longer an 
option.  
Accordingly, the second feature is that there is a prominent role of finance in Inclusive CWP. 
A financial partner is usually required for either simply holding the accounts, or more broadly 
in implementing and administering the project while building a payment infrastructure. These 
partners can either be public- or privately-owned banks or payment companies. The regulation 
of this relationship between state and organisation is often crucial to the success of a CWP, 
where the financial partner is not explicitly and clearly regulated, exploitation and profiteering 
is possible. There is also a prominent financial inclusion element. As all people receiving 
welfare must have a financial account, not only does this immediately ensure substantial and 
rapid financial inclusion in terms of accounts, but it also facilitates the subsequent selling of 
financial services. This is frequently constructed as ‘empowering’ and ‘dignity providing’ for 
those previously excluded or ‘underserved’. In doing so, those who are using a card for the first 
time are also having their everyday lives programmed by becoming familiar with handling 
money in card form or withdrawing cash electronically.  
The third feature is that Inclusive CWP depend on certain infrastructures to function. If money 
is to be dispersed in a cashless form, locations where the money can be used are required. This 
can mean either the building of new infrastructures, such as mobile cash payment locations, 
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building on existing infrastructure such as ATMs or developing the knowledge and confidence 
of users so that people know how to use the cards. Rural locations are especially targeted for 
infrastructure and training, expanding the reach of the state and market into spaces it previously 
could not reach. The development of these infrastructures aids both state and capital. The 
market is able to expand into previously inaccessible areas, whilst the state gains much more 
presence, knowledge and (potentially) control.  
A fourth feature is that paying through the formal payment network requires the creation of 
formal citizenship identities. As many recipients may not have previously had formal contact 
and relations with the state or finance, identities are created. Through registration processes 
prior or during the inception of a CWP, large amounts of information are provided, such as 
date of birth, income, household size and make up. This provides important information on 
society and especially groups in rural locations that are less well understood; this is ‘legibility’ 
in Scott’s (1998: pt1) terms. Identities can also be represented by both an identification number 
or a PIN and sometimes are accompanied by biometric identification. In sites where these 
identities already exist, they are used by the state as part of the registration process. In doing 
so the state can develop and build formal identities and state relations that are critical for 
governance projects.  
Finally, in Inclusive CWP systems in the Global South, international development actors, such 
as the World Bank, are prominent, providing funding, research and support to the programme 
and advocating for its expansion. ‘Inclusion’ is especially prominent, given the influential 
“Leave No One Behind” agenda of the Social Development Goals (UN 2013: 7), and the World 
Bank’s (2013a: 4) beliefs on ‘inclusion’. It believes that inclusion is a process that improves 
the “ability, opportunity, and dignity of people, disadvantaged on the basis of their identity, to 
take part in society”. These actors have an influential role in shaping the forms of social policy 
emerging in the Global South through financial and technical assistance (Hall 2015:145-147). 
As social protection becomes a dominant theme in development projects the mode of delivery 
becomes critical, and digitised and cashless modes of transfer are the preferred form of payment 
for these development organisations.  
These categories will now be applied to a selection of international instances of CWP. The 
examples to support the argument of the Inclusive CWP system are Brazil’s Bolsa Familia 
programme, Mexico’s Prospera and the Canadian state of Ontario’s welfare debit cards. Further 
examples of Inclusive CWP can also be seen in Fiji (Boletawa 2012), Mali (BTCA 2013), 
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Nigeria (Doya 2017) or India (CGAP 2015). A summary of the different cases and their 
relationship to the ideal type is summarised in Table 1, and also includes the features relevant 
to South Africa in the upcoming chapter are included.  
Table 1 - Summary of the different aspects of the Inclusive CWP 
 Opt out 
Financial 
involvement 
Building 
infrastructures 
Formalising 
identities 
Prominent 
transnational 
organisations 
Brazil Bolsa 
Familia 
✓ 
 
✓ 
 
 
✓ 
 
✓ 
 
Mexico 
Prospera 
✓ 
 
✓ 
 
✓ 
 
 
✓ 
 
Ontario 
Welfare 
Card 
✓ 
 
✓ 
 
 
 
 
 
South 
Africa 
SASSA 
Card 
✓ 
 
✓ 
 
✓ 
 
✓ 
 
✓ 
 
 
2.1.1 Brazil’s Bolsa Familia  
 
Figure 2 - The Bolsa Familia Bank Card (Hellmen 2015: 14) 
One of the most well-known and established Inclusive CWP is the Brazilian Bolsa Familia 
(which translates to ‘Family Allowance’). The Bolsa Familia is a conditional cash transfer 
programme that reaches 13.8 million families, which covers about 48 million people, or 25% 
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of the population (Schwarzer 2015). Payment is made for a number of different programmes 
that make up the Bolsa Familia and these can be categorised into two areas. There is an 
unconditional payment for those in extreme poverty, and conditional payments for those 
households with children or a pregnant woman. The conditional aspects of the payment require 
85% attendance for school age children up to 15 years old, 80% attendance for 16 and 17 year 
olds and regular health visits by children and pregnant women (Soares et al. 2010: 174). The 
monthly value of the payment varies from R$77 (£14) up to R$336 (£62) depending on which 
payments a household is eligible for (Hellman 2015: 11).127 
To be part of the Bolsa Familia, families must either contact the local municipality, or be 
identified by municipality surveys and research. Registration involves providing a substantial 
amount of information to the state, including household access to services and utilities, income 
and expenses, membership of any indigenous groups, education level and employment 
situation for each household member. One member of the household must register as the 
‘individual responsible for the family unit’. The designation is explicitly gendered, as the 
payment is made “preferentially to the woman in each family”,128 who must also sign a 
‘responsibility agreement’, ensuring that the money is used and spent correctly and responsibly 
(Lindert et al. 2007: 17). This ritual, which has no legal or binding commitment, immediately 
loads this money with social meaning and programmes its use. The individual responsible for 
the household must update the state each year with any changes in the household or incomes, 
providing the state with up to date information on a substantial segment of the population. Once 
registration is completed, each member of the household is enrolled into the ‘Federal 
Government Single Registry of Social Programs’ and each are given a Social Identification 
Number that is needed for accessing other services (Hellman 2015: 8-19). The creation of the 
Bolsa payment thus necessitated a formal identity, and the development of a relationship with 
the state.  
To deliver the Bolsa the state partnered with Caixa Economica Federal, a public bank, which 
holds the accounts, issued the cards and administers the payments. Caixa Bank has an extensive 
                                               
127 Exchange rate calculated as £1 equal to R$5.43 as on the 19/09/2018.  
128 The rationale for this is that channelling the money via the card to a woman in the household would mean 
money is spent more appropriately, while also providing women’s empowerment because of their increased 
control over decision making (de Brauw et al 2014: 487). The evidence of the effect this targeting is mixed, with 
some evidence suggesting that ‘high female bargaining power’ was reported in Bolsa households (Fabio Veras 
Soares and Silva 2010: 23–24), while others suggested there was an urban/rural split in terms of its affect (de 
Brauw et al 2014: 496). None of the evidence has, however, investigated how the mode of transfer shapes and 
effects intra-household spending, if at all. 
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network of banks branches, ATMs and small local agents that spread its influence and reach 
out into the most rural locations in Brazil, and this network is used to make the payments 
(Hellman 2015: 14-15). At these locations users can withdraw cash or check their balance. 
There are two types of card that users can choose. The ‘Bolsa Social Card’ is a closed loop 
cash dispersal card wherein the entire benefit must be withdrawn in cash within 90 days of 
payments and cannot be used for deposits or purchases. This withdrawal can be done at any 
number of the Caixa Bank infrastructure points. This form of payment applies to 11 million 
users, 75% of household heads who receive a grant (WWP 2017).  
The other alternative is for people to choose to have their payment made into a fully functioning 
open loop debit card, the Caixa Facil (colloquially known as the ‘blue card’). This card was 
introduced in 2009 to enable financial inclusion and provide a basic current account. The card 
and account can be used for savings, multiple withdrawals are allowed, purchases can be made 
at point of sale (POS) readers and crucially, the purchase of financial services such as 
microcredit and insurance become possible (Hellman 2015: 14-15). The Facil card has no 
account fees, unlimited free balance enquiries and free withdrawals for the first four uses of 
the card (Mariscal and Renteria 2013: 120). All of these transactions take place via the payment 
rails of Mastercard (CGAP 2011: 20). However, this has not manifested in wide use, with only 
25% of people using a Facil account (WWP 2017).  
A key concern for Caixa has been the extent to which the Caixa accounts are profitable. As a 
result, Caixa are seeking to encourage more in-store (and therefore cashless) transactions to 
increase their profitability. According to a state report that aimed to share the experience of the 
Bolsa with the rest of the world:  
The Ministry of Social Development has begun to play a role in the 
financial education of beneficiaries, essentially by encouraging people 
to use banking and financial services in a responsible manner, with the 
newly aware and empowered users increasingly able to make decisions 
about their financial situation and their relationship with banks (WWP 
2017: 4). 
Notable here is the social meanings about people and the money with neoliberal tropes of 
responsibility, empowerment and independence of those receiving the payment, with a 
suggestion (“newly aware”) that the Bolsa is responsible for creating this. While complete cash 
withdrawal remains the dominant method of receiving the grant money for Bolsa recipients, 
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the state and financial companies are seeking to develop familiarity with financial practices 
and promote relations between the poor and financial capital.  
The value of distributing the payment using a cashless medium is said to have benefits that 
chime with the discourses seen above. According to a research report from the University of 
Toronto: “The electronic payment system was adopted to ensure that cash transfers are reliable, 
safe and have a broad reach” (Wong et al. 2015: 13). The World Bank considers the Bolsa 
Familia the archetype of social protection programme from which many others can learn, and 
reflected this with two tranches of funding in 2004 and 2010 (Ceratti 2014; World Bank 2010a). 
The funding is intended to improve the registration, management and monitoring of the 
programme, as well as expanding other associated programmes that encourage labour market 
inclusion and productivity improvement (World Bank 2010b). Similarly a CGAP report 
comments favourably on the introduction of financial inclusion aspects of the programme, 
finding that the digitisation of the Bolsa was cheaper for the state and offered recipients a 
convenient method of payment (Bold et al. 2012: 21–22). 
2.1.2 Mexico: Prospera  
 
Figure 3 - The Prospera Card (Junco 2014) 
Mexico’s Prospera (which translates to ‘Mexico Prospers’) is another example of an Inclusive 
CWP. The Prospera programme is a conditional cash transfer scheme that has been in existence 
since 1997. Initially covering 300,000 households it had increased to 6 million by 2015 (Nino-
Zarazua 2017: 10). The programme seeks to improve the health, education and nutrition of 
poor families (Larraga 2016: 8). Those eligible for the programme are households with an 
estimated income lower than the amount necessary to acquire the minimum amount of food. 
Payment is made to a single member of the household (ideally a woman) on condition of the 
households fulfilling certain requirements, namely attending schools, health appointments and 
workshops. The monthly value of the payment varies from $335 Peso (£13) up to potentially 
$2,737 Peso (£111) depending eligibility for extra payments based on household size, age and 
Chapter Three: CWP in International Context 
 122 
education situation (Larraga 2016: 24).129 The programme is considered to have been a success 
because of its effects on poverty and access to services, and is said to have been influential in 
the design of many other countries’ social protection systems (World Bank 2014).  
Distinctive neoliberal logics of state management have been combined with cashless discourses 
to transform the payment form to a CWP. The World Bank have been central to this evolution 
providing two loans to support the development of the project, while encouraging a focus on 
financial inclusion and developing the technological capacity of a payment infrastructure 
(World Bank 2013a). Previously payments were made through either cash dispersal or direct 
transfer into personal accounts. The cash payments were made in specific points in towns and 
are said to have caused long travelling time, queues and risk of theft and assault (Masino and 
Niño-Zarazúa 2014: 4). 130 In response, the Mexican government transitioned to a cashless 
mode of transfer. This was driven by the limitations of cash based distribution, reflecting the 
distinctive cashless arguments of convenience, safety and reduced leakage, and also as some 
critical observers suggested, by a desire within the national treasury to put in place “measures 
for increasing austerity, discipline and a reduction in the public administration’s expenses” 
(Amin et al. 2012: 5).  
The mode of payment introduced had two types, but both cards were provided by Bansefi, the 
national development bank. The first card is a closed loop cash dispersal form, which is used 
by 80% of Prospera recipients. Here accounts are credited every two months and the assigned 
household member must withdraw all the money within six days from either an ATM or a 
temporary local pay-point. The second option is an open loop card, the ‘Bansefi Mas’ card, that 
can be used in the wider payment infrastructure on Mastercard’s ‘rails’. Money can be accessed 
at Bansefi ATMs, but can also be used for purchases in stores or to gain cashback. Using non-
Bansefi ATMs however, accrues large fees of $22 Peso (90p) for a withdrawal and $8 Peso 
(33p) to check balances (Larraga 2016: 22 n52). By administering the Prospera programme, 
the bank was able to expand its technological capacity, infrastructure, and profits as a result of 
the expanding base of users (World Bank 2013a: 14). However, the rural financial 
infrastructure in Mexico is still said to be inadequate (Grandolini 2016), so the state and Bansefi 
aim to “extend banking services into dispersed areas” by using ‘agent banking’, which is local 
                                               
129 Exchange rates are calculated at £1 equal to $24.59 Peso on the 19/09/2018.  
130 The extent to which the new card is safer is debatable, and arguably has removed one form of risk and replaced 
it with another, as media reports demonstrate that cards are also stolen (Xinhua 2017). 
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independent merchants who can also distribute cash, and expanding POS devices (NCFI 2016: 
12-13).  
The Bansefi Mas card was part of a wider push towards financial inclusion for people receiving 
payments, and the card offered a selection of financial services. Financial inclusion is one of 
the key features of the overall Prospera project and is defined in this context as “giving priority 
access to the beneficiaries of the programme to financial services such as financial education, 
savings, life insurance, and credit” (Larraga 2016: 7-8). Not only is the extension of financial 
services an important development outcome for the Prospera, the expansion of services is an 
important business aim for Bansefi (World Bank 2013a). According to Mastercard’s press 
release on the Bansefi Mas card, “the Prospera program marks a great era for the company in 
Latin America, and this is just the first step to develop economies and the financial ecosystem, 
enabling more people to participate in the global economy” (Junco 2014). Welfare payments 
become a means to include the poor into the infrastructure of the global economy, intertwining 
micro and macro circuits of finance. 
Despite these efforts, some research suggests that financial inclusion has not been completely 
successful through the Prospera, with both infrastructural limitations in rural regions and a lack 
of trust in banks being blamed (Chiapa 2015; Riley and Kulathunga 2017: 145). Some suggest 
that the poor need to be trained and persuaded of the benefits of financial services. One of the 
World Bank’s (2013b: 13) funding objectives was to “modify the behavior on financial 
management and savings” through financial education programmes (Masino and Nino-Zarazua 
2014: 2).131 Others suggest that the routine use of debit cards will eventually lead to users to 
become more willing to engage with the formal financial sphere (Bachas et al. 2017), which 
can be considered an example of financial familiarisation as discussed in Chapter Two. This 
does challenge the underlying assumption of financial inclusion, however, that poor people are 
demanding these services, whereas in fact they may need to be trained and persuaded of the 
benefits to become financial market subjects.  
                                               
131 As well as this, Bansefi used traditional and social media to build the brand of its financial services organisation 
“L@Red de la Gente” (World Bank 2013a: 13) 
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2.1.3 Ontario’s welfare debit card 
 
Figure 4 - Ontario Welfare Debit Card (RBC 2018) 
In 2012, Toronto replaced their previous system of paper welfare cheques with a debit card, 
before being rolled-out across the Ontario province in 2015. This was done to achieve benefits 
for both state organisations and citizens, and was considered a “win-win” by local councillors 
(Moloney 2012). Previously those without a bank account received payments in the form of 
paper cheques that had to be taken to a store to be cashed, accruing fees in doing so. The fees 
were substantial, with a person who receives $599 (£351) a month, saving $250 (£147) a year 
from the transition. At the same time Toronto city government saved $2.5 million (£1.46 
million) a year on cheque cashing fees.132 The transition to a debit card form of payment drew 
on tropes of cashless payment discourse. The card was said to be safer, because the money 
would be protected by a PIN and large amounts of cash would not need to be carried (Dale 
2011a). It would be cheaper because of the avoidance of fees, and more convenient for the user 
because the card could be used for purchases (City of Toronto 2017; CTV 2015). See, for 
example, this statement from a local service manager: 
The reloadable payment card helped one of our clients in Windsor by 
ensuring that he did not have to carry cash, which would have made 
him vulnerable to theft, and made it easy for him to purchase the things 
that he needed (MCSS 2016).  
The new payment system provided a ‘RBC Right Pay’ debit card onto which the money would 
be paid each month, allowing the user to withdraw cash, make payments at POS devices, or 
pay bills. The card is set up by the Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) and could only be loaded with 
money from the state; individual private deposits were not allowed. Additionally, the card was 
operated with Visa, and therefore can be used at any place where these cards were accepted. 
                                               
132 Exchange rates calculated as £1 equal to $1.71 Canadian Dollars on 20/09/2018.  
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The programme makes use of existing financial infrastructure. Users are allowed four free cash 
withdrawals from RBC ATMs, any more withdrawals, or those from non-RBC ATMs are 
charged at $2 (£1.17). The use of the card enables financial inclusion by providing accounts to 
those previously without one, but also increased the familiarity and comfort with handling 
money in card form. Once enrolled in the programme, people were offered further assistance 
with financial literacy (RBC 2016) and finding employment (City of Toronto 2012). The card 
can therefore be seen as a ‘gateway’ to further financial or labour market participation, and an 
example of inclusionary neoliberal welfare.  
One of the dominant claims for the card was that it would provide dignity to those receiving 
welfare, to “remove the stigma of the welfare cheque” (Brennan 2015). According to one 
councillor: “For me, it’s a dignity card, that’s how I see it…Where welfare cheques stigmatize 
people, this card will enable recipients to live like other Torontonians” (Thompson, quoted in 
Moloney 2012). Yet these claims are subject to challenge. When it comes to stigma, the 
introduction of the card will not necessarily lead to a reduction, which is experienced in more 
sites than purely the transformation of vouchers into cash. Additionally, as Chapter Seven will 
show, a card can in some instances exacerbate stigma, as it is noticeably different from other 
cards.  
Notably, politicians were explicit about not wanting to monitor or control welfare expenditure 
in the electronic form. For example, one councillor commented: “I think it’s a little draconian 
to start saying, ‘You’re on welfare, and this is exactly how you’re going to spend the money 
we give you” (Ainslie, quoted in Dale 2011a). Surveillance of spending was also ruled out 
because of Canadian privacy laws. According to a Toronto city official : “In Canada, we don’t 
have the legislative right to track those kinds of things that way. Nor should we, quite frankly. 
And we wouldn’t want to” (MacVicar, quoted in Dale 2011b). 
While the Canadian case demonstrates a clear example of an Inclusive CWP (a focus on 
financial inclusion, reducing costs of payment, opportunity to opt-out), it has underlying 
elements of a disciplinary approach. Although the current government has no apparent 
intention of controlling or monitoring spending, some others do. For example, a 2013 White 
Paper published by the main opposition party suggests using the debit cards to: 
Provide the security sought for taxpayers’ dollars that are intended to 
cover essential food items. A debit card with a limit that only works at 
food vendors offers an alternative to the food stamp system, ensuring 
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that the portion of monthly benefits intended for food is set aside and 
cannot be used on other expenses… By limiting where the money can 
be spent, we can ensure that the money intended for necessities is set 
aside (Hudak 2013: 18). 
The card builds the states capacity and infrastructure to undertake disciplinary control, should 
a shift in ideas or policies occur. This possibility supports the claim made above that ideal types 
require revisiting and interrogating, as the policies themselves are not static, but in constant 
development and evolution.  
 
2.2 Disciplinary Cashless Welfare Payments  
The second ideal type is the Disciplinary CWP. These types of payment systems seek to control 
and discipline the people they send money to. The central features of a Disciplinary CWP are 
the absence of an opt-out for those receiving welfare payments, an explicit social meaning of 
money, the control of where and what can be purchased, and the surveillance of participants. 
These schemes are more commonly seen in ‘developed’ welfare states, where most individuals 
have already been included into relations with the state and (formal) finance by having existing 
bank accounts that benefits are paid into. As a result, the next stage is to build on these relations 
to pursue social policy objectives. Financial firms are required, but their involvement is 
confined to administering payments and providing the technological capacity for control and 
surveillance. Aspects of financial inclusion, such as using the incomes to gain financial 
services, are generally restricted or forbidden.  
As with Inclusionary CWP, Disciplinary CWP are also a consolidation of neoliberalisation 
although with a different focus. While there are some accumulation potentials, chiefly through 
micropayments and privatisation, these policies are predominantly focused on governance. 
Disciplinary forms of cashless payments enable specific governance strategies typically 
through controlling welfare money and extending surveillance to promote market-based 
behaviours. As discussed in Chapter One, a feature of neoliberal governance is the experience 
of stigma in welfare, and this was extended to the everyday experience of stigma through 
welfare payments in Chapter Two. These forms of CWP can stigmatise users by signifying 
them as a ‘dysfunctional’ welfare recipient. Accordingly, the power of the state is used to 
enforce certain everyday practices, monitoring and ensuring that people act in line with 
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preordained market behaviours, underpinned by a paternalism that people receiving welfare 
are either unable or cannot be trusted to spend welfare money ‘properly’. While Disciplinary 
CWP are individualising (by restricting money to a specific card) they are not responsibilising, 
in the sense of leaving individuals to be responsible for the monetary decisions they make. 
Instead, Disciplinary CWP can be seen as a response to a perceived lack of responsibility, 
requiring the state to intervene to enforce responsible uses of welfare money (Trnka and 
Trundle 2014: 139).  
There are four key aspects of a Disciplinary CWP. Firstly, all Disciplinary CWP are 
compulsory, and this can be considered the unifying and distinguishing feature of this type. 
The state is able to use its power to set the terms and conditions of the receipt of welfare money 
especially in how it can be used. Recipients are not able to use their own accounts or withdraw 
cash, as this would subvert the controls placed on the money. They are therefore forced to 
choose between refusing payment or accepting the terms set out; something of a false choice 
given that those requiring state welfare would struggle to live without it. The Disciplinary CWP 
thus consolidates the already unequal relationship between state and citizen. The money cannot 
be accessed in any form other than using the account, usually through the card and sometimes 
using internet transactions.  
The compulsory nature of the scheme is critical for the second defining feature – the control of 
economic behaviour, either where welfare money can be used or what goods can be purchased. 
As was seen in the previous chapter, neoliberalisation of welfare involves the programming of 
everyday life through controls on the form of money. Disciplinary CWP seek to restrict, direct 
or programme the behaviour of those receiving welfare payments, enforcing spending towards 
some things and away from others. More than simply attempting to shape spending, there is an 
underlying attempt to shape the behaviour and mind-set of people receiving welfare. This may 
mean inhibit certain practices or purchases (such as alcohol consumption) or encouraging 
‘effective’ money management through training sessions or enforced budgeting.  
In confining money to a card and ensuring payment can only occur through specified channels, 
the Disciplinary CWP also has a surveillance element. The card enables the state to have 
information and monitoring over the everyday lives of welfare recipients. Disciplinary CWP 
allow the tracking of expenditure, which could be in terms of how much is spent, on what 
products or which locations. All the data that the card collects can be monitored by the state or 
associated financial companies for any ‘unusual’ activity that may require investigating, as well 
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as providing data to inform subsequent policy making. For instance, the required level of 
payment could be increased or reduced depending on how much or where people spend their 
money.  
Fourth and finally, Disciplinary CWP are typically driven by a concern for ensuring state 
money is spent ‘correctly,’ meaning on ‘essentials’. Such purchases and expenditures that are 
considered ‘appropriate’ are payments for things such as groceries, rent or bills. The other side 
of coin is that effort is made to exclude and prevent inappropriate purchases, usually understood 
as expenditures on alcohol, gambling, unhealthy foods, or any illicit activities. These 
distinctions are made to ensure that welfare money is not ‘wasted’. As the schemes invoke a 
moralistic tone, they are accompanied by an experience of stigma and shame for those receiving 
welfare, especially considering the material and symbolic presence of the card. The use of this 
money and the restrictions on it are also subject to contestation, both by the users and the wider 
society, who question whether the state should be setting restrictions on welfare payments.  
These categories will now be applied to a selection of international examples of Disciplinary 
CWP. The three cases are, the USA Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT), the ‘State Welfare 
Card’ in Thailand and a selection of local council projects and national trials in the UK. Further 
examples can also be seen in Egypt (Abdalla and Al-Shawarby 2018) and Nepal (Das Shrestha 
2011). The main features and differences of the cases are summarised in Table 2 with 
Australia’s features also included.  
Table 2 - Summary of different features of Disciplinary CWP 
 Compulsory 
use 
Control of 
spending  
Social meaning 
of money 
Surveillance 
USA SNAP 
program 
✓ 
 
✓ 
 
✓ 
 
 
Thailand State 
Welfare Card 
✓ 
 
✓ 
 
✓ 
 
✓ 
 
UK cashless 
projects 
✓ 
 
✓ 
 
 
✓ 
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2.2.1 The USA EBT Card 
 
 
Figure 5 - A Californian Food Stamp Card (Christensen 2017) 
The first example of a Disciplinary CWP is the USA’s EBT Card. 41 million people in America 
received money from the Supplementary Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), commonly 
known as ‘food stamps’. The programme “offers nutrition assistance to millions of eligible, 
low-income individuals and families and provides economic benefits to communities” (USDA 
2018a). Households receive a monthly maximum of $193 (£146) for a single person, that goes 
up to $1,153 (£871)133 for an eight person household (USDA 2018a). The official state rationale 
is that the payments “ensure that no one in our land of plenty should fear going hungry” (USDA 
2018b). Progressively introduced throughout the 1990s, EBT was adopted as the mode of 
delivery of SNAP payments as part of the 1996 Welfare Reform Act (Caswell and Yaktine 
2013: Ch.2). Prior to this, welfare payments were made either in cash or with vouchers. 
However this form of transfer was said to generate stigma and vulnerability to theft, to which 
the EBT card was proposed to be a solution (Hunt 2016: 380).  
Those receiving SNAP benefits must use an EBT card to receive the payment, and the card can 
also receive other cash benefits such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), an 
option for those without their own bank account.134 The EBT card can therefore hold different 
types of payment and thus different types of money. While SNAP payments cannot be accessed 
in cash and can only be used to purchase specific goods at specific retailers, cash payments can 
                                               
133 Exchange calculated as £1 equal to $1.32 on the 08/09/2018.  
134 Those with their own bank account can use an Electronic Fund Transfer (EFT) to move the money directly 
into a personal account.  
Australia Cashless 
Debit Card 
✓ 
 
✓ 
 
✓ 
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be used anywhere or withdrawn. The disciplinary aspect of the card then is specifically related 
to the SNAP, whereby the use of the card is required to use the money. The EBT card does not 
allow people receiving SNAP to opt-out. 
The SNAP payments enable the purchase of certain foods and prevents the purchase of others. 
Accepted purchases are cold food, seeds and plants, while forbidden purchases are any hot 
food, alcoholic drinks, household items or medicines (USDA 2017a).135 There is a prominent 
public discourse on the misuse or misspending of food stamps, along with the stigmatised 
characterisation of the ‘welfare queen’ (Cammett 2014: 244).136 The system is policed and 
enforced by cashiers at the point of sale, rather than technologically as seen in Australia in 
Chapter Seven. At the point of purchase, customers inform the cashier which portion of their 
account they would like to use (SNAP or cash). The cashier must then make sure the goods 
that are being purchased are allowed and refuse to accept any that are not. Stores may have 
systems that scan certain items as eligible goods, depersonalising the enforcement. There are 
strategies to circumvent the system, such as by finding accommodating cashiers or stores who 
may overlook the restrictions, or simply selling the cards at a discount for cash (Edin and 
Shaefer 2015: 105–116). 
SNAP benefits can be used at any authorised retailer that has the technological capacity to 
accept EBT cards. To qualify, stores must offer two of these eight food categories: meat; 
poultry or fish; fruits or vegetables; bread or cereal; or dairy products. As a result a wide variety 
of stores are eligible, including convenience stores, pharmacies or grocery stores (Racine et al. 
2013: 361). Stores however must purchase their own EBT equipment rather than the state 
distributing the infrastructure (USDA 2017b). A number of payment companies are thus well 
placed to profit from stores purchasing or renting payment infrastructures. An important issue 
with SNAP and EBT is the quality of the food sold by EBT accepting stores and so in order to 
address some health concerns arising the state funds EBT infrastructure to farmer’s markets 
(USDA 2017b; Wetherill and Gray 2015). Thus, not only is the state seeking to shift and shape 
everyday lives towards certain purchases and locations (Shannon 2016), but is also encouraging 
the incorporation of local exchange into the formal payment infrastructure.  
                                               
135 Any unusual mix of typically ‘inappropriate’ goods and other more unlikely goods such as medicines or 
toiletries.  
136 The origin of this trope is often attributed to Ronald Reagan whilst campaigning in 1976: “She has 80 names, 
30 addresses, 12 Social Security cards and is collecting veterans’ benefits on four non-existing deceased husbands. 
And she’s collecting Social Security on her cards. She’s got Medicaid, getting food stamps, and she is collecting 
welfare under each of her names. Her tax-free cash income alone is over $150,000” (Cammett 2014: 244). 
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Finally, the state requires a third-party private provider to facilitate the payment. The USDA 
lists each provider by state, and the contracts are now dominated by two firms, Fidelity 
Information Systems and Conduent, which hold 52 of the 54 national contracts (USDA 2018d). 
JP Morgan has also been prominent in the delivery of the payments (Simon 2012). These firms 
make large profits from the transfer of welfare money, stemming from three main areas, the 
fee from each user, the sale or lease of POS machines, and fees from ATM machines and lost 
cards (GAI 2012).137 As suggested in the previous chapter, the micropayment revenue 
generated from the everyday use of money is an important aspect of CWP. So, while 
Disciplinary CWP may often prevent or control access to financial services, they still promote 
micropayment based forms of accumulation.  
2.2.2 Thailand State Welfare Cards 
 
Figure 6 - The Thai State Welfare Card (The Nation 2017a) 
The second example of a Disciplinary CWP is the State Welfare Card, introduced in Thailand 
in 2017. The scheme pays a monthly income to 11.7 million people, replacing the previous 
system of physical cash dispersal. The State Welfare Card was introduced to disperse money, 
but the cashless form allowed a greater control over how the money was spent, while also 
aiming to boost consumer spending in local economies. As previous cash dispersal programmes 
were criticised for allowing free spending and ‘abuses’ of the system, the cards were intended 
to ensure that state money was spent ‘appropriately’ (Mokkhasen 2017a; Mokkhasen 2017b). 
The cashless aspect also enabled the state to achieve a number of social policy goals on top of 
simply making payments. It could remove the universal provision of public transport by instead 
                                               
137 It is difficult to quantify how much is made from these contracts as the USDA does not collect this information 
(Simon 2012) 
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providing means tested subsidies (The Nation 2017b), direct spending to specific areas of the 
economy, and extend surveillance on the poor.  
Cash cannot be withdrawn from the card and its use is compulsory. The account has internal 
earmarking and couponing to target specific social policy goals. The money held on the card 
is paid monthly and is allocated to three different areas. Firstly, there is money earmarked for 
travel expenses, this allocates 1,000 (£23) Baht for train tickets, 800 Baht (£19) for 
interprovincial bus tickets, and 600 Baht (£14)  for Bangkok bus fares. Secondly, there is 
money allocated to utilities, with 200 Baht (£5)  allocated for electricity and 150 Baht (£3.50) 
for water bills. Finally, there is money for groceries, which is means tested. Those earning less 
than 30,000 Baht (£700) a year receive 300 Baht (£7) a month, and those earning 30,000 - 
100,000 receive 200 Baht a month (Mokkhasen 2017b). Although people are allowed to add 
money to the account, it cannot accumulate and must be spent by the end of the month, 
promoting spending in the local economy. According to a government spokesperson, the card 
led to 11.8 million Baht (£270 000) being spent on consumer goods in the first four months of 
the scheme, along with 14 million Baht (£320,000) on cooking gas, and 100 million Baht 
(£2,260,000)138 on transport (Sangsrichun, quoted in Pattaya Mail 2018).  
The portion of money earmarked for groceries can be used at ‘Blue Flag’ shops, a national 
discount store, and other stores certified by the Commerce Ministry. POS devices are required 
at all stores that wish to accept payment on a State Welfare Card and these are installed by the 
state. As Thailand seeks to move away from cash and develop a national payment 
infrastructure, it is attempting to establish the accompanying infrastructural features 
(Chantanusornisiri 2017b). An additional feature of this is the offer of free broadband internet 
services to state welfare card holders in a selection of remote villages (The Nation 2017c). 
Access to the internet is important for the card readers to get access to the national payment 
infrastructure. In the initial phase, 20,000 card reading devices were installed at local stores 
and shops, and 20,000 more are planned by the end of 2018 (Pattaya Mail 2018). With a 
cashless scheme however, some rural stores did not have the required infrastructure, and so 
people in these regions struggled to use the cards (Mokkhasen 2017a). 
By installing card readers, the state became able to direct which stores people were allowed to 
visit and purchase from, and which would be excluded. The money is not only couponed, as 
the locations and amounts are restricted, but it is also earmarked. While the card does not 
                                               
138 Exchange rate calculated as £1 equal to 44 Thai Baht on the 30/07/2018.  
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restrict the types of goods being purchased,139 the purchases should be “considered necessary 
for their living and agriculture” (Kalayanmit, quoted in Sangiam 2017). The state has thus 
sought to influence how users should understand and spend the money. This has provoked 
contestation. According to a local advocacy group: “It is as if the government will exert its 
power over the poor, telling them where to spend and what they should not hope for” 
(Tienudom, quoted in Saengpassa 2017).  
The extension of surveillance over the behaviour and lives of people receiving the card is an 
explicit part of the policy. All users were asked to register with the government to receive the 
card, and share extensive personal financial information (Mokkhasen 2017b). Not only does 
this create a national database of the poor in Thailand, but also functioned to rule certain 
applicants ineligible (Mokkhasen 2017c). The card collects the information and spending 
behaviours of the everyday lives of users, which some have suggested should be repurposed 
for other uses. One suggestion was for “the government to understand the people’s needs and 
spending, and to plan better to help them” (Yee 2018). Further, by collaborating with the Krung 
Thai Bank, the State Welfare Card is part of an unspecified policy to harness ‘Big Data’ 
(Cheevasittiyanon 2018).  
During the registration, people were asked to share information on any outstanding debts, as 
part of a strategy to formalise and discipline debt relations (Mokkhasen 2017b). The 
introduction was seen as an opportunity to tackle ‘underground debts’, meaning loans from the 
informal sector that charge a much higher interest rate, which would be uncovered by collecting 
personal financial information (Chaitrong 2018). However, there was also a simultaneous effort 
to encourage the poor to borrow in the formal sector, the government Saving Bank was 
instructed to promote lending and deposit products for the poor (The Nation 2017a). This 
provides an example of the overlapping and contradictory disciplinary and inclusive features 
within CWP, in one instance the state is seeking to prevent debt relations, and in the next it is 
encouraging them. The debt relation itself is not the problem, it is credit through informal 
channels the state is seeking to prevent. 
The card has also generated some controversy in terms of misspending, or the allocation to 
‘undeserving’ people who are considered inappropriate recipients because they earn too much 
                                               
139 According to the Director General of the Department of Internal Trade, smart cards can be used to purchase 
any goods or commodities from any brand or merchant (Sangiam 2017).  
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money.140 Thus, the cashless form enables the government to monitor spending and eligibility 
to prevent potential fraud. It has been suggested by think tanks that the government “use 
spending behaviour information to filter out unqualified persons. If any recipients of the 
government's welfare scheme usually spend 300 Baht per meal or dine out at luxury restaurants, 
they are not living on the poverty line” (Somachai, quoted in Paweewun and Arunmas 2017). 
In addition to this the government required 70,000 students to survey card recipients and 
corroborate their findings with the national bank to ensure correct eligibility. The cashless 
system therefore promotes and enables the capacity to monitor, control and enforce the state’s 
understanding of the appropriate use of welfare money. 
2.2.3 UK cashless projects 
 
Figure 7 - The Azure Card (Roberts 2014) 
The UK does not have a national or permanent CWP system, but it does have a number of trials 
and local schemes that can be considered as Disciplinary CWP.141 There has been a significant 
push in the UK among local councils to use ‘pre-paid’ cards to distribute welfare payments. 
These are said to reduce costs, improve risk management and control spending, both by users 
and councils. One of the clearest examples of a Disciplinary CWP was the Azure card, which 
operated in the UK between 2010 and 2017, when the system was ended (UK Government 
2017). The card provided an income to asylum seekers who had had their asylum request 
rejected, but were unable to their return to their home country.  
The Azure Card replaced a previous system where cash was distributed (Santo 2014). The cash 
payment was ended as it was considered inefficient for the state. For the state cash was 
considered an incentive for recipients to remain in the UK because of the freedom it allowed, 
                                               
140 A prominent public example of this was a male model who obtained a welfare card and shared photos of 
himself with it and other expensive items on social media (Chantanusornisiri 2017a).  
141 It should also be noted that the UK also has trialled an Inclusive CWP as a route to financial inclusion with no 
controls over spending or cash access (Cole et al 2016).  
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whereas the controls on the card would make the experience of staying in the UK more 
unpleasant, disciplining people to leave the country (Travis 2006). Distinctive cashless 
discourses were also used. The Minister for Borders and Immigration suggested the card would 
“enable the UK Border Agency to cut down on the abuse of asylum support and provide a more 
efficient system” (Woolas, quoted in Santo 2014: 1–2). Additionally, the transition to the 
cashless form was seen to offer greater monitoring and surveillance capacity to the UK Border 
Agency (Carnet et al. 2014: 13–14). Each transaction was traceable and would show where 
and when transactions were made, preventing the state from ‘losing’ people who may need to 
be deported or detained. This would also allow the identification of cases where support was 
no longer needed, predominantly when the amount in the account would build up rather than 
being spent (Santo 2014: 9).  
The card was debited with £36 a week, and could only be used at specified supermarkets and 
stores, for food, essential toiletries or clothing. Forbidden items were alcohol, tobacco, 
transport or gift cards. The card could be used at the major supermarkets (Tesco, Sainsbury’s 
Co-Op, Asda, Morrisons and Iceland) as well as other major chain stores (Mothercare and 
Boots) (UK Home Office 2015). The overall project was administered by Sodexo, a 
multinational services company.  
The card sought to control the everyday lives of recipients and directed where they could spend 
their money, and on what products. These controls created issues for the users. The use of the 
card was said to “painful” when transacting at stores, especially when the card failed to work 
and cashiers learned of the user’s situation (Klein and Williams 2012: 747). The ‘painfulness’ 
of the transaction echoes the findings in Chapter Two when different modes of payment created 
‘psychological pain’. The restrictions also prevented users from purchasing at smaller, cheaper 
or culturally specific stores as they would not accept the Azure card (Piacentini 2012: 174). 
Notably, because the card could not be used for transport, users were often unable to get to a 
store where the card could be used (Ellis 2010). The card not only restricted the sites that 
transactions could be made in, but also restricted the ability of people to access those locations.  
Although the Azure card has now ended, experiments with cashless welfare continue in the 
UK. In 2014, the Minister for Work and Pensions Iain Duncan-Smith announced to the 
Conservative Party Conference: 
I can stand here and announce to you that I am going to start testing 
prepaid cards onto which we will make benefit payments so that the 
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money they receive is spent on the needs of the family, finally helping 
I believe to break the cycle of poverty for families on the margins (BBC 
News 2014). 
This ethos of shifting payments onto cards to assist social policy objectives is present in a 
number of local council policies, especially for those receiving direct payments for care 
services. Personal budgets and payments are designed to increase the ‘personalisation’ and 
control of care provision by disabled and elderly people. Money is distributed directly to the 
user to choose to purchase what they considered to be the most appropriate services. For 
example, Brent Council prepaid cards are used for payments to users for care services. This 
Mastercard enabled card can only be used to purchase care related services identified on the 
users’ ‘care plan’. The card will not work at ATMs and cashback at stores is disabled (Wessels 
2014: 8). The card enables the council to more closely monitor how the money is being used, 
and to check for any underspending that might mean the amounts being received are too high 
(National Prepaid Card Steering Group 2012: 22).142  
                                               
142 Similar schemes are seen in Merton Council (2014). 
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3. Conclusion 
In conclusion, this chapter has demonstrated the proliferation of CWP systems around the 
world, and the prevalent underpinning discourse that accompany them. Whilst each case is 
driven by its own specific circumstances and contingencies, the international examples cluster 
around two forms: the Inclusive CWP and the Disciplinary CWP. As seen above in Table 1, 
the Inclusive form was focused on financial inclusion, the building of identities and 
infrastructure and the option to choose not to use the state’s card. As in Table 2, the Disciplinary 
form is characterised by the inability to refuse the state’s card, and extension of control and 
surveillance. Some of the central dividing lines between the two forms are presented in Table 
3. These two forms can be understood as two examples of contemporary neoliberalisation, 
either of a form of inclusive state building or disciplinary intervention seeking to change 
behaviours. Both cases are underpinned by neoliberal ideas of policy making, which are 
reinforced and reproduced by influential transnational actors.  
Table 3 - The differences between Inclusive CWP and Disciplinary CWP 
 
 Inclusive cashless welfare Disciplinary cashless welfare 
Involvement of 
private sector 
Prominent involvement 
Private delivery partner but 
minimal involvement 
Dominant 
discourses 
Safe, convenient, efficient 
payment for the 
un(der)banked 
Ensuring value for ‘taxpayers’ 
money’, guaranteeing money is 
spent ‘correctly,’ welfare as a 
privilege. 
Form of 
neoliberalism 
Seeking to include, 
building and formalising 
capitalist social relations 
Seeking to discipline and 
stigmatise people receiving 
welfare, produce market 
subjects 
Prominence of 
financial inclusion 
Financial inclusion is 
prominent 
Subjects are already financially 
included 
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This 
chapter has exposed the need for further research in this area. As many of these policies are 
relatively recent (the Thailand policy was introduced in 2017), there is very little academic 
research on these topics. The politics of new payment systems and how they connect to the 
wider shifts towards cashless would be a fruitful avenue to explore. This would show more 
examples of ‘actually existing’ forms of CWP and the unique, contingent factors that shape 
their introduction and form. Further, whilst the ideal type analysis is useful as an initial guide, 
it requires subsequent research to test, refine or reject the types. It is perfectly possible that the 
categorisation could be better constructed around different dimensions and incorporate new 
examples, but this can only be discovered with further investigation.  
In conclusion, alone this chapter’s analysis is insufficient. Whilst the ideal type method has 
been useful in mapping and categorising the different schemes around the world, to fully 
address the research questions of why states have introduced these policies and what the impact 
on everyday life has been, a detailed study of cases is required. This would allow a fine-grained 
understanding of the specific form of an Inclusive or Disciplinary CWP, the contingencies that 
shaped, and continue to shape its form, as well as an understanding of the experience of 
receiving welfare payments this way. The subsequent chapters will undertake this, and the two 
cases also reflect the classification made here. The South African SASSA card is an example 
of an Inclusive CWP, it allows an opt-out, it seeks financial inclusion and extends the reach of 
Key motivation 
Improving efficiency of 
cash dispersal and 
pursuing financial 
inclusion 
Controlling money and 
behaviour of people receiving 
payments 
Representation of 
target population? 
Beneficiaries, trapped 
entrepreneurs requiring 
freeing, the ‘excluded’, 
Dysfunctional, requiring 
changes in behaviour, liable to 
waste money 
Impact in the 
everyday? 
Financialising daily 
routines by requiring a 
relationship with financial 
market. 
Shaping the everyday 
experience of using welfare 
money, how and where it can 
be used 
Form of 
surveillance 
Gaining understanding of 
population through re-
registration, preventing 
fraudulent payments 
Collecting data on daily 
spending behaviour and 
economic activity 
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the state into the everyday lives of people receiving the grant. The Australian case is a 
Disciplinary CWP that seeks to enforce certain forms of behaviour and controls everyday lives.
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Chapter Four: Contextualising the SASSA 
card 
Having identified two ideal types of CWP in the previous chapter, the thesis now moves on to 
study an example of each type. Over the next two chapters an Inclusive CWP will be analysed 
in detail. In 2012 the South Africa Government, through the South African Social Security 
Agency (SASSA), introduced a national cashless social grant card. Social grants for the elderly, 
disabled people, carers and those raising children were now paid onto a Mastercard enabled 
debit card. Prior to this system, grant payment had been devolved to the nine regions resulting 
in a variety of different payment forms. The new centralised and cashless payment was 
accompanied by a significant amount of policy documents and promotional material that 
considered the policy an influential success. Riley and Kulanthanga (2017: 12) writing for the 
World Bank describe the system as an “exemplary” example, while the Better Than Cash 
Alliance (2018b) use the SASSA card as an example in their Digitizing Government Payments 
Toolkit. 
This chapter provides important background knowledge on the card whilst addressing 
alternative state justifications and legitimations for its introduction. It argues that the form and 
features of South African CWP can partly be explained by the context it emerges from where 
neoliberalisation and achieving biometric data have been prominent trends in post-apartheid 
South Africa. Secondly, while the state claims that the new card provides dignity in a number 
of different ways, these are found lacking. Instead it is argued that the card functions to 
legitimise and further include people into the market relations of the post-apartheid capitalist 
economy that impoverishes people. In doing this, the chapter demonstrates the historical and 
institution contingencies of the policy and also clears the ground of other explanations for the 
upcoming analysis of the SASSA card in Chapter Five.  
The chapter is broken into two sections. In section one, background information and context to 
the welfare system in South Africa is presented. Relevant literatures on the South African 
context are discussed to reveal important contingencies that shape the SASSA card system. 
This encompasses the post-apartheid and neoliberal political economy of South Africa, the 
historical emergence of South African social protection, and the critical importance of 
biometrics. The section ends by describing the contemporary state of South African poverty 
and grant payments as well as the specific details of the SASSA card system. The second 
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section of the chapter is a discussion and critique of the discourses surrounding the introduction 
of the card. The overarching discourse suggests the new card will enhance the dignity of people 
receiving grants. This is also identifiable in two areas: through poverty alleviation and financial 
inclusion. These claims are seen to fail on their own terms. Not only does the card struggle to 
provide dignity in the state’s sense, it also fails to provide dignity in a meaningful, substantive 
sense.   
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1. The historical and institutional context of 
the SASSA Card 
1.1 South African political economy 
Brenner et al. (2010: 333) emphasise “the need for context-sensitive inquiries into patterns of 
regulatory experimentation” that generate variegated forms of neoliberal restructuring. As such 
this section aims to elaborate on the political economy of South Africa following apartheid and 
the contingencies that shape the SASSA card’s form. Post-apartheid South Africa is 
characterised by a form of neoliberalisation that evolved from the shifting priorities of the 
African National Congress (ANC) (Marais 2011: ch5).143 Crucially, the shift to neoliberalism 
from previous social democratic principles did not address the underlying race structures that 
had previously organised South African society. During apartheid, the state enforced a 
distributional regime that directed resources to a specific racial group, namely white people, 
restructuring society and social relations. As the post-apartheid transition failed to address the 
economic inequalities, concentrating on political and institutional inequality, underlying power 
relations were not significantly altered (Seekings and Nattrass 2005; Ashman et al. 2011: 182). 
As a result, neoliberalisation has operated through and within these raced social relations, 
creating contingent forms of governance and accumulation that parallel apartheid. Apartheid 
had many far-reaching consequences, but most relevant here is that it has left a significant 
portion of the population of South Africa who are black or coloured144 in poverty and 
deprivation. As a result, the associated issues with social grants and people using SASSA cards 
have disproportionally affected people from these groups.  
The emergence and evolution of neoliberalisation in South Africa is most clearly seen in the 
transition between two different development plans created by the ANC. The first version was 
the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) was influenced by social democratic 
principles that aimed to alleviate poverty and meet basic needs (Blumenfeld 1997). In 1996, 
                                               
143 James (2014a: 5-6) argues that it is hard to characterise the South African state as neoliberal, because of the 
scale of state intervention, especially in the form of social grants, but more broadly in the case of state planning 
and regulatory frameworks. However, as argued in Chapter One, the state does not wilt away under neoliberalism 
and retains an important function maintaining capitalist social relations and accumulation.  
144 Whilst considered a pejorative and racist label in some contexts, ‘coloured’ in South Africa is acceptably used 
to describe people of a mixed heritage and continues to be used by the South African state as a demographic 
category.  
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this was replaced by the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) programme that 
was significantly more neoliberal (Narsiah 2002: 5; Adelzadeh 1996). The ANC was seen to 
have been heavily influenced by neoliberal discourse propagated domestically by businesses 
and think tanks, and internationally by international financial and development organisations, 
chiefly the World Bank and the IMF (Williams and Taylor 2000). 
The GEAR programme concentrated on a number of neoliberal policy prescriptions to ensure 
macro-economic stability (Cheru 2001).145 These included fiscal stringency, privatisation and 
financialisation as seen Chapter One. Fiscal stringency and disciplinary control of public 
spending has commonly been a feature of neoliberal rule. A restriction of state expenditure 
ensures that taxes can be kept low, inflation can be controlled, and the economy made attractive 
to international investors. The GEAR suggested that the South African fiscal deficit was 
‘unsustainable’ and therefore government expenditure must be rapidly cut (Adelzadeh 1997: 
75). South Africa’s ANC adopted this imperative and cut state spending in the post-apartheid 
era (Cheru 2001: 516; Peet 2002: 75). Privatisation has also been an important aspect of South 
African policy. Indeed, Nelson Mandela claimed that “privatisation is the fundamental policy 
of our government” (Mandela, quoted in Williams and Taylor 2000: 34). This was carried out 
most controversially in water and housing, and according to its critics, increased costs for 
society, diminished public space and obscured democratic accountability (Narsiah 2002: 7-12). 
Finally, financialisation has taken a number of forms in the post-apartheid period, but 
especially relevant is the expansion of private indebtedness (Marais 2011: 130).146 Following 
the ending of capital controls that existed because of international sanctions, surplus credit was 
channelled into consumption and real estate. All strata of society were said to have been 
affected by this ‘indebtedness epidemic’, from the poorest to the President (James 2014a: 5–
6).147 The post-apartheid aspirations of the black population struggling in poverty and excluded 
from formal finance meant a rapid increase in consumer debt. However, the main target of this 
phase of financialisation were wage earners, including both stable middle-class employees and 
the more insecure ‘precariat’ (James 2014a: S20-21). As such, the targeting of people whose 
only income was a social grant is the next logical step of financialisation. As will be seen in 
the next chapter, each of these areas are related to the features of the present social grant 
                                               
145 See Adelzadeh (1997: 79-84) for an analysis of the macro-economic fundamentals of the GEAR. 
146 An alternative aspect of South African financialisation is seen in the financialised nature of mining companies 
and growing power and influence of the financial sector (Ashman et al. 2011).  
147 Former President Jacob Zuma’s large presidential home was said to have been built with the help of a variety 
of creditors (James 2014a: 3) 
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payment system. These social grants have built on the next important feature of the South 
African context; a prominent social protection system.  
 
1.2 South African Social Protection  
Although there is evidence of neoliberal restructuring, South Africa has also consistently 
maintained a social protection system. This system is sometimes considered as an ‘exceptional’ 
case in Africa as a result of its “coverage, generosity and efficiency” (Devereux 2011: 414). 
This exceptionalism derives in part from the significantly higher wealth in South Africa, which 
means it cannot be replicated in other states on the continent (Devereux 2011), but also because 
of the scale of redistribution, the progressive taxation it is built on and the substantial elderly 
pensions provided (Seekings 2002: 4-6). This is a product of a specific historical configuration 
and subsequent institutional spill-over. The origins of the South African welfare state begin in 
the early 20th century when pensions and social grants were extended to white people and 
coloured men in formal labour. This was gradually extended to the black African and Indian 
populations from 1944 but at a lower rate and stricter eligibility criteria compared to white 
people’s pensions (Seekings 2002: 12). There was a further spatial dimension to grant 
coverage, as rural populations were excluded. This was because they were “presumed to be 
better placed to meet their traditional subsistence needs” due to their agrarian existence (van 
der Berg 1997: 486). This rural exclusion, and its spatial and social consequence, has been a 
recurring theme in South African social policy, and as will be seen is relevant to the SASSA 
card.  
The extension of social grants to black and other systematically disadvantaged people should 
not be seen as a benevolent act. As with other expansions of social welfare systems, it was done 
to prevent and address rising social and political unrest. Grants were extended to disadvantaged 
population in order to maintain order (Barrientos 2004: 11; Patel 1992: 42). In the post-
apartheid period, racial differences in grant coverage were removed, although it is worth noting 
that payments had been almost completely equalised prior to the end of apartheid. This was 
achieved through an increase in payments to non-white people, but also through a significant 
reduction in payments to the few white people receiving the non-contributory payment (van 
der Berg 1997: 488; Burns et al. 2005:104). Despite restructuring efforts that have somewhat 
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eroded grant payments and eligibility, social protection has remained and continues to be a 
vital source of income for the poorest in South Africa (Ferguson 2007: 77).148  
A final important feature of the South African institutional and historical context in terms of 
welfare has been the use of biometric technology. Breckenridge’s (2005; 2014) work is 
especially useful here. He charts the emergence and resilience of the idea of biometric 
registration in South Africa since 1850.149 Biometric identification, chiefly in the form of 
fingerprints, was central to early forms of policing in the pre-colonial state and was connected 
to the racial eugenics that influenced segregationist policies in the apartheid era. The apartheid 
state governed and organised society on the basis of pseudo-scientific racial characteristics. As 
part of this a ‘civil registration’ was undertaken and the fingerprints of black African people 
were taken and connected to identity cards and was specifically aimed at those from rural areas 
(Breckenridge 2014: 20-27). This left South Africa with a biological archive that regulated 
property rights, movement and families. As argued in Chapter One, welfare policies are 
contingent on the policy contexts they emerge out of. So, as will be seen in the next chapter, 
biometrics continue to be a prominent policy aspiration for the South African state, which 
enable new forms of surveillance and identification.  
In the contemporary era, South African social protection remains a crucial source of income 
for many. As this section will demonstrate the different types of grants that the SASSA card 
pays are received by a substantial portion of society. Despite being considered a middle-income 
country with a GDP of $295 billion, South Africa also has one of the highest rates of inequality 
in the world, “the poorest 20% of the South African population consume less than 3% of total 
expenditure, while the wealthiest 20% consume 65%” (World Bank 2018b). In 2018 national 
unemployment was recorded at 26.7%, while youth unemployment (15-25) was double, at 
59.3% (STATSA 2018). As a result, a number of the national indicators reveal a significant 
level of poverty. The number of people below the ‘Food Poverty Line’150 was 13.8 million 
people in 2015, 25.2% of the population. Reflecting the racial consequences of apartheid, 
statistics demonstrate substantial disparity between different racial groups. 47.1% of black 
                                               
148 Some literature has looked at the suggestion of an introduction of a basic income grant in South Africa. The 
2000 Taylor Committee was asked to develop and ‘rationalize’ the post-apartheid social assistance system. Of the 
recommendations, one which has stood out was the recommendation to introduce a Basic Income Grant (BIG) 
(Seekings 2002). Ferguson (2007: 77) has argued that the BIG is justified as a policy as both poverty alleviating 
and neoliberal, due to its promotion of creating human capital, preventing dependency and promotes risk-taking. 
149 His work also demonstrates how globally influential the biometric technologies in South Africa have been, for 
example influencing the Ghanaian E-Zwich programme (Breckenridge 2005).  
150 The amount of money required to purchase the minimum amount of food intake (STATSA 2017a: 7). 
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African people live below Lower Bound Poverty Line151 compared to 23.3% for coloured 
people or 0.4% for white people (STATSA 2017a: 18–19). Further, women are 
disproportionality affected by poverty, especially amongst black African groups (see Figure 8). 
Remarkably, life expectancy has actually reduced since apartheid, down from 62.2 in 1992 to 
61.9 in 2015 (World Bank 2018c).152 
Figure 8 - Proportion of population living below the lower-bound poverty line (LBPL) by sex and 
population group (Table from STATSA 2017a: 18–19) 
 
 
The South African social protection system thus plays a critical role in sustaining significant 
part of the population who are without any other forms of income. Grants are paid to those 
unable to work or doing care work, but are distributed to many more through household and 
kinship sharing of the payments (Sagner and Mtati 1999). A breakdown of the amounts, 
conditions and reach of the grants can be seen in Table 4.153 Notably, all of the main three grant 
payments are means tested and thus receiving them will inevitably associate the recipient with 
being in poverty. 
Table 4 - Types of SASSA grants, demographics, value and eligibility (Source: Author, data from 
(Kelly 2017; STATSA 2017b; SASSA 2016; 2018) 
                                               
151 Individuals at the LBPL cannot afford to purchase or consume both adequate food and non-food items, and 
therefore sacrifice non-food items for food (STATSA 2017a: 7).  
152 Although this is a significant increase from 2005, where life expectancy was 52.6.  
153 There are also three other grant types – War Veterans Grant (166 people), Grants in Aid (173,628 people) and 
Care Dependency (145,506 people) grant, yet there are relatively fewer people receiving them (SASSA 2017).  
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Grant type Number of grants 
Value of 
grant per 
month154 
 
Total annual 
cost Eligibility 
Means test 
(monthly) 
 
Old Age 
Grant 
 
3,302,202 
 
1600R 
(£90.60) 
 
58 billion Ran 
(£3.3 billion) 
 
 
Over 60 year’s old, 
South African 
citizen, means tested. 
 
Income 
below R6150 
(£348.60) 
 
 
Child 
Support 
Grant 
 
12,081,375 
 
380R per 
child 
(£21.50) 
 
51 billion 
Rand (£2.9 
billion) 
 
Below 18 years old, 
payment made to 
‘primary care giver’, 
means tested. 
 
 
Single 
income 
below 
R3,800 
(£215.42) 
 
Disability 
Grant 
 
1,067,176 
 
1600R 
(£90.60) 
 
20 billion 
Rand (£1.1 
billion) 
 
Aged 18-59, South 
African citizen, 
requires medical 
certification, means 
tested. 
 
 
Income 
below R6150 
(£348.60) 
 
Foster 
Child 
Grant 
 
440,295 
 
920R 
(£52.15) 
 
5 billion Rand 
(£280 million) 
 
Requires court order 
for foster status, 
child and parent must 
be South African 
citizen. 
 
NA 
 
  
                                               
154 All exchange rates calculated by £1 to 17.60R, as on the 24/07/2018. 
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1.3 The SASSA Card 
Prior to 2012, grants were administered at a sub-national, regional level and involved a mix of 
public and private providers responsible for the payments. People could choose to have their 
grant paid into their own bank account if they owned one, or else received the money through 
the regional provider. Each of these schemes involved simple cash dispersal on closed loop 
payment systems. As noted in Chapter Two, closed loop payment involves the person receiving 
the grant attending a specific place for withdrawal – which could be an ATM, merchant or 
specific pay-point - with a card or identity document where cash money can be withdrawn. A 
closed loop system cannot be widely used at merchants to make transactions, and chiefly 
functions to disperse cash to a specific person.155 Some of these systems also used a biometric 
fingerprint or photocard ID (Porteous and Hazelhurst 2004: 50).  
In 2012, the South African government announced the introduction of a centralised payment 
system, ending the devolved system of payments. Rather than a variety of regional providers, 
one contract was provided to a single private company to deliver across the whole country, 
standardising the service. The contract tender specified that the provider would need to be able 
to offer biometric authentication, either by voice or through their fingerprints, offer a cash 
payment system and facilitate financial inclusion (Supreme Court 2013: pt.29).156 The winner 
of this contract was CashPaymaster Services (CPS), a subsidiary company of multinational 
payments firm Net1.157 The SASSA card was introduced in 2012. Every person receiving a 
grant was required to attend a SASSA office or pay-point to ‘re-register’, providing their 
personal and biometric information, and choose whether to have a SASSA card or have the 
payment made into their account. Net1 are a payments company, but do not have a banking 
licence and were therefore unable to hold the accounts themselves. Grindrod Bank, a domestic 
South African investment bank was contracted to hold the SASSA accounts, whilst all 
payments administration was handled by SASSA. The contract reduced the cost of payment 
from 35R per transaction under the devolved regional system to R16.44 per transaction in the 
new contract (Interview 5, senior state official, 2017).  
                                               
155 In some instances, people receiving grants were offered the opportunity to open commercial bank accounts 
such as the Sekululua card (Porteous and Hazelhurst 2004: 50–52). 
156 The biometric aspect of the contract has caused controversy and has been the subject of a number of court 
cases. The actual contract tender was ruled invalid as a result of the tender process, but the partnership had to 
continue due to the need to maintain the payment of social grants.  
157 To avoid confusion, when referring to the specific operation of the policy ‘CPS’ will be used, whereas ‘Net1’ 
will be referred to when talking about the organisation as a whole.  
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Payments are made to people on the 1st of the month. Shortly before this, SASSA transfers the 
lump sum of all grant amounts to CPS as well as a data file with the information on how much 
each person should be paid. CPS then transfers the appropriate amount of money to each 
account (private or Grindrod) on the 1st of every month. As the card is ‘open loop’, users who 
have a SASSA card can access their money through multiple ‘channels’. It can be used at any 
POS device or ATM where Mastercard is accepted. If a user wants to withdraw cash, there are 
different places where this can be done. Five large supermarket chains158 entered into an 
agreement with CPS to allow users to withdraw cash, free of charge, from their tills. Cash can 
also be withdrawn at other non-affiliated retailers or ATMs for a fee. Finally, there are specific 
SASSA ‘pay-points’ where users can go and withdraw cash. This final option is used more in 
rural parts of South Africa where there is limited extension of cashless infrastructure and 
involves the physical transportation of cash (Vally 2016: 973). As the card is a debit 
Mastercard, it also allows each user to be able to set up direct debits and purchase other 
services, in this way providing financial inclusion. The physical card can be seen in Figure 9.  
Figure 9 - A SASSA card. 
 
Interestingly, it was suggested that part of the reason for the choice to use an ‘open loop’ card 
was as a result of pressure by the South African Treasury, as the card could help them reach 
their financial inclusion targets (Interview 6, senior state official, 2017). In a 2011 policy 
document the Treasury stated that  
financial inclusion is about ensuring that all South Africans have access 
to financial services that encourage them to manage their money, save 
for the future, obtain credit and insure against unforeseen events. This 
                                               
158 PicknPay, Boxer, Shoprite, USAVE and SPAR are the large retailers.  
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is especially important for low-income households who live in or close 
to poverty” (SA National Treasury 2011: 59).159  
Thus the form and features of the South African CWP depended on the negotiations between 
different state departments and the compromises that emerged. In this instance the Treasury 
was able to exert influence of the final design of the grant payment, as according to a 
department employee, for SASSA and the Department of Social Development, financial 
inclusion “has not been explicit in any of our policies (Interview 6, 2017).
                                               
159 Subsequent Treasury documents, once the scale of deductions of social grants became clear, are more 
circumspect about financial inclusion (SA National Treasury 2017: 165–170). 
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2. The discursive context of the SASSA card  
In this section the justifications, legitimations and rationales for the introduction of the SASSA 
card will be presented and analysed. A central thread can be found in the attempts to achieve 
‘dignity’ through the SASSA card. These is seen in two areas: poverty alleviation and financial 
inclusion. Each of these is claimed to be a progressive move but will be shown to fail on their 
own terms. This raises questions on the nature and extent of dignity provided by the card. 
Dignity, in terms of the SASSA card, is a primarily capitalist concept. It is a move to create 
economic market relations in everyday life, making the system function more effectively, 
whilst maintaining and legitimising the scale of national inequality. This section sets the 
groundwork for the following chapter to deepen and extend this critique.  
 
2.1 Dignity 
Central to state discourse regarding the introduction of the SASSA card, and one which has 
underpinned many of the other justifications, was the claim that the new payment system would 
ensure dignity for people receiving the grants. Providing dignity is an important constitutional 
aspect of all South African policy making. The primary values of the state set out within the 
post-apartheid constitution are “human dignity, the achievement of equality and the 
advancement of human rights and freedoms” (RSA 1996: 3). Echoing this, the shift to the 
SASSA card and the re-registration were, according to Minister for Social Development 
Bathabile Dlamini “measures aimed at making ‘a better life for all’ for beneficiaries and to 
ensure that they receive their grants with dignity,” she claimed that “everybody, no matter 
where they live, could have the same standard of service” (Dlamini 2012). 
There were four major areas of ‘indignity’ that people receiving grants (in the previous system) 
referred to. As found by Wright et al. (2015: 4), prior to the new system people receiving grants 
were said to have their dignity infringed upon in four ways. Indignity stemmed from: the 
variation in payment standards and service, the fact that people needed to stand in long queues 
to receive their money, concerns around the stigma of receiving grants and the treatment people 
received from state employees.160 It was suggested that these features made those receiving 
                                               
160 Interestingly this claim about queues was not supported by interview participants, none of whom stated they 
had problems queuing.  
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grants feel that the state did not care about them and that they were subject to discrimination 
and stigma whilst they were queuing (Hudson 2016: 18).  
In some senses, the indignity of grant receipt has been addressed, specifically in the case of the 
practicalities of receiving the grant. The card is said to ensure dignity by providing choice to 
people receiving grants, allowing them to access money, whenever and wherever they chose. 
Previously, people were required to queue up, potentially for a long time and from early in the 
morning, on a specific day, or risk pay-points running out of cash. This is supported by an 
interview participant recalling the previous system: “You couldn’t draw money from an ATM, 
[there was] a different machine that you put card in, it was a lot of people and you had to sit 
and wait and stand. Sometimes for maybe half a day” (Interview 3, 2017). Alternatively, the 
new system opened a wider selection of ‘channels’ for payment, including ATMs, 
supermarkets, and official pay-points. This was popular with some interview participants who 
received a social grant. One participant, who uses a SASSA card, when asked about how they 
use the card, replied:  
I draw cash from it. On the first of each month, from any ATM or 
ShopRite, Pick’n’Pay wherever you want. I usually go to ATM, because 
Shoprite is normally crazy on the first…for me it is easier and quicker to 
go to the ATM, than standing in the queues all day, but normally I don’t 
go on the first, I go on the second or the third, then it’s like, calmer 
(Interview 2, 2017).  
People receiving grants thus have a greater choice of locations to draw from, allowing them to 
choose the most convenient or preferred withdrawal location, when and how they used the 
money. There is then some evidence that the SASSA card provides dignity, or at least reduces 
indignity, in the terms used by SASSA. Fewer people queue up on the 1st of the month, with 
60% not using pay-points but alternative channels instead, compared to 40% under the previous 
system (Interview 5, 2017). Interviewees suggested they appreciated the convenience and 
freedom of choosing where and when to withdraw.  
However, the card has not led to the complete end of queuing, for people receiving social 
grants. Vally (2016: 971-974) suggests that these issues still exist, and queues at supermarkets 
are still common, meaning that people continue to have to line up in front of the community, 
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identifying themselves as receiving a social grant.161 During fieldwork, supermarkets were 
observed on payday on the 1st July, and long queues, of mainly elderly people, ran out of the 
store. Inside, only one cashier was paying grants, whilst other tills were empty and unused, 
requiring the purchase of goods to also receive grants in cash. Also evident was that fact that 
by introducing supermarkets as a withdrawal point, people then became subject to the 
interpersonal relationship with supermarket staff, rather than state officials. While the state 
aimed to improve the service from state officials, this was partly achieved replacing them with 
supermarket staff. This may end up with a more undignified interaction as these staff are likely 
to know less about the social grants and unable to resolve any issues that arise, an experience 
described by one interview participant (Interview 10, SASSA card user, 2017).  
In other ways dignity is also not achieved. The SASSA card does not directly address the 
stigmatising meanings associated with grant receipt, while addressing the issue of queuing 
simply hides the underlying indignity of receiving a grant. Wright et al. (2014: 199–200) 
suggest there is an underlying deserving and undeserving poor distinction in South African 
grants, and so the mode of transfer may not alleviate the dependency stigma associated with 
their receipt. Whilst the efficient payment of the grant might provide dignity in some ways, 
arguably it is accompanied by indignity because of the stigma associated with being a grant 
recipient.162 A number of studies suggest that people relying on grants are stigmatised as 
dysfunctional, lazy or dependent on the state, a stereotype familiar to many welfare systems 
(Hochfeld and Plagerson 2011; Marais 2011: 246–247; Wright et al. 2015). The SASSA card 
may allow some disguising of this by using alternative locations to draw money, but the 
physical presence of the card still marks the user as a recipient of a grant, let alone the fact that 
queueing is still an experience for some. As argued in Chapter Two, social meanings of money 
can be generated by the physical media of payment and so a specific ‘state grant card’ has the 
potential to generate associated pejorative social meanings. The interviews undertaken in this 
study were varied on this. Some suggested they experienced stigma, notably in the case of 
working age men who may need to collect disability benefits. Others did not, particularly in 
the case of those in receipt the old age grant (Interview 3, 2017; Interview 13, 2017). This 
distinction reflects the deserving/undeserving poor found by Wright et al. (2014) and is 
                                               
161 One media report suggests that people start queuing from before 6:30am or 4am (Maregele 2015; see also 
Interview 15, card user, 2017).  
162 As seen in Chapter Two, this reflects Lefebvre’s understanding of alienation in ways that disalienation can also 
cause other, new, alienations. 
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suggestive of the fact that the SASSA card may not completely provide dignity for all 
recipients.  
 
2.2 Dignity via poverty alleviation  
The second claim that is made in support of the SASSA card is that dignity may be achieved 
by reducing poverty. Social protection payments in South Africa are considered a part of the 
“right to dignity” by preventing severe deprivation (Mandela quoted in NDA 2015). As such, 
discourse on the extension of payment through the SASSA card can be seen as a claim to reduce 
poverty and therefore improve dignity. Social grants have been proved in a number of empirical 
studies to make an important contribution to poverty alleviation in South Africa. The scale of 
inequality and unemployment requires an alternative source of income for many people, which 
is provided by social grants. Poverty following apartheid is considered to have reduced largely 
because of grants (van der Berg et al. 2007), with further evidence suggesting that they have 
improved food consumption (Agüero at al 2006; Gutura and Tanga 2014a) and are 
progressively gendered, helping to reduce household gendered inequality (Dubihlela and 
Dubihlela 2014; Patel 2012). Supporting this, interviews with people receiving grants 
frequently corroborated the claim that they played an important role in the absence of any other 
income. According to one participant, the grant “is so helpful to us. It helps us a lot I am telling 
you. Without it I don’t know how we will manage. Very important” (Interview 9, 2017).  
As a result, efficient, reliable delivery, and therefore mode of payment, is critical to providing 
social grants. In speeches and public statements by politicians, the poverty alleviating role 
grants play was a pertinent theme. The shift to the new payment system was said to “allow the 
right person, to be paid the right amount, Njalo!”163 (Dlamini 2012). According to state 
officials, centralising the system would mean that each individual should, in principle, receive 
their money reliably and correctly, and find it accessible anywhere in the country. In making 
this change, the system was anticipated to also become more efficient and therefore cheaper, 
allowing extra money for the state and potentially for social grants (Interview 5, state official, 
2017). 
The cashless payment also allowed SASSA to rapidly increase the amount of people receiving 
grants. This was one of the key statistics the department was, and is, responsible for in annual 
                                               
163 With echoes of Lefebvre’s everyday routines, “Njalo” translates to ‘routinely’ or ‘continually’.  
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reports. For instance, SASSA’s Chief Executive Officer makes it explicit that extending 
coverage is an important aspect of SASSA’s work: 
SASSA continued to make good on its promises that were made in the 
Annual Performance Plan of 2012/13. The total number of grants in 
payment stood at 16,106,110; this was in spite of the many challenges 
SASSA had to overcome. SASSA successfully extended its social 
assistance coverage to the previously excluded and marginalised groups 
as required by the Constitution. Between April 2007 and March 2013, 
the total number of social grants increased from 12,423,739 to 
16,106,110 respectively, and the average annual growth of social grants 
for this period was 5.3% (SASSA 2013: 11).164 
Contrary to developed welfare states that would often seek to reduce the amount of payments 
being made to society,165 the increasing coverage is a target for SASSA. The card, and 
associated system, allowed the state to more efficiently expand the scale and reach of the social 
grant. This was due to the increase in electronic, rather than physical transfers of value and the 
supposed ease of registering for payments.   
However, does the extension of grant coverage and the improved efficiency of the payment 
adequately tackle poverty? A criticism of this position can be both internal and external. The 
internal critique is that regardless of the form of payment, the actual level of payment is 
insufficient. In interviews several participants suggested that whilst they were very grateful for 
grants, the absolute level of payments was insufficient. One participant suggested the elderly 
pension was insufficient for an independent life. “In reality you cannot maintain a little place 
of your own and food, and transport whatever and have something to wear, on that money, you 
can’t. It is very, very hard” (Interview 3, 2017).166 These comments are supported by academic 
evidence that suggests that whilst payment levels are important to reduce suffering, extreme 
destitution and starvation, they are unable to adequately lift people out of poverty in a 
substantial sense (Gutura and Tanga 2014b).  
                                               
164 This is maintained in subsequent Annual Reports, such as the 2016 annual report that claimed that “during this 
particular financial year, SASSA managed to increase the number of social grants in payment by 2% from 16 642 
643 at the end of 2014/15 to 16 991 634 at the end of 2015/16 financial year” (SASSA 2016: 14). 
165 Take, for example, the Australian case in Chapter Six.  
166 See also (Interview 14, grant recipient, 2017; Interview 15, grant recipient, 2017) 
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This is also intensified by the ‘dilution’ effect of social grants whereby grants are shared 
amongst family and kin members who do not have their own income (Devereux and Waidler 
2017: 19–21). Although some claim the SASSA card individualises social protection money 
(Cobbett 2015: 323–324), the small amount of social grant money tends to be shared amongst 
family or kin networks (Interview 13, 2017; Sagner and Mtati 1999). As there is a limited 
provision of social protection for those of a working age with no parenting responsibilities, and 
with unemployment high, social grants are often used to support a wide selection of people, 
further limiting the poverty alleviation effect.  
Despite claims that grants are a gender sensitive anti-poverty measure, the fact that payments 
are low in absolute terms and must be shared amongst multiple family members, places extra 
responsibilities on women. Female headed households have lower incomes and rely more on 
social grants, whilst gender norms give responsibility for managing household budgets and 
distributing household incomes to women (Satumba et al. 2017: 40). As a result, they must 
constantly manage the competing demands and household politics on the grant money (Fakier 
and Cock 2009: 364). One participant when describing the challenge of household budgeting 
considered it her responsibility “I must be strong, I am strong as a wife” (Interview 1, 2017). 
This is further reinforced by the distribution of the grants that directs them disproportionately 
to women, chiefly as a result of the Child Support Grant (CSG). In 2012, 34% of all South 
African women received a CSG, compared to 3.2% for men (DPRU 2015: 121). Overall, the 
absolute value and the amount of people dependent on the grant undermines achievements of 
dignity, regardless of the mode of payment.  
The external critique recalls the theoretical arguments regarding the nature of welfare made in 
Chapter One. Welfare is fundamentally related to the maintenance of capitalist social relations, 
and these social protection payments operate to make structural inequalities manageable and 
functional. There are structural constraints on the (specifically black) poor in South Africa and 
limited material benefit will not address this. Instead, the grants arguably legitimise and 
reproduce the economic system, generating “political dependency” on the ANC from the poor 
majority (Marais 2011: 246-247), without fundamentally challenging the power relations that 
ensure middle and upper classes remain wealthy (Seekings and Nattrass 2005: 35). The shift 
in mode of transfer does not challenge this system, and instead as will be seen subsequently in 
Chapter Five, further entrenches aspects of it. Returning to dignity, the alleviation of severe 
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poverty appears a low benchmark for a dignified life, especially considering the structural 
disadvantage people receiving grants face.167  
Clearly, the poverty alleviating aspects of social grants, delivered with the SASSA card, are 
critically important to a significant portion of South African society, specifically the black 
population. Without these payments, there would be a major risk of severe impoverishment 
due to the absences of other forms of income. The new card makes receiving a grant generally 
more efficient and convenient. However, not only is it highly debateable if the payments are 
sufficient to alleviate poverty, but they also facilitate the structural maintenance of an unequal 
economic system on an everyday level. By ensuring there is a wide expansion of payments, 
along with the dilution to people not receiving grants, unequal power relations are further 
embedded and consolidated in society.  
 
2.3 Dignity via financial inclusion  
The final way that the SASSA card is said to achieve a dignified experience for recipients was 
the role it could play for financial inclusion, and here the CWP discourses discussed in Chapter 
Three can be clearly identified. Those without a bank account, or those who chose not to use 
their own bank accounts,168 were given a SASSA card that instantly included them into the 
financial sector. As the cards were ‘open loop’ it allowed them to save, make payments, and 
importantly, access formal financial services such as credit, insurance and direct debits. Prior 
to the SASSA card, South African financial inclusion was considerably lower. In 2011, 54% 
of people aged over 15 had an account, whereas in 2014 this was 69%, and by 2016 this had 
reached 77% (CHAF 2011; Finmark 2016; World Bank 2018c). 
The main proponent of the financial inclusion discourse originated more from a variety of 
agents from the financial sector, rather than the state. Mastercard was especially prominent and 
dedicated a significant portion of marketing material to promote how many people were 
financially included by the SASSA card (Mastercard 2012). During the introduction of the 
SASSA card, a number of press release statements were made. For example, according to 
Philip Panaino, the Division President of Mastercard South Africa: 
                                               
167 This is especially true when, more transformative conceptions of the concept. For example, Holloway (1998), 
influenced by the Zapatistas sees dignity as the transformation of social relations. 
168 At least two interview subjects previously had a bank account but chose not to have their grant paid into it.  
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The success of the SASSA Debit MasterCard card roll out is having a 
significant impact on the South African payments system, on socio-
economic development and most importantly on the cardholders who 
can now manage their finances in a much more dignified, convenient 
and safe way…It is clear that electronic payments are being embraced 
by millions of South Africans who are now realising the benefits of a 
cashless society. It is our goal to continue to grow financial inclusion 
both in South Africa and abroad by introducing innovative payment 
solutions that will help make transacting quicker, safer and more 
convenient for everyone, everywhere and whenever needed 
(Mastercard 2013b). 
The quote effectively demonstrates the different justifications for financial inclusion through 
the SASSA card, echoing the discourses analysed in Chapter Three. Financial inclusion is said 
to facilitate convenience, safe payment of social grants and, once again, provide dignity for 
those receiving grants. Further, once again this is seen as a progressively gendered process, as 
more women are financially included than men, as a result of their majority representation as 
grant recipients (Naidoo 2016). In this sense dignity and gender equality are correlated to 
people’s relationship to the financial sphere. The World Bank also saw the electronic payment 
of social grants as “an opportunity to promote more meaningful financial inclusion for SASSA 
grant recipients.” (World Bank 2013c: 28). As one of the 25 countries targeted as part of the 
Universal Financial Access by 2020 project, South Africa’s social grants payment was seen as 
an important route to this goal (World Bank 2018d). Support also took a financial form, with 
the International Financial Corporation (IFC) investing $107 million into Net1 in 2016. The 
IFC chose to invest because of Net1’s technological capacity to reach lower income and rural 
populations in South Africa and around the world (IFC 2016). 
The state however, was more circumspect in early statements about the card, with little mention 
of the financial inclusion aspect of the card. In 2014, Minister Dlamini (2014) stated: 
The new payment system sought to facilitate financial inclusion so that 
social grant recipients had access to bank accounts that would allow 
them to access their funds safely within the framework of the financial 
infrastructure that all of us enjoy. It was also our intention that through 
banking the poor, we would reduce their vulnerability from the greed 
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of money lenders or omashonisa169 who charged exorbitant interest 
rates.  
Notably, there is little mention of the opportunities for people receiving grants to access 
financial services. Financial inclusion was conceptualised as encouraging bank accounts and 
payments or avoiding the risks of informal money lenders, acknowledging that people were 
already included into informal finance. SASSA sought to use financial inclusion as a method 
to efficiently disperse money, rather than seeing it as a necessary social development policy. In 
the original bidding document financial inclusion was conceptualised as “allowing 
Beneficiaries to interact through the regulated National Payments System as well as enable 
them access to funds in the most remote parts of the country” (Pulver and Ratichek 2011: 11). 
Yet both capital and the state’s discourses on financial inclusion have an important dignity 
element. ‘Dignity’ is mobilised in the possibilities of moving people away from vulnerability 
to exploitative informal money lenders and towards ‘formal’ financial services (Dlamini 2015). 
The interviews support the idea of exploitative informal lenders. A participant described a 100R 
loan increasing by 40R per week, which if it could not be paid would result in personal goods 
being taken or other “favours” being required (Interview 15, card user, 2017). Those previously 
excluded therefore would also now have the freedom to choose financial services, an option 
previously unavailable to them. Access to formal finance and payment is considered by Dlamini 
something that “all of us enjoy”, and that by including the unbanked to the services this would 
ensure no inequality between grant receivers and non-grant receivers, as well as removing the 
category of ‘unbanked.’ (Dlamini 2014).  According to a senior state official, “the main idea 
there was we wanted to give people the same level of access to their money as everyone else 
who uses the open loop system” (Interview 6, 2017). Whilst another state official claimed that 
the financial inclusion element would mean that “everybody could have been seen to be banked 
and have access to the banking infrastructure” (Interview 5, 2017).  
These claims are questionable. Evidence shows banking and lending ‘informally’ has always 
been present and is not inherently exploitative (James 2014, ch.3). ‘Stockvels’ for example, 
were a form of rotating saving and borrowing in local, predominantly female organisations that 
have proved resilient to efforts at formalisation (Verhoef 2001: 284-89). As will be seen in the 
next chapter, formal finance can be just as exploitative as informal. Further, the idea that “all” 
South African’s have access to formal finance, as claimed by Dlaimini, is questionable when 
                                               
169 An omashonisa is a label for informal money lenders.  
Chapter Four: Contextualising the SASSA card 
 161 
in 2011 only 54% of people over 15 had a bank account. As with Lefebvre, dignity is seen to 
be achieved by the ‘elimination of difference’ of alternative ways of living across different 
spaces, and the inclusion in, and access to, formal financial markets. 
Yet these are quite thin and insubstantial conceptualisations of dignity, revolving mainly around 
mainstream capitalist practices and access to markets. In a society where finance is prevalent 
having access to electronic payments and a safe(r) place to store money is beneficial, and for 
some financial services may be very valuable. However, gaining this form of dignity meant 
developing increased reliance of grant recipients on finance capital, which poses risks to those 
being included. Financial inclusion through the SASSA card provides a foundation for 
fundamentally unequal debtor-lender relations (Lazzarato 2012: ch.2). James (2014: 21) argues 
that much of South Africa’s wage-earning population is either targeted for debt or is already 
indebted, because of their stable salaries. The SASSA card makes the non-wage earners 
vulnerable to similar relationships. This is supported by World Bank (2018d) data which shows 
that 85.6% of South Africans borrowed money in 2014, compared to 54% in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and 37.7% for middle income countries. In policy discourse on financial inclusion 
through the SASSA card, there is rarely a suggestion that it may have negative effects for the 
‘included’. However, privately even members of the financial industry are sceptical about the 
viability of microloans and the extension of financial services:  
People have different views on microloans, if you speak to the IFC they 
will most likely tell you, and this is hearsay, but they are very strongly 
supportive of microloans. We are probably more sceptical of that. We 
are saying if you take on a loan at 60% annual interest, for that to be a 
good deal for you, what do you have to buy with that money to generate 
a return that offsets that? There are few things in this world that can 
give you that. So maybe if you do it for emergency, sure, fair enough. 
Maybe if you have to do it to fund studies, I don’t know I’m hesitant 
(Interview 4, finance worker, 2017).  
As hinted in the above quote and discussed in previous chapters financial inclusion has a 
number of problematic features that require critical attention to avoid exploitative relations. 
How the SASSA card includes people and with what consequences will be elaborated in the 
next chapter.  
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3. Conclusion 
This chapter has provided the background to understand the emergence and key features of the 
SASSA card. It has noted the specific context of South African neoliberalisation and political 
economy that have shaped the emergence of this specific form of an Inclusive CWP. There are 
crucial historical, institutional and social dimensions upon which the SASSA card is 
contingent. South African neoliberalism has consistently sought to privatise state services as 
well as encourage financialisation, and the SASSA card enables these two features to conflate. 
Apartheid and the historical discrimination of non-white populations influences who is both 
targeted and impacted, as well as some of key dynamics of the policy, such gaining a biometric 
and surveillance capacity. Those affected by the card are the grant receiving population of 
South Africa, which is a group of people who are disproportionally black and female. As such, 
the cards’ impact is inherently raced and gendered, although notably this is an unspoken 
assumption, not mentioned or addressed in any policy discourses or interviews. 
The chapter has also discussed the discourses on the SASSA card and the claims about a new 
‘dignified’ experience for grant recipients. A dignified experience for a grant recipient was 
articulated as one where people do not have to queue, receive their grants safely and efficiently 
and in doing so alleviate poverty while having access to the financial system. The card 
marginally improves the material situation of the (predominantly black) poor in South Africa 
and prevents absolute deprivation. Yet these claims support and promote market participation 
and capitalist accumulation, enforcing financial practices, deepening relations between state, 
citizen and financial capital, and avoiding challenging more fundamental structural issues. 
These two aspects of the SASSA card (poverty alleviation and financial inclusion) are more 
accurately understood as an attempt to create and stabilise market relations in everyday life. It 
has been argued that the more efficient payment of social grants enables the continuation of 
system of accumulation that leaves a significant portion of society impoverished. The card is 
creating relationships with the state and capitalist accumulation, and the poorest are unable live 
outside of them, and instead are made dependent on these relations and structures. The next 
chapter will expand and deepen this critique, demonstrating the of consolidation of 
neoliberalisation in everyday life. 
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Chapter Five: Neoliberalisation and the 
Inclusive SASSA Card 
 
In Chapters One and Two a framework for analysing CWP was developed. It drew on studies 
of the neoliberalisation of welfare, where market-based or market-disciplinary forms of 
regulatory restructuring were framed around specific forms of governance and accumulation. 
This was developed with Lefebvre’s work, which demanded attention to the routine and 
rhythmical aspects of the everyday, how these are programmed or resisted with an important 
focus on lived experience. Deploying this framework, this chapter will take a critical look at 
the South African SASSA card, analysing the introduction and implementation of card-based 
cash distribution and the cashless system it promotes.170  
The South African case offers an example of an Inclusive CWP as developed in Chapter Three. 
There, an Inclusive CWP was shown to be characterised by: the ability to choose not to use the 
state’s services; a prominent role for financial inclusion; extending cashless infrastructures; 
creating formal identities and the involvement of transnational development organisations. All 
of these features are present in the South African case. As suggested in the conclusion of 
Chapter Three though, simply labelling the case ‘Inclusive’ is insufficient. As such this chapter 
will combine the insights and arguments from the previous four chapters to study the contingent 
and everyday nature of the SASSA card.  
The questions this chapter seeks to answer are, why was the SASSA card introduced and how 
has this introduction targeted and affected the everyday lives of those receiving grants? It draws 
on extensive empirical study of the social and policy context to argue that the South African 
welfare system has consolidated neoliberalisation by introducing an Inclusive CWP in the form 
of the SASSA card. This is an example of a neoliberal restructuring of everyday life and social 
relations that enables distinctive governance and accumulation strategies, with these two 
dynamics complementing and contradicting each other at different times. Although there is 
some resistance and opposition, people have been generally compliant to these changes, 
                                               
170 The analysis is focused predominantly on the policy up to July 2017, when the fieldwork was concluded. This 
is important considering the ongoing and constantly changing policy of the grant payments as the new contract 
was signed in March 2018. 
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acquiescing to attempts to programme their routines and the development of capitalist relations 
in everyday life.  
The chapter is structured by first discussing the governance strategies that are characterised by 
‘inclusion’. Here the card is seen to be seeking to bring parts of the population closer to the 
state through the development of formal biometric identities and extension of cashless 
infrastructure. Both of these deepen and formalise state-society relations, whilst extending the 
surveillance capacity of the state, especially in rural areas. The second section discusses the 
ways that the SASSA card has provided new accumulation opportunities specifically for 
financial accumulation, at a national and everyday level. This is first seen in the privatisation 
of this payment service, the fee revenue it provides, and the connection of the grant payment 
to other third parties. At an everyday level, the SASSA card created a market for financial 
services for card users, and these people have then been then targeted, with significant costs 
for this group. In this final instance the state and capital come into conflict, reflecting the 
contradictions of neoliberalisation.  
The chapter contributes to the overall thesis argument by demonstrating a specific empirical 
example of how CWP are a process of neoliberalisation that affect everyday lives, promoting 
market subjectivities, relations and commodification, as well as how the specific example 
derives from the social, policy and everyday context to which they are connected. It also 
grounds and deepens important IPE concepts. Inclusion, surveillance, privatisation and 
financialisation are all viewed from an everyday perspective, understanding the lived 
experiences and complexities of these processes. Finally, it provides weight to the argument 
that CWP need to be looked at from a critical perspective, as in South Africa the payment 
system has created opportunities for dispossession and exploitation of those in most need of 
support. This critique is a vital task considering the proliferation of Inclusive CWP and 
influence of the South African case.  
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1. Governing with the SASSA card 
The first aspect of the consolidation of neoliberalisation through the SASSA card is the 
governance dimensions it enables and the development of market subjects. As discussed in 
Chapter One key dimensions to neoliberal welfare are inclusion and surveillance, both of which 
are identifiable in this case. There, inclusion was understood as the extension of market 
principles and relations to those previously excluded or separate from the formal capitalist 
economy. Surveillance was argued to involve increased monitoring of poor welfare recipients, 
who are considered distinctively ‘risky’, ‘dysfunctional’ or ‘deviant’, to ensure they are acting 
appropriately and in-line with market principles. These processes seek to, in different ways, 
produce space and programme the routine, rhythmical aspects of everyday life, with mixed 
success. Through the example of the SASSA card, these processes can be seen in two areas, 
the development of formal state identities and the extensions of cashless infrastructure.  
 
1.1 Creating identities  
Firstly, the SASSA card governs by creating formal state identities. It created the bureaucratic 
records required for market subjects, whilst also enabling the deepening of relations between 
state and society. From 2011, SASSA and CPS re-registered all social grant recipients, which 
involved taking a number of pieces of personal information. Those re-registering needed to 
provide their ID documents, a previous payment card, a phone contact number, name and 
contact details of a family member, a confirmation of address and to confirm their income 
level. If applying for a CSG, a birth certificate for the child was also needed, whilst for a Foster 
Care Grant the appropriate court order was also required (South African Government 2013; 
Ihsan 2013). Children were also asked to attend to record their existence and identify who their 
primary carer was. The re-registration took place at a number of locations across the country, 
and home visits were made for the elderly or those unable to attend. This information was 
centralised into one single database possessed by SASSA and used to pay people by CPS. 
According to Dlamini (2014) re-registration allowed “SASSA to have a solid database of all 
beneficiaries which can enable it to pay grants on behalf of government in the future”. Each 
person was given a unique identification number that would ensure that there were no 
duplications in the payment system (Interview 5, senior state official, 2017).  
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This aspect of the SASSA card formalises and develops the state-citizen relationship. It 
provides the state with a substantial central database about their citizens, specifically the poor 
citizens who receive a social grant. Those who do not need a social grant are exempt from the 
registration.171 As such the first stage of the formalising of identities for people receiving grants 
was to gain significant bureaucratic data and allocating each individual to a specific number. 
The attempt at developing formal state relations is one more commonly seen in places with less 
developed state institutions and welfare systems. In states with more developed welfare 
systems, more formalised state-citizen relations have already been created. For Scott (1998: 2) 
this is a “central problem in statecraft”, where the state must take “exceptionally complex, 
illegible and local social practices” to create a central database to be monitored and managed. 
Similarly, Ferguson (2007: 72) quotes Guyer’s idea that:  
Modern African history can be illuminated by exploring the tension 
between attempts at “formalization (especially in the form of “fixing” 
social and economic arrangements through documents and conventional 
quantitative measures) and a vernacular logic of practice that undermines 
and mistrusts such reduction and fixity.  
In Lefebvre’s terms this is the state aiming to create an ‘abstract space’ by creating unique 
formal state identities that homogenise differences and unevenness, facilitating attempts at 
restructuring projects or programming. By including people in this way, it then becomes much 
easier for them to access state services. Processes of commodification and marketization central 
to neoliberalisation are mediated through state institutions such as social protection, education 
or healthcare (Brenner et al. 2010: 330). The formalising of citizen identities, then, will enable 
further marketised forms of social life by accessing of state services by these individual 
‘customers’. In addition, the state may also be able to use these identities to undertake other 
forms of (potentially more disciplinary) governance. Whist previously, state-citizen relations 
were regionally based, partial and unreliable, the new SASSA identifications are formal, 
verified and useable.  
As well as the personal details being taken during re-registration, biometric identification and 
authentication was central to the new forms of identity and inclusion, and was a crucial part of 
the 2012 contract.172 The re-registration brought South Africa closer to the vision of a biometric 
                                               
171 Although they are liable to be on a different database for income or tax reasons.  
172 Also, a key issue of contestation for the subsequent court cases.  
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database for not only social grants, but also banking and consumption (Breckenridge 2005: 
272–273).173 The original proposal for the SASSA card was to use either fingerprint or voice 
recognition, to authenticate that the person with the card was the correct person receiving a 
grant. Biometric authentication was said to serve three purposes for the state. Firstly, it enabled 
the people receiving grants to use fingerprints rather than a PIN, especially valuable for those 
unfamiliar with remembering or using them. Secondly, it was a security device to protect 
against a lost or stolen card, which meant only the user could verify themselves as the correct 
recipient (Interview 5, senior state official, 2017). Finally, it allowed the state constant 
surveillance and ‘proof of life’ of individuals (Interview 6, senior state official, 2017). The 
intention was for grant users to verify their existence monthly, routinely presenting themselves 
to the state: 
Essentially every time you draw your money you confirm you are still 
alive…every time you get a biometric confirmation it’s as good as 
having the person there in front of you confirming they are still alive 
(Interview 6, senior state official, 2017).  
Thus, everyday life now has a routine surveillance and verification aspect for people receiving 
grants. In a monthly rhythm, users must acknowledge their presence to the state. This provides 
a further example of the increased surveillance of welfare recipients indicative of 
neoliberalisation. Biometric identities were verified each month via the market practices of 
accessing financial infrastructure, building the capacity of the South African state over the grant 
receiving population, whilst tying everyday life to these routines.  
The everyday lived experience of biometrics however differs from academic research, which 
continues to raise concerns of privacy and surveillance when it comes to biometric data 
(Cobbett 2015: 323; Maki 2011). This was not a concern voiced by interview participants. 
Biometric appears an instance where there is general acceptance and compliance to potentially 
pernicious extensions of the state’s knowledge and power. Indeed, the opportunity to use a 
fingerprint rather than a PIN was a positive for some. As an urban resident, one interviewee 
withdrew their money at supermarkets, and regretted the required use of a PIN rather than 
fingerprint.  “But you know what the best was? When we first get this in 1991 that was nicer 
with your fingerprints. I wish that could come in again” (Interview 2, card user, 2017). In some 
                                               
173 Relatedly, Jacobsen (2012) analyses the Indian biometric ‘assemblage’, seeing it as a state tool for surveillance 
and financial inclusion. However, the analysis does not go as far as critiquing the role of private interests and 
invasive effect of the surveillance project.  
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respects, this demonstrates the contingency of the biometric SASSA card. The history of 
biometric surveillance and verification in South Africa legitimises its use in the present policy; 
in a different context it may have been considered unnecessary, or resisted as being too 
invasive. However, this also demonstrates a fundamental challenge to the privacy critique. In 
a world where the use of money is needed, but also potentially dangerous (especially 
considering the crime rate in South Africa),174 making that money more secure and convenient 
may well be seen as a be positive for many people and may outweigh the costs to privacy. 
As well as biometric identification and surveillance being experienced in everyday life, the 
everyday practicalities of the ‘biometric imaginary’ were not always as possible as 
policymakers hoped. One of the two key pieces of biometric identification – voice recognition 
– was rarely used and then dropped shortly after 2012, as the technology did not work 
(Interview 6, senior state official, 2017). The plan had been to ask users to call a SASSA 
number to verify they were still alive if they were using a PIN. As this plan failed, PIN 
verification prevails for many. Users in rural settings more frequently used biometric 
validation, whereas in the fieldwork site in urban Cape Town, most people used a PIN to verify 
and draw their money, and few withdrawal sites such as ATMs or supermarkets had biometric 
readers. PIN use thus became a way to verify a user’s existence, but clearly anyone could use 
this. Further, some interview participants were aware of the system, and were glad biometric 
authentication was no longer being used: 
Because now if I might die, then nobody can get my print with the thumb, 
because I am dead, because it will show that mamma is dead. But with 
the card, they can go and draw if they know my PIN number, to use it in 
my funeral. So, I prefer this one, the card one. Now if you die today, you 
can’t get that money, it’s gone. My children know my PIN number, so 
that if anything would happen, they can use it (Interview 9, 2017).  
In a similar vein, Vally (2016: 972) notes how the previous manual labour work of many elderly 
male people receiving grants meant their fingerprints could not be read by the machines.175 
                                               
174 South Africa is considered one of the most dangerous stable countries in the world for crime (GPI 2017). In 
2017 the robbery rate (including house robberies) was 780.8 per 100,000 people (SAPS 2017). The African poor 
are considered the most vulnerable to crime (Shaw and Gastrow 2001: 236). 
175 The issue of the technological ability to read fingerprints has long been an issue. “Even the normal operations 
of this biometric system highlight some of the boundaries of computerised biometric technologies. The mobile 
pay-out points and the fingerprint scanners that CPS uses have been carefully ‘ruggedised’ to help them withstand 
the battering handed out by rural roads, but unfortunately the fingers captured by finger-printing tend not to be 
very reliable in the long run” (Breckenridge 2005: 274) 
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Thus whilst Cobbett (2015: 323) argued that “in this new world of cashless money, the body 
becomes the site of financial actions and authentication” in everyday life, the capacity to 
repeatedly connect welfare payments to specific bodies was lacking in practice. Policy 
outcomes, then, are a contingent feature of the compromises required in the attempts to 
programme the everyday through regulatory restructuring. 
The (limited) surveillance that the SASSA card did provide, however, served an important 
purpose for the state to identify ‘non-compliant’, or ‘corrupt’ practices that interfere with the 
smooth operation of the system. The state constructed, and sought to tackle, the problem of 
incorrect payments (Donovan 2015a: 829). This construction of an endemic problem of fraud 
included practices such as claiming payments for children who did not exist or were not being 
cared for, or elderly pensions being paid for people who had died (Supreme Court 2013: pt.23; 
Donovan 2013: 9). The costs of this were said to be substantial. In 2006, of the R57bn social 
security budget, 2.46%, (R1.4bn) was lost to ‘corruption’ (Reddy and Sokomani 2008: 19). 
The biometric reregistration that occurred with the introduction of the SASSA card was 
claimed to have removed 150,000 incorrect claimants and made an annual saving of R150 
million (SASSA 2013: 11).176  
As well as biometric surveillance, centralising the payments meant that ‘unusual’ economic 
activity could be identified. The state had the power to track when and where payments were 
made or withdrawn. One state report suggested that if payments were made at 1am on the day 
of the payment that is likely to mean that it is an informal and criminal money lender who has 
the card. Or if the withdrawals were made outside of South Africa, this may lead to 
investigations (PMG 2012a). When (state dictated) unusual or unpredictable everyday routines 
occur, the SASSA card gave the power to exclude as well as include.  When these problems 
are found (or suspected) the state can then cancel the payment. Being included in a formal 
relation with the state means grant recipients are subject to more extensions of power.  
While the state creates these identities, it also inadvertently allows other actors to use and 
exploit them, the everyday is not a passive space but one that reacts and adapts to attempts to 
programme it. A major problem the state encountered was new forms of identity theft and fraud 
(Black Sash 2014). The formalised identity of ID, PIN or card numbers became the target for 
crime. There were frequent reports of ‘phishing’ scams, where people were being contacted 
                                               
176 However, Donovan (2013: 15) suggests these were voluntary cancellations, and it is not clear if these were 
fraudulent or not.  
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through either SMS or phone calls, or people posing as SASSA staff and asking for personal 
card details (Interview 7, card user, 2017; see also Pillay 2017; van Zyl 2017). By connecting 
the identity to the cards, it meant that if a card was stolen or confiscated by an informal lender, 
they would then have ongoing access to the money each month (Interview 15, card user, 2017). 
The introduction of formal identities into the everyday lives of vulnerable groups has 
unexpected consequences, demonstrating the messiness of policy making. In tackling the 
defrauding of state grants on a national level, vulnerability to fraudulent or criminal activity 
shifted to those receiving grants themselves, transferring the risk from the state to society. 
SASSA consistently had to respond and make public statements requesting people do not hand 
over their information, but the issue arises partly because of the state’s actions.  
In summary, the attempt at including people by developing these formal biometric state 
identities (with admittedly mixed success) is in line with neoliberal attempts at state-building, 
where “new technologies of government are being designed and rolled out” (Peck and Tickell 
2002: 389). The creation of identities is partly a disciplinary process, as people dependent on 
grants are unable to refuse, whilst those who do not receive a social grant are not subject to the 
same collection of information. Grant recipients are thus drawn into a process neoliberalisation, 
deepening state-society relations and facilitating attempts at creating discrete, individualised 
units. Not only does this identification enable more interventionist social policy by providing 
the tools for surveillance and welfare reform, but also the re-registration formalised relations 
between individual people, and society and state, allowing the development of market relations. 
These units can then subsequently be extended to all manner of state or financial enterprises 
that require identification, such as ‘consuming’ welfare services, credit scoring or debit 
payments.  
 
1.2 Infrastructuring cashless  
The second aspect of inclusive governance is the extension of cashless infrastructures. Payment 
infrastructure can be considered to be one of the important aspects of a modern state, allowing 
the smooth movement of money and data across the country and the world (Maurer 2012: 27). 
Not only did the SASSA card allow a more efficient and effective distribution of social 
protection payments, it also supported the development of an electronic payment infrastructure 
and the capacity for intensified involvement in everyday life. As seen in Chapter Two, the 
development of ‘techno-institutional infrastructures’ are crucial to intervening in everyday life 
Chapter Five: Neoliberalisation and the Inclusive SASSA Card 
 173 
and developing spaces for governance and accumulation, while infrastructures also operate as 
‘relay-stations’ organising social relations between state, society and capital. As a form of 
governance, the extension of cashless infrastructure, and its use by people receiving social 
grants on SASSA cards, attempts to include people into the mainstream payment network and 
enable formal financial market activity. Yet the resilience of cash handling of everyday life 
challenges and undermines these efforts.  
The payment system requires users to routinely make an interaction with formal payment 
locations, either ATMs, supermarkets or pay-points. One feature of this was to make the 
payment of grants more ‘convenient’ (Interview 6, state official, 2017). The variety of payment 
channels and accompanying infrastructure allowed users to access their money electronically. 
In Chapter Two it was argued that convenience was important when discussing how everyday 
life is ‘programmed’ and colonised by new technology. By making cashless payments 
convenient, everyday routines of market exchange and activity then become suffused with 
them, and increases the familiarity with the process of electronic payments. As an example 
from South Africa, it was noted how younger people were said to be more comfortable with 
using the SASSA card when transacting with merchants, which suggests cashless will become 
more prominent over time, and will thus require a further development of infrastructure 
(Interview 5, state official, 2017). 
The desire to build payment infrastructures was especially the case for rural areas; urban 
locations being well connected, whereas rural areas were less so (Turok 2012: 20). There is an 
important historical aspect to this. Apartheid had spatial effects through urban segregation but 
also an intensified urban-rural divide (Turok 2012: 20; Westaway 2010). This returns to 
historical South African race relations and spatial politics. Under apartheid South Africa was 
separated into different large territories for different ethnic groups, which were called 
‘Bantustans’ (see Figure 10) . White areas were predominantly in the urban areas of the country 
whilst black areas were in the eastern and more rural regions (May and Budlender 1998: 9). 
The Bantustans were significantly poorer and underdeveloped, suffering from a lack of 
investment and subject to significant state control (Turshen 1986). One feature of this was an 
absence of infrastructures, and post-apartheid governments have sought to address this (Philip 
2010: 3; Lipton 1972: 263).  
 
 
Chapter Five: Neoliberalisation and the Inclusive SASSA Card 
 174 
 
  
Chapter Five: Neoliberalisation and the Inclusive SASSA Card 
 175 
Figure 10 - A map of the racial concentration and Bantustan regions of South Africa in 1979 
(University of Texas Library 2018) 
 
 
Government documents reveal that connecting rural locations to electronic payment networks 
has long been a priority:  
With regard to increased access to social security services in semi-rural 
and rural areas, SASSA was also looking at improving the way in which 
the people were paid, and promoting a safer method of payment, 
electronically (PMG 2011).  
In the original tender the payment model was supposed to develop areas “where there is a lack 
of access to payment facilities” (Pulver and Ratichek 2011: 22). The payment infrastructure 
gave the state an opportunity produce these spaces to promote market exchange and create its 
own spatiality by spreading and expanding modern infrastructure. This is a part of a strategy to 
consolidate neoliberalisation, spreading key infrastructures into spaces previously excluded or 
underdeveloped as a result of past racist state policies. The extensions of infrastructure allow 
and encourage people receiving cashless grants to move towards market-based forms of 
exchange via financial infrastructure, whilst aiming to eliminate the differences between people 
and modes of payment across spaces of those who do not transact in this way. 
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The South African state did not produce this infrastructure alone. Governance capacity is 
developed simultaneously alongside the private sector, working in partnership to extend 
payment infrastructures across South Africa. According to Mastercard (2017b), the prominence 
of cash is a “bad habit”177 that needs to be removed by effort from the payments industry and 
the state. The interests of the state and capital thus combine in the aim to extend payment 
infrastructures and change everyday behaviours. An example of this is Spaza shops, an 
important group of retail agents in South Africa. Spaza shops are small informal independent 
retailers178 that sell consumer goods in townships to lower income customers, with 140,000 
outlets in South Africa (Nielsen 2017). These informal, predominantly cash based stores are 
relatively unconnected to the wider economy or payments network. However, with the 
introduction of the SASSA card, there has been increasing desire in including and formalising 
Spaza shops to cashless payment systems through a variety of financial technology and 
payment innovations. 
The state creates the market for cashless facilities by producing demand through the distribution 
of payment enabled SASSA cards and the market subjects using them, opening spaces for new 
forms of commodification. Mastercard are especially prominent, distributing POS devices into 
Spaza shops, allowing them to enter the payment network through Mastercard’s payment 
infrastructure and thus accept SASSA cards. This movement is strongly supported by the state 
with the SA Reserve Bank supporting payment innovations (Fin24 2016). For the case of 
SASSA card, the state gains an extended infrastructure and cash dispersal, whilst capital (and 
specifically financial capital), is able to accumulate, as seen in the next section.  
As well as attempting to develop these infrastructures, policymakers also hinted at the desire 
to use them to control spending in a way typical of a Disciplinary CWP. The extension of the 
cashless infrastructure begins to build the technological capacity to promote ‘efficient’ market 
subjects and practices. The state had a clear view on what the money was for and was not for. 
According to a SASSA (2016b) statement, “the standpoint of the Department is that social 
grants are meant to provide for the most basic needs of people who have been unable to make 
                                               
177 This phrasing is notable and recalls the discourses discussed in Chapter Three. For Mastercard the use of cash 
is a “bad habit” because it is less safe, more expensive form of payment, whilst also being often associated with 
criminal activity. This discourse also imbues cash with a stigma of backwardness, whilst cashless is associated 
with modernity. Undeniably Mastercard also consider cash a “bad habit” as it is unable to profit from it. 
178 Defined as “a shop or business operating in a section of an occupied residential home or in any other structure 
on a stand in a formal or informal township which is zoned (or used) for residential purposes and where people 
live permanently” (Ligthelm 2005: 202). 
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provision for themselves”. Even more specifically, the CEO of SASSA179 suggested that they 
“would prefer that the card be used to buy food rather than clothes” (PMG 2012b). As such the 
state clamps down on instances of ‘misspending’ when uncovering them, explaining why the 
discovery that liquor stores were promoting alcohol to pensioners caused such a furore 
(Magubane 2016). SASSA thus seeks to shape the usage of grant money by cultivating a 
meaning on what they should be spent. Grants are also given meaning by their target 
beneficiaries. CSG are the most obvious example, where the payment is made to the primary 
carer (usually a parent) with the expectation that the money should be spent on the child. 
However, amongst the interview participants there was a sense that often the child would be 
left with grandparents, and CSG money spent on leisure “those youngsters, they go sit in the 
tavern and they leave the young for their granny” (Interview 7, card user, 2017).  
With the new payment system, disciplinary policies to enforce certain types of spending 
behaviours, become a possibility. Interview participants suggested that new forms of restricted 
cashless could follow, to ensure that the money was spent on the ‘appropriate goods’. Net1 
consider the SASSA card to be technologically advanced enough to restrict payment to specific 
locations: 
Although the SASSA card is a single-wallet system, it is possible to 
enable multiple e-wallets on a single card, where each wallet can be tied 
to specific payment partners. For example, education grants could only 
be activated when used to pay school fees. This could potentially 
enhance cash management capabilities of the beneficiaries and ensure 
grants are used for the intended purpose (Riley and Kulathangra 2017: 
149). 
Using this, it was suggested by a senior state official that SASSA could:  
Put restrictions on where this card can be used. So, for example 
withdrawals can only take place within South Africa, and then also 
looking at putting limitations on that it can’t be used at a bottle store, at 
a gambling institution, nowhere a child under 18 is not allowed, then not 
at a money lending business. It wouldn’t be allowed to be used there 
(Interview 6, 2017).180  
                                               
179 South African government departments are organised with a head civil service titled a CEO.  
180 See also (Interview 6, 2017)  
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The introduction of cashless payments opens up a number of subsequent opportunities for the 
manipulation or programming of everyday life, by including people into cashless transactions 
and building the required infrastructures. The SASSA card builds a foundation upon which 
disciplinary process can be undertaken, allowing the state to programme everyday life.  
Yet in actuality, despite attempts to promote and infrastructure cashless and electronic payments, 
the routines of cash handling were resilient to attempts to programme them, therefore preventing 
the ability to programme other aspects of everyday life.181 Policymakers were aware of the 
practical difficulties the dominance of cash handling would cause for disciplinary uses of the 
SASSA card: “You can't stop people. People can draw the cash and go and buy alcohol. You can 
block the card, but cash can be accessed from the card” (Interview 6, 2017). The ability to coupon 
welfare money and programme people’s everyday practices is not possible until cashless 
infrastructures are more widely spread and, crucially, until cashless money practices are more 
deeply ingrained. The latter certainly appears a distant goal. According to a Mastercard (2017b) 
study, 53% of all transactions in South Africa are still made with cash. Previous money habits 
have remained resilient, whilst new factors related to the cashless system have actually 
encouraged cash spending, as will be seen in the next section. Cash remains resilient in part 
because of its importance to the everyday lives of people receiving grants. For some groups, cash 
remains resilient because of habit. This is potentially the result of credit ‘apartheid’ (James 
2014a: ch.5), since so many people receiving grants were previously excluded from holding bank 
accounts or credit, they are therefore unfamiliar with managing their money that way. Accessing 
grants was previously done by queueing at pay-points and receiving money in cash, so some 
people, and especially the black and coloured elderly population have this routine behaviour 
ingrained, as also seen in the continued prominence of queuing in the previous chapter. The 
routines and rhythms of previous programming can be resilient to change.  
Cash also retains an important social function. For instance, it has a meaning of being a reliable 
and respected form of payment, which can reaffirm certain local social relationships (Interview 
15, card user, 2017). Cash’s fungibility also allowed people to distribute money to all the 
obligations and outstanding debts they had. One SASSA card user would remove all her money 
in cash, bring it home and distribute it back out, “some small debts…I prefer to do this in cash” 
(Interview 11, 2017). For others, cash’s physical form makes it preferable to bank transfers as 
                                               
181 According to a Mastercard (2017b) report, 50% of transactions are still done with cash, claiming to cost 
consumers R23 billion. However, clearly Mastercard have a vested interest, so reservations should be held about 
their conclusions.  
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a more reliable form of payment. For example, the transfer of a cash payment is clear and 
tangible, whereas some worried that electronic payment was unreliable and could mean 
payments were missed. “I draw all my money out, so I can pay everything personal. Nowadays 
they phone you, and say “you didn’t go and pay”, and you did. So, you get fed up with that.” 
(Interview 8, 2017). One feature that cash is said to offer is trust and faith in the exchange. For 
those who are new to electronic banking and money there is an absence of trust in the system 
to work properly or not take their money (Ikdal 2017). As a result, cash usage in market 
exchange remains prominent for everyday lives of grant recipients, despite efforts to try and 
programme it in and the infrastructure developed to incentivise cashless.  
In conclusion, one key aspect of the SASSA card’s restructuring has been inclusive 
governance. At points encouraging and at points disciplinary, the SASSA card has sought to 
promote market subjects and market-based behaviours through formal identities and cashless 
infrastructure. By developing biometric identities, requiring routine validation with the state, 
and extending payment infrastructures, the card develops state-society and the capacity for 
surveillance. It thus consolidates neoliberalisation, strengthening the power of the state for 
potentially market disciplinary interventions in the future while reinforcing capitalist social 
relations between the state and citizen in everyday life. However, this does not mean the 
reshaping of everyday life and inclusion into these social relations has been entirely smooth or 
linear. Cash handling habits remain resolute, other actors have exploited the new identities for 
fraudulent activity, and the actual biometric technology has been limited. Finally, the 
contingent nature of the SASSA card has been shown. Its form, and ongoing adaptation, are 
contingent on both the practical, everyday obstacles it has faced but also the context into which 
it is introduced. The wider South African context is one of limited financial inclusion, rural 
underdevelopment and deep racial inequality all of which the card seeks to address.  
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2. Accumulating through the SASSA card  
The second aspect of the SASSA card’s consolidation of neoliberalisation is the different 
financial accumulation processes it enabled through commodification and the creation of new 
market spaces. As in Chapter One, neoliberal welfare is notable for privatisation and 
financialisation, both of which are present in the SASSA card. Neoliberalisation is consolidated 
both by the policy and the changes it sought in everyday routines. Everyday life is targeted in 
these processes and has an important experience of the dislocations these processes can cause. 
People using the card were forced into relations with finance capital as a result of the 
commodified payment and the new markets which were created. Accumulation occurred in 
three ways: one in the form of transaction fees, secondly the incorporation of third-party 
financial organisations and finally via the sale of financial services. Accumulation 
predominantly accrued to the company given the SASSA card contract, and which thereby 
granted it monopoly control over the system. The company, Net1, and subsidiary CPS used 
this to seek significant rents from the state and their ‘customers’ using SASSA cards. The 
privatised, cashless mode of payment for social grants connected and exposed everyday lives 
to a specifically financial form of accumulation, which is enabled and funded through the 
actions of the state. 
 
2.1 Privatisation and microtransactions 
Whilst social grant payment in South Africa has always been delivered by a patchwork of 
private, semi-private and public bodies (Seekings 2017: 637), the SASSA card was the first 
time this was centralised and contracted to a single organisation. In doing so the state 
commodified the process of payment and gave market access to one company, enabling the 
capacity to extract a number of different rents through the creation of new market spaces. The 
first is the opportunity for microtransaction revenues. These are an accepted aspect of the 
SASSA payment for the state, as they were part of the original contract. Those using the card 
are forced to interact with a pre-existing payments market for accessing money. Whilst the 
state is at pains to argue that there may be no extra fees182 (Kelly 2017) this should be seen in 
                                               
182 The 2011 bidding document also requested the new contract “should not burden Beneficiaries with transaction 
costs” (CGAP 2011: 22). 
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a context where high fees are already in existence. Proportionally those on lower incomes, and 
especially those receiving grants, are consequently more affected.  
Each time the card is used at an ATM or non-approved retailer there is the possibility to 
generate fees. The Terms and Conditions of the fee structure of the card in Table 5 reveal these 
opportunities. The table demonstrates the variety of moments when microtransaction revenue 
can be achieved by CPS, outside of the associated withdrawal locations where there are no 
fees. CPS gains somewhere between 1% and 10% of any ATM cash withdrawal, up to R21 
(£1.20) for a R2000 (£114.50) withdrawal.183 Fees are incurred if a withdrawal is attempted 
but there are insufficient funds (R1.73/9p), but also it costs R2.23 (14p) for each balance 
enquiry. Many grant recipients may be elderly or disabled and have difficulty with PIN entry 
(Interview 6, finance worker, 2017), and thus faced a R1.64 fee at ATMs if a mistake is made. 
On top of this, although using the SASSA card as a debit card for retail purchases means there 
are no costs to the user, there would be fees accruing from interchange that must be paid for by 
the merchant.  
  
                                               
183 Net1’s (2017: 52) annual report also makes it clear that expanding their ATM network is an important strategic 
objective. 
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Table 5 - CPS transaction charges from SASSA card (amended from Net1 (2018)) 
 
Card use location Card activity Cost 
Associated national 
supermarkets  
No fees 
 
R0.00 
 
 
SASSA/CPS pay-points 
 
No fees 
 
R0.00  
 Balance enquiry R1.21 
 Cash withdrawal  R2.19 
All other retailers Insufficient funds R1.73 
 Transaction cancelled R1.73 
 Invalid PIN  R1.73 
 Cash withdrawal - R50 R5.80 
 Cash withdrawal - R100 R6.19 
 Cash withdrawal - R500 R9.34 
 Cash withdrawal - R1000 R13.26 
ATMs Cash withdrawal - R1500 R17.19 
 Cash withdrawal - R2000 R21.12 
 Balance enquiry R2.23 
 Excess PIN- Card Capture R4.90 
 Insufficient funds R1.64 
 Invalid PIN  R1.64 
Other costs Card replacement fee R20 
 
CPS’s strategy is to target everyday transactions of people receiving grants. The routine and 
repetitive acts of consumption by SASSA card users generate tiny incomes for CPS every time 
the card comes into contact with the financial infrastructure. As part of this development, 
Net1’s (2017: 52) annual report makes it clear that expanding their ATM network is an 
important strategic objective. The commodification of these transfers, while individual 
amounts may be very low (R1.64 is roughly 1p), in the context of the number of people with 
SASSA cards the amounts accrue rapidly. In the 2015/2016 financial year alone, CPS made 
R1.2 billion revenue (£73 million) and R347 million (£21 million) profit from transaction fees 
(Wierzycka 2017).  
These microtransaction fees have a lived experience by people receiving grants, and everyday 
lives were affected in different ways. Some participants remarked how they had no problem 
with the system but couldn’t understand why sometimes their grant amounts were lower than 
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they expected, micro-fees seem like a likely explanation. In other instances, the costs of 
accessing grant money incentivised the complete withdrawal of cash. This reinforces what was 
said above in the ways that the SASSA card system is contradictory, as well as encouraging 
cashless, it also inadvertently encourages the resilience of cash:  
And also, we are a bit wary, that if you take it bit by bit, they will deduct 
fees… I don’t trust the banks for that reason, because you see that a little 
bit goes here and a little bit goes there, and it’s just a little bit. So, you 
just draw it all out and you keep it there with you, so you know when it 
its finished, then you just pay that little amount once for the 
administrative costs (Interview 3, card user, 2017). 
The quote importantly demonstrates the agency and awareness of people subject to these 
transaction costs. They are not passively experiencing fees. The persistence of handling cash 
cannot by understand as simply a lack of education about the benefits of using electronic money 
as suggested by some.184 Many grant recipients are aware of the structures and costs associated 
with different modes of money and act accordingly. Yet the market created by privatising the 
payment meant there was little way to avoid them, and so as seen above, most recipients were 
sufficiently compliant or unable to avoid fees such that CPS was able to generate significant 
profits.  
Through microtransaction fees, everyday life and the routines of consumption are also shaped 
by where people can use the grant. The financial incentives encourage the use of the card at 
large supermarkets where cash can be withdrawn or used as a card for free, and disincentivises 
local, informal community merchants. One report suggests that social grant payment day is the 
busiest time of the month for supermarkets, as people collected their grant and did shopping 
on the same day, with stores accordingly increasing prices for that period (Steyn 2012). The 
grant payment not only shapes the everyday lives of the recipients, but also the rhythms of the 
stores who must employ more staff and purchase more stock.  
The SASSA card sought to improve convenience for people by allowing them to access their 
money through a number of channels. If there were long queues at pay-points or supermarkets, 
alternative sites could be visited. However, the alternative sites would often be ATMs or non-
approved retailers and thus incur costs. The convenience and dignity that the state was seen to 
                                               
184 James (2017: 297) makes the argument that often financial education is claimed to solve financial exploitation, 
and that if only the poor were more aware, the scale of exploitation would be reduced. In fact, she argues that 
financial exploitation is a structural issue which systemically dispossess the poor. 
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be seeking in Chapter Four thus comes at the price of card fees. This erodes the absolute value 
of the (already meagre) grant, undermining the principle of poverty alleviation. The market 
therefore is constructed more to the benefit of Net1 profits and revenue, than to cheaply and 
efficiently provide social grants to users, who must pay to access their constitutional 
entitlements. If people want money at the start of the month (as many do), they must either 
visit an official pay-point or supermarket, where there are queues. To avoid these people can 
use ATMs or other stores, but these incur fees. Or, finally people can keep the money on the 
card, making them beholden to a mistrusted banking system and restricted to electronic 
payments only.  
Transaction costs can therefore be understood as a form of rent, siphoning small amounts of 
money from the grant recipients that is enabled by the marketized provision of grant 
distribution. The routinised accessing of grant money was targeted to generate profits. Despite 
some instances of resistance and adaptation in the face of these costs, for most, these fees are 
unavoidable. Net1 were positioned to extract this value from payments as the sole provider of 
social grants, acting as an intermediary between state and citizen, whilst grant recipients lack 
the capacity or willingness to open other, cheaper, bank accounts. This is an example of the 
ideas developed in Chapters One and Two about neoliberalisation creating monopolies rather 
than free markets and competition, and the everyday experience of such a relationship.  
 
2.2 Privatisation and third-party involvement  
CPS did not enter into the contract with the state alone. In privatising the service, several other 
private organisations became enmeshed within the South African social grant payment, 
connecting global finance to the national system of social grant payments. Neoliberal welfare 
accumulation dynamics of privatisation and financialisation thus intertwine. The web of 
economic interests spreads out from Net1 as the nexus point, which built relationships with a 
number of other financial companies. Three actors are especially relevant: Grindrod Bank, 
Mastercard and global investment firms. The role of these actors shows how mundane everyday 
processes such as paying social grants are commodified or converted into sources of financial 
value and a variety of new market spaces are produced. The ‘fringes’ of the global economy, 
where those receiving SASSA grants exist, are subject to “countless little financializations in 
the ‘cramped spaces’ of everyday practice” (Aitken 2015: 7–9). However as will also be seen 
the relationships and differing interests within ‘capital’ are not always aligned.  
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Grindrod Bank 
In order to hold all the SASSA accounts, an organisation with an account holders’ licence was 
required. As Net1 did not have a banking licence, they outsourced the holdings of the SASSA 
accounts to Grindrod Bank. Grindrod is predominantly an investment bank, which does not 
have any retail bank branches, and prior to the contract with Net1 did not do ‘retail banking’. 
This is the first instance of the creation of relationships between SASSA recipients and global 
finance. The SASSA contract provided R35million (£1.8 million) a year profit to Grindrod 
through the 10.5 million SASSA accounts it held (Business Day 2017). But Grindrod were not 
involved in any of the day-to-day administration of the SASSA grants and existed only to hold 
the money. With no physical bank branches, account holders could not visit and raise 
complaints. This was an important problem that a state official raised with the payment system. 
Privatisation obstructed the ability of the state to control the accounts when problems occurred 
and for users to solve problems on their own accounts, specifically in the case of preventing 
unwanted debit deductions (Interview 6, 2017).  
Grindrod also gained fee revenue from the accounts, with CPS paying 50c per user generating 
“improved profitability” for the bank (Moody’s 2014). Grindrod is primarily an investment 
bank, so the commodification of the SASSA accounts acted as a buttress for more speculative 
activities of global finance. In this sense the accounts act as a “bedrock of financial capitalism”, 
concentrated in the hands of one bank and providing “a stable source of income, on which more 
speculation might be built” (Leyshon and Thrift 2007: 98). Although the money in SASSA 
accounts cannot be used as collateral for investment activities, it generates a “free float” from 
these accounts that, despite the low amounts, can offset the risks Grindrod has in relation to 
other market activities (GCR 2017; Moody’s 2014).  
Mastercard 
The other partner in the Net1 payment system is Mastercard. As seen in the previous chapter, 
Mastercard were vocal in their promotional material for their involvement in the SASSA card. 
Their actual role in the project is considered to be relatively low. According to one interviewee: 
“they don’t really have that much of role… all that Mastercard are saying is you can run this 
through the payment system” (Interview 4, finance worker, 2017). However, the project can 
be understood as a part of their strategy to expand cashless payments and improve their market 
reach. Mastercard’s (2017a: 4) strategy is to:  
Chapter Five: Neoliberalisation and the Inclusive SASSA Card 
 186 
grow our business by personal consumption expenditure growth, 
driving cash and check transactions toward electronic forms of 
payment, increasing our share in electronic payments and providing 
value-added products and services. 
Further it intends to “diversify its customer base…broaden financial inclusion for the unbanked 
and underbanked” (Mastercard 2017a: 4). Thus, being part of the SASSA scheme for 
Mastercard is important as it is able to use the resources, influence and policies of the state to 
pursue its wider project. On the one hand it associates the Mastercard brand with millions of 
potential customers each time the card is used. As discussed in the Chapter Two, corporate 
‘brand’ is an important strategy for global payment firms, and reflects the importance of social 
meanings of physical forms of money. On the other hand, it also familiarises users with 
electronic money, rather than cash money. The routine handling of money in the electronic 
form makes people more comfortable with storing value this way, remembering a PIN, using 
a card for payment at merchants or using financial infrastructures such as ATMs. Over time, it 
can be supposed that Mastercard will hope this will become normalised for grant users and 
help generate for Mastercard a large and growing customer base. Whilst it was argued above 
that cash still retains dominance in South African society, Mastercard have effectively 
positioned themselves so that they are able to profit from any transitions away from cash.  
 
Financial markets 
Finally, the privatisation of grants payments connected the everyday lives of grant recipients 
to global finance. Net1 is a publicly listed company, on both the NASDAQ and the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). As a result, they are connected to a number of other 
financial institutions that purchased shares following the SASSA contract. Both Grindrod and 
Net1’s price rose significantly following the awarding of the contract in 2012. Grindrod’s price 
changed from R1270 in 2012 to R2818 by the end of 2013, an increase of 122%. Net1’s growth 
was even larger. On the JSE the share price rose from a low of R4200 at the end of 2012 up to 
R27500 in September 2015, an increase of 555%.185 
The listings of both Net1 and Grindrod involves investors including a number of large Wall 
Street hedge funds, as well as the IFC in the case of Net1. These publicly traded shares suggest 
                                               
185 This has steadily declined to R12,949 on the 05/08/2018. 
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an enmeshing of global finance and growing influence of ‘shareholder value’ within the web 
of state welfare payments in South Africa. The financialisation literature on the importance of 
shareholder value suggests that firms must respond to financial markets and promote practices 
that support this (Froud et al. 2000). As a result, given the prominence of the SASSA contract, 
especially to Net1’s business, it seems likely that maintaining the highly profitable system of 
grant payment was important to maintaining shareholder value. Yet this was not universally 
the case. Some firms investing in Net1 publicly opposed their business model. Allan Grey, a 
South African investment company, have been one of the largest investors, with a share of 
15.6% in June 2016.186 According to interviews, the investment into Net1 was predominantly 
profit-orientated, but with an additional bonus of some element of social contribution: 
At that point, with the low banking penetration, you have a company that 
says we want to distribute the grant, but also, we actually want to 
improve access to the formal financial sector for people who had largely 
been excluded due to apartheid. So, on paper that looks good! You’d 
think if you do it in a sustainable way you can generate a decent, not 
super profit, a decent profit, and it’s beneficial for the customers and for 
the shareholders who make money. I think if it was presented that way 
today, you’d still opt for it (Interview 4, finance worker, 2017). 
Allan Gray increasingly became the focus of public pressure for their investments (and profits) 
in Net1.187 The organisation attempted to preserve its reputation and legitimacy as socially 
conscious by writing a number of media articles demanding that Net1 “do the right thing” by 
ending unauthorised direct debits (Lapping 2017a), and criticising the $8 million severance 
pay of the outgoing Net1 CEO (Lapping 2017b). Allan Gray recognised the need to legitimise 
their investment to wider society, and in fact people receiving grants may have benefited from 
this connection to global finance. Allan Gray had the influence to pressure Net1 to alter their 
practices, advocating for people receiving grants. However, they had minimal success, as the 
practices they sought to stop continued. This challenges the financialisation literature that 
suggests that firms must respond to their shareholders. The interviews revealed the difficulties 
of this process which were both legal and financial. As the company had a primary listing on 
the NASDAQ, Allan Gray had limited power to remove or influence the board of governors 
                                               
186 That percentage has steadily decreased, down to 10% on 21/07/2018. 
187 See, for examples (Crowley 2017; Davis 2017; Ziady 2017).  
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because of NASDAQ rules. But also, if they tried to sell their shares, the price would reduce 
significantly, losing their investment (Interview 4, 2017). 
Cashless welfare payments, and the outsourcing of their delivery has allowed global finance 
firms to profit from the social grant infrastructure via Net1’s privileged market position. The 
routine everyday payment and spending of recipients is connected all the way to large 
institutional investors and financial structures, where profits are drawn from the state and 
society. Indeed, a significant portion of the appeal of Net1 as an investment was the creation 
of a market in financial services for the large portion of South African society for whom this 
was previously out of reach (TechCentral 2012). These financial services materialised as 
exploitative practices causing hardship for the people it was proposing to support, as the final 
section will demonstrate.  
 
2.3 Financialising with the SASSA card 
The final section of this chapter looks at how the SASSA card consolidated neoliberalisation 
by enabling everyday financialisation, which both programmed and disrupted everyday life 
with significant consequences, leading to the state and capital ending in opposition. It also 
illustrates two claims of the thesis. In one sense it demonstrates the sociological foundations 
of financialisation, the techniques, practices and experiences of financial inclusion and 
financial relations.188 In another it also demonstrates the contingency of CWP restructuring. 
Despite state plans for the SASSA card to be predominantly used for cash dispersal, Net1 was 
able to use its market position for significant accumulation. The extensive selling of financial 
services to newly included grant recipients was contingent on the actions of Net1, and the loose 
regulations put in place by the state.189 This case demonstrates a fundamental issue with an 
understanding of financial inclusion that assumes that the ‘unbanked’ can smoothly and 
unproblematically be inserted into financial systems. Instead, as will be seen, when financial 
inclusion is not accompanied by education, regulation and protection, vulnerable and 
                                               
188 As Aitken (2015: 11-14) argues, it is important to acknowledge the terms of incorporation “the actual 
mundane techniques and practices of incorporation – the actual mechanisms that facilitate incorporation and the 
terms and conditions those mechanisms facilitate”.  
189 Seekings (2017: 367) argues that the delivery of substantial social protection programmes in Africa have not 
been affected by issues of ‘capacity’ as much as expected. Despite having small bureaucracies, relationships 
with private firms allowed welfare states to be built quicker than the “less efficient public sector bureaucracy”. 
However, what Seekings neglects is the challenges that this form of ‘in-direct’ rule can generate for state and 
society, especially when a large group of people are rapidly included into financial systems. Thanks to Jeremy 
Seekings himself for pointing this out.  
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impoverished people can be made significantly worse off from their interaction with formal 
financial markets.190  
The SASSA card built a platform upon which a raft of financial services could be sold because 
it was an ‘open loop’ card. It extended the borders of finance to the “fringes”– aiming to include 
people outside formal financial capital (Aitken 2015: ch.6). Inclusion has been an explicit 
strategy of Net1. It aimed to:  
Leverage our infrastructure and extensive product portfolio to generate 
new income streams, introduce a broader array of products and services 
[...and that…] our business strategy relies on our ability to leverage the 
social welfare recipient cardholder base to provide them with additional 
financial and other services (Net1 2013: ii, 16).191  
Here the crossover with the governance strategies can be seen, demonstrating how they can 
reinforce each other. Net1 could sell financial services partly because of the creation of formal 
identities and new infrastructures that were leveraged for commercial lending activity, but were 
only loosely regulated by the state, who did not realise the consequences of the policy 
(Interview 5, state official, 2017).  
The SASSA card created a new market in financial services for people receiving social grants, 
which Net1, with its privileged market position, could exploit. Net1 pursued this strategy by 
marketing products such as credit, insurance, mobile phone airtime and prepaid electricity 
through a variety of channels. These included stalls and salespeople at pay-points at the start of 
each month or contacting recipients via phone and email (Vally 2016). Using different 
subsidiary companies, financial services are marketed to ‘under-served’ markets. These include 
Manje (mobile airtime and electricity), MoneyLine (loans) and SmartLife (insurance) and 
EasyPay Everywhere (card accounts). While all of Net1’s services have successfully sold 
financial services, the most prominent and relevant form is loans. These were widely offered 
and marketed to social grant beneficiaries through online channels, mobile contact or physical 
                                               
190 This should not come as too much as surprise, considering the body of research on microfinance and the risks 
and consequences it has created (Taylor 2012).  
191 This strategy goes back at least as far as 2010, where an investor presentation suggested that the strategy was 
to “Lead with a key product to create sizeable recurring cardholder base; [and] Cross-sell additional products” 
(Net1 2010: 8). Similarly, the IFC, argued that “Net1’s core offering is basic, affordable financial services to 
low-income customers and rural populations that are often excluded from established financial services” (IFC 
2016). 
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stores. The loans accrue no interest, but instead borrowers are charged a ‘service fee’, the cost 
structure of which can be seen in Table 6.  
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Table 6 - Cost structure of Moneyline loans (amended from KPMG (2017: 18) 
 
Loan Value (Rand) 1160 1000 850 650 540 440 240 
Service fee (Rand) 340 320 290 250 240 160 60 
Total cost (Rand) 1500 1320 1140 900 780 600 300 
Loan Period (Month) 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Monthly repayment (Rand) 250 220 142 150 130 100 50 
Effective interest rate 29% 32% 34% 39% 44% 36% 25% 
 
The central social grant database contains all the information about the users’ income, allowing 
a smooth and immediate acceptance of any proposed loans or debit orders. Net1 claim that the 
social grant database is not shared between any of its subsidiary organisations (Cameron 2017). 
However numerous reports suggest otherwise, and the smooth and rapid acceptance of financial 
relations would be impossible without it (McKune 2017). Net1 thus do not require financial 
background checks and incur minimal risk as the payment can come immediately out of the 
account as soon as it is paid in, without requiring the owner of the account to confirm or make 
any payments. James (2014b: S21) suggests that in some settings, debtors are able to 
“temporarily evade the repayment of debt” through a variety of social or calculative strategies, 
yet for grant recipients this is more challenging. The Net1 debtor system makes it impossible, 
as the debt is deducted simultaneously as the payment is made. Further, the state acts as 
guarantor and collateral for these financial relationships. As social grants are a constitutional 
right, the grant income can be considered highly reliable, guaranteed to be paid routinely and 
repetitively at the start of each month. Thus, the variety of debit orders set up are even lower 
risk as Net1 knows they will always be paid. Not only does this give Net1 competitive 
advantage over other providers, but also allows significant profits to be made from the rapid 
expansion of financial services into everyday lives of the ‘unbanked’.  
These loans and financial services also have crucial everyday experiences, manifestations and 
consequences. One SASSA card user suggested the value of a loan a grant recipient can have 
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is decided by how many children they have. Having four children allows a R1160 loan, whilst 
only having one child allows a R200 loan (Interview 2, 2017). This might suggest that people 
with social grants are able to ‘leverage’ their family and children to access higher levels of 
credit, reaffirming the idea of debt as an ‘embodied experience’ (Allon 2015: 699). This could 
also be a case of the ‘domestication of finance’ where everyday actors are able to turn financial 
markets to their own advantage, and intentionally embed these structures into their everyday 
lives (Pellandini-Simányi et al. 2015). More persuasively, it can be seen as Net1 leveraging 
their SASSA card network and targeting the everyday lives and families of people receiving 
grants.  
Despite Net1’s claims to the contrary (Cameron 2017), the people they are targeting are 
vulnerable, and in many cases, desperate, requiring the money to survive until the next month’s 
grant payment. Interview participants reported knowingly taking out a loan that was going to 
cause future problems, but urgently required the money in the present (Interview 15, 2017; 
Interview 3, 2017). Once again, the exploitation of people receiving grants would not be solved 
by better education alone, as there are material constraints and structures forcing them towards 
taking on debt (Mashigo 2006: 14).192 One of the most perverse features of the system is that a 
grant recipient whose account is already being debited for other financial products may be left 
them with no income for that month. At this point, they may need to then borrow more from 
Net1 to avoid severe deprivation, further enmeshing them into the debt relation (Torkelson 
2017). Net1 on the other hand, take on no risk by further lending to grant recipients, and make 
significant amounts of profit by doing so. The relation between the two groups is one of a 
fundamental power asymmetry.  
These debt relations gained public prominence. When potentially unauthorised or unexplained 
payments were routinely made from people’s SASSA accounts, they became colloquially 
referred to in South Africa as ‘deductions’. These  are effectively direct debits, but with an 
accompanying social meaning that reflects their perceived illegitimacy. There are different 
‘types’ of deductions. One form is when a grant recipient unwittingly signed up to an initial, 
cheaper introductory offer for a service that rolled into an ongoing, more expensive monthly 
payment. There are also fraudulent deductions that occur when one person has used the card of 
another to sign up to a financial service or direct debit, without the consent of the original card-
                                               
192 In support of this, Bateman (2015: 21-22) finds that between 2010 and 2013, African Bank, a South African 
bank that provided microcredit to poor people, had a loan book that doubled from R30.6 billion (£1.6 billion) to 
R61 billion (£3.2 billion). This coincided with the aftermath of the global financial crisis and reflected what 
Bateman calls ‘desperation-driven’ clients who were seeking to stave off immediate destitution.  
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holder. Finally, there are examples where the deductions are unauthorised and unexplained with 
no one clear as to why they began (Groundup 2015; Torkelson 2017).  
A critical problem however, is the inability to stop the monthly deductions once they have 
begun. These frustrations and difficulties of debt relations are experienced at an everyday level. 
The construction of the system makes escaping the debtor-creditor relations exceptionally 
difficult, and this is exacerbated by the privatisation of payments that meant speaking to SASSA 
did not provide a simple resolution,193 and that Grindrod, the actual account holder has no 
branches. A number of media reports support this,194 as well as interview participants:  
When you have a problem with MoneyLine, then you must go to SASSA, 
then SASSA tell you no, you can’t come to us we’ve got nothing to do 
with the loans, you must go to them, that's your problem because you 
went to the loans (Interview 2, 2017). 
The resolution mechanism for these deductions is not clear or accessible. The recommended 
route is calling a helpline, however that is slow to be answered and is expensive to call 
(McKune 2017).195 As a result, the people who have taken out these deductions are unable to 
stop them. The system is constructed to ensure their grant money remains restricted within 
Net1’s circuits.  
For some, these experiences manifested in hopelessness at the situation. As many people 
struggle on the low level of the social grants, those who experienced unknown and unwanted 
deductions from their grants are further impoverished (see Case Study 1). One interview 
participant’s friend had experienced a deduction: 
She must go to SASSA and ask them to fix it. I don’t think they will do 
anything! Because if the money has been deducted, because sometimes 
they say your money has been deducted for electricity, maybe it is 400R 
they say 300R for the airtime… The SASSA people don’t tell you who 
draw that, who bought the electricity. They should know, because they 
are taking the money out. We’ve got it difficult (Interview 10, 2017). 
                                               
193 Recent changes to the system allow people with issues with deductions to visit a SASSA office (Interview 6, 
state official, 2017). 
194 See also (Dasnois 2016) 
195 The costs depend on the type of mobile phone service the caller is using. Given most people receiving a grant 
will not have a landline, they will accrue costs. 
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Others were conscious and wary of engaging with the financial sector and taking out a loan. 
One participant told a story of encountering one of the loan shops, “now when you go there 
you find there’s a long queue, I thought maybe there’s something. I asked someone what is this 
queue for? ‘It’s to get a loan.’ What?! I left” (Interview 8, 2017). As seen throughout, mundane 
forms of opposition manifested in the practice of many withdrawing all their money to avoid 
any risk of their money being deducted. The system is thus contradictory. In wanting to 
encourage financial participation and inclusion by providing then SASSA cards, the system in 
fact encourages people receiving grants to immediately withdraw all of their money in cash and 
remove themselves from the financial system.  
Resistance to this financialisation also took an organised form alongside the more individual 
acts of resistance or refusal. James (2017: 296–298) documents instances of ‘counter-
deductions’, whereby groups have sought to challenge or prevent the deductions occurring. 
Black Sash, an advocacy NGO, were the most prominent organisation, starting a “Hands off 
Our Grants” campaign in 2013. The campaign demanded that debit orders be made illegal from 
social grant accounts, the nationalisation of the payment system and compensation for 
deductions (Black Sash 2013). This group was prominent as the central organising group for 
everyday resistance, and in seeking to reclaim recipients’ control over social protection, can be 
considered an example of ‘autogestion’ in Lefebvre’s terms. They filed a number of court cases 
against both SASSA and Net1 for exploiting people receiving grants. Critical to their campaign 
was a social meaning of money that suggested that debits, whilst not illegal, were ‘immoral’, 
and the deductions were taking away “our” money (Black Sash 2014). The Black Sash 
movement can be seen as an organised attempt to resist, mobilising the power of the judiciary 
to protect them. This leads on to the final point of the chapter, the internal contradictions of 
neoliberalisation.  
 
2.4 The contradictions of neoliberalisation  
This chapter has argued that in many ways the state and capital have worked together with 
mutual interests in the SASSA card scheme. Up until the extension of financial services, the 
state and capital had mutually compatible aims, reflective of the thesis’ wider argument about 
the nature of welfare  in capitalist societies (as developed in Chapter One). The state gained 
cash dispersal at a cheap rate, capital gained a reproduction of social relations, valuable 
infrastructure and new markets. The SASSA card delivered monopoly power to Net1 in return 
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for a social policy service. However, the increased power and position of Net1 and the activities 
it was doing generated conflict, predominantly in the case of financial services sold to the 
‘un(der)banked’. This has become a site of significant contestation between branches of the 
state and finance as aspects of accumulation began to erode the value of the grant and thus the 
dignity and poverty alleviating aspects it was supposed to provide. The government confronted 
Net1 as the scale of ‘deductions’ became clear and began to erode the state’s authority and 
social policy objectives.  
An example of the “unique ways” that contestation occurs between legitimate and illegitimate 
lending is in the meaning and appropriate use of grant money (Aitken 2015: 136). SASSA, as 
suggested above, claimed that grant money should be for the intended person, and spent on 
poverty alleviating products such as food, rent or education. Minister Dlamini even went as far 
as to describe Net1 as “big sharks in suits” using social grant money for the “wrong purpose” 
and thereby causing increased hardship and impoverishment (Dlamini 2014). Branches of the 
state began a variety of methods to prevent, restrict or regulate the market in financial services 
for grant recipients and the behaviour of money lenders. This included better procedures for 
reporting and ending deductions such as toll-free helplines, cash refunds and an improved 
communication strategy. Though in doing so, it also placed the responsibility onto individuals, 
“grant beneficiaries are encouraged to monitor their SASSA branded account statements 
carefully [and] continue to register any deductions” (Dlamini 2016). Thus, the state was seeking 
to restrict the new financial market and prevent and delegitimise aspects of the financial sector, 
pushing Net1 outside the borders of legitimate finance to promote the inclusion aspects of the 
SASSA card over the accumulation ones.  
Capital, and Net1 more specifically, saw grant recipients as a legitimate commercial customer 
to sell their products to. In their view a financially ‘underserved’ group now had the access to 
the services they wanted, if people choose to take up these offers, then that was their choice. 
According to Net1, they have: 
provided services to our customers who voluntarily subscribe to 
lifestyle-enhancing bank accounts, short-term loan facilities, life 
insurance products, prepaid airtime and electricity offerings that are 
materially better and cheaper (Net1, quoted in Cameron 2017).  
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Further, they challenged the definition of ‘deductions’ and disputed any wrong doing. While 
deductions are illegal under the Social Assistance Act of 2004, they consider their services to 
be ‘debit orders’ and therefore legitimate and legal (Cameron 2017).  
Processes of neoliberalisation aim to create market forms of social life, and therefore in this 
example, utility seeking, market subjects contracting financial services as they need them. The 
SASSA card created this market, but lacked the subjects. The policy was undermined by the 
structural inequality that means people are lacking appropriate information and education, or, 
are desperate and therefore willing to take any terms in the short-term and face the 
consequences later. As suggested by one state official, while the principles of the SASSA card 
were market-based, society did not act as expected: “we were maybe a little bit naive thinking 
its people's choice, people will be able to manage their affairs lets open the system and allow 
people to contract within the system” (Interview 6, 2017). The consolidation of 
neoliberalisation in everyday life via the SASSA card had significant deprivation consequences 
for people.  
Whilst social meaning may have an influence for some, in this instance Net1 were able to 
comfortably ignore requests and demands to end their practices, as there was no legal way to 
prevent it. According to one senior state official: 
It was a very difficult space. We would write letters to them to say, ‘you 
need to stop it, that’s not what was intended’, and they would write back, 
all innocently, that ‘CPS does nothing but payments. The other 
marketing and financial products is being done by subsidiary companies, 
but they have no connection with CPS’. As ‘you only have a contract 
with CPS’ therefore you cannot do anything about it because is outside 
of the contract (Interview 5, 2017). 
The Department of Social Development (DSD)196 sought to alter legislation, making automatic 
payments for financial services from grant accounts illegal (Van Der Westhuizen 2017), with 
one financial commentator describing this as a “terrible blow” to financial inclusion in South 
Africa (Eighty20 2016). Net1 did two things in response. Firstly, they introduced a rival 
EasyPay Everywhere (EPE) card that was functionally identical to SASSA card, except had 
removed any of the branding or association with SASSA (see Figure 11). To take out any new 
                                               
196 SASSA is a branch of the Department of Social Development.  
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Net1 products, an EPE (known colloquially as a ‘Green Card’) card was required and came 
with free funeral insurance as an incentive (Net1 2017). Net1 stripped the social grant of any 
of its physical associations with SASSA, ensuring that any claim about financial services would 
be a private matter between EPE and the person receiving the grant, removing the state from 
the relationship between borrow and lender. This would also mark the user as someone who 
had taken out a loan, the ‘Green Card’ acted as a signifier of someone desperate to need to enter 
a debt relationship (Interview 2, 2017; Interview 13, 2017). With these cards, ending debtor 
relations was even more challenging and cost R150 (£8.50) just to cancel the card (Dlamini 
2016). 
Figure 11 - An EasyPay Everywhere card and advertisement  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Secondly, Net1 took SASSA to the Constitutional Court for attempting to forbid debit orders 
from grant recipients’ accounts. In the case the judge ruled with Net1, that: 
Once the grant is transferred into the recipient’s account at Grindrod, it 
operates as any bank account at any Commercial Banking 
Institution…a debit order levied against a recipient’s bank account is 
nothing other than a payment of a legitimate debt... Neither SASSA, 
nor the Minister of Social Development, is extended regulatory powers 
under the Act that would empower them to regulate and impose rules 
and restrictions relating to electronic payment (Van Der Westhuizen 
2017: 11, 13).  
The Court supported Net1’s ability to sell financial services and deduct payments. The logic 
and laws of a ‘free’ market in financial services legitimised for the judiciary the on-going 
deductions to which the government was opposed, curtailing their power to prevent it 
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occurring. By outsourcing control of the accounts to private companies, SASSA lost the control 
over how the money was used.
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3. Conclusion  
In many ways the SASSA card has been a policy success. Millions of people critically 
dependent on state welfare generally receive their grant in a timely and accurate manner. And 
for the state, the per capita cost of delivery has been reduced. However, a closer critical reading 
of the policy reveals important issues which have had significant consequences for the everyday 
life of the people receiving grants.  
This chapter has argued that the SASSA card effectively developed inclusive governance and 
enabled numerous new avenues for financial accumulation for capital, consolidating 
neoliberalisation in South Africa. Although state discourses suggested that the SASSA card 
would improve the dignity of people receiving grants, this has not always been the case, in 
some instances the everyday lives and experiences of these people have been shown to have 
resulted in increased vulnerability, impoverishment and therefore indignity. The restructuring 
was seen as a form of neoliberal restructuring where both state and capital worked together to 
deepen capitalist social relations and accumulation. This relationship functioned effectively 
and built the platform for subsequent restructuring, potentially through controls of money and 
grant recipients’ behaviour or alternatively in further financialisation. While the opposition to 
‘deductions’ has been marked, the other aspects of everyday programming by the card have 
faced little opposition. The routines and rhythms of those using a SASSA card have been 
infused with governance and accumulation potential.  
The implementation of the policy has not been entirely smooth. Technologies have failed to 
work, cash habits have remained resilient in the face of efforts to shift to cashless, and state 
created formal identities have been used for crime. However, the absence of significant 
resistance might suggest that the disruption to everyday life was either minimal, or the changes 
beneficial. Critically, the state and capital have come into conflict over the extension of 
financial services to grant recipients. Here it was seen how the use and targeting of people 
receiving grants (on the fringes of finance) was an important site of contestation. The border of 
legitimate finance was constantly negotiated in different sites, such as legal courts or public 
opinion.  
The chapters’ contribution to the wider thesis is twofold. It has demonstrated an ‘actually 
existing’ example of an Inclusive CWP functioning to consolidate neoliberalisation, the 
contingencies that explain its introduction and progression, and the everyday nature of a 
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cashless payment and the impact it has had. However, the chapter has also complicated and 
deepened some key IPE concepts. The strongest example of this is in the case of 
financialisation. By taking an everyday perspective, it has demonstrated how processes of debt 
relations are created and maintained, how they are understood by parts of the population, the 
contestation with the state, and crucially, the lived experience of people subject to 
financialisation. 
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Chapter Six: Contextualising the Australian 
Cashless Debit Card 
While the previous two chapters analysed an example of an Inclusive CWP, the next two 
chapters will discuss a Disciplinary CWP in detail. In 2016, the Australian state introduced a 
trial of the ‘Cashless Debit Card’ (CDC) in two sites, Ceduna in South Australia and in 
Kununurra and Wyndham in Western Australia. All those receiving a state welfare payment, 
except pensions, would receive 80% of their payment onto a new, state created, card and the 
other 20% into their own bank account. The state card could not be used for purchasing alcohol, 
gambling and cash could not be withdrawn.  
This chapter provides important background knowledge on the policy trial and addresses the 
state justifications and legitimations for the card’s introduction. It argues that the form and 
features of the Australian CDC can be partly explained by the context it emerges from, where 
neoliberalisation, the race politics of Aboriginal society and paternalism have been prominent 
trends. Secondly, it analyses the state’s three central claims about the introduction of the CDC, 
finding each of them problematic. In doing this, the chapter demonstrates the historical and 
institutional contingencies of the policy and clears the ground of other explanations for the 
CDC, before the thesis’ own analysis is presented in Chapter Seven. 
The chapter is divided into two sections, first, it contextualises the policy in historical and 
institutional terms. It does this by initially discussing the broad historical shifts in Australian 
political economy and welfare, as well as the Aboriginal aspects of this. The academic literature 
suggests that welfare policies have transformed from ‘entitlements’ to containing ‘obligations’, 
whilst the experience of Aboriginal welfare has been paternalistic and controlling. It then 
moves on to explain the contemporary phase of ‘income management’ and the institutional 
features that have been developed. Finally, it describes the policy details and operation of the 
CDC itself. Section two critiques the prominent discourses that were deployed to justify and 
legitimise the introduction of the card. There were three main areas: that the card responded to 
a social problem, that the local communities wanted and were deeply involved in its design and 
roll-out, and that the card controls were legitimised as welfare money is ‘taxpayers’ money’.  
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1. The historical and institutional context of 
the CDC 
 
1.1 The political economy of Australian welfare 
The progress of Australian welfare reflects the analysis of welfare settlements found in Chapter 
One, where there was a period of embedded liberalism in the post-war period that was followed 
by a neoliberal restructuring.197 Castles (1985) argued that rather than focusing on welfare 
payments, Australia’s welfare system initially focused on ensuring a high wage and limited 
income inequality. Those in work, usually men, had an adequate income without welfare to 
support a ‘traditional’ heteronormative nuclear family. Counter to many analyses of welfare 
states where, a strong unified working class is supposed to lead to welfare expansion, this was 
not seen in Australia, leading Castles (1985: 102) to describe it as the “wage earners welfare 
state”, providing ‘social protection by other means’.198 Whilst there was means testing, it was 
made to ensure that only the wealthy were excluded, reducing the stigma around social 
insurance as well as seeking to make the administrative system as navigable as possible. This 
avoided having an explicit deserving/undeserving poor distinction, whereby people receiving 
welfare have to prove they were deserving – indeed Castles (2001: 541) argues that Australia 
sought to avoid this.  
Castles’ subsequent work (2001) reflects the historical evolution of Australian welfare, 
experiencing a transformation similar to those seen across the liberal welfare states in line with 
the neoliberal settlement (Johnson and Tonkiss 2002; Harris and McDonald 2000; Harris 
2001). The Australian neoliberal settlement is characterised by a focus on the ‘individual’ and 
an attack on welfare ‘dependency’ leading to paternalistic policies (Mendes 2009: 105). There 
are now work tests for the unemployed, and an emergence of ‘mutual obligations’, ensuring 
people who receive welfare are seeking work or job training (MacIntyre 1999). “Passive 
welfare” was demonised, where welfare dependency is seen as an addiction that requires people 
to be ‘activated’ and stimulated out of their ‘deviant’ lifestyles (Gray 2011: 9). Distinctive 
language was also used to label people who receive welfare, with the ‘dole-bludger’ emerging 
                                               
197 See for example (Millmow 2015; Furphy 2015) 
198 Centralised wage arbitration was also seen to be critical to keeping wages high (Weatherley 1994: 155). 
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as a common description as part of a neoliberal framing that justifies economic reform. For 
Archer (2009: 187) “this new ‘common sense’ cast ‘taxpayers’ as the supreme bearers of 
economic rights, and the welfare state as intruding on those rights.” The Australian welfare 
settlement also manifested in a restructuring of the public sector, underpinned by managerial 
principles and market discipline. Public sector spending was restricted, and employment 
services were also marketized as part of a wider process of privatisation, leading to a reduction 
in public accountability and exercises of local discretion (Ramia and Carney 2000). ‘The Job 
Network’ is a central example of this, as “government sought to dismantle the vast welfare 
bureaucracy it had created through contracting out services… and transferring them to the 
private sector” (Gray 2011: 9; see also Chenoweth 2008).  
The second important aspect of Australian welfare is how Aboriginal199 people were and are 
treated, especially within the welfare system. Early colonial governance led to exclusion from 
welfare for Aboriginal people by legally distinguishing between them and colonial settler 
s, restricting the access of Aboriginal people to services and resources (Altman and Sanders 
2002: 207). From the 1950s welfare policy shifted to attempts at inclusion and ‘assimilating’ 
Aboriginal people into the ways and cultures of ‘white Australia’200 (Altman and Sanders 
2002). Assimilation was an official government policy until 1972, and was based on the belief 
that Aboriginal families and culture were fundamentally dysfunctional as a result of contact 
with colonisers (Rowse 2000: 1514-1515).201 Some authors argue that Australian welfare ought 
to actively attempt to shift and change ‘Aboriginal cultures’ to allow them to improve their 
living standards to the rest of (white) Australia. According to Johns (2008: 68), for instance, it 
is incumbent on the state to facilitate the removal of disadvantaging cultural practices to 
provide material wellbeing. This perspective leads to paternalistic and interventionist policies, 
and is prominent in the public and private discourses surrounding the CDC (see, Rothwell 
2016).  
                                               
199 This thesis takes guidance from ACTOSS (2017) and Flinders University (2017) on terminology for Aboriginal 
people. Whilst there is wide variation in the correct terminology, this thesis when naming will use “Aboriginal 
people” or “Aboriginal person”, using the term as an adjective and not a noun. It is important to recognise the 
wide variety that ‘Aboriginal’ can mean and can suggest that all Aboriginal people are the same, when in fact it 
is a diverse group of people and societies.  
200 A selection of policies to designed to exclude non-white people from immigrating to Australia, which was 
described as a “vehement effort to maintain a high Western standard of economy, society and culture” (Bean 
2014: 5)  
201 This is most clearly demonstrated by the ‘Stolen Generation’ where children of Aboriginal families were taken 
and raised by white foster parents or Christian Missions (Broome 2010). 
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While Aboriginal people have been included into the welfare system, their incorporation into 
the formal economy and labour market has been limited for a range of “historical, structural 
and cultural reasons” (Altman and Sanders 220).202 An indicative example of this is the finding 
that some Aboriginal people dispute the legitimacy of money altogether, considering it to be 
“white man’s culture” (Godinha et al. 2017: 155). The rejection of money makes functioning 
in capitalist social relations difficult and is emblematic of the challenges Aboriginal cultures 
and social relations present to the fundamental principles of capitalist accumulation. It is also 
particularly relevant in the CDC’s controls on money and attempts to programme everyday 
money management practices. 
The consequence of the limited incorporation into the formal economy and labour market is  
that a significant portion of Aboriginal people’s main source of pecuniary income is welfare 
payments, as seen in Figures 12 and 13. It is worth noting in Figure 12 the similar spatiality of 
state welfare usage of black people as seen in South Africa in Chapter Four to Indigenous 
Aboriginal people, where the receipt of welfare is progressively higher the further from urban 
centres. These discrepancies created significant concern about welfare ‘dependence’ and 
correspond to wider neoliberal concerns (Martin 2001). As a result, whilst assimilation has 
ended as official government policy, some argue that the key practices and beliefs that underpin 
it continue, with ‘neo-paternalism’ still seeking to make traditional Aboriginal existence 
difficult or impossible (Klein 2016: 511; Bielefeld 2016a: 159). These recent developments are 
said to be based on an absence of trust in communities to act ‘the right way’ and thus require 
the state to promote or discipline people receiving welfare to act appropriately (Dee 2013). 
Altman (2007) also argues that there has been a resurrection of assimilation ideas, which are 
underpinned by neoliberal principles of individuality, specifically in the reshaping of 
indigenous forms of labour and involving coercive intervention into everyday lives.   
                                               
202 See also McRae-Williams and Gerritsen (2010) for an ethnographic study of the cultural issues surrounding 
Aboriginal employment. 
Chapter Six: Contextualising the Cashless Debit Card 
 207 
Figure 12 - Main source of income, people aged 15 and over, by Indigenous state and remoteness 
2014-15 (graph from AIHW 2017: fig. 7.5.1, 285)  
 
 
Figure 13 - State welfare (including pensions) as the main source of income, people aged 15 and 
over, by indigenous status and age, 2014-15 (graph from AIHW 2017: fig, 7.5.2, 285) 
 
 
Through the above discussion, the influences on the CDC can be identified, demonstrating how 
contingent policies emerge from the context they are implemented in. The underpinning 
meaning of welfare shifts from being an entitlement, where there is no reciprocal action 
required on the part of the recipient, to a relational payment whereby either side has certain 
responsibilities. Thus, the idea that the state is able to put paternalistic conditions on payments 
becomes conceivable and acceptable, especially when one side is depicted as not ‘fulfilling’ 
their obligations. Similarly, the emergence of the trope of the ‘taxpayers’ money’ and the 
responsible and careful use of state money is one that appears in the CDC as discussed in the 
next section. The restructuring of the organisation and bureaucracy of welfare and the 
introduction of new public management principles, such as introducing private employment 
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agencies, means important policy institutions and practices are developed, facilitating 
subsequent decisions in the creation of the CDC. Finally, the raced aspect of Australian 
political economy and neoliberal welfare is critical. Not only does it influence the forms and 
types of policies that are implemented in Australia, but the racial aspect affects the experience 
of welfare policies by Aboriginal people who are conscious of its history. As such, the reception 
to new forms of welfare will be understood through the filter of a historical racially 
discriminatory welfare system.  
In the contemporary era one critical form of Australian welfare policy, and one that is directly 
related to the CDC, is the use of income management (IM), where the themes of paternalism, 
control and assimilation are prominent. IM refers to policies of welfare payment that control, 
to some degree, the use of welfare money. IM was first introduced in the Northern Territories 
from 2007, as part of the Northern Territory Emergency Response (NTER), an exemplar of 
neoliberal interventionist social policy. In response to reports of child abuse, a number of policy 
measures were put in place, including significant penal and police intervention, ‘work for dole’ 
programmes and alcohol restrictions. IM was one of the most prominent measures (Altman and 
Hinkson 2010), and the policy has been most widely delivered through the use of the Basics 
Card (Bray et al. 2014), which can be considered the forerunner of the CDC. With the Basics 
Card (seen in Figure 14), 50% of any welfare payment is placed onto the card, and the other 
50% directed into the person’s own account. The money on the Basics Card cannot be spent 
on specific products and can only be used at specific retailers, who have a prior agreement with 
the Department of Human Services (DHS). Alcohol, cigarettes, gambling and pornography are 
banned purchases.  
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Figure 14 - A Basics Card (DHS 2018a) 
 
 
IM has faced varied and valid critiques203. Most notably is Bray et al. (2014: xxi), who 
undertook a substantial empirical analysis of the effectiveness of IM in the Northern 
Territories. They found that there was no substantive evidence of significant changes to 
people’s behaviour or economic habits, such as spending patterns, financial wellbeing or 
community environment. Yet IM continues to be a desired policy for the state. This mode of 
payment has been formalised into bureaucratic processes in the section of the Department of 
Social Services (DSS) devoted to ‘Welfare Quarantining’, and this to some extent, normalises 
the policy practice. This department develops and administers new policies focused on the 
restriction of welfare payments and this is also the department administering the CDC. By 
organising the department in this way, this institution provides not only the legitimation to 
quarantine, but also the bureaucratic structures and capacity to apply new cashless 
technologies. Further, when the department is labelled with the term ‘quarantining’ it 
contributes to a social meaning of money.204 Not only is it legitimate to quarantine, but also 
necessary. Cash in the hands of people receiving welfare is depicted as a ‘virus’ and so this 
money must be ‘quarantined’ to protect people and society.  
                                               
203 See also, Mendes (2013: 495) analysed empirical and policy literature on the effectiveness of IM finding that 
it “represents a fundamental shift in Australian income security policy from structural to individualistic 
explanations of social disadvantage”. Taking a more theoretical critique, Bielefeld (2016a: 156) considers IM to 
operate at the nexus of neoliberalism, paternalism and colonialism. This reflects ongoing attempts to colonise 
indigenous ways of life, encouraging self-reliant, individually disciplined lives through the use of neo-paternalistic 
methods. As poverty is a consequence of the poor decisions of people receiving welfare who, especially in the 
case of Indigenous people, have behavioural and cultural deficiencies that can be removed by micro-managing 
economic lives. 
204 As similar example can be seen in Zelizer’s (1994: 125) work where unrestricted welfare money in the USA 
was considered to be ‘dangerous’.  
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1.2 The Cashless Debit Card 
The CDC is different from the Basics Card in two important ways. Firstly, there is a difference 
between the ‘closed’ and ‘open’ loop nature of the cards. The Basics Card is a ‘closed loop’ 
system, it could only be used at specifically approved merchants who sign an agreement with 
the DHS (Interview 35, federal state officials, 2017). It made the use of the money much more 
restrictive and prohibited the movement of people using a card to places where there are 
approved merchants (Interview 18, activist, 2017). As a result, the Basics Card was considered 
to be an extremely invasive and coercive form of income management and seen to be 
unsuccessful, and racist, even by some policymakers (Interview 30, state official, 2017). The 
CDC differs from the Basics Card as it is an ‘open loop system’ and should work at all 
merchants with a card reader by default, except those specifically blocked by the DSS. An open 
loop system more effectively incorporates those using a card into the payments network and 
makes the functioning of income management more efficient. It allows the placing of controls 
on any person, anywhere across Australia, ensuring the efficient functioning of income 
management.  
Secondly, the CDC relies much more on the financial sector in its design and implementation. 
The Basics Card was administered through the DHS, and notably has little of the usual branding 
of a mainstream bank card. There is no card issuer logo or chip that are common signifiers of 
a standard card, which are present on the CDC, see Figure 15. The CDC, as will be seen in the 
subsequent chapter, had a much greater involvement of the financial sector, and clear role for 
the contracted payment company that delivered the project. In doing this, the aim was to 
normalise the card and associated financial behaviour, but, as will be seen, this created a 
number of issues that the Basics Card did not face, chiefly in the increased susceptibility to 
card fees. These two changes demonstrate learning and advancement from the Basics Card, 
indicative of institutional learning and development of social policy, as well as adaptive 
processes of neoliberalisation. The changes sought to normalise and embed IM into everyday 
life more effectively and less disruptively than the Basics Card.  
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Figure 15 - An Indue Card (Indue 2018) 
 
The CDC was introduced as a trial in two communities – Ceduna in South Australia, and later 
in Kunnurra and Wyndham in Western Australia – from March 2016. It was later introduced 
in Goldfields, in Western Australia in March 2018, and there are plans to implement the card 
in Hinkler, in Queensland at the end of 2018 (DSS 2018a). A map of the regions can be seen 
in Figure 16. All four locations are rural and relatively remote from the state capital, Hinkler 
being the most urban of the four sites. In Hinkler, the card is used in the cases of people under 
35 who receive unemployment or parenting payments (DSS 2018a). Hinkler was able to gain 
this exception through local political pressure and using the community consultation to request 
changes. In the other three locations, all welfare payments except pensions and Veterans’ 
Payments are made to a CDC. As well as unemployment and parenting, this includes disability 
support allowance and carer’s payments.  
Figure 16 - Locations of the CDC trial (Image authors own) 
 
 
Ceduna, South 
Australia  
Kununrra and 
Wyndham, 
Western Australia 
Goldfields, 
Western Australia  
Hinkler, Queensland 
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Payments are made fortnightly for all forms of Australian welfare, although different types are 
made on different days. A breakdown of the types of payment, the value and their national 
usage is can be seen in Table 7.  
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Table 7 - Breakdown of types of welfare payment including eligibility, usage and value of payment 
(Source: Author, data from DHS 2018b) 
 
                                               
205 GBP amounts worked out using an exchange rate of $1AUSD to £0.56 on 03/08/2018.  
Payment type Eligibility 
Amount (maximum 
amount per fortnight, 
all subject to income 
and asset tests)205 
Usage 
(percentage of 
national 
population) 
Pension 65 or over and an Australian resident. 
$894 (£694) for single 
person, $1348 (£1003) 
for a couple. Deductions 
occur as a result of 
income and assets. 
2,498,765 (10%) 
Disability 
Support 
Pension 
16-65, a permanent 
diagnosed disability or 
medical condition or have 
undertaken a program of 
support. Means tested 
Varies from $371 (£208) 
to $1245 (£698) 
depending on age, 
accommodation and 
relationship states 
758,911 (3.2%) 
Carer 
payments and 
allowance 
Both carer and person 
being cared for must be 
eligible; caring for 
someone who has a severe 
disability, is frail aged, or 
have children with severe 
needs. 
$127 (£71) for carer 
allowance 
$826 (£463) for a single 
carer payment, $1245 
(£698) for a couple 
 
610,068 (2.5%) 
Carer Allowance, 
263,874 (1.1%) 
Carer Payment 
Newstart 
Allowance 
Aged between 22 and 65; 
be unemployed but 
proving you are looking 
for work. 
$538.80 (£302.1) single 
person, $486.50 
(£272.77) partnered 
733,088 (3%) 
Youth 
Allowance 
16-24; looking for work, 
studying, or needing to live 
away from home. 
Varies from $573.30 
(£321.44) to $239.50 
(£134.28) depending on 
age, children, 
accommodation and 
relationship status 
305,368 (1.3%) 
Parenting 
Payment 
Be principal carer of a 
child younger than 6 with a 
partner or 8 single 
(including a job plan). 
$752 (£421.64) single, 
$486 (£272.5) couple 255,801 (1.1%) 
Veteran’s 
payment 
Served during or after the 
Second World War 
$894 (£694) for single 
person, $1348 (£1003) 
for a couple. Deductions 
occur as a result of 
income and assets. 
106,970 (0.45%) 
(including 
partners/widow(e
r)) 
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The policy places 80% of welfare payments onto a CDC, whilst the other 20% is paid into a 
personal account. The 20% can then be spent on anything or withdrawn fully in cash. The 
money on the CDC cannot be withdrawn in cash and cannot be used at prohibited locations, 
i.e. any location that sells alcohol or enables gambling. Other than these restrictions, the card 
is designed to work at all other merchants. The card functions as follows. In a transaction at an 
unblocked merchant, the user enters their PIN and the transaction should go through 
smoothly.206 Alternatively, a transaction payment may be declined, which tends to occur for 
four main reasons: use at a prohibited merchant, insufficient funds, incorrect PIN entry or 
exceeding a daily use limit (Orima 2017a: 25). If any of these were to occur, the card would be 
rejected, and if the person receiving welfare has connected their phone to the CDC account 
they would also receive a text informing them their card had been declined. The person 
receiving welfare either has to purchase the goods with different money or leave without the 
goods. Having described the historical and institutional context and specific policy details of 
the card, the following section will begin to focus on the discursive context of the CDC and 
will discuss the prominent claims and legitimations used to justify the introduction of this 
policy. 
                                               
206 Contactless payment technology was removed from the functionality of the card because the risk of fraud was 
considered to be too high (Interview 17, federal state official, 2017). 
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2. The discursive context of the CDC 
There are three dominant claims for the CDC, which together argue that the policy trial is a 
legitimate and practical solution to a significant problem. Firstly, that the card was necessary 
to respond to a critical and urgent social problem. Secondly, that the local community have 
been closely involved and have consented to the policy. Finally, that the state is legitimate in 
restricting welfare money as it is ‘taxpayers’ money’ and therefore the state has a claim on how 
it is spent. In critiquing these discourses it is argued that whilst there is some evidence of a 
social need, the proposed solution is flawed, and the legitimations are disputed. The extent of 
community consent and involvement is highly contested, and the idea of a ‘right’ to control 
money is questionable at best.  
Notable here is the connection to the discourses of cashless discussed in Chapter Three, which 
appear, but not in typical ways. In terms of Provider’s discourses, cashless is seen in the CDC 
to allow a greater control over money for states but it cannot be said to be an inexpensive 
policy. The CDC is a relatively expensive project for the state. For Advocates’ claims, the CDC 
is not explicitly or publicly articulated as being financially inclusive, although in the next 
chapter it will be shown there are financial inclusion aspects. In terms of safety, the CDC is 
seen by policymakers as being safer for non-card user, in the risks from the misuse of cash 
leading to ‘antisocial’ behaviour, but rarely considered safer for card users themselves. One 
exception is the increased safety of vulnerable people to demands on their cash from kin 
networks, which will also be discussed in the subsequent chapter.  
 
2.1 Responding to a policy need  
The first discursive justification for the CDC was that it was responding to a vital social need. 
One of the central ideas is that the card would reduce ‘social harm’ that occurs as a result of 
the misuse of welfare money, chiefly through alcohol consumption, drug use and gambling 
(Interview 22, 33, 37, 38).207 According to Alan Tudge, Minister for Human Services and key 
actor in the policy: 
                                               
207 A policy evaluation after one year had two central aims: reducing alcohol, gambling, drug use and the social 
harms of domestic violence and non-school attendance (Orima 2017a). 
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Since the introduction of federal unemployment benefits in 1944, the 
government has provided welfare in cash. The reason is expedience: 
dropping cash into an account is simpler and cheaper than the 
traditional church welfare of providing clothes, food or vouchers. But 
what happens if the cash is wasted on drugs, alcohol and gambling, 
leading to catastrophic social consequences? (Tudge 2015). 
The social consequences targeted by the policy thus included alcoholism, drug addiction, 
domestic violence and child neglect, based on the argument that easy access to cash facilitates 
these harmful behaviours. By restricting access to cash and spending money on supportive 
services, the policy aimed to disrupt these behaviours and promote financial independence. The 
implication was that there are certain communities in (specifically rural) Australia that were 
dysfunctional because of people who receive welfare payments spending their money on 
alcohol, drugs and gambling, which then cause a number of subsequent social problems such 
as domestic violence. However, despite claims that this was a non-racial policy, there is a clear 
assumption that these ‘communities’ are Aboriginal communities that are dysfunctional. Take, 
for example, this quote from Minister Tudge: 
In some respects it’s hard even for some of the Australians who haven't 
visited these remoter communities, [to understand] just how 
dysfunctional some of them are, how really stuffed up they are, in terms 
of the level of alcoholism or poor education standards, the level of 
violence, housing conditions and the like. Just a real breakdown of 
society (Interview 38, 2017). 
Or this from a federal state official referring to rural Aboriginal communities: 
 I was shocked when I went there. It’s what I imagine a ghetto in South 
Africa would have been like in the apartheid era, just horrendous. 
Falling down shacks, and rubbish and dogs running around and half 
clothed children (Interview 36, state official, 2017).  
This can be traced back to the specific emergence of the CDC in 2014, when Andrew Forrest208 
produced a report for the federal government on Aboriginal and Indigenous disadvantage in 
                                               
208 Andrew Forrest is a former CEO of Fortescue Metals Group who subsequently established “The Minderoo 
Foundation” that works to end Indigenous disadvantage, and the group has been prominent in supporting the 
CDC.  
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Australia. In Creating Parity, Forrest aimed to “end the disparity between our first Australians 
and other Australians” (Forrest 2014: 3). A central plank of the recommendations was the 
‘Healthy Welfare Card’ (HWC) that would: 
Enable welfare recipients to purchase the goods and services required 
to maintain healthy lifestyles yet block those goods and services – such 
as alcohol, drugs and gambling – that damage health, family wellbeing 
and ability to enter or return to work (Forrest 2014: 27). 
In Forrest’s conception of the policy, 100% of the money would be restricted to a card with no 
cash, which could be used anywhere, except alcohol and gambling outlets, no cash could be 
withdrawn. Whilst some of the recommendations in Forrest’s report were not technologically 
possible209 the principle underpinning it became influential. Politicians who were interviewed 
all mentioned the influence of the report. For instance, according to one federal MP, “[Andrew] 
‘Twiggy’ Forrest, did a study for the federal government. Not specifically on these issues, but 
his recommendation was that he thought the cashless welfare card may well be a way to address 
a lot of these problems now” (Interview 37, federal politician, 2017; see also Interview 27, 
local state official, 2017).  
Do these claims stand up to critical scrutiny? There are two central questions to ask: are these 
behaviours and communities a real problem, and if so, is the CDC the best way to solve them? 
In publications and reports related to the policy, evidence is taken from qualitative interviews 
with local ‘stakeholders’ that considered alcohol consumption and violence related to illicit 
substances to be significant problems in their regions. The stakeholders were “members of 
regional leadership groups as well as government and non-government service providers” 
(Orima 2016: A20). However, there is an absence of statistical analysis or data on the scale, 
prevalence and severity of the issues in the chosen communities compared to the country.  
Nationally, the picture is mixed on the scale of the problem amongst people receiving welfare 
payments and it is difficult to get specific figures for the trial sites. In the case of alcohol 
consumption, people whose main income is a government payment were found to spend to 
disproportionately less on alcohol than the average household (ABS 2017). Whilst a 2013210 
survey found that people who were receiving welfare were 1.5 times more likely to have taken 
                                               
209 This provoked some issues for policy development, as although Forrest suggested individual items could be 
blocked, the technology did not exist to do this (Interview 36, 34, federal state officials, 2017) 
210 2013 was the last time data was collected by income source.  
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drugs in the last year than the average, it also found that employed people were the most likely 
to be ‘problem lifetime drinkers’ (AIHW 2014: 92). Yet considering the CDC applies to all 
payments, including carers and disability allowance, there is little specific data on their usage. 
There appears to be little substantial evidence that people receiving welfare payments are a 
group who consume significantly more alcohol and drugs than others. Indeed, Australian 
society as a whole consume a high amount of alcohol, with the per capita consumption the 19th 
highest in the world (WHO 2014: 289). Alcohol is often described as part of “Australian 
culture”, embedded in its colonial history and costing $15 billion in related consequences and 
treatment (Collins and Lapsley 2008: xi). If it is a problem it would, therefore, seem to be a 
national problem rather than a problem of a specific group, such as people receiving welfare.  
In the case of Aboriginal people, broadly, there is acceptance that they are disadvantaged 
leading to issues such as higher infant mortality, lower educational attainment, lower 
employment, lower life expectancy and higher rates of incarceration (CoA 2018: 8-9). 
Aboriginal people are proportionally more likely to be receiving some sort of welfare 
payments; 45% of Aboriginal people received a payment compared to 26% of non-indigenous 
(AIHW 2017: 3). In terms of alcohol consumption, Aboriginal people are both more likely to 
abstain from alcohol, as well as more likely to binge drink than non-indigenous people (AIHW 
2011: vii). Notably, evidence suggests that Aboriginal women and children are 
disproportionally vulnerable to family violence, especially in remote areas, and that this is 
exacerbated by alcohol and drug use (AIHW 2018: xi; AIHW 2016: 1). Thus, it seems possible 
that Aboriginal communities may need support and services to tackle some of the entrenched 
disadvantage they face, which was also a perspective taken by the majority of people spoken 
to during the study.  
According to authoritative groups on Aboriginal people and healthcare, to target communities 
to reduce alcohol and drug usage with a CDC not only ignores the empirical evidence of how 
to solve these issues, but also neglects the historical colonial context. In terms of solving 
socially dysfunctional behaviours such as alcoholism or domestic violence, policy principles 
such as community ownership, local cultural appropriateness, flexibility, long-term 
sustainability and support, and a holistic focus are required to treat deeply embedded 
behaviours (AIHW 2016: 2; NIDA 2012: 2-4; WHO 2008). These are not the principles present 
in the CDC. The CDC policy also neglects the historical context within which Aboriginal 
affairs need to be considered. The colonial and post-colonial experience had significant and 
widespread negative and traumatic effects on these communities that continue to be relevant, 
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disrupting social relations, community structures and cultural practices that were central to 
previous ways of life (Broome 2010). In terms of alcohol, those who experience traumatic 
events are said to be especially susceptible to alcoholism, a finding that applies to Aboriginal 
Australians specifically (Nadew 2012). Alcohol consumption is also related to structures and 
practices of  colonialism, such as initially paying Aboriginal wages in alcohol, constructing an 
image of the “drunken Aborigine” (Langton 1993: 195). Alcohol was then banned for 
Aboriginal people throughout the country during the 19th century.211 Banning alcohol led to 
strict surveillance and exclusion from certain public spaces and social practices and made 
alcohol consumption a privileged activity that excluded Aboriginal people, and is a policy with 
clear echoes in the CDC. As such, the CDC does not seem to offer an appropriate or 
contextually sensitive approach to tackling the presence of social problems.  
 
2.2 Community demand and interest 
The second prominent discursive justification was the claim that the local communities wanted 
the trial and were closely involved in its design and implementation. By doing this, the state 
can claim that the policy, although controversial, was requested by the local community. The 
legitimation of the policy was based on this decentralisation, and the consent communities are 
said to have given. For instance, an opposition Senator supported the card, but warned that “as 
soon as they lose support, particularly of the Aboriginal leaders, then they need to re-look at 
it.” (Interview 33, federal politician, 2017). The idea that the local community is closely 
involved in the running and consent of the policy is an important legitimatising strategy, which 
has provided it with cross party support and to some extent limited the trial from criticism (Sky 
News 2017).212 
This could be considered a form of ‘welfare decentralisation’, which is sometimes considered 
to be a progressive move in welfare delivery. Supporters of decentralisation argue that by 
rescaling downwards, governance is more effective and democratic decisions are taken at a 
level as close to the target community as possible, and therefore have a greater understanding 
of the local issues. It allows the policy to be adapted to local needs, the inclusion of a variety 
of local partners in the design and delivery of the project, and flexibility in implementation 
                                               
211 New South Wales first banned it in 1838, and all states did so by 1929 (Wilson et al. 2010: 7).  
212 Despite some apparent private misgiving amongst the opposition parties on the policy (Interview 40, federal 
politician, 2017). 
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(Kröger 2011; OECD 2003; Sellers and Lidström 2007). Many politicians articulated the 
introduction of the CDC this way. According to one local state official it was “co-design, first 
time for a long time in this area, where the community has had as much buy in about how the 
card was developed” (Interview 31, local state official, 2017). 
Decentralisation in practice meant that the state required the local community to agree to 
participate, including local and state political support, as well as community groups. In Ceduna, 
this took to the form of a signed document that each of the heads of local Aboriginal community 
groups signed. These documents and agreements were taken to be proof of local support, but 
depend on the assumption of a homogenous, coherent local community. In reality there was 
contestation and dispute over who represented who, and who was able to make these decisions, 
and it was not as simple of finding a specific single Aboriginal perspective. This extended to 
internal Aboriginal groups, some of whom were not consulted on the plans, whilst those who 
spoke for the Aboriginal communities have been accused of being ‘self-selected’, exacerbating 
divisions between rural and urban Aboriginal people (Davey 2017b). For example, a local 
Aboriginal leader prominent in the introduction of the card was described as such by another 
community member: “He grew up white way, he never grew up black way, his father never 
grew up with black people, and they’re the ones pushing for the card.” (Interview 26, 
community member, 2017). These intragroup tensions stem from those who want to maintain 
their traditional cultural ways of life maintaining their independence and authenticity, and those 
who want to change or reform these communities, and as a result community permission and 
involvement was hard to gain.213  
As well as providing consent for the new card, the community was said to be closely involved 
in the design and implementation. Minister Tudge suggested that policy decisions: 
Were really designed, hand in glove, with the key leadership group in 
each of the two trial sites. So we set up leadership groups there, in the 
places that put their hand up and said they wanted to be part of this. We 
set up a regional leadership structure, in every single element of the 
design of the card went through that regional leadership group, and if 
they said no to something, we would not proceed (Alan Tudge, 
Interview 38, 2017).  
                                               
213 Further, when one of the previous groups leaders withdrew their consent for the policy this was ignored and 
the policy continued (Davey 2017).  
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Although the members of these leadership groups have not been made public, the members 
were drawn from local leaders from different Aboriginal organisations and local council 
services, encountering the same problems as seen above.  
The actual extent of policy changes resultant from ‘community engagement’ were minimal, 
centering on the shifts to 80% restricted from the Forrest Report’s initial 100% restricted, and 
the introduction of the ability to transfer $200 each month to a different account in order to 
purchase cars. The co-design was arguably simply a way to better adapt a pre-conceived policy 
into a society, and how to overcome any hurdles. According to federal state official, much of 
the design had been already made prior to the selection of trial sites (Interview 35, federal state 
official, 2017). As expressed by Minister Tudge: 
Then, once we'd worked that out, what was technologically possible, 
then the parameters around what's included what's excluded? How 
much cash do you get? How do you deal with internet purchases? How 
do you deal with some cash payments that people need to make for 
example if they’re in shared accommodation? (Interview 38, Tudge, 
2017). 
Decentralisation did not extend to the practice or principles of the policy, but how can it be 
implemented most effectively, and the local community groups served to provide these 
solutions. Contrast this with the exclusion of pension payments from being paid onto a CDC. 
Different reasons were given for the exclusion. For one state official, controlling pensioners’ 
money was both unnecessary and inappropriate:  
Pensioners are excluded from the trial, and that was done deliberately. 
If they are that bad a drinker they probably haven't made it to that age, 
and the reality is a lot of them have to deal with cash” (Interview 27, 
local state official, 2017).  
Although this concern with people who ‘have to deal with cash’ did not extend to other groups. 
A more cynical view was “aged pensioners are sacrosanct, you can’t do anything to them as 
they spend all day writing to their MP”. (Interview 36, federal state official, 2017). In both 
perspectives, the policy was adapted to suit political concerns and realities. ‘Community 
involvement’ appeared to function to suit the policy to the local environment, rather than 
looking at the local context to understand what was most needed.  
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An important example of the sort of community involvement that was promoted was the use 
of local ‘community panels’. These were established to allow the local community to adjust 
the cash portion of welfare payments, giving the panel the ability to adjust a person’s payment 
from 80% restricted/20% cash, to 50/50, or somewhere in between. The rationale for the panel 
was that “there’s 100 hundred problem drinkers in town, and 90% of them will fail one of these 
objective tests – having a conviction in the last 12 months or been in the sobering up centre. If 
we just measure those things, that’ll solve those things” (Interview 36, federal state official, 
2017). In theory, this would allow the local community to adjust the effect of the card on 
different members of the community, making it flexible and adaptable to the local context and 
the those ‘deserving’ of more access to cash. According to one local state official who was on 
the panel:  
The other thing we would do is that if they were good honest folks, both 
on the basis that they knew people in the community, "yeah he's a 
bloody good bloke he goes to the church and he volunteers to do this 
and that" - so that's a low risk to increase their cash percentage 
(Interview 27, local state official, 2017).  
While according to Alan Suter, Mayor of Ceduna who has been one of the most prominent 
supporters of the CDC:  
They know most of the people involved, if someone is of exemplary 
character and isn’t a boozer or a drug user or inveterate gambler, there 
is that capacity. I think it’s mainly to make people feel better (Interview 
22, Alan Suter, 2017). 
To apply for the increase in ‘unrestricted’ income requires people to submit an application form 
that was created by the local leadership group. More than simply removing the ‘problem 
drinkers’ from getting extra cash, the form also considers their character and community 
participation (DSS 2016). The form has a selection of health, crime and accommodation 
questions, and then concludes by allowing people the space to provide a “Supporting 
Statement: The Panel encourages you to provide additional information to support your 
application to change the restricted amount on your Cashless Debit Card” (DSS 2016). In 
Kununurra, applicants are supposed to meet five values, which include “adults who are capable 
to go to work or are in training” and require that “people take personal responsibility and do 
not commit crimes”. Further within the form itself, applicants are asked, whether they “do any 
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volunteer work or other community activities” (DSS 2016). Where these conditions are met, 
and the panel deem them ‘deserving’, or ‘cashworthy’ in Zelizer’s (1994: 157) terms, extra 
cash is allowed. Increased freedom therefore is conditioned on being a responsible and 
committed local citizen, underpinned by neoliberal logics of responsible citizens who work, or 
prepare themselves for work, or engage in formal voluntary work (Rosol 2012). However, 
neoliberal norms do not always register with rural Australian norms of behaviour. One 
respondent suggested that their understanding of community values was very different, 
contesting the external imposition of conventions of personal responsibility and education. “In 
the community if the river is running and the Barra are biting you take your kid and you teach 
them to fish, that's the community norm, not going to school every day and being stuck relying 
on the supermarket” (Interview 39, community member, 2017).  
The discourse of ‘community involvement’ has involved a homogenous, coherent local 
population with clear structures of representation and authority, with identifiable people able 
to speak and make decisions on behalf of the whole. However, despite the claims that the CDC 
was a positive policy because of the community’s involvement, in fact, the consultation and 
consent has been contested, and the extent of community design was strictly limited to 
implementation adaptations. The involvement of community also poses the risk of local social 
and power relations shaping influential policies. An awareness of the politics and implications 
of decentralisation that is illuminated by the CDC is thus important, given the questionably 
neutral conception of the ‘local’, and its role for transformative politics (Rogers 2015: 409).  
 
2.3 Taxpayers’ Money  
The final discursive claim is a distinctive social meaning of money, that welfare money is 
‘taxpayers’ money’, and this is used to justify the placing of controls and conditions on welfare 
money. This discourse is part of a wider trend in Australian welfare (and neoliberal welfare in 
general) of its reconfiguration as an exchange relation, where each side has rights and 
responsibilities. This sense of mutual obligation thus justifies the introduction of controls by 
the state if they believe that the money is not being spent correctly. The idea of the taxpayers’ 
money has a racial connotation too and is usually used to apply to Aboriginal people, with the 
underlying assumption that Aboriginal people are not taxpayers (Morris 1997: 171). Minister 
Tudge encapsulates the logic of the ‘taxpayers’ money’ clearly:  
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To me, if someone has earned their money, then the government has no 
role in telling people where to spend it…If it is welfare dollars, which 
is money, effectively which the government takes from other people, to 
provide for those who are down on their luck, then I have no problem 
at all with placing conditions upon those dollars. Absolutely no problem 
at all. And in fact, I think it’s almost an obligation for us to do so if we 
are seeing very significant harm being caused simply by providing cash. 
The analogy I use is if we know that people are big drinkers, and we 
know when they drink they become violent or cause harm. Then is there 
a responsibility on the providers of welfare to try to avoid that harm? 
And my argument is that, yes there is, where possible. At the moment 
in some places it’s almost like we know there is harm occurring, we 
know that the welfare dollar is contributing to it, but we continue to 
hand over a twenty dollar bill every couple of hours even though that 
person might take that money and drink it all and cause very significant 
damage to the community in the process (Interview 38, Tudge, 2017). 
This discursive device was prominent amongst Federal and State politicians (Interviews 38 and 
20), local residents who did not use the card (Interview 24; Interview 20) and state officials. 
By this logic welfare payments are no longer considered rights-based entitlements that states 
are obligated to pay, but are now a gift from the ‘taxpayer’, who is entitled to condition and 
coupon welfare money that people are privileged to receive.214 The state is able to place these 
constraints because it originates with the taxpayer, and therefore entitled to place controls on 
it. If a person receiving welfare wants to avoid this then they should provide their own income. 
As Alan Suter said: “If I wanted to be blunt, I would say, if the card has inconvenienced you, 
why don’t you get off your backside and get a job?” (Interview 22, Alan Suter, 2017).  
However, there a number of issues with this conceptualisation of state money. Firstly, it works 
on the assumption that some people pay taxes, whereas others do not. Therefore, those who do 
not should not have a say in how it is spent, and should not spend it on ‘inappropriate’ goods. 
Yet this neglects the fact that everyone pays at least some tax through non-income related taxes 
such as Goods and Services Taxes, or taxes paid in the past. In the case of Aboriginal people, 
taxes could even be seen to have been paid in the form of land taken from them in the past. If 
                                               
214 This is demonstrated by a recent exchange in Hansard between two Senators (Parliament of Australia 2017). 
Chapter Six: Contextualising the Cashless Debit Card 
 225 
it is the behaviours taxpayers should not be paying for, then they should be prohibited or 
restricted for all, rather than simply the poorest or most vulnerable. “Forcing the victims of 
economic mishap to behave in certain ways when others more fortunate are not forced to do so 
is to treat them as second-class citizens” (Standing 2007: 517).  
Additionally, the taxpayers’ money trope also neglects the crucial care work that people do, 
which is (partially) remunerated through welfare payments. Payments for parenting and carers 
for example are made by the state for the care work undertaken by citizens, rather than the 
state. This was a point made by one interview participant who uses the card.  
And these people crying out, ‘what’re they doing with the taxpayers’ 
money?’ Once you’ve paid your tax, it no longer belongs to you. It’s 
like no-one else is a taxpayer. I gave up a full-time job to take to my 
dad on, where I was earning $1000 a week, to go down to what I’m 
doing. And I’m saving the government squillions in care fees, and they 
don’t care (Interview 28, 2017). 
Given the proportion of women who undertake these care roles, the CDC is gendered as it 
neglects the care roles that women play and the contribution they make. The idea that those not 
in formal employment are taking money from the taxpayer is challenged by feminist ideas of 
the socially reproductive work women do (Bakker 2007). Parenting payments being placed on 
the CDC also neglects the idea of care as important, socially valuable work as the money is 
considered as ‘unearned’, and a privilege with which recipients cannot be trusted.  
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3. Conclusion  
This chapter has presented important background context to the CDC. In doing so, it has 
demonstrated how the specific form of CWP are contingent on a variety of national and local 
factors. It has demonstrated how the CDC emerges out of a historical and institutional political 
economy. The social and policy context are especially crucial to understanding this. The history 
of colonialism and ongoing discrimination of the Aboriginal population manifests in a political 
context of paternalistic policies creating the legitimation for the CDC. In policy terms, the state 
already has a history of privatising welfare services, as well as controlling welfare money in 
the form of the Basics Card. The CDC is the next extension of this.  
As well as these factors, the discursive context is important to appreciate the contingent from 
of this CWP. However, the claims that have been used to justify and legitimise the introduction 
of the CDC, whilst influential and important in understanding why and how the policy 
emerged, have been found lacking. Local stakeholders suggest the communities require new 
policies and assistance to tackle a significant problem of social harm.  There is some (limited) 
evidence that some of these communities, especially Aboriginal ones, need support. However, 
the proposed solution in the form of the CDC and the legitimations of a community demand 
and governmental right to control money are highly questionable. Whilst Aboriginal 
communities facing these issues may require support, maybe to autonomously address them, 
the CDC is a blunt paternalistic tool for tackling complex illnesses and addictions. If the aim 
was to truly address alcohol, drug or gambling addiction it seems a highly inappropriate way 
to do so and is therefore suggestive of other principles or objectives underpinning the policy. 
As such, an alternative understanding and interpretation of the policy will now be presented. 
The CDC will instead be considered a consolidation of neoliberalisation in everyday life.  
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Chapter Seven: Neoliberalisation and the 
Disciplinary Cashless Debit Card 
This chapter provides a detailed analysis of an archetypal Disciplinary CWP as defined in 
Chapter Three. There, a Disciplinary CWP was characterised as the inability to refuse the card, 
was underpinned by a social meaning of money, controls on spending locations and goods, and 
new forms of surveillance. All of these features are present in the Australian case and this 
chapter will delve into this example to understand the introduction, implementation and 
everyday experience of a Disciplinary CWP.   
The questions this chapter asks are, how should the introduction of restricted cashless payments 
be understood, and what are the implications of this mode of payment in everyday life for those 
who receive it? These questions are especially important as the extensions of control and 
surveillance are frequently directed at the poorest in society, those who have no choice but to 
accept the terms of new payments. As a result, it is a critical task to analyse the politics within 
these policies and their effect on people’s lives. To that end, the chapter draws on extensive 
empirical study of the social and policy context to argue that the Australian welfare system has 
consolidated neoliberalisation with the CDC. Drawing on the framework developed in 
Chapters One and Two, the CDC is seen as a form of neoliberal restructuring that programmes 
the routines and rhythms of everyday life to enable governance and accumulation 
opportunities. These which are sometimes complementary and sometimes contradictory. The 
implementation of this is not simple and linear, there are unintended consequences that occur, 
reinforcing, adapting or challenging the policy introduction. In spite of state attempts to 
“pulverize” space to make it manageable and controllable, there is a response from everyday 
life (Brenner and Elden 2009: 367). 
The chapter is broken up into two sections that are framed around the dynamics of governance 
and accumulation. Firstly, in the governance section the CDC created an experience of stigma, 
whereby everyday routines of payment were infused with disciplinary meanings, with a crucial 
racial element. Secondly the CDC used technology to control and programme everyday lives 
towards state directed activities, especially on spending habits. Finally, the CDC sought to 
individualise welfare subjects by directing, and locking, money onto a card, preventing sharing 
and spreading of money and thus targeting a specific Aboriginal form of distribution. The 
second section is on accumulation. This is first discussed in the privatisation of the payment 
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system and the possibilities for everyday micro-revenues by enforcing cashless transactions. 
Secondly, the CDC prepares un-financialised people for financial behaviours by familiarising 
them with cashless money, technologies, digital identities and debt relations. Throughout it is 
found that everyday life offers challenges and resistance to attempts at programming it, leading 
to ongoing adaptation and compromise.  
The chapter provides a second empirical example to support the thesis’ argument. The CDC 
constitutes an example of neoliberalisation that programmes everyday life to develop capitalist 
social relations and accumulation. As ever, these attempts are variegated and uneven. 
Stemming from the context elaborated in the previous chapter, this instance of neoliberalisation 
is contingent on the discourses, institutions and historical contexts, generating a specifically 
Australian and community-based form of neoliberalisation. In this occurrence it is a policy trial 
in a small selection of  rural locations, and one where attempts at governance are more 
prominent than accumulation strategies, especially in comparison to South Africa. Governance 
is significantly more interventionist, seeking to control everyday life, and as such generative 
of a more active resistance and opposition. It also provides the thesis with empirical validation 
and development of key concepts of discipline, stigma and privatisation, understanding them 
through people’s lived experiences of these processes.  
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1. Governing with the Cashless Debit Card  
This first section, on governance, is characterised by disciplinary control that broadly seeks to 
cultivate neoliberal market subjects and social relations. With regard to the dimensions 
discussed in Chapter One, the neoliberalisation of welfare there characterised by increased 
disciplinary interventions and the inclusion of people into market-based ways of life, these are 
clearly identifiable in this case. Whilst in some senses neoliberalisation is characterised by a 
utopian vision of responsible market participation and subjects, there is also a recognition that 
people do not act this way. As a result, the consolidation of neoliberalisation may require the 
disciplinary transformation of those refusing market responsibilities (by taking state welfare 
payments) to become neoliberal market subjects (Glaze and Richardson 2017).  
This will be drawn out in three ways, first, by infusing payments with disciplinary stigmatising 
meaning that is symbolised by the material presence of the card. Second, the card is able to 
exert direct control over lives, and specifically over the use of money. Third, it seeks to produce 
market social relations by individualising money and inhibiting non-market practices. The 
targets of these forms of governance are people who require government payment, but it is 
predominantly Aboriginal people and their ways of life that the card is seeking to alter. In doing 
so, the CDC can be understood as an ‘elimination of difference’ of the (non- or anti-capitalist) 
ways of life of people in ‘remote’ communities, and disciplinary insertion of centrally-derived 
ways of living and behaviours.  
 
1.1 The stigmatising experience of cashless 
The first governance strategy has been the use and experience of stigma, which has a significant 
effect on people using a CDC. People using the card are stigmatised as dysfunctional or 
‘inadequate market subjects’ who are unable to generate an income for themselves or be 
independent.215 In stigmatising people in this way, participation in the labour market may be 
encouraged, by making welfare “so degrading and punitive as to instil in the labouring masses 
a fear of the fate that awaits them should they relax into beggary and pauperism” (Piven and 
Cloward 1972: 3). To fully understand stigma however, a grounded empirical perspective is 
required. Lefebvre’s work encourages an analysis of lived experiences, which is especially 
                                               
215 ‘Inadequate market subjects' is a phrase taken from Streinzer (2018: 109), who used to describe a perception 
of Greek people following the Greek financial crisis. 
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crucial to understand the impact of welfare stigma but also of the ways it is navigated or 
resisted.  
When planning the policy, state officials claimed to be aware of the dangers of stigmatising 
people receiving welfare, and the aim was to ensure they were not “screwing people around 
too terribly” (Interview 36, federal state official, 2017). However, the shift in mode of payment 
was predominantly focused on not making anyone worse off ‘financially’, rather than 
ameliorating the experience of using the card. Indeed, for some the argument of stigma was 
irrelevant. According to Minister Tudge, “really the only impacts on you would be that instead 
of reaching into your pocket for cash, you would reach into your pocket and grab your card. 
You'd swipe it and off you go” (Tudge 2017). Whilst Alan Suter, local Mayor in Ceduna, was 
more forthright:  
The card is indistinguishable from any other card any way, it hasn’t got 
welfare bludger written over it. You go into a shop, you pull your card 
out, you buy something and you leave. This so called stigma is in 
people’s minds, and maybe a convenient argument for people who 
haven’t got a very strong argument (Interview 22, 2017). 
Yet the lived experience of the card by people in their everyday life was very different. In 
interviews with people receiving welfare the experience of stigma and shame was prominent. 
This was strongly influenced by the surrounding discourses, the material presence of the card 
and the practice of using it, as the physical presence of the card acted as a signifier of welfare 
receipt.216 For some this meant they felt included in a stigmatised group that they did not belong 
as they were not a ‘dysfunctional subject’. One local card user claimed “it’s stigmatisation, it’s 
discrimination as far as I am concerned. Because they have discriminated against me and put 
me in a category with other people…You go somewhere with that card and people look at it 
and think ‘ah she’s a drugged up drunk’” (Interview 28). Others attribute significant negative 
feeling towards the card itself, which gathered a number of different labels such as “Devil 
Card” (Interview 29), “Grey Card” (Interview 25), “White Card” (Interview 40) or “Shameless 
Card” (Interview 26). As seen in Figure 15, the card has the familiar signifiers of a mainstream 
card, for example the Visa symbol, the chip and card details. However, in a small community, 
where significant awareness raising occurred, leaflets handed out and posters placed on shop 
                                               
216 This is not dissimilar to the ways in which national currencies have been used to cultivate national identities 
(Helleiner 1998: 1410-1414). The physical appearance can have a substantial social meaning, bringing people 
together or dividing them by what sort of money they use.  
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windows, it became common knowledge what these cards are, and who users were. In fact, one 
participant suggested they felt less stigma when they were travelling out of town, as nobody 
knew what the card meant (Interview 35, local community member, 2017). As argued in 
Chapter Two, the physical media of the card generates a social meaning, and further supports 
the claim that social meanings of the card and welfare money are embedded in local community 
knowledge about different payment forms. The physicality of the card identifies the user as a 
person receiving welfare to anyone making, or present at, a transaction. Coupling this with the 
discursive association of card users as drug users or alcoholics as demonstrated in the previous 
chapter, significantly affects and shapes everyday transactions. Whether others actually see 
what sort of card is being used in a transaction was less relevant; the lived experience of it by 
card users is one of intense stigma.  
Using a card for transactions is an everyday practice that is routine and rhythmical, a task that 
must be undertaken daily or weekly. The introduction of the CDC has imbued this simple 
everyday practice with stigma. Everyday lives are thus programmed through a disciplinary 
social meaning of money, that is drawn from elite discourses and the material form of the 
payment. Each time the card is used, the transaction is permeated with a deeper meaning that 
connects an individual person to the wider structures of neoliberalisation and shape the lived 
experience of people receiving welfare.  
People do not however, experience this passively, with strategies to resist, avoid or confront 
the stigma.  In navigating the stigma people experience, some contributors suggested that they 
hide the presence of the card: “If I use it here in the supermarket I’ll keep my finger over the 
end of it so that nobody can see what sort of card it is. Yeah, it’s embarrassing.” (Interview 28, 
community member, 2017). However, these stigmas are also sometimes met by resistance, 
where the negative portrayal is challenged. One participant who uses a card told this story:  
I did have a joke one day, I had my daughter with me, and I had my 
Indue card, it was the day after they wrote these ‘parasites’ [on social 
media], so I said ‘can this parasite pay on my card please?’ And she sort 
of looked at me, and I was like, ‘I’m joking’ (Interview 21, 2017). 
The disciplinary, stigmatising aspects of the CDC have also had an effect on local social 
relations within the communities. As in Chapter Two and also seen in the South African 
example in the previous chapter, attempts at restructuring or programming everyday life 
generate local forms of resistance, or ‘autogestion’, seeking to reclaim control and reject state 
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interventions. One example of this was a cross-cutting class opposition. Those out of work or 
requiring state support tended to be poorer and more working class, creating alliances between 
white and Aboriginal people, especially within the anti-card groups who were spoken to during 
the fieldwork. Within communities this has manifested in anti-card marches, contact with local 
and national media, and protesting at community meetings (See photos in Figure 17). There 
has also been rural and urban forms of solidarity working together to oppose the policy, the 
majority of which has occurred online. Taking place mainly on Facebook, these groups share 
ways to navigate or avoid the card’s restrictions, voice struggles and messages of solidarity, 
produce alternative arguments or data opposing the success of the card, and critical memes or 
images of the political proponents of the card (Figure 18). These groups have caused annoyance 
and disruption to those implementing the scheme, who consider their activity unhelpful and 
ignorant (Interview 27, state official, 2017).  
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Figure 17 - The “Ceduna street protest against the healthy welfare card” (A Ceduna Dreaming 
Facebook, 2017)  
 
 
Figure 18 - Critical memes and photos of Alan Tudge MP from the Say No to the Welfare Debit Card 
Ceduna Facebook Page (2017) 
 
  
 
However local relationships were not always solidaristic and supportive. Some had developed 
a deserving/undeserving distinction where those who frequently consumed alcohol, gambled 
or took drugs should be on the card, as they were ‘inadequate’ market subjects, and those who 
lived ‘properly’, the ‘good’ market subjects, should not be. Those articulating this would 
usually place themselves in the latter category. Beyond just a deserving/undeserving 
distinction,  Richardson and Glaze (2017: 141) argue that ‘Hayekian neoliberalism’ promotes 
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the informal sanctions of non-ideal market subject by the public217 (or other card users) to 
slowly fragment the working class into different groups. For instance, distinctions would 
sometimes be raced, with the undeserving, ‘dysfunctional’ subjects being Aboriginal people 
who need disciplinary governance (Interview 28, community member, 2017). This deepened 
racial divisions in some respects between the white community and Aboriginal community, 
and reflected a further example of historical racial discrimination:  
I think it’s unfair to insult this community with this card. Because the 
white people here think they are better than what we are. Don’t mind 
me saying. We’ve been living on this land for many years. 
Discrimination against us mob. Not bloody fair… Its racist around here, 
people are racist, and the card is (Interview 29, Aboriginal community 
member, 2017). 
This also meant that the stigmatising experience was often raced for Aboriginal people,  
especially as it is experienced within the context of a colonial history of controlling spending 
and money through ‘ration cards (Rowse 1998).218 According to (Davey 2017a):  
Peters [a local resident] says being on the card is like being placed on a 
ration. This is particularly painful to him because white pastoralists 
gave his ancestors rations of food, rather than wages, in return for their 
labour. “But we’re not in the old days,” Peters says. “We’re looking 
forward now. How can we go back to ration days?”  
This was a sentiment echoed by other Aboriginal people in the study (Interview 29, community 
member, 2017). The experience of using the card was one of racialised stigma, and the potential 
to manifest in being vulnerable to exploitation for extra card fees:  
And you know you get shamed using the card all the time. Sometimes 
I feel ashamed to pull that card out you know. They go, ah ‘black person 
walking here, that’s the Indue card, we’ll put an extra $2.50, $4 on 
there’ for your fees. 
                                               
217 There were also some reports of stigmatising comments on social media, which Glaze and Richardson (2017: 
141) comment is a contemporary discursive space of social sanctioning, which was upsetting for many people. 
One notable Facebook page, “Say YES to the Heathy Welfare Card” was highly contentious.  
218 Rationing goods to Aboriginal people was a common form of governance during the colonial period. It 
restricted their ability to access food, clothing and other goods facilitating a variety of forms of governance 
strategies. See Rowse (1998) for more on the rationing of Aboriginal money.  
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And then this provokes anger and fury when the card failed to work: 
You got to abuse, just to make yourself feel better, ‘ah fuck you white 
cunts, you’re having a good fucking laugh you know’ that’s what I do 
when I walk out the [shop]. And I know I’ve got the money for my 
shop, but then [the card is] declined (Interview 26, community member, 
2017).  
Stigma emerges from the use of a CDC. Stemming from the surrounding discourses of the card 
and local social relations and interactions it is actualised and lived through the process of 
making payments and transactions. In doing so, the card stigmatised those non-market subjects 
for requiring state welfare and promoted a change of behaviour by making the routines and 
rhythms of everyday life unpleasant or shameful. Although people have demonstrated some 
capacity to resist of navigate, the card is especially pernicious as the stigma cannot be escaped. 
Market exchange is a potentially daily activity and stigma is experienced each time. It is 
however, somewhat contradictory, while the consolidation of neoliberalisation encourages the 
participation in ‘responsible’ exchange as market subjects, it also makes the experience 
stigmatising.  
 
1.2 Controlling welfare subjects 
More than governing simply by making everyday routines stigmatised, the CDC also imposes 
direct programming on everyday lives. It controls where and how money can be spent, as well 
as attempting to reshape how people think about money. The CDC makes use of developments 
in financial payments technology, and the presence of cashless infrastructure to implement 
close control of everyday lives. Once again, the interventionist strategies of the state are aiming 
to produce market subjects who are unable to live ‘properly’ and therefore need external 
coercion to cultivate the right sorts of behaviour.  
In order to be able to control the everyday life of welfare recipients, the appropriate cashless 
infrastructure was needed to make the policy functional. To use the CDC, transactions have to 
be electronic and conducted at a payment terminal. Policymakers were not particularly 
concerned about the prevalence of cashless facilities and the issues this would cause for control, 
given that “the bulk of merchants already had card facilities” (Interview 27, local state official, 
2017). However, that did not mean that everywhere was connected to the payments network. 
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As such, different sites in the communities required the state to provide the cashless 
infrastructure. As in Chapter One, the state intervenes in the market to make sure they can 
function under the new conditions of cashless-only consumers.  
Initial planning exposed sites that were lacking card payment facilities. Representatives from 
the state and Indue visited the sites to uncover those places where cashless transfers would be 
problematic. One of the most commonly mentioned was the local charity shops, which were 
popular but handled all transactions in cash. On discovery of this, card facilities were provided 
and paid for by the state.  
Clothing stores, even the OP [charity shops] shops… they’re mostly 
staffed by elderly ladies, and when they heard we were bringing in 
this change, they were quite agitated. They didn’t accept any form of 
card, we arranged for them to be given, free, facilities to accept cards 
(Interview 22, Alan Suter, 2017).  
Similarly, it was reported that each year in Ceduna there is an ‘Oyster Festival’, but it was 
realised that the smaller merchants there would not have card readers and therefore exclude 
members of community using a CDC, as well as losing money for the sellers. This was 
identified by a local state official: 
So I said, I want you to make sure that they know, that if they don't 
bring card readers - and they've got them, they'd rather have cash 
though - they'll lose half their revenue. The bigger places have a 
reader, but even the oyster growers had them. We even promoted to 
the smaller vendors, that there are products like, SquarePOS, $20, you 
plug it into your phone, download the app. We bought a bundle of 
them and said if anyone comes along we can sell it to them and get it 
organised (Interview 27, local state official, 2017). 
As the state wants to exert disciplinary control via the market, it has to act to ensure the 
penetration of card readers into locally embedded informal forms of exchange. To effectively 
programme everyday life, discipline must be convenient. State and local representatives are 
tasked with constantly facilitating the expansion of cashless payments when their absence 
becomes apparent, such in the case of putting card readers into schools to pay for lunches, or 
card readers at sports locations. The aim then is not to prevent market exchange by welfare 
recipients, but to only be able to do so at state authorised locations. Accordingly, this creates 
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its own momentum, as merchants visiting CDC locations realise they need to have card 
readers and purchase them voluntarily; the state begins the process of introducing governance 
infrastructure, but it is supported and maintained by commercial organisations. In doing so, 
the state is also producing the space for formal accumulation through fee revenue, as will be 
seen in the second section of the chapter. This production of cashless spaces and infrastructure 
was observed with both travelling farmers markets and fairs during the research, who 
independently brought card readers, whilst some permanent local merchants who previously 
didn’t have card facilities felt obligated to introduce them. However, the costs were 
considered to be high and therefore they simply claimed to increase their prices to cover it, 
placing the cost burden back on the card user.  
Using the technological infrastructures, the CDC aims to programme the spending habits of 
people receiving welfare such that when using the CDC money is spent on ‘appropriate’ and 
‘responsible’ goods, whereas spending the 20% is unrestricted. This reflects an attempt to 
coupon, en-masse, welfare money. However, while the card according to a state official “just 
makes them think about using it [welfare money] differently” (Interview 30), the presence of 
cashless technology also allows the state to ‘coupon’ welfare money: 
Every merchant in Australia has to identify, broadly, what merchant 
category it fits into, conveniently for us, there are codes like "gambling 
outlet" "bottle shops" "pubs" "discotheque". What you can do as part of 
the e-payment systems, is that you can block expenditure at certain 
merchant categories. So we have just gone through the list of categories, 
identified the ones where you would sell primarily alcohol or gambling 
and just blocked them. We did that once, it took an hour, and someone 
codes it into the card (Interview 34, state official, 2017). 
The final sentence is notable for its banality, disguising how the CDC is able to significantly 
programme and control everyday lives in “an hour” by restricting access to certain markets. 
With a few lines of technological code, the state is able to extend and impose its power onto 
people receiving welfare, programming everyday lives to state directed routines, and away 
from unauthorised ones. This technological capacity, combined with the inability to access 
cash, writes into the financial payment infrastructures the meaning of spending that states wish 
to convey of welfare money. Meanings of ‘responsible’ consumption are inserted into the 
materiality of the card and layered with technological control. Without having to be actively 
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present in these remote communities, the state is able to exert control, through the use of 
financial infrastructures, which once again act as ‘relay stations’ as a way to organise social 
relations and social life.  
As well as controlling the use of money, the features of the CDC also meant that at times people 
avoided or were excluded from public spaces that they would normally frequent where cash 
purchases might need to be made. Choosing to or to not have POS became a tool of inclusion 
or exclusion. If a site did not have a POS device, it would be much less likely to have people 
receiving welfare payments visiting. As some important social locations initially did not have 
card readers, those on the CDC had to choose to use their limited cash on attending, or not 
attend at all. According to informants, locations such as local leisure centres, sports clubs or 
local markets did not initially have cashless payment terminals, increasing the obstacles for 
people receiving welfare. Even in cases where there was card acceptance the experience was 
felt to be too shameful. For instance, one participant claimed they no longer came to the local 
town for shopping because the card had made them too sad and upset, showing that stigma can 
also control people’s everyday life (Interview 29, community member, 2017). A number of 
local merchants that sold alcohol refused to accept the card, despite also selling non-alcoholic 
products, to prevent the unspecified ‘issues’ that they perceived accepting the card would 
cause. Similarly, one local pub was a community owned venture, and as a result an important 
social space. However, as it sold alcohol the till points in the bar would automatically be 
restricted. To allow CDC users to still attend and buy non-alcoholic drinks or food, separate 
till points were created, one included and one excluded. Whilst in theory a helpful step, it is 
still exclusionary and divisive as users’ everyday lives are shaped and directed by the card.  
This demonstrates an important contradiction within the CDC policy. The initial Forrest (2014: 
2) report and subsequent policy articulations talk about the ‘inclusion’ of marginalised groups 
and creating parity with “first Australians and other Australians”. Neoliberalisation has, in this 
thesis, been argued to at times aspire to inclusion and interaction with the state. However, in 
this instance, the CDC serves to exacerbate inequality between those receiving welfare 
payments and those not by either excluding or segregating people in important social spaces 
and participation in the local community. Further, considering the popularity of alcohol 
consumption or gambling as social activity it also excludes people receiving welfare from 
being involved (McMillan and Donnelly 2008: 403-404). The governance of dimensions of 
neoliberalisation are in tension, whereby the disciplinary features of welfare governance affect 
other policy priorities.  
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The CDC allows direct control over welfare spending and budgeting that is directed by the 
state. It is said that welfare money should be for “getting the basic essentials of life, such as 
food, housing, electricity and education” (DSS 2018b). The other side to this is that no more 
than 20% of welfare money (the proportion in a person’s own account) should be spent on 
luxuries or indulgences such as alcohol or gambling and ideally should be used on 
expenditures that require cash such as ‘garage sales’. This is a prime example of Lefebvre’s 
bureaucratic society of controlled consumption, where everyday life is controlled and 
organised directly by the state, eliminating any different or alternative practices.  
The poster in Figure 19 clearly articulates how the Australian state wants welfare money to 
be spent. By placing these posters around the communities, they are also making sure this 
spending structure is widely known. Not only does the card control what should and should 
not be purchased, it also seeks to implement a budgeting system of how much should be spent 
on different categories of goods, in effect imposing an external earmarking system.219 The 
card therefore seeks to control actual behaviours of people receiving welfare, but also 
influence the meanings of welfare money.  
Figure 19 - A poster designed by the DSS and placed around the trial locations. 
                                               
219 A strategy previously found by Zelizer (1994: ch.5) in the USA where social workers sought to earmark welfare 
money for recipients using a variety of strategies to encourage efficient, ‘appropriate’ spending.  
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How effective is this as an attempt to control everyday economic behaviour and restructure 
perceptions of money? The outcome was varied. One person using a CDC suggested that the 
controls of the card were positive, as it allowed them to ‘play’ and waste the 20% of their 
‘own’ money, safe in the knowledge they would not lose everything until the next payment. 
Others were enraged at that idea that they were being told how to spend their money. In a 
number of informal conversations, the fact that money was restricted to a separate card 
generated feelings that the money ‘wasn’t mine’ and demands to ‘give me my money back’. 
Despite the fact the money is still widely usable, the location of money on the card made some 
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feel that the money retains the government’s ownership of it.220 Others complied with the 
restructuring of consumption: “I get $200 into my Indue, because I get $500, but I got my 
rent, electricity, other debts to pay off... My Indue money, that goes on my shopping” 
(Interview 26, local resident 2017). Similarly: “I buy food first, petrol, the basics, medical 
appointments” (Interview 29, local resident 2017). This is supported by local public servants 
in the region claiming that there has been a significant increase in the purchase of fresh food 
from local supermarkets (Interviews 14, local state official, 2017). In these instances, the card 
has been effective at inculcating market subjects and the associated behaviours and 
consumption.  
Whilst there may be an aspiration to control everyday lives using arm’s length, impartial 
technology, in practice this proved challenging. Should a card payment be refused as a result 
of use at a banned merchant, insufficient funds or incorrect PIN, the social interaction does not 
end there, despite the economic transaction finishing. As a result, the cashiers in these 
situations become the ‘face’ of the abstract system and may have to justify it. This caused anger 
and annoyance at staff members when cards were declined, or embarrassment at having to 
return goods (Interview 25, local merchant, 2017), although sometimes staff would offer 
sentiments of solidarity (Interview 26, local community member, 2017). In other times, the 
card could not extend the control the state wanted it to. Restaurants that also sold alcohol, or 
shops that sold fungible gift cards had to sign contracts agreeing not to sell these products to 
CDC users. Compromises were made so that lottery tickets were not classed as gambling 
because of their ubiquity (Interview 36, federal state official, 2017). These examples 
demonstrate that adaptation to policies occurs in the interaction of restructuring efforts with 
the everyday. In another instance, local merchants become the enforcers of the policy when 
one observed CDC users purchasing gambling chips that could be used online, but were not 
blocked by the card. Upon informing the local council it was agreed these would not be sold: 
“They voluntarily undertook not to accept the card, they signed an agreement and they’ve 
honoured it. And they’re happy, they always felt rather guilty selling those things anyhow” 
(Interview 22, local Mayor, 2017). The operation of the card works through social relationships 
and interactions, requiring policing and surveillance of the policy. Whilst the principle of 
control and surveillance may be impersonal, the practice of it was interpersonal.  
                                               
220 This was a finding with echoes in Zelizer’s (1994: 169) work, where externally earmarked welfare money was 
experienced by recipients as “budgeted by strangers, and therefore never entirely their own”.  
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1.3 Individualising welfare subjects  
The final disciplinary feature of the CDC is that it individualises221 economic practices, 
prohibiting certain behaviours (such as sharing money), and promoting others (individual 
rational actors who budget and take responsibility for managing their own money). It also 
seeks to reconstruct social relations by interfering with economic practices that reproduce 
non-capitalist relations, especially those that neoliberal rationalities consider incompatible 
with economic independence and market participation. These have significant effects on 
everyday life and are navigated in different ways.  
The primary actor for neoliberalism is the rational individual, whose decisions are designed 
to maximise their utility. However, in many cases, policymakers are confronted by the fact 
that people do not actually live this way. As such they attempt to inculcate the ‘correct’ sorts 
of behaviours, with a mix of disciplinary consequences and regulatory arrangements to 
produce the market subject who is economically self-sufficient and responsible. As one 
federal politician put it:  
So much comes down to personal choice, and the expectation that we 
have that people will make choices that are in their best interests. 
Unfortunately, as we know that if someone is struggling from a drug 
problem, or from alcohol problem, sometimes they won’t be making 
choices in their best interest…this sort of measure was looking to break 
that cycle (Interview 33, 2017). 
By locating welfare money onto a specific card that is allocated to one person, the CDC seeks 
to direct an amount of money to an individual, giving them responsibility to spend and budget 
appropriately. In some ways the CDC appears to contradict conventional notions of 
responsibility as the person receiving welfare has actually had their responsibility for spending 
removed, seemingly challenging the neoliberal logic of the policy. However as Trnka and 
Trundle (2014: 140) argue, “neoliberal ideals of accountability, risk and responsibility can 
                                               
221 In previous analyses of individualisation in welfare policy, there are two common understandings. One refers 
to the move towards differentiating and personalising public services to recognise the diversity and social life 
(Borghi and van Berkel 2007). Individualisation is here considered to be a progressive step to improve the quality 
of public services. Alternatively, it has been used more critically, to refer to the ways in which responsibility for 
securing welfare has been shifted from the collective, or the state, to the individual. For instance, through 
privatisation or reduced or restructured state services (Clarke 2004). 
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thus curtail certain freedoms and choices”. In order to achieve the responsible individual 
Australian neoliberalism desires, it is necessary to remove freedoms and choices, disciplining 
individuals to follow certain forms of behaviour. This can be seen in the financial management 
training courses that were also introduced for card users that were designed to encourage 
responsible and rational use of welfare money: 
So we went to community, and everyone in community signed up to get 
there card and we sat them down with a financial counsellor who did 
the budget for them, basically so they could understand how much 
money they would have in their hands, and whether they could pay their 
bills (Interview 31, community state official, 2017). 
In practice this individualisation of money, and the aim to improve people’s money 
management skills affected people’s everyday lives, causing inconvenience. As convenience 
has been considered important to programming everyday routines, this may have led these 
attempts to be less successful. These examples also challenge the claims propagated in Chapter 
Three about cashless money being more ‘convenient’, here it is seen that cashless can in fact 
be an obstructive and inconvenient.  One way was this happened was by undermining people’s 
own budgeting. By enforcing a second account, as well as the recipient’s usual account, 
significant inconvenience for simple daily payments occurred. Research has shown people on 
low incomes to be effective budgeters, who are able to make small amounts of money ‘stretch’ 
(Dowler 1997; Edin and Lein 1997; Edin and Shaefer 2015). The insertion of a new account 
and cashless money directly intervenes into people’s existing, well-rehearsed money 
management strategies. An inability to know specifically how much is in each account, the 
scope to be shrewd with purchases that might require cash, or visiting different stores – all of 
which are the everyday consumption behaviours of utility seeking market subjects – were 
remarked to have been interfered with by the CDC. 
The restriction of money onto a physical card caused a number of other difficulties for people 
receiving welfare. A frequently cited example is when the recipient of the payment, and 
therefore card holder needed to leave or move town for a period of time, often to get medical 
treatment. This caused issues, as it meant money that might be needed for more than one person 
needed to stay with the card holder: 
I had a friend who was stuck [out of town] with her son who had broken 
his ankle, and she’s got 4-5 kids...She couldn’t give anyone who was 
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caring for her kids here, she couldn’t send money, she couldn’t do 
nothing because she was on this card… she couldn’t give her kids 
money for lunch box feeds or anything here, because she’s over there 
with her card. She felt quite guilty of having to ask for people for help 
(Interview 21, community member, 2017). 
The individuality of the card prevented the sharing or distributing the money. Although a 
solution of sorts was developed, allowing ‘internal’ transfers which enables the transferring 
of money from one CDC to another, this still forbids the movement of money to non-CDCs 
and requires users to be familiar enough with the ‘Indue App’. As a result, the majority of 
money remains fixed to the card and the user, restricting the ability of communities to circulate 
money. People have however, found various entrepreneurial strategies to access cash. Stories 
circulate within the communities about how people overcame restrictions on the card to access 
cash. These vary from the overcharging of journeys by taxi firms (Dupe 2016), the purchase 
of meat or electronic goods which are then sold at a lower price for cash (Interview 33, federal 
politician, 2017; Interview 28, community member, 2017), the rental of hotel accommodation 
which was not used and then reimbursed (Interview 19, community member, 2017), or the 
purchase of groceries in exchange for cash. The exchange in these solutions is underpinned 
by a social power relationship that can be exploitative or supportive. In some circumstances 
existing social relations provide support and assistance to CDC users.  
Buying food and getting cash back? Yeah I do that sometimes. Just 
people, you got to get the person at the right time, got to be willing to 
give their money to swap it for Indue to help another person out. Just to 
help. They know that that person is down and out and they know they 
have got the money in the Indue. So they go ‘give me that $20 and I’ll 
get it out with the Indue’. So it’s all about trust, yeah (Interview 26, 
community member, 2017). 
Whilst there may be an individualising ethic that seeks to prevent these forms of exchanges, 
the embeddedness of individuals means that these forms of accessing cash are inevitable, and 
to some extent unavoidable. Yet power infiltrates these relationships, and so these informal 
markets created by a need to access cash can also be exploitative. Those who want or need 
cash are made vulnerable by its absence, and open them up to trades on unfair terms, such as 
$100 of food for $75 in cash, or in more severe cases there have been reports of “a couple of 
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examples of prostitution” to get cash (Orima 2017b: 35). Money and its different forms 
operate through social relationships. Whilst the card might seek to individualise money and 
create market subjects, local relationships interfere and prevent the smooth extension of 
control and discipline.  
Some policy discourse concentrates on a specific cultural practice – ‘demand sharing’, or 
‘humbugging’ in more colloquial terms – that by individualising subjects the CDC would 
attempt to disrupt (Peterson 1993; 2013). Demand sharing is an anthropological concept of 
distribution that is not based purely on altruistic sharing, but instead on social relationships, 
kin and hierarchy (Altman 2011). The allocation of goods responds to verbal and non-verbal 
demands, not only as a method of distribution, but also having an important function for social 
relations, potentially testing, asserting or substantiating relationships (Peterson 1993: 870-
871).  Demand sharing has been a central target of Australian Aboriginal welfare policy, as the 
process is said to prohibit individual or household control of resources, and therefore poses 
challenges to improving standards of living via capitalist practices (Peterson and Taylor 2003). 
Critically, this practice is opposed to “neoliberal sensibilities that valorize the right of the 
individual to control resources” (Altman 2011: 187). As a result, ‘humbugging’ to get cash for 
alcohol was often presented a problem for the CDC: 
 A peculiar one to indigenous communities, where there is a cultural 
concept called demand sharing. Where basically people share their 
money, or resources. And there is almost an obligation that if someone 
does ask you for money you have to provide it. So in those situations, 
it’s actually very difficult to target the people who are big drinkers. 
Because then those big drinkers will go and ask for the money in any 
case. So, we wanted to overall, reduce the cash out of these 
communities (Interview 38, Alan Tudge, 2017). 
The CDC then functions to direct money to specific people or families, restricting and 
prohibiting the movement of resources, especially in cash form, and enforcing individual 
money management. Economic social units are restructured and disciplined to be either 
individuals, or ‘traditional nuclear’ families, rather than maintaining wider kinship ties that 
were prominent amongst some Aboriginal people and communities.222 Couponing and 
                                               
222 Rowse (1998: 84) describes these attempts to shift relations away from kin and tribe as a process of 
‘detribalisation’.  
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controlling money can thus promote capitalist, exchange-based relations over ones based on 
reciprocity or sharing (Rowse 1998: 178-179).  
Some Aboriginal people found this challenging, claiming that it made their usual economic 
activities difficult, such as paying a friend a small amount for staying in their house, or gifting 
cash to someone when they asked. This economic activity is considered important to some 
Aboriginal cultures, where sharing is an important function for reaffirming social relations 
(Peterson and Taylor 2003). Thus the CDC has the effect of disrupting important everyday 
social practices and breaking down these relationships, as the inability to fulfil a demand 
sharing request can have social consequences (Schwab 1995). This can be seen as a further 
example of the ‘spatial homogenisation’, as these ‘remote’, ‘distant’ communities with 
different organising and distribution principles are targeted for homogenisation encouraging 
‘mainstream’ behaviours. That is not to say that these groups accepted it passively; forms of 
‘routine resistance’ were present (Scott 1985). There were frequent reports of innovation and 
collaboration by Aboriginal people to find ways around the card such as the pooling of non-
card money to purchase goods, the sale of cards for cash, or the increased demands on those 
with cash, such as the elderly whose pensions were not quarantined (Orima 2017b).  
Finally, the ‘humbugging’ discourse also took a specifically gendered perspective that was 
portrayed as ‘saving’ local women from male family members demanding goods or cash and 
giving back control of money to women to spend on food, children or savings. In many 
articulations of this card, men are represented as the ones who will waste money and spend it 
on the wrong things - “it’s the blokes who don’t want it” (Interview 31, local state official, 
2017). Echoing development practice around cash transfers and microfinance (Luccisano 
2004), gender norms are reinforced however, by suggesting that women are the ‘responsible’ 
consumers who need to be given control to pursue households’ well-being, whilst keeping 
money away from irresponsible men. The ‘humbugging’ debate essentialities the experience 
of women in these narratives (Bielefeld 2016b: 874). Whilst some women may appreciate the 
new power and control of resources the CDC can offer, others refer to increased family tension, 
conflict over how to spend their cash, or the increased difficulty and inconvenience of 
managing a low household income across multiple accounts.  
In summary, the CDC has consolidated neoliberalisation through the everyday discipline of 
people receiving welfare to be market subjects. It has aimed to eliminate non- or anti-capitalist 
practices, chiefly through stigmatising, controlling and individualising welfare recipients’ 
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money. Although effective in some ways, this has not been straightforward or uniformly 
successful and the policy has been constantly adapted to practical difficulties, active resistance 
and social relationships that have found ways around the controls of the card. The chapter will 
now move to discuss the second aspect of neoliberalisation, accumulation dynamics in the 
CDC.  
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2. Accumulation through the Cashless Debit 
Card  
The CDC also consolidates neoliberalisation by creating accumulation opportunities for 
capital. This second section will look at the way that the restricted cashless aspect of the 
payment system creates new market spaces in everyday life for profitable activity, while also 
building the foundation for possible subsequent financialisation. This also corresponds to the 
idea that welfare is not simply a benevolent social policy, but it has an important role in creating 
opportunities for capital accumulation. By privatising payments and incentivising cashless and 
financial behaviours, everyday life is programmed to create new revenues, whilst this is also 
experienced and resisted by people. These accumulation dimensions sometimes intertwine and 
reinforce with governance dimensions. For example, the individualisation of welfare subjects 
contributes to the generation of formal identities required for financialisation. However, in 
other instances the two dimensions contradict, as will be seen when the control of money 
interferes with flows of financial payments for assets such as mortgages or debt repayment.  
 
2.1 Privatising welfare payments 
In previous iterations of income management, much of the delivery was undertaken by the 
state, through the Department of Human Services, and CentreLink.223 In its latest form 
however, the delivery was outsourced to Indue Payments, commodifying the means of welfare 
payment and creating a new market space through welfare policy. There was a clear motivation 
throughout the policy development to incorporate the commercial sector, influenced by 
Forrest’s224 recommendation that “the Commonwealth Government would partner with the 
responsible financial institutions, major retailers and major card issuers to put the new system 
in place” (Forrest 2014: 106). The contracting of a private partner involved consultation and 
negotiations with different areas of the financial services: 
                                               
223 CentreLink is the payments department of the DHS. Although Indue did also have a ‘back-end’ role in these 
systems (Interview 36, federal state official, 2017).  
224 A federal state official claimed that this recommendation was highly influential in gaining a private firm 
involved in the policy (Interview 35, federal state official, 2017). 
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The design specifically related to the card, was very much from the 
financial services institutions where we had ongoing discussions with 
them, from the big banks to small and nimble players. In terms of what 
technology is available, how would you do, how quickly could you do 
it, what would it cost etc. (Alan Tudge, Interview 38, 2017). 
The interests of the financial sector have been central to the design and conceptualisation of 
the CDC. In practice though, the larger banks declined to take part. The reasons for this were 
disputed: some argued that the larger banks would not want to be associated with such a trial, 
others that the costs for larger banks would be too significant. The Australian Bankers’ 
Association suggested that there were “technological and infrastructure limitations…as well as 
adverse and unintended consequences for welfare recipients exposing them to further financial 
and social marginalisation and disadvantage” (ABA 2015). However, Minister Tudge 
(Interview 38, 2017) suggested that in fact Indue were chosen as the provider as they were 
“more nimble and able to turn things around more quickly”.225 Indue was able to implement a 
new, alternative payment system quickly, using a close relationship with the state to shape the 
operation of payment infrastructures and industry as seen in Chapter One. This is an example 
of a form of privatisation where private firms “are given a seat at the planning table” (Aldred 
2008: 31). Indue also received a significant contract in order to deliver this service, and were 
paid $10,000 (£5,580) per card user (Knaus and Davey 2017).226 The contract has become a 
significant reference point for everyday opposition to the CDC, where the argument is made 
that the CDC constitutes a privatisation of welfare (Interview 19, local community member, 
2017).  
However, there are two interesting avenues of further analysis in the restructuring of welfare 
payments to create new market opportunities, which become clear when looking at everyday 
life: the privatisation of payment ‘rails’ and ‘infrastructures’. Firstly, the process can be seen 
as part of a wider move of Australian neoliberalism to commodify state payment rails.227 
According to the BIS (2011), most government payments are through the Bulk Electronic 
Clearing System (BECS) using the Government Direct Entry Service. Essentially, this keeps 
                                               
225 Notable here is the use of discourse commonly associated with emergent ‘fintech’ around being ‘nimble’ and 
‘disruptive’, challenging the way that established financial firms operate (Laven and Bruggink 2016). 
226 One informant involved in the implementation did suggest that this was comparatively cheaper than the 
previous Basics card scheme, which when only given to those targeted as a ‘risk’ was costing up to $100,000 a 
year (Interview 36, federal state official, 2017).  
227 See Chapter Two, section 3.2 for a discussion on the issue of public and private forms of payment.  
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the payment public until the money reaches recipients’ bank account. By privatising the 
service, the payment is rerouted to a private entity first, before being dispersed.228 The CDC is 
one of a number of different projects by the Australian state to shift the process of payment to 
the private sector for welfare projects and create a market in these services. The Welfare 
Payment Infrastructure Transformation (WPIT) is another example of the restructuring of state 
payments. WPIT is said to be “transforming how we deliver welfare payments” by 
incorporating new digital technologies and incorporating commercial partners (DHS 2017). 
The latest phase of the project involves the transformation of student payments and 
“developing our new welfare payment platform with our commercial partners and other 
government agencies” (DHS 2017). There is a clear trend in towards the increased role for 
payment firms in the payment of Australian welfare.229 The CDC sits at the forefront of this 
move, as an experimental trial not only in social policy, but also in the way that the private and 
public sector can partner to deliver payments.  
The second aspect of the privatisation of welfare payments is the added costs to people 
receiving welfare, and the everyday consequence this has. As argued in Chapter Two, while 
cash is a public form of money that allows free exchange,230 electronic money is a commodified 
form, incurring monetary and privacy costs when used. While the amounts are low, these 
everyday, frequent payments can constitute a significant accumulative opportunity for the firms 
that are able to access them. Profits can therefore be gained from a number of different aspects 
of everyday life when cashless is a required form of payment. By enforcing that 80% of welfare 
money can only be spent in cashless form, the CDC ensures that participants must routinely 
use the card. This is reinforced by the control dynamics discussed in the previous section. 
There, the state needed to spread cashless infrastructure to enable the disciplinary control of 
money. However, this also produces these rural, ‘remote’ spaces for capitalist accumulation. 
This is both through the revenue generating physical infrastructures, such as POS devices, but 
also the linking of previously non-cashless exchange (such as farmers markets) to the payment 
network.  
                                               
228 The privatisation can be seen in the promotion of a private form of bill payment. BPAY is a payment platform 
jointly owned by the four major Australian banks, which is promoted within the CDC app, whilst CentrePay, a 
public platform for bill paying has been side-lined. 
229 One of the most controversial attempts was the proposal that Medicare payments – the reimbursing of health 
expenditure – would be privatised to commercial partners. However this caused such political impact it was 
abandoned by the government as a policy in the run up to the 2016 elections (Duckett 2016). The importance and 
popularity of public healthcare meant it was too controversial to privatise. 
230 Although it is not completely free, for example accruing costs in its storage or movement.  
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Importantly, both Indue and Visa receive small payments each time a transaction is made with 
the CDC through interchange fees.231 As the money on the CDC is guaranteed by the state to 
be routinely paid, fee revenues are therefore state backed. For Visa, although these will be 
small compared to their global business, it benefits their wider strategy. As argued in Chapter 
Two, payment companies aim to increase the prominence and familiarity of users with cashless 
transactions and awareness of their corporate brand, which was also seen in Chapter Five with 
the case of Mastercard’s involvement with the SASSA card.232  
Repetitive, mundane economic activities therefore routinely generate accumulation for 
payment companies, but also have significant effects on everyday life. In a quote reminiscent 
of a SASSA card user from Chapter Five, this community member was experiencing fees from 
their account, but did not know why this was the case: “But lately when I been getting my 
Indue statement, money’s been taken out like $2, $3 for fees to use the card” (Interview 26, 
local community member, 2017). Payment companies are able to siphon small fee revenue 
from the accounts of people receiving welfare payments, especially those who are unfamiliar 
with the process. One source of these fees was for checking account balances. Where 
previously the checking of accounts was free, as long as it was done at a customer’s own bank, 
the Indue card has no such relationship. As a result, those who were unwilling or unable to 
check their bank balance online or using a phone, accrued costs at ATMs. While the CDC may 
have intended people to improve their money management to be better market subjects, 
contradictory accumulation dynamics of cashless made this more difficult. In response to 
opposition in the communities the state was required to print an entire new set of cards that 
allowed people receiving welfare to check their account for free, the policy adapting once again 
to new hurdles: 
And now they’re giving us a new card…that’s just to check your bank 
account. Why would I want to put card into an ATM machine, when 
I’m paying fees without me knowing about it! (Interview 26, local 
community member, 2017).  
Through the CDC system then, there are fees and tolls to be paid, but these are paid by different 
actors. In some instances, as seen above, it would be the person receiving welfare themselves. 
Although the state claimed that no one would be financially worse off as a result of using the 
                                               
231 Indue’s Annual Reports do not breakdown their revenues by income from the CDC or transaction fees, so it is 
hard to establish how much this is worth.  
232 Although being associated with a disciplinary welfare policy is unlikely to be the sort of awareness they intend. 
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card (Interview 22, Alan Suter, 2017), this only applied to additional costs that were specific 
to the Indue card. Transaction costs incurred as a result of using any card would not be covered 
and have to be paid by the person. The cashless card prevents the opportunity of people 
receiving welfare to use cash and avoid these merchant required fees. This was experienced by 
people emotionally, and caused confusion and upset, as they were under the impression that no 
fees should be charged: “That will only come up to $10 under, but you still got to pay that 
$2.50 for using less than $10. I said, ‘this is not an ATM bank card, fees pay automatically!’” 
(Interview 26, community member, 2017). Yet this only applied to bank fees, not merchant 
fees. 
Alternatively, merchants would have to pay the added costs of cashless transactions. In 
response, some merchants chose to have a minimum spend amount, forcing consumers to spend 
more if they want to use a card, which was observed at local shops in the research site (see 
also, Interview 21, community member, 2017). In the development stage of the card, 
policymakers did attempt to persuade merchants to remove their minimum spend amounts, but 
they also uncovered some merchants exploiting confusion about card fees. Opportunities arose 
in everyday life for local organisation to profit from a shift to cashless money that undermined 
the governance aspects of the trial: 
We were working with one of the outlets at the start of the trial, they 
used to charge you $2 to make a transaction under $10, and then they 
tried to tell us that that represented the cost to them, and the Indue 
lady was like ‘bullshit’, because she knows (Interview 34, federal 
state official, 2017).  
In other examples, some merchants were forced to introduce card rates to cover the added 
costs of hiring and maintaining card payment facilities. In this instance, people using the CDC, 
who often have very low incomes, must choose to spend at smaller local stores, where they 
may pay merchant fees, or larger national chains who are able to absorb the merchant costs. 
Of those spoken to, most did their shopping at the larger national supermarket chains, 
demonstrating how the state can shape markets through welfare policy to promote certain 
organisations over others.  
By ensuring that payments must frequently be electronic and used by an authorised merchant, 
other locations were excluded. This once again displays the contradictory impact of the CDC 
on everyday life. While the card aims to improve money management, it also makes the 
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actions of an efficient market subject difficult, as the ability ‘shop around’ and find the best 
prices to make welfare money ‘stretch’, are limited.  This was most notable in forms of local, 
informal markets that were cash-only. One significant site of local exchange was a 
“buy/sell/exchange” Facebook page. Here users could request items they needed or wanted to 
sell to other local community members, allowing a cash based, informal market. This was 
important for purchasing goods at lower rates compared to purchasing new goods from local 
merchants. Some participants in the study reported the importance of these sites for saving 
money:  
We have an online site called buy/exchange/sell and basically, 
everything I own in my house is on that site. Everything that I buy, my 
kids beds… it’s like a garage sale but its online, it’s really reduced 
prices. So even for a car, for example, if I were to buy that car through 
a shop, it would cost me like $4000 dollars, but it was cheap, only about 
$2000 for it. I was lucky because I had funds in my bank, but if I’d been 
on Indue I wouldn’t have been able to do it…it really is saving a lot of 
money (Interview 21, local community member, 2017)  
Similarly, informal markets such as ‘car boot’ sales, local farmers markets or online sites such 
as eBay are made more inaccessible and more inconvenient as these sites are cash only. The 
CDC then programmes everyday life to promote certain forms, and certain sites, of exchange 
over others, by making the access to cash difficult and the transactions at some online sites 
inconvenient. People are therefore forced into the formal market in stores or accepted online 
merchants, where also prices are often higher.  
These accumulation dynamics that stem from privatisation thus programme everyday life. In 
one respect everyday exchanges are layered with accumulation potential. With each use of the 
CDC, small incomes are made such that payment firms profit from the routine consumptions 
of everyday life. In addition, because of the fee structure, people forced to use the CDC must 
choose to spend extra on card fees and visit certain (usually were smaller independent) 
merchants or use the card at larger stores where cashless payments are free. This thus 
programmed everyday lives towards the larger national stores and away from local markets.  
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2.2 Familiarising financial practices 
The final dimension of the consolidation of neoliberalisation relates to financialisation and 
financial practices. Once the CDC infrastructure has been built, extended and enforced, this 
builds a platform in everyday life for financially based accumulation, encouraging and 
enforcing financial market engagement into everyday routines. Previous studies of 
financialisation in the Global North, as discussed in Chapter One, have tended to focus on 
people already within the circuits of finance or comfortable with basic financial practices such 
getting mortgages or savings. Yet, not everyone has these capacities and so the processes of 
the CDC can be seen as foundational for these more active acts of finance. The CDC is then a 
consolidating process for financialisation. Those unfamiliar with the basics of financial 
behaviour – cashless payments, electronic money management, direct debits – are less likely 
to engage or engage productively with the financial sector. As a result, the CDC can be 
understood as preparing and increasing the familiarity of people with financial sector practices, 
especially those with little experience, by programming their everyday lives with routine uses 
of cashless payment technology and practices. This will be shown in four areas: the attempt to 
promote the relationship between finance and welfare recipients, the promotion of new 
financial technologies, the creation of digital identity categories and finally, contestation over 
access to credit. Rather than necessarily a disciplinary approach in this instance, the financial 
aspect acts as a way to create the environment for a more accumulative and entrepreneurial 
individual who, once disconnected from other non-capitalist behaviours and social relations, 
can take advantages of the financial system as an active market subject.  Yet at each step, these 
policies encounter resistance and obstacles that obstruct policy objectives.   
Firstly, the CDC requires people to routinely rehearse mainstream financial practices. This is 
widely recognised by policymakers, as suggested by this quote from a politician: “Initially 
there were a lot of issues because people hadn't used cards before it’s brought a number of 
generations along to where the rest of Australia is” (Interview 33, federal politician, 2017).233 
The CDC inculcates everyday habits and practices of cashless transactions, increasing 
familiarity with card-based exchange, and homogenising the abilities of people to access 
finance. Also noteworthy is once again the spatial phrasing of the ‘rest of Australia’, suggesting 
that all people must be able to use cards and finance, difference should not be allowed. The 
                                               
233 Literature on financial literacy also often talk about increasing the financial ‘familiarity’ of students to these 
practices (Jindal 2015: 145; Marron 2013: 799).  
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abilities that everyone should be comfortable with might be storing and keeping hold of a card, 
remembering a PIN, or managing money in a non-physical form. As part of this process to 
create more engaged and active financial subjects, the state sought to train and educate people 
on making these payments and other financial activities:  
The other thing is there is a lot of transactions that they pay for with 
cash, that they are going to need to pay with card. And maybe some 
training and help to set up direct debits and stuff like that. Teach them 
how to do transfers and that (Interview 27, local state official, 2017).  
By doing this the card begins to normalise electronic payments with groups who were 
previously separate, either willingly or unwillingly, through repetition and routine use. Yet this 
did does not always work. One clear of example of this is the frequency with which cards were 
lost and needed to be replaced (Interview 30, state official, 2017). The importance and 
attachment to money in the form of a card had not yet been inculcated.  
The implementation required not only the adaption of people to financial practices, but also for 
financial firms to adapt to the everyday life of the communities. This involved the interaction 
of the staff of payment companies and people receiving welfares, seeking to entrench these 
infrastructures and practices into local communities.  
You then needed to get Indue over here to spend time, on the ground, 
talking about how to activate cards, how to get replacement cards. They 
had people over here for weeks and they door knocked every door. They 
spent days and days in the community helping people with this stuff, 
helping their office people. They set up a local partner in each 
community to be local partner (Interview 27, local state official, 2017). 
However, this was not an interaction that was smooth, and encountered the ill-feeling parts of 
the community had towards the policy, leading contestation with the representatives “Basically 
everybody on the trial was door knocked, before the trial to give them information. I can tell 
you for example some people said, ‘fuck off’ and slammed the door” (Interview 27, local state 
official, 2017).  
The second aspect of ‘financial familiarisation’ is the way that the card functioned to enforce 
and normalise modern financial technologies. One important aspect of this was the Indue ‘app’. 
The app allowed users to view their accounts online, make transfers to other card users and pay 
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bills using the BPAY platform. The initial hope, according to state officials was that users 
would use this and the online site as the main source of information and money management 
(Interview 35, 2017). Mobile money and banking is sometimes considered to be an ‘on-ramp’ 
for more formal financial services and products, “facilitating shifts toward financialised 
behaviour” (Yenkey et al. 2015: 1; Maurer 2017). Correspondingly, Gondiha and Singh (2013) 
propose ways that mobile banking could contribute to Aboriginal financial inclusion. However, 
others have been more critical, pointing out the importance of digital technologies to the 
extension of finance into everyday life (Schwittay 2011; 2014). In the CDC, digital inclusion 
was a tool to support users to manage their new cards, but also underpinning this, familiarising 
users with these technologies. Technology again becomes the means of programming, as the 
app is designed to be more convenient and inexpensive way of managing money. With the aim 
being to encourage everyday use of  financial money, especially in the context of rural locations 
with closing physical branches (PJCCFS 2004: ch:2).  
However, the realities of everyday life posed a number of issues for this area. The functioning 
of the app depended on users having, or having access to, a smart phone, which was not the 
case for some. According to an Aboriginal community member, “they say if you want money, 
you need to use a computer. These people coming in from the bush they haven’t ever used a 
computer in their life, or a phone!” (Interview 29, 2017). While the assumption from 
policymakers was that this would be an efficient means for the policy to allow money 
management, this neglected the reality that mobile internet and smartphone capacity is low 
amongst certain groups.234 Specifically, low income households, the disabled, Aboriginal 
people and those in rural areas have some of the lowest digital inclusion in Australia, and these 
groups who are also especially targeted by the CDC (Thomas et al. 2017: 16).235  
The third aspect of this familiarisation was the attempt to formalise users’ identities and build 
them a digital profile. This extends further than the state identities seen in the SASSA example 
to include key categories such as email addresses and phone numbers, enabling access to more 
financial opportunities or credit scoring. To log on to the app, the user was required to have 
both an email address and password as well as their account number. These identifiers are 
central to the operation of individualised financial activity and the building of a digital profile. 
                                               
234 Smartphone coverage was said to be 84% in 2016, which still constitutes 3,840,000 people without 
smartphones capable of accessing the Indue app (Deloitte 2016). However, remote Aboriginal people are the most 
digitally excluded group in Australia (Godinho and Singh 2013: 1) 
235 Digital inclusion is said to be able to affordably access the internet, and owns a mobile phone (Thomas et al. 
2017) 
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These processes are complementary and reinforcing with the efforts to individualise welfare 
subjects in the previous section. For some this may have been the first time they would have 
had these identifiers, and this also proved challenging. It required the active construction of 
numerous email addresses for people so that they could log onto the sites. However, many did 
not have one. Local or federal agencies therefore needed to create accounts, even to the point 
where “we created so many email accounts that Gmail blocked our access and stopped us 
making anymore” (Interview 35, federal state officials, 2017). The whole process was 
challenging for users, as articulated by this interviewee:  
They made me about three or four emails but I don’t know one of them. 
But then they help us to ring Indue to ask for our email address, but then 
I got my email address and then I forgot my password! How am I going 
to remember my password? (Interview 26, community member, 2017).  
The move towards digital and electronic money management is a prime example of Scott’s 
(1998) analysis of the failure of state projects as discussed in Chapter One. Despite attempts at 
legibility in the creation of digital identities, and manipulation via the shift towards digital 
banking, a misreading of society by state policymakers led to issues with the implementation.  
The final type of familiarisation with financial practices was in the form of credit, and is 
indicative of the enmeshing of finance with everyday life as a consequence of the CWP, as also 
seen in the South African example. As the trial progressed there were media reports that payday 
loan companies were targeting CDC users (Cetta 2017). This makes logical sense as those with 
little access to fungible money would be tempted by the offer of a cash loan to spend how they 
want. Simultaneously, there was said to be an increase in marketing by credit firms, and stories 
of the indebtedness of people receiving welfare (Interview 33, federal politician, 2017). This 
is suggestive of one of the features of welfare financialisation discussed in Chapter One. As a 
result of changes in welfare provision, people are pushed towards the financial sector and in 
this case the CDC has increased the dependence on, or need for, finance-based cash. This causal 
relationship was, however, hard to verify or corroborate, and one interviewee suggested people 
had been heavily indebted prior to the CDC (Interview 30, local state official, 2017). 
Conversely, the state was also seeking to promote forms of indebtedness to the communities, 
through ‘No Income Loan Schemes’. These allowed people to take out a loan for “essential 
goods and services”, but could not be accessed as cash (Good Shepherd 2017). Whilst this 
could be read as a positive, allowing people to get the things they need without being exploited 
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due to high interest rate. It is once again rehearsing and familiarising people with debt relations 
and repayment, promoting a more entrepreneurial financial subject whilst maintaining 
paternalistic disciplinary control by restricting cash access.  
However, it is also important to recognise the “meaningful limits to [financialisation’s] depth 
and scope” (Christophers 2015: 194). In such a restrictive scheme as the CDC, there are cases 
where the controls placed on welfare money opposed financial practices and payments. This 
involved challenges in paying mortgages, credit accounts or routine payments for services such 
as insurance. Early in the trial, restrictions on where money could be transferred to extended 
to paying for financial obligations, running the risk of increased costs or default, although this 
was subsequently address by the state (Interview 19, community member, 2017). In other 
instances, the shifting of money to the Indue account meant that people’s other own accounts 
had less money in. As a result of the lower amount in the commercial account, they began to 
generate fees for users as their total tipped below a threshold (Interview 39, community 
member, 2017). The internal governance and accumulation dynamics of neoliberalisation can 
complement but can also contradict. 
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3. Conclusion  
It has been argued in this chapter the CDC consolidates neoliberalisation by restructuring 
everyday life in two dimensions. On one hand it provides disciplinary governance, in an effort 
to create market subject and affecting people’s experience of welfare receipt. On the other hand 
it creates new market spaces and practices to promote accumulation. Both these dimensions 
have sort to programme the routines of everyday life towards different ends and have more 
often than not worked in a complementary fashion reinforcing and supporting each other. 
Given the centrality of payments to everyday life, due to their routine and repetitive nature, the 
CDC provides the state with significant power to intervene and programme.  
Broadly, the CDC has enabled the state to programme everyday life both technologically, and 
sociologically. Technologically, the CDC allows the state to monitor and control spending 
behaviour in the attempt to produce market subjectivities. In doing so, it also extends 
accumulation opportunities by developing under-developed state spaces, predominantly 
through the commodification of payments in the form of fee revenues. Sociologically, the CDC 
has a significant social power to remake social relations and meanings. It has affected how 
welfare money is understood and has aimed to develop capitalist social relations while breaking 
down anti-capitalist ones. However, it has been shown that each attempt to shape everyday life 
encountered opposition and resistance. This has varied from practical implementation 
obstacles, locally organised protest and small forms of ‘routine resistance’ that undermine the 
policy (Scott 1985: 255). This has led to a constant process of adaptation by the state, 
reasserting and enforcing where possible and compromising and withdrawing at other times.  
One standout point, and one that offers an important addition to the literature on 
neoliberalisation, is the relevance of race. Explaining the emergence of the CDC can only be 
done with an understanding of the racial politics of Australia and the social relationships within 
Aboriginal communities. Whilst the state sought to suggest that the policy was not racist, 
because it applied to everyone receiving welfare, it is clearly raced. There is a colonial history 
of controlling Aboriginal people’s money, and many of the effects of the policy target 
Aboriginal cultural practices of sharing and money management. The chapter further 
demonstrates the importance of understanding raced social relations to understand the 
contingent forms of neoliberalisation. More deeply it draws out how race relations are not a 
simple binary but intersect with social relations of class and gender.  
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Given the contested and unpredictable nature of the implementation of the CDC, it is not clear 
where the policy goes next. It is subject to constant scrutiny and growing organised opposition. 
Despite this the plans to introduce the card to a fourth site in 2018 are still going ahead. 
However, one interesting statement was made about the possibilities of the CDC technology, 
which may become relevant beyond Australia in the future. Whilst so far, the policy has 
focused on controlling gambling and the purchase of alcohol or drugs, the policy does not 
necessarily end there. The technology opens the possibility to restrict specific purchases, such 
as unhealthy or sugary foods, once product level blocking is possible. This is seen as the 
“Nirvana of the CDC” (Interview 34, DSS State official, 2017).
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Conclusion  
The thesis began by posing the question: how can the emergence of cashless welfare be 
explained and how has this affected everyday life? In response, it has been argued that cashless 
welfare payments create a space in everyday life in which social relations and social behaviours 
can be restructured. They have been considered as a process and consolidation of 
neoliberalisation that was defined as a variegated process of market-orientated restructuring. 
The precise form of CWP however are contingent on the social and policy contexts in which 
they are embedded, the contradictory nature of neoliberalisation, and crucially, the effects on 
everyday life and its responses to this. In South Africa it has taken an inclusive form that has 
facilitated state-society relations and financial accumulation. While in Australia it has taken a 
disciplinary form that has sought to control consumption and encourage capitalist social 
relations. 
This argument has been made in three parts. Firstly, an understanding of welfare was 
developed. It was argued that welfare settlements are intrinsic to stable capitalist societies and 
are characterised by the contingent dynamics of governance and accumulation, which apply in 
different, uneven ways. Whilst analysis of welfare restructuring using these two dynamics of 
neoliberalisation is valuable, it was argued that a shift to the everyday was also required. Using 
Henri Lefebvre’s conceptualisation of ‘Everyday Life’ and its relation to capitalist 
accumulation and social relations, a framework was developed to understand CWP. The 
concept of ‘programming’ was used and developed to understand the shaping and changing of 
routines and rhythms of everyday life. Secondly, an appreciation of the international context 
was necessary. The discourses supporting and promoting CWP and the variety of ‘actually 
existing’ international examples were described and critiqued. The discourses were found to 
reflect key neoliberal ideas about welfare, money and cashless with a focus on the ability of 
states to control payments and facilitate financial inclusion. The selection of international 
examples show clear variation but were heuristically categorised into two groups, an 
‘Inclusive’ and a ‘Disciplinary’ form, each responding to different aspects of neoliberalisation.  
The final part of the argument closely interrogated an example of both an Inclusive and 
Disciplinary CWP. This provided an understanding of the everyday as well as the context 
specific reasons for the introduction of CWP. In the first instance, the South African SASSA 
card was argued to be a form of neoliberalisation, restructuring everyday lives to enable 
neoliberal governance and accumulation strategies that promote market subjectivities and 
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create new market spaces. In the second example in Australia, the Cashless Debit Card was 
also a case of neoliberalisation, restructuring everyday lives. However, the details and effects 
were different. Whilst in South Africa a CWP was introduced to enable inclusive governance 
and financial forms of accumulation, in Australia it tended towards more disciplinary 
governance, and accumulation through privatisation. The specific details and features of each 
policy responded to the context and setting. For example, the history of biometric surveillance 
in South Africa is replicated in the SASSA card, while the history of social control and 
paternalism in Australia is seen in the CDC.  
The effect on the everyday was also variegated. In South Africa, the actual rhythms and 
routines were not dramatically changed, but instead new forms of governance were enabled, 
allowing the state surveillance and verification of people’s existence each month. The SASSA 
card also layered the routine and repetitive aspects of grant payment and receipt with financial 
accumulation opportunities, both in interchange fees and financial services. This example 
clearly demonstrated the contradictions within neoliberalisation, as the state and financial 
partner contested the appropriate use and targeting of grant money. Net1, the financial partner, 
considered grant recipients and their money to be viable and legitimate customers for financial 
services. The state did not, considering grant recipients to be vulnerable and grant money to be 
for essentials, not financial services. In Australia, the everyday was programmed much more 
clearly, while finance was less prominent. The CDC facilitated closer control over social 
behaviours and relations, programming where and how money is used. As a result, the CDC 
invokes a closer involvement in everyday life by the state but has also created much stronger 
and widespread forms of resistance. 
1. Findings 
This section will return to the research questions and provide the thesis answers and findings. 
The thesis had one overall research question and three sub questions.  
• How can the emergence of cashless welfare be explained, and how has this affected 
everyday life? 
1. How, and where, have cashless welfare payments emerged internationally as a new 
form of welfare delivery? 
2. Why were the policies introduced in South Africa and Australia? 
3. How has the cashless form of delivery affected everyday life, and how has everyday life 
affected cashless?  
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Firstly, cashless welfare has emerged as a result of a selection of factors. In the contemporary 
global political economy, the neoliberal settlement is dominant, and policies respond to the 
underpinning governance and accumulation strategies. CWP allow states to use new 
technologies to pursue these objectives. Discourses on CWP promote their policy possibilities, 
and these discourses permeate almost all the international forms of cashless payments. Cashless 
is claimed to offer control, surveillance, security, efficiency and financial inclusion. However, 
the specific forms of CWP are a ‘mutation’ of these broader, transnational ideas with the 
features contingent on social and policy contexts. Thus, the shift to cashless within specific 
cases must be appreciative of these contexts, the social ‘issues’ they address, historical legacies, 
domestic discourses and other unique influential factors. The thesis has shown two examples 
of this in South Africa and Australia.  
In South Africa, the SASSA card was introduced for a number of reasons. Publicly, it was 
justified by the need to ensure the dignity of people receiving grants, provide financial 
inclusion and prevent fraudulent payments. However, while these may have been relevant, the 
thesis instead argues that the SASSA card is a consolidation of neoliberalisation, which is 
influenced by the domestic context of post-apartheid neoliberal political economy and history 
of biometric data collection. The SASSA card facilitated the extension of surveillance and 
development of financial infrastructure, especially into rural areas, allowing a database of 
information. Crucially this also built and developed relations between state and citizens 
receiving grants. As well as these forms of governance, the SASSA card was also introduced 
to enable financial accumulation, which occurred through a variety of rent seeking activities 
by the financial partner providing the payment service.  
In Australia the CDC was publicly claimed to be tackling social harm while being justified by 
community demand and involvement, and legitimised by a claim on the rights of the state over 
welfare money. However, this was also seen as a consolidation of neoliberalisation, influenced 
by the domestic political economy and welfare practices. The CDC was introduced to discipline 
welfare recipients through stigmatising the experience of welfare receipt and spending, while 
controlling and individualising economic life. The card also supported accumulation, 
commodifying welfare payments while familiarising and rehearsing financial money 
management.  
The third sub-question addressed the relationship with everyday life. Given the centrality of 
payments to everyday life, it will be affected by any change in the mode of transfer. This is 
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borne out in the research. Conceptualised using Lefebvre’s concept of programming, CWP 
have the capacity to control, shape and monitor everyday lives, as well as disrupt non-market 
social relations and encourage capitalist ones. The way this occurs can, again, only be 
understood in specific analysis. However, the relationship is not only one directional. The 
activities within everyday life can also shape CWP. The forms of minor and major resistance, 
practical difficulties and political compromises mean that the forms of payment are constantly 
changing and adapting in response to everyday life.  
In the introduction it was argued that CWP are an imperative area of study because of the 
importance of welfare payments to a vulnerable portion of society. The mode of payment and 
the conditions attached to it have the capacity to affect, positively or negatively, these people’s 
lives. The findings bear this out; in both cases the effect on people’s lives has been dramatic. 
This is most notable in South Africa, where the rapid extension of financial services and the 
mystery of ‘deductions’ has further impoverished a substantial portion of society. As the mode 
of payment opened this market for lending and direct debits, people became vulnerable to a 
vast selection of financial products. Not only was there insufficient education of the new card 
users, but also structurally they were vulnerable to such products given the scale of deprivation. 
In Australia lives have also been affected, although the amount of people is smaller. The CDC 
programmed everyday lives and affected social relations, for instance by changing the 
experience of transactions, increasing certain costs or interfering with money management 
strategies.  
These findings therefore suggest some considerations for future research and policy on CWP. 
In policy terms it is important  not to overlook the centrality of mode of payment to people’s 
lives. A shift to CWP is not a necessarily a regressive move, and the convenience it offers may 
be highly beneficial to some people. In South Africa it was seen that some people were very 
grateful for the new system as it made their lives easier and safer. However, CWP have been 
shown to also have  negative consequences that should be recognised. The mode of transfer is 
not a purely technical choice, and different modalities have different meanings and 
consequences. Being able to identify a person as receiving some sort of state payment 
associates them with intersubjective meanings of welfare. For example, if payments are 
stigmatised, as in Australia, a CWP can serve to intensify this. Whilst some policymakers were 
seen not to consider stigma, it was a prominent theme for people receiving welfare. Another 
important policy consideration is the relationship between state, recipient and any private 
payment partner. The private payment provider can be given significant market power and 
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privilege. If the terms of this relationship are not appropriately regulated and understood, there 
is the possibility for the exploitation of the position, as seen in South Africa. Beyond policy 
advice, the research also makes an important contribution to academic literature that was 
discussed in the Introduction and Chapters One and Two. 
 
2. The importance of an everyday approach 
Broadly, the thesis has demonstrated the value of an everyday approach to questions and 
phenomena in IPE. Firstly, the inclusion of an everyday perspective in studies of both welfare 
and financialisation provides insight on the lived experience of the people involved. Studies 
that operate above the level of the everyday, Regulatory IPE in Seabrooke and Hobson’s (2007) 
terms, focus on policies or regulatory changes. While these are valuable, this study has 
contributed to these approaches by adding the experiences, perspectives, emotions and 
thoughts on neoliberal regulatory restructuring. Adding this sociological angle deepens the 
critique made by IPE theories. It has shown in detail the effects of restructuring efforts and the 
disruption and harm caused by processes of everyday financialisation.  
Secondly, it has also demonstrated the contingency and dynamism of policies. Rather than 
conceiving of restructuring attempts as a simple imposition onto a passive population, this 
thesis has contributed and supported studies that emphasise the messy, uneven implementation 
of policies, and the compromise and adaptation that occurs upon interaction with the everyday 
(Peck and Tickell 2002; Scott 1998; Seabrooke and Hobson 2007; Elias and Rethal 2016). 
States are shown not to be omniscient, unitary and perfectly rational actors, problematising a 
reified, unified and simplistic depiction. Instead, policies are made by specific departments 
with different interests, responding to certain policy needs, making errors and attempting to 
adapt to everyday resistance and practical obstacles. For instance, the admission that SASSA 
got their policies wrong in the regulation of Net1, or the ways that the CDC has required 
constant adaptations and changes from the initial policy position. Finally, the study has 
provided an example of the application of Lefebvre’s conceptualisation of Everyday Life to 
contemporary restructuring projects. This makes an important contribution to the emerging 
study of everyday IPE. It offered an understanding of the everyday as routine, repetitive and 
rhythmical while also concentrating on how these are programmed to support the 
(re)production of capitalist accumulation and social relations. The everyday approach of the 
research also means that a specific contribution can be made to the fields of welfare 
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restructuring and financialisation, both of which can be extended empirically and analytically 
by the findings of this thesis.  
 
2.1 Welfare restructuring and neoliberalisation 
The first contribution this study makes is an empirical one. The thesis has shown that the mode 
of transfer is an important site of welfare politics and provided two cases to support this claim. 
Whilst welfare literature has focused much more extensively on welfare payments, the focus 
has rarely extended to the mode of payment. Yet a to neglect this is to overlook a critical aspect 
of welfare. Along with the value and conditions of a payment, the mode is also a feature 
relevant to people’s lives. This thesis has presented a defence of this argument. In Australia, 
the mode of payment has enabled a significant extension of state power over people’s lives and 
is part of a wider paternalism and stigma associated with welfare receipt (Mestan 2014), a 
crucial aspect of this is the new modes of payment that are the forefront of these processes 
(Dee 2013). Given the possibilities of different forms of transfer, especially as money becomes 
increasingly cashless in areas such as digital mobile money, this will be an important new focus 
area for research.  
Secondly, the thesis also makes an empirical contribution to welfare literature in the cases that 
were chosen. The majority of welfare literature concentrates on specific national sites, usually 
richer, OECD countries that are most prominently associated with Esping-Anderson’s (1990) 
Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. A perhaps inappropriate title given the amount of 
countries absent from these ‘worlds’. As a result, analysis has disproportionately focused on 
these sites at the neglect of others. This thesis then extends the analysis of welfare restructuring 
by focusing on a state that is less frequently discussed, in the form of South Africa. This is not 
to argue that there have not been studies of South Africa and its political economy as it relates 
to ‘social protection’ (Seekings and Nattrass 2005; Marais 2011; Carmody 2002). Instead, this 
thesis analyses South African policies as form of welfare using the same concepts and 
frameworks developed to understand welfare policies in richer countries. It has shown that 
these are relevant and can be applied productively to different cases, whilst also enriching the 
body of scholarship with new empirical evidence. For example, by demonstrating that welfare 
policy can in fact be a tool of inclusion, rather than necessarily one of exclusion and discipline, 
complementing theoretical work on neoliberalisation.  
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Further, by comparing South Africa to Australia – a more familiar, ‘liberal’ welfare regime in 
Esping-Anderson’s typology (see also, Arts and Gelissen 2002: 146) – the thesis sought to 
overcome the divide between different groups of states that are not analysed together. This 
thesis has shown that the divide that has permeated welfare literature is unhelpful and 
counterproductive. As welfare and social protection systems develop in states where they were 
previously limited or absent, it becomes more feasible and productive to consider them 
together. Doing so will also contribute to undermining and overcoming the unhelpful binary of 
developing/developed states that suggest that there is a fundamental difference between the 
two groups. The thesis has in fact demonstrated important patterns and similarities between 
policies in both, especially in the experiences of restructuring. Discovering and revealing 
policy similarities wherever they occur is a beneficial future route for welfare analysis.  
The research has also extended, nuanced and complicated some of the analytical categories in 
neoliberal welfare restructuring. In most instances the research has supported the concepts, 
finding them helpful in understanding the cases, whilst providing further evidence for their 
relevance, and new ways to develop them. One example of this is privatisation. The thesis has 
demonstrated further diverse examples of the variegated, but patterned process of 
neoliberalisation. Not only were new spaces of market activity created, but also the outcomes 
and policies were characterised by unevenness and variations. Both cases of CWP involved a 
financial partner to deliver or implement the policy, as with a number of other types of welfare 
policy that have been privatised. Notable here however is a newer area of privatisation – the 
privatisation of the mode of welfare payment. By rerouting payments via a private firm and 
commodifying the act of payment, new spaces of market activity are enabled, while new 
spatialities of the market are also created by spreading cashless infrastructures into new, 
generally rural, locations. The findings support the argument made by Maurer (2012a; 2015) 
that the payments space is experiencing a form of ‘enclosure’ as transfers are made through 
private ‘rails’ rather than public forms of exchange (see also, Dwyer 2015: 233). The 
privatisation seen in CWP provides a further example of the enclosure of public payment. The 
thesis also demonstrated how this instance of privatisation has a specifically everyday aspect. 
In privatising the payment of welfare money, recipients must now interact with the payment 
infrastructure routinely and repetitively.  
This was also an uneven process across the two sites, as market-orientated restructuring 
collided with local contexts. In support of Peck and Theodore (2007: 223), the realities of 
restructuring were found to be messy and complex, resulting in different policies and 
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regulation, impacting on accountability, responsibility or profitability in the delivery of public 
services. In South Africa the private provider took on a significant portion of the policy. CPS 
was responsible for the payment, pay-points, and resolution of issues, whilst also being able to 
gain revenues from transaction fees and the monopoly position of selling financial services by 
the parent company. Given its size and power, it was able to challenge and ignore the requests 
from the state to alter its activity. However, CPS was not directly involved in the design of the 
project, instead winning a public contract. By contrast, in Australia the state was dominant, 
able to direct and control the private partner. Yet the relationship between public and private 
was much closer. Indue and the financial services industry were intimately involved in the 
design of the policy, to the point where Indue visited the sites with policymakers and 
participated in design workshops. This supports the claim of a new trend in privatisation, where 
the private sector actors are “given a seat at the planning table” (Aldred 2008: 31). Crucially, 
the findings further challenge the notion of a ‘withdrawal’ of the state under privatisation. The 
state remains fundamentally involved throughout in both examples of privatisation, supporting 
the notion of a ‘restructuring’, rather than ‘retrenchment’ and the enmeshing of state and market 
in the reproduction of capitalist accumulation and social relations as argued in Chapter One 
(Peck 2004: 394; Polanyi 2001). 
A second example is the new forms of surveillance and control that CWP enables. The thesis 
has provided an example of how neoliberalisation is consolidated in everyday life by promoting 
and ensuring neoliberal market behaviours. It has also shown how surveillance occurs through 
the market, in monitoring spending and consumption behaviours. Everyday life then was 
programmed to enable surveillance by directing people to routinely engage with the market. In 
the literature on welfare surveillance, the process is sometimes referred to in the abstract, in a 
simple form of ‘increasing surveillance’. What this thesis has done is, firstly, grounded 
surveillance as a capitalist process that promotes and enforces accumulation and capitalist 
social relations, while seeking to prohibit (or ‘eliminate’ in Lefebvre’s terms) alternative, non-
capitalist ones. Secondly, it has also empirically verified and provided a concrete example of 
how surveillance is introduced into society onto ‘deviant’ or risky populations, and how this 
can then be extended into social control, as suggested by the Foucauldian literature (Fopp 
2002). 
Once again, as neoliberalisation is a variegated process, so have been the examples of 
surveillance. This can be limited to how much money is being withdrawn and when, providing 
(limited) biometric ‘proof of life’ as in South Africa, or as in Australia where cash is restricted 
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and therefore much more spending data is created. These policies provided oversight and 
insight into the everyday life of people receiving welfare payment. Some literature considers 
surveillance problematic, especially when occurring as a result of welfare receipt and where 
opting out is not possible (Cobbett 2015). In South Africa however, it was notable that 
surveillance, and biometric surveillance, was rarely a problem for the people interviewed. In 
fact, the cashless biometric system was sometimes considered a positive, safer and convenient 
step. This complicates the understanding and critique of surveillance. It may be the that case 
people are willing to trade off some loss of privacy for the convenience and security cashless 
and biometric money offers. It suggests that a simplistic understanding of surveillance may be 
inadequate to understand the different concerns of the very poor.  
While surveillance may not raise concerns, its corollary, social control is likely to be much 
more contested, and is also seen in both cases in complementary ways. The use, or creation, of 
cashless infrastructure was shown here to act as a ‘relay station’ to extend state influence and 
control into rural or ‘remote’ spaces. The surveillance enabled by the SASSA card allowed the 
state to identify fraudulent withdrawals and gave them the power to restrict and cancel those 
payments, while interviews also suggested a desire to move towards the more direct forms of 
control seen in Australia. The Australian CDC demonstrates an archetype of contemporary 
invasive neoliberal welfare that seeks to remake and shape forms of ‘deviant’ behaviour to 
promote market subjects. A CWP can enable direct control over economic spending on the 
assumption that subjects are unable to reliably make the decisions themselves. The CDC is a 
new example of the ‘couponing’ of money to control people (Douglas 1967), which from the 
governmentality literature could be seen as a new ‘technology of control’ (Rose 2000; Mitchell 
2006: 400). The thesis also demonstrates a further example of the diversity of monies in modern 
society, a form that restricts the freedom of those to whom it is given.   
One area where the thesis challenges the welfare restructuring literature is in the area of labour 
commodification. As discussed in Chapter One, a substantial portion of neoliberal welfare 
literature has looked at ‘workfare’ and the encouraging or coercing of welfare recipients into 
work (for instance, Peck 2001b; Dingeldy 2007; MacDonald and Marston 2005). This has been 
the entry point for many studies of welfare payments. This thesis questions this perspective, 
suggesting that labour commodification and workfare are not always the most appropriate 
focus in welfare restructuring. In both examples, propelling the unemployed into work was not 
the central impetus of the payment, even in cases related to unemployment. Instead, the shifts 
in payments responded to different issues. In South Africa it was predominantly about 
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inclusion, within both the state apparatus and financial circuits of capital, rather than the labour 
market, and was pursued via parental payments, disability payments or pensions rather than 
unemployment payments. In Australia the focus was on changing behaviours, rather than 
enforcing labour market participation.236 As one Australian federal political said, with regard 
to unemployed people with addiction: “It’s a big jump to go from being an alcoholic to go into 
full time employment…if you get someone managing their life right, then there might be a 
chance to get people back into work” (Interview 35, 2017).  
This presents a new perspective on contemporary welfare, which may be moving away from a 
central focus on workfare. This is especially likely in economies with high unemployment. In 
South Africa, unemployment remains remarkably high, at 27%. Clearly in this context there 
are more systemic issues that prevent employment for a quarter of the population. As a result, 
the grant system seeks to avoid severe poverty, rather than coercing people into the 
dysfunctional labour market. Possibly in this example, the grant system supports the labour 
market by maintaining a large surplus outside it, through sharing and dilution, as high 
unemployment becomes the ‘norm’ (Ferguson 2007: 82). Alternatively, in Australia, where 
unemployment is relatively low at 5.1% in 2018 (ABS 2018), welfare policies, especially in 
rural or deprived areas where there are limited employment opportunities, may be moving 
towards simply dealing with social effects rather than addressing structural issues.  
 
2.2 Financialisation  
The second significant contribution the thesis makes is to the field of financialisation, where 
again an empirical and analytical contribution is made. Empirically, the thesis contributes and 
complements the emerging body of literature that focuses on everyday financialisation and 
cashless payments. One significant way it has done this is through the use of primary fieldwork 
and data gathering that empirically verifies and confirms the relevance of financialisation in a 
new space. Further, the primary fieldwork and use of interviews and observation provides 
valuable fine-grained data. Some studies of everyday financialisation engage and study the 
subjects of these processes directly (for example, Mader 2015: Pellandini-Simányi et al. 2015). 
However, this is not always the case and the abstraction can mean that the complexity and 
experience is lost. This research grounds its theoretical arguments and critique in the everyday 
                                               
236 They do, admittedly have a number of other policies to do this. The ‘work for the dole’ is the most prominent 
example and was mentioned by some interview participants (Shaver 2001).  
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practices of financialisation and money, of the firms involved, state officials and those people 
targeted.  
The research has also shown how the use of cashless payments inevitably leads to some 
involvement of financial capital. In a similar fashion to how Maurer (2012b: 597) suggested 
mobile money can be an ‘on-ramp’ to mainstream finance, cashless payments offer a new 
example of how those outside of the financial sphere are incorporated into a relation with it, 
through cashless payments. As well as examples of microfinance or payday lending (Aitken 
2015), CWP are a strategy of everyday financialisation to include people into mainstream 
finance with the support of the state, as well as connecting them to global financial circuits. 
CWP could then be seen as a new form of ‘adverse incorporation’, a coercive strategy to 
enforce long term, exploitative and stable participation in financial behaviours and markets 
(Aitken 2015: 162). What is especially noteworthy is that CWP target a specific group for 
financialisation, namely the very poor, with the aim of including them into functioning national 
financial systems and targeting them with a variety of different strategies. Beyond simply debt 
relations, financial services were sold for mobile airtime, electricity or insurance. All of these 
created routine, repetitive revenue streams and financial relations. While this research was 
unable to investigate the differing politics and issues with each, this has promising potential 
for a future research agenda. One noteworthy example was the commodification and 
formalisation of cultural burial practices of black African people manifesting in funeral 
insurance or indebtedness (Lee 2011; Case et al. 2008).  
The thesis was also at pains to point out that the inclusion of people into financial relations was 
not straightforward. In South Africa, ten million people were financialised with little adaptation 
to their specific circumstances, while in Australia groups unused to cashless money 
transactions were required to routinely handle money on a card. For those with minimal 
experience of financial behaviour, engagement and participation in the everyday practices was 
challenging or limited. This offered an example of the inclusionary and disciplinary aspects of 
neoliberalisation that seek to create financial market subjects who have both the institutional 
environment and individual capacity to engage in the financial market. Previous studies of 
everyday finance have looked at the creation of subjectivities and mindsets of people towards 
financial behaviours such as ‘investor’ or ‘saver’ subjects who use the financial system through 
mortgages or investments (Finlayson 2008: 414; Langley 2007). Yet to achieve this there are 
some fundamental practices they must be familiar with. Therefore, CWP are also an example 
of more foundational financialisation, but one that is here considered to be a distinctively 
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capitalist process to eventually enable accumulation. CWP function to programme everyday 
life with routines of basic financial activities. In doing so they familiarise marginalised and 
previously excluded people with these practices, such as storing money on a card, using a PIN 
for purchases or online and mobile banking. This complements the literature on financial 
literacy that has so far predominantly focused on teaching an understanding of the financial 
system in order to engage and invest with it more productively, whilst shifting the 
responsibility for failure onto the individual (Clarke 2015; Langley 2007: 68). CWP, as a form 
of ‘financial familiarisation’, is precursor to this process.   
However, in other ways the research has demonstrated a coercive example of neoliberalisation 
that draws attention to the power of capital. Rather than seeking to remake subjects and 
behaviours to support financialisation, in South Africa a financial firm was able to leverage its 
power in a new market space to directly remove money from people’s accounts. This required 
no changes or associated behaviours – there was no coercion or requirement  to make the 
payments – but was done electronically and immediately at the beginning of each month. 
Finance was able to exploit the powerful social relation given to it by neoliberal privatisation 
to seek rents by directly targeting everyday household incomes rather than disciplining or 
remaking behaviours (Lapavitas 2013: Soederberg 2014: 70-71).  
The empirical research has also complicated and deepened the study of everyday finance by 
grounding its processes in specific events and social meanings. The study of financialisation 
encounters the critique that it is overly broad and under-defined leading to an understanding of 
an all-encompassing irresistible phenomenon. As Christophers (2015: 194) asks, “Is 
financialization, of the land or anything else, really inexorable; or are there meaningful limits 
to its potential depth and scope”? As both Aitken (2015: pt2) and de Goede (2005) have shown, 
finance has always been a site of contestation between legitimate and illegitimate practices. 
The CWP examples support these claims. The research has demonstrated a number of examples 
of the ongoing contestation, contradiction and complexity of processes of financialisation.  
In both cases the form of financialisation is remarkably messy and contested. In South Africa, 
it was found that whilst there was a rhetorical desire to promote financial inclusion, as the 
policy proceeded it was clear that financial inclusion meant different things to different actors, 
reflecting the contradictory nature of neoliberalisation. Whilst SASSA wanted to financialise 
grant recipients to be able to access electronic payments and money storage, Net1 saw this as 
an opportunity to extend a full range of financial products. This led to public contestation 
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between the organisation, financial commenters, advocacy organisations, state departments 
and even investment banks with interests in Net1. The outcome of this contestation led the state 
to restrict financialisation of the grants, which was then reversed by the constitutional court. 
The subsequent second stage of the SASSA grant card, beginning in 2018, appears to have 
restricted the ability of the card to access financial services (News24 2018). Financialisation in 
this case was not linear and uniform. In Australia, the CDC restricted the ability of users to 
access financial services, and in some early instances interfered with payments such as 
mortgages or utilities while also contesting the ‘inappropriate’ presence of loan adverts and 
marketing in the trial sites. With one hand the state restricts financialisation to a vulnerable 
group, in order to exercise disciplinary social policy. Yet with the other hand it offers no 
income, cashless loans to encourage financial participation, seeking to encourage the ‘right’ 
sort of indebtedness. The thesis then contributes to the study of financialisation, as a dimension 
of neoliberalisation, by demonstrating an example of its messy and variegated nature, as well 
as the variety of actors who contest it.  
 
3. Limitations and new avenues for research 
Although the thesis has made a number of valuable contributions, it does have limitations and 
absences that must be acknowledged. These limitations expose new ways to research CWP, 
while the final section will address new empirical areas in studies of money and IPE. 
Reconnecting with the methodological issues discussed in the Introduction the thesis has two 
limitations this section will draw out. Although the choice was made to focus on the everyday, 
capitalism and the importance of finance, this is not the only interesting and relevant 
perspective that these cases offer. A more gendered or raced study would have drawn out a 
number of other valuable insights and conclusions.  
A more gender sensitive study could have looked at the ways that CWP have differing effects 
on men and women as a result of gender relations. One potential avenue could be the ways that 
women are disproportionately affected by restructuring of welfare payments (as they are 
disproportionately recipients) and how this interferes with their gendered reproductive and care 
roles (Orloff 1996). In South Africa, for instance, further research could investigate the 
financial mediation of social reproductive expenditures on utilities or groceries and the 
financial relations and structural linkages this creates (Roberts 2014: 113). It potentially could 
have exposed the absence of gender sensitivity of policymakers in the restructuring 
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programme, neglecting the variety of care responsibilities women in both settings have. 
Alternatively, a gender approach could consider domestic family power relations and the 
effects that neoliberal restructuring may cause with a change in mode of welfare payment. It is 
probable that the directing of cashless, PIN or biometrically protected money would affect the 
power dynamics within families. For instance, recent research has suggested that the SASSA 
card improved women’s decision-making power in the household, leading to labour force 
participation (Biljon et al. 2018). Alternatively, the loss of independence and autonomy 
stemming from the restrictions of the Australian CDC might have had effects on masculinity. 
However, whilst this was an angle of enquiry at the beginning of the research, my positionality 
in the research meant that accessing the right people, building that relationship and asking those 
questions was not feasible. For example, in Australia one white female community member 
who was not receiving a card informed me that it had taken her “ten years” to build a 
relationship with the local Aboriginal women (Interview 7, 2017). This does nevertheless 
expose a potentially new area of research for a more appropriate researcher.  
A second area that is somewhat neglected in the thesis is a post-colonial raced approach, which, 
given the case selection of South Africa and Australia, would be especially apt. At the outset 
of the research a raced angle was expected, but predominantly in the everyday aspect of how 
local social relations of race are affected by welfare restructuring, and how the discourses and 
policies were affected by racial discourses. Upon reflection at the end of the thesis it is possible 
to consider a more comprehensive, post-colonial approach to the CWP in both cases. A post-
colonial lens would have been beneficial especially in understanding the ways that historical 
representations and modes of governance of different marginalised and raced groups have 
parallels and reappear in these contemporary forms of CWP. In South Africa this is most clear 
in the use of biometric data, but also in the use of social grants to suppress revolt against 
structural oppression, whilst building political support for the ANC (Ndletyana 2016). Whereas 
in Australia this is seen in the control of Aboriginal people’s money and the state’s distrust of 
their ability to spend it appropriately. A historical study, akin to that of Zelizer (1994), of modes 
of payment could potentially trace the ways that representations of these social groups are 
connected to the modes of payment used to make welfare payments. This would have been 
especially beneficial as the colonial echoes within both schemes are rarely commented on and 
would offer a valuable corrective.237  
                                               
237 In Australia it is sometimes referred to, most clearly by Bielefeld’s (2016b) work and some news media (Davey 
2017) 
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A post-colonial perspective could also demonstrate and unpack the unusual ways that race is 
present in both cases. One way to think about this would be to connect this work to 
contemporary literature in IPE on ‘raced markets’. Tilley and Shilliam (2018: 535-53-9) argue 
that despite the neglect of race in studies of political economy and neoliberalism, it has been, 
and continues to be, a fundamental organising structure, such that capitalist social relations are 
class and race relations. Accordingly, they suggest three scholarly foci of research on 
neoliberalism and race. One particularly relevant to CWP is the ways that neoliberal ideologies 
and policies have created ‘colour-blindness’ and reduced race to individual acts of racism, 
while “structural racialised inequalities in life chances are explained by behavioural deficits” 
(Tilley and Shilliam 2018: 538). Thus, neoliberalism disguises and obfuscates the central role 
of race in contemporary societies.  
This speaks to the ways that race appears in both cases. In South Africa, race is barely, if at all, 
discussed or considered in public discourses.238 This is despite the fact that those who are 
affected by ‘deductions’ are those who use the SASSA card, which is a fundamentally raced 
group. Those who use the SASSA card, rather than their own account, are disproportionately 
the black and coloured populations, and therefore the associated financial exploitation is 
significantly raced. Yet it is not conceptualised as a raced policy or discussed in such a way by 
any participant, and so the importance of race in structuring distribution and inequality in South 
Africa is overlooked and normalised. It also offers a contemporary example of economic 
accumulation by a large South African finance firm by exploiting poor people of colour, a 
further echo of apartheid (see, Fine and Rustomjee 1996: 20-21; Wolpe 1972). In Australia, 
CWP offer another example of the ways that raced neoliberalism seeks to overrule structural 
and historical racial disadvantage by instead attributing social problems to individual 
behavioural dysfunction.239 Politicians and policymakers went to great lengths to argue the 
policy was not racist or racially targeted because the trial sites also had a significant proportion 
of white people on welfare. This quickly collapses under scrutiny (Klein 2016) but proves a 
further example of the ways that policies seek to erase race. Indeed, the forms of resistance 
documented sought precisely to racialise the debate, with Aboriginal people opposed to the 
policy understanding and discussing the card through a racial lens.  
Taking a raced approach would also have allowed the opening up of alternatives to capitalist 
social relations, especially those that the state was aiming to restructure or erase. The everyday 
                                               
238 This is similar to White’s (2002) argument on race in development studies.  
239 An argument made by Altman and Hinkson (2010) in the context of the Northern Territories Intervention.  
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focus of the research exposed, only tentatively, some alternative ways to conceptualise social 
behaviour and relations. In South Africa for instance, the SASSA card mobilised discourses of 
dignity, which is also central to the national post-apartheid constitution. While the meaningful 
substance of dignity under the SASSA card was found to be lacking, it did prompt thinking 
about the possibility of more revolutionary change. An alternative way to conceptualise and 
mobilise dignity is through drawing influence from other revolutionary movements. Taking 
inspiration from the Zapatistas, ‘dignity’, for Holloway (1998) refers to the rejection of the 
way things are, to reject oppression, dehumanisation and alienation, and claim recognition of 
the presence and dignity of all people and marginalised groups. This encourages an 
understanding of social relations as not relations between ‘things’ (for example, money, 
commodities, the state), but relations between people, and social relations that are not capitalist 
and not power relations (Holloway 2002: 18).  
A more ethical critique could also be applied to the Australian case, where this study has 
exposed, but was unable to fully explore, the social relations and practices of Aboriginal 
communities that the CDC sought to remove. Although some note was made in the thesis to 
Aboriginal forms of social organising, such as demand sharing, differing family structures or 
money management, there are more possibilities in this field. Anthropological work has already 
extensively covered the variety of indigenous practices in Australia (Yengoyan 1979; Povinelli 
1993). Yet investigation from a political economy perspective could further expose the tensions 
with capitalist forms of social relations, or demonstrate spaces of non-capitalist organisation, 
exchange, and resistance to restructuring, of the destabilising sort envisaged by Gibson-
Graham (2006: ch.1).240 While the CDC imposed a form of moral economy on the rights and 
wrongs of economic behaviour, Aboriginal cultures offer alternative forms of economic 
organisation (Peterson and Taylor 2003). For example, McRae-Williams and Gerritsen (2010: 
8-9) demonstrate the conflict between traditional Aboriginal ways of social organising and 
work with capitalist forms, arguing that Aboriginal relations are founded on ‘relatedness’. It 
was “a potent psychological and emotional investment. It was about being-in-the-world with 
others, showing and feeling love, compassion, care and concern. It was about being human.” 
These relations are not forgotten on entering the workplace, but instead are the framework by 
which engagement with the workplace occurs. Aboriginal research on kin, relatedness and 
reciprocity are fundamental challenges to the individuality of capitalism (Peterson 1993), 
                                               
240 See Peck (2013: 256), for a good example of the interaction between Aboriginal society and global capitalism. 
Drawing on Polanyi he argues that the Pilbara region of Australia is ‘patchwork’ economy that encompasses 
different organisation principles and interactions.  
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which it seeks to overcome (Altman and Hinkson 2010: 189). The CWP is an instance of the 
conflict between these two approaches, and a raced perspective could foreground this and 
therefore be a useful new avenue for research.  
Finally, the research on CWP has opened up new empirical areas of research that should be 
pursued in future work. The first, simply, is further research on the types, contingencies and 
impacts of forms of CWP. Given their recent emergence, a number of schemes, which were 
briefly explored in Chapter Three, offer interesting new cases. Most prominent are the 
Canadian Welfare Card and the Thailand State Welfare Card as examples of CWP that are 
recent versions of Inclusive and Disciplinary CWP respectively. Further research could also 
interrogate and contribute to the two ideal types that were developed to verify its use, or 
discover if the typology is valid. Future research, could also extend into new, alternative forms 
of cashless money, such as new blockchain currencies as described in the introduction, or the 
increasing prominence of types of mobile payment and the controls it enables.241 The research 
also can provide a starting point for cashless payments in other spaces, particularly in 
humanitarian disasters or refugee camps where Mastercard and the World Food Programme 
have been especially prominent. It would be of considerable value to explore the differing 
politics and meanings of payments in these situations compared to stable welfare systems.  
A complementary new area of IPE research on a similar theme would be to research the policy 
transfer of cashless and CWP. Peck (2001) and Peck and Theodore (2015) have already 
demonstrated some examples of the ways that policy ideas move and mutate across different 
settings with the examples of conditional and unconditional cash transfers and participatory 
budgeting. They argue that contemporary social policy under neoliberalism is increasingly 
interconnected, and more importantly, accelerated. Policies are repackaged from one context 
and introduced elsewhere, but also face ‘frictions’ in the everyday delivery of policies (Peck 
and Theodore 2015: xvii). An interesting avenue of research therefore would be how ideas 
about cashless welfare are spread across contexts. As an indication, in the Forrest report, which 
was particularly important for the Australian CDC, the South African SASSA card is 
mentioned as an influence (Forrest 2014: 104). Alternatively, some policy documents refer to 
the negative consequences seen in other settings, such as the stigma experienced by people 
through USA food stamps as a reason to avoid cashless payment (Wood and Salter 2013: 26). 
Further, the interactions and relations between international policymakers and advocates was 
                                               
241 As suggested by one interview participant from the mobile payments industry (Interview 12, South Africa 
2017). 
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an area touched on in the thesis but warrants further investigation, especially into how some of 
the more questionable claims about cashless are spread.  
More broadly, the thesis has demonstrated the value of two areas analysis that can continue to 
be pursued by scholars in the field of IPE. Firstly, cashless is a diverse form of payments that 
is growing around the world, and so far, has had limited critical attention. This does not have 
to be solely welfare related. From new financial technologies, to cashless giving to homeless 
people (Millard 2018), money’s form is changing and diversifying and spreading into different 
parts of social life. However, as this thesis has shown, the shift is not apolitical and is driven 
by powerful interests seeking new ways to exercise power in the pursuit of governance and 
accumulation. This reflects the importance of seeing money’s duality, as relational as well as 
a form of value, and therefore of grounding studies of money and finance in its meanings, 
practices experiences and uses.  
Accordingly, and finally, the thesis has made a consistent case for the value of an everyday 
approach to questions in IPE. The everyday encourages questions that are based on people’s 
experiences, which is crucial for a critical approach. The understanding of the lives and 
struggles of people subject to potentially oppressive or exploitative restructuring can strengthen 
IPE critique and complement its theories. Core areas of IPE such as trade, finance, global 
governance or development would all benefit from an everyday approach, both of the people 
involved and those affected. Although here Lefebvre’s approach has been used, there is a 
growing literature on the everyday in IPE and importantly from other disciplines that deepen, 
nuance and complicate an understanding of the world. Pursuing an everyday approach would 
be of great value in discovering the extraordinary, in the ordinary.
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Case Studies 
 
 
  
Case Study 1: “Now I can’t afford groceries” (Maregele 2014).  
Sassa beneficiary Esme Pamplin, 65, of Heideveld says she did not approve the 
deductions for airtime, loans and other goods. In February, Pamplin first noticed that 
more than R100 had been deducted from her account for electricity and airtime. The 
deductions have not only forced Pamplin's family to cut back on essential goods, but 
have also had a negative impact on her well-being. Pamplin's case will soon be 
included on a list compiled by Black Sash for their country-wide campaign to stop 
illegal debt deductions from the bank accounts of Sassa beneficiaries. Pamplin lives 
in Heideveld, a community where unemployment is high. 
Seated in the front room of her two-bedroomed council flat, Pamplin clasps several 
papers. These are her payment receipts for the past four months. As an old age 
pension beneficiary, Pamplin receives R1,350 a month. Pamplin said her grant was 
the only stable income for her family of seven which included her husband, two 
children, two grandchildren and a great grandchild. 
"I pay R70 for rent relief. I can only afford to buy between R10 and R30 electricity 
as we needed it, but I could never afford to buy more than that. The most important 
things I buy are maize meal, rice, some vegetables and R200 worth of meat for the 
month," she said. "In February I started noticing the deductions, R50 for electricity 
and R99 for airtime. Since then, I've changed my Sassa card twice. I called the 
helpline and office numbers, but could never get through. When I got through they 
said I should contact CPS. I got so angry because no one was helping me and the 
money was still being deducted," she said. CPS is the company that administers 
social grants. 
Pamplin said she went to Sassa offices in the city centre where an official promised 
to reimburse her for the deductions. "I explained to them that I don't even have a 
cellphone. All my telephone calls go to my neighbour's phone. I also told them it 
couldn't be my children buying the airtime because I hide my ID and (Sassa) card 
away from them. The person that helped me, told me they would refund me in June," 
she said. Pamplin became tearful as she explained how her family has struggled in 
the past four months. "It's a lot of money being taken from my account. Now, I can't 
afford to buy most of the groceries I did before. I just hope they keep this promise 
and stop it from happening again. I haven't paid my accounts for the past two months. 
If they [Sassa] refund me, I can make ends meet again," she said. 
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List of interviewees  
  Description  
South 
Africa 
Interview 1 SASSA card user, Cape Town 
Interview 2 SASSA card user, Cape Town 
Interview 3 SASSA card user, Cape Town 
Interview 4 Finance worker 
Interview 5 State official  
Interview 6 State official  
Interview 7 SASSA card user, Cape Town 
Interview 8 SASSA card user, Cape Town 
Interview 9 SASSA card user, Cape Town 
Interview 10 SASSA card user, Cape Town 
Interview 11 SASSA card user, Cape Town 
Interview 12 Finance worker 
Interview 13 SASSA card user, Cape Town 
Interview 14 SASSA card user, Cape Town 
Interview 15 SASSA card user, Cape Town 
Interview 16 SASSA card user, Cape Town 
Interview 17 SASSA card user, Cape Town    
   
 Australia 
Interview 18 Activist, Adelaide 
Interview 19 Local community member (card user) 
Interview 20 State politician 
Interview 21 Local community member (card user) 
Interview 22 Alan Suter 
Interview 23 Local community member 
Interview 24 Local community member 
Interview 25 Local community member 
Interview 26 Local community member (card user) 
Interview 27 State official (local) 
Interview 28 Local community member (card user) 
Interview 29 Local community member (card user) 
Interview 30 State official (state) 
Interview 31 State official (state) 
Interview 32 Local community member (card user) 
Interview 33 Federal politician  
Interview 34 State official (federal) 
Interview 35 State official (federal) 
Interview 36 State official (federal) 
Interview 37 Federal politician  
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Interview 38 Alan Tudge 
Interview 39 Local community member (card user) 
Interview 40 Federal politician  
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